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Introduction: Lying about the Holocaust
Holocaust denial is a postwar phenomenon at whose core lies the rejection of the 
historical fact that six million Jews were murdered by the Nazis during World War 
II. Alongside explicit repudiation of the Holocaust, denial includes the minimiza-
tion, banalization, and relativization of the relevant facts and events, so as to cast 
doubt on the uniqueness or authenticity of what happened during the Shoah.¹ 
These softer variants of Holocaust denial are designed to gain public accep-
tance for its viewpoint as the “other side” of a legitimate debate. According to 
the hardline deniers or “revisionists” (as they misleadingly describe themselves), 
the extermination of the Jews never actually took place: the German authorities 
never planned to kill the Jews of Europe, and they never built or operated any 
death camps in which Jews were gassed. Most revisionist accounts rarely put 
Jewish losses between 1939 and 1945 above 300,000 persons, and these deaths 
are usually blamed on wartime deprivations, hardship, and disease.
According to the deniers, the Nazi concept of a “Final Solution” always meant 
only the emigration of the Jews, not their annihilation. The Jews “missing” from 
Europe after 1945 are assumed to have resurfaced in the United States (as illegal 
immigrants), in Israel, or elsewhere. The massive documentation on the Holo-
caust—including official papers of the Third Reich, statements by Nazi criminals, 
eyewitness accounts by Jewish survivors, diaries, memoirs, and the mountains of 
evidence from court trials—are invariably dismissed by deniers as unreliable and 
fantastic or as an outright lie.² For the deniers, no testimony by Jews is acceptable, 
because it was the Jews who invented the Holocaust “myth” in the first place, to 
serve their own financial and political ends. In the same way, all the volumes of 
1 For earlier overviews of the subject, see Gill Seidel, The Holocaust Denial (Leeds 1986); Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory. Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust (New York 1992); 
and Deborah E. Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory 
(Toronto 1993). A more recent study is Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: 
Who Says the Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It? (Berkeley, Calif. 2002). On 
French Holocaust denial, see Florent Brayard, Comment l’idée vint à M. Rassinier, Naissance du 
révisionnisme (Paris 1996); Nadine Fresco, Fabrication d’un antisémite (Paris 1999); and Valérie 
Igounet, Histoire du négationnisme en France (Paris 2000).
2 For typical examples of this literature, see Paul Rassinier, Le drame des Juifs Européens (Paris 
1964); Thies Christopherson, Die Auschwitz Lüge (Mohrkirch 1973); Richard Harwood [pseud. of 
Richard Verrall], Did Six Million Really Die? The Truth at Last (Ladbroke 1974); and Arthur Butz, 
The Hoax of the Twentieth Century (Torrance, Calif. 1976). The last two works were published by 
the Historical Review Press in the United Kingdom.
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documentation assembled by the Allies at the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal in 
1946 are rejected: they are seen as part of a vengeful act of injustice by the victors, 
who stand accused by the deniers of having mistreated the Germans.³
According to the godfather of American “revisionist” historians, Harry Elmer 
Barnes, what Germans suffered at Allied hands—bombing of civilians in German 
cities, starvation, invasion, and the mass expulsions of ethnic Germans from 
Eastern Europe after 1945—was far “more brutal and painful than the alleged 
exterminations in the gas chambers.”⁴ As for postwar Nazi testimony, the deniers 
allege that German defendants had no choice after 1945 but to confess guilt to 
false charges in the hope of receiving clemency. Confessions such as those of 
the Auschwitz commandant, Rudolf Höss, are routinely regarded by Holocaust 
deniers as having been extracted through the use of torture and humiliation.
The mendacious propaganda of the Holocaust deniers relies on a number of 
standard techniques. They like to focus relentlessly on any discrepancies in the 
testimonies of witnesses, contradictions in documents or disagreements among 
scholars, in order to undermine the credibility of what they call the Holocaust 
“story.” They make much play of the fact that no explicit order from Hitler for a 
mass murder of the Jews has been found; that the Wannsee Conference of January 
1942 did not refer to gassings in the present or future; or that Allied aerial recon-
naissance of Auschwitz did not indicate gas chambers or crematoria with con-
stantly burning chimneys. The deniers also cynically exploit the ambiguity of 
Nazi euphemisms like Sonderbehandlung (special treatment) for the gassing of 
Jews to suggest that this term actually mean “privileged” treatment. They provide 
similarly fake interpretations for the forced “evacuation” of Jews to the East.⁵
The “revisionists” usually explain away the large number of crematoria in 
the death camps by claiming that these were a means of dealing rapidly with 
3 See Maurice Bardèche, Nuremberg ou la Terre promise (Paris 1948); Paul Rassinier, Le 
Mensonge d’Ulysse (Paris 1950); Richard Harwood [pseud. of Richard Verrall], Nuremberg and 
Other War Crimes (Ladbroke 1978); Austin J. App, The Holocaust Put in Historical Perspective,” 
Journal of Historical Review (henceforth HJR) (Spring 1980).
4 Harry Elmer Barnes, Blasting the Historical Blackout (Torrance, Calif.: Liberty Bell 
Publications, 1976) and idem, Barnes against the Blackout: Essays against Interventionism 
(Torrance, Calif. 1991), both published by the Institute for Historical Review. On the American 
“revisionist” school, see Lucy. S. Dawidowicz, “Lies about the Holocaust,” Commentary 70, 
no. 6 (Dec. 1980): 31–37; it also appears in idem, What is the Use of Jewish History? (New York 
1992), 84–100.
5 See ADL, “‘Holocaust Revisionism’: A Denial of History,” Facts 26, no. 2 (June 1980); and 
Roger Eatwell, “The Holocaust Denial: A Study in Propaganda Technique,” in Neo-Fascism in 
Europe, edited by Luciano Chales et al. (London 1991), 120–43; see also Danny Ben-Moshe, 
“Holocaust Denial in Australia” in this volume.
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the growing number of victims of typhus and other epidemics toward the end 
of the war. At the same time, they like to suggest that most photographs of the 
Holocaust showing the liberation of the camps are nothing but fakes or else have 
been presented in a distorted way to exaggerate German barbarity. In any case, 
the Allies themselves were to blame. Through their ruthless bombing, they had 
created the total breakdown in the supply of food and medicine that produced the 
epidemics and the emaciated victims, whose condition so shocked the eyes of a 
disbelieving world in 1945. Moreover, by juggling world Jewish population figures 
before and after World War II, the deniers generally maintain that Jewish losses 
in the camps remained in the hundreds of thousands rather than in the millions.⁶ 
All these arguments and many other lies can be found in The Six Million Swindle: 
Blackmailing the German People for Hard Marks with Fabricated Corpses (1973) by 
Austin J. App, formerly a professor of English at La Salle College in Philadelphia. 
App, whose antisemitism was quite explicit, blamed Communists as well as Israel 
and world Jewry for inventing the myth of the gas chambers to divert attention 
from their own crimes.
Holocaust “revisionists” have for some time focused special attention on the 
gas chambers. The French revisionist and literary critic, Robert Faurisson, extrap-
olating from American gas chamber executions of single prisoners and evidence 
about the commercial use of Zyklon B as a disinfectant, deduced to his own sat-
isfaction that mass gassings were impossible in Auschwitz.⁷ This assertion was 
then “tested” by Fred Leuchter, an unlicensed American engineer financed by 
the revisionists, who took forensic samples in Auschwitz-Birkenau and Majdanek 
and could find no significant traces of hydrocyanic acid (the toxin in Zyklon B).⁸ 
Leuchter’s evidence was dismissed at the 1988 trial in Toronto of Ernst Zündel, a 
German-Canadian neo-Nazi and “revisionist.” Leuchter’s complete lack of exper-
tise and credibility was summarily exposed.⁹ This did not stop the British his-
6 For examples of “revisionist” juggling with figures, see Harwood, Did Six Million Really 
Die?, 6–7; and the English language compilation of Rassinier’s work, Debunking the Genocide 
Myth (Torrance, Calif. 1978). For an analysis, see Georges Wellers, La Solution Finale et la 
Mythomanie Néo-Nazie: L’existence des Chambres à Gaz, Le Nombre des Victimes (Paris 
1979); also Wolfgang Benz, ed. Dimension des Völkermords. Die Zahl der jüdischen Opfer des 
Nationalsozialismus (Munich 1991).
7 Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory, 61–62.
8 For information about Leuchter, see ADL, Hitler’s Apologists: The Anti-Semitic Propaganda of 
Holocaust “Revisionism.” (New York 1993), 8–10; Michael Schmidt, The New Reich. Penetrating 
the Secrets of Today’s Neo-Nazi Networks (London 1993), 198–99.
9 Shermer and Grobman, Denying History, 45–46, 64–67, 129–30; see also Alain 
Goldschläger, “The Trials of Ernst Zündel” in this volume.
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torian and Holocaust denier, David Irving, from publishing the Leuchter Report 
in 1989, declaring that it was “the end of the line” for the Auschwitz “myth.”¹⁰ 
Leuchter’s claims would be decisively refuted by Jean-Claude Pressac in his Aus-
chwitz: Technique and Operation of the Gas Chambers (1990), but this has not 
prevented his lies from taking on a life of their own in “revisionist” circles.
Among present-day Holocaust deniers, apart from Irving, there are very few 
historians. As far back as 1977, in his best-selling Hitler’s War, Irving groundlessly 
asserted that the mass murder of Jews had been carried on behind Hitler’s back. 
In his published work, he has been a consistent apologist for the Nazis and a 
denigrator of Winston Churchill and Allied leaders. For many years, he main-
tained a close connection with the Deutsche Volksunion (DVU), an extreme Right 
grouping in Germany that consistently deplored Nazi war crimes trials and made 
no bones about its sympathy with the Hitler regime. As a result of the Zündel 
trial in May 1988, Irving embraced fully-fledged Holocaust denial. In May 1992, he 
was fined by a Munich court for claiming that the Auschwitz gas chambers were 
“fakes” built after the war to attract tourists to Poland. Banned from a growing list 
of countries, he still remains the most publicized personality involved in Holo-
caust denial in England, with a small but enthusiastic following in Canada, Aus-
tralia, Germany and the United States.¹¹
However, in the spring of 2000 in the High Court of London, Irving brought 
a libel suit against the American historian Deborah Lipstadt and her British pub-
lisher, Penguin Books, for having alleged that he was “one of the most danger-
ous spokespersons for Holocaust denial.” Irving lost his case, and the verdict 
undoubtedly dealt a serious blow to Holocaust denial in Western Europe, though 
by no means a decisive knockout. Already in his brief opening statement, Richard 
Rampton QC, representing Deborah Lipstadt, declared that Irving was “not an 
historian at all, but a falsifier of history. To put it bluntly, he is a liar.” The British 
judge, Charles Gray, in his 350-page verdict, was no less unequivocal. Not only did 
he determine that Irving qualified “as a Holocaust denier,” but he also character-
ized him as a “right-wing pro-Nazi polemicist,” content to mix with neo-fascists 
and sharing “many of their racist and anti-semitic prejudices.”¹² In 2006, Irving 
10 David Irving, Foreword, The Leuchter Report (London: Focal Point, 1989). At the 1989 con-
ference of the Institute for Historical Review in California, Irving characterized Leuchter as “the 
best-qualified specialist on gas chambers.” See ADL Fact-Finding Report (New York 1989), 9. 
Shermer and Grobman, Denying History, 129–33.
11 On Irving’s neo-Nazi connections and popularity in far Right circles in Germany, see 
Schmidt, The New Reich, 195–99.
12 Richard J. Evans, Lying about Hitler. History, Holocaust, and the David Irving Trial (New York 
2002); for Judge Gray’s verdict on the case, see ibid., 225–43.
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was tried and sentenced to jail for three years in Austria, for negationist remarks 
he had made on a visit there seventeen years earlier. In Austria, as in Germany, 
Switzerland, France, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and a number of other European 
countries, denying the Holocaust is a crime. Nor is Irving the only denier to have 
been prosecuted. In the United States, however, denial is not liable to prosecu-
tion, despite its malicious falsehoods.
Holocaust denial in the United States began with Harry Elmer Barnes, a pas-
sionate opponent of America’s entry into World War I and its involvement in the 
war against Nazi Germany. Toward the end of his life, Barnes became literally 
obsessed with what he termed the “historical blackout”—a conspiracy against 
publishing his “isolationist” views. By the mid-1960s, he was also denying that 
Nazi Germany had committed mass murder.¹³ It was Barnes who encouraged a 
former Harvard student, David Hoggan, to go to a neo-Nazi publishing house 
with his Der erzwungene Krieg (The forced war, 1961)—the core of his dissertation 
about the origins of World War II, which presented the British as warmongers, the 
Poles as provocateurs, and Hitler as an angel of peace. Hoggan’s book was warmly 
received by the German radical Right. Eight years later he brought out a booklet, 
The Myth of the Six Million (1969), which attacked all the existing eyewitness tes-
timony about the murder of European Jewry while distorting, suppressing, and 
inventing sources in the classic revisionist manner. It was published by Noontide 
Press, a subsidiary of Liberty Lobby (headed by Willis Carto), the best-organized 
and wealthiest antisemitic organization in the United States.
Carto, a racist and white supremacist, had for decades promoted the idea that 
international Jewish bankers were at the heart of a conspiracy that threatened the 
“racial heritage” of the white Western world. Like many other Holocaust deniers, 
he believed that the Western Allies in World War II fought against the wrong 
enemy in Nazi Germany.¹⁴ Instead, they should have allied with Hitler against 
communism. In 1966, Carto took control of the American Mercury, an antisemitic 
monthly that almost immediately began to feature major articles on Holocaust 
denial. The theme was also given considerable prominence in the Liberty Lobby 
newspaper, The Spotlight, which could claim at its peak a circulation of around 
300,000 copies. Carto was indeed the eminence grise of Holocaust denial in the 
United States. In 1979 he created the Institute of Historical Review and its annual 
Journal of Historical Review (which began publication in 1980 in Torrance, Cal-
ifornia). The journal succeeded in giving “revisionism” a deceptively scholarly 
13 Dawidowicz, What is the Use of Jewish History?, 87–90.
14 On Carto’s background and beliefs, see Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust; for a sample of his 
style, Willis A. Carto, “On the Uses of History,” JHR 3, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 26–30.
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format, learned footnotes, and involvement in organizing “revisionist” interna-
tional conventions. It heralded the sinister determination of Holocaust deniers in 
the 1980s to win academic legitimacy.
The most significant example of new-style “critical” and “scientific” Holo-
caust revisionism appeared over thirty-five years ago in The Hoax of the Twenti-
eth Century (1976) by Arthur Butz, a professor of electrical engineering and com-
puter science at Northwestern University in Evanston, Illinois. Butz adopted a 
pseudo-scientific tone, claiming that so-called “exterminationists” (by which he 
meant historians who believe in the death camps) had either misinterpreted or 
deliberately distorted the evidence. In his view, there had never been any exter-
minations at Auschwitz, which he described as a huge industrial plant and a 
“highly productive” work camp. The chemical Zyklon B had been nothing but 
insecticide for disinfecting worker’s clothing; the gas chambers were in fact 
baths, saunas, and mortuaries; the stench from the camp was due to hydrogena-
tion and other chemical processes, not to the burning of dead bodies.¹⁵ For the 
past three decades, similar falsehoods have been parroted by Holocaust deniers 
around the world.
Butz blamed the Holocaust “hoax” on three main sources: Allied propaganda 
designed to justify the high economic and human costs of war; Zionist machi-
nations, which had successfully manipulated the Allied powers, especially the 
United States; and Communist self-interest in magnifying Nazi atrocities. But it 
was above all the Jewish and Zionist role in this world conspiracy that was central 
to Butz and his followers. The Holocaust was vital to Zionists in order to gener-
ate the popular sympathy necessary for creating the State of Israel.¹⁶ Like most 
deniers, Butz also believed that the emotional grip of the “Holocaust myth” on 
the world enabled Israel to blackmail a prostate postwar Germany for reparations 
and to extract enormous political dividends from a guilt-ridden America. More-
over, the Holocaust, by becoming a new “canon of faith in the Jewish religion,” 
had strengthened the ties of the international Jewish community and made it 
more powerful than ever. Butz—himself a consummate falsifier of history—saw 
his task as debunking this “universe of lies” constructed by occult Zionist forces. 
The unemotional tone of his book, with its seemingly meticulous investigation 
15 See Eatwell, “The Holocaust Denial,” 120 ff; and Peter I. Haupt, “A Universe of Lies: 
Holocaust Revisionism and the Myth of Jewish World Conspiracy,” Patterns of Prejudice 25, no 1 
(Summer 1991); for information about Butz, see Facts 26, no 2 (June 1980): 7–8.
16 For the connection between anti-Zionist antisemitism and Holocaust denial, Alain 
Finkielkraut, L’Avenir d’une négation. Réflexions sur la question du génocide (Paris 1982), 135 ff.
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of the facts, provided a convenient mask for its underlying belief in a secret and 
sinister Jewish conspiracy controlling international events.
In Great Britain, a role analogous to that of Butz’s work was played by the 
1974 booklet, Did Six Million Die? The Truth at Last by Richard Harwood (the 
pseudonym of Richard Verrall, editor of the British National Front journal, Spear-
head). Harwood borrowed heavily from Hoggan’s Myth of the Six Million and from 
Frenchman Paul Rassinier, one of the founders of the so-called “revisionist” 
school in Europe. Typically, he rationalized Nazi antisemitism, describing it as a 
legitimate response to attacks by “international Jewry.” He pretended that Hitler 
only wanted to transfer all Jews to Madagascar. Like other deniers, he also con-
cocted the fabrication that population figures after the war proved Jewish losses 
to have been minimal. The diary of Anne Frank, as in all the denial literature, was 
naturally dismissed as a hoax.¹⁷
The political significance of Harwood’s pamphlet lay more in its comments 
on race problems in Britain than in its ludicrous scholarly pretensions. The 
author maintained that Anglo-Saxons could not speak out openly about the need 
for racial self-preservation because the Holocaust “lie” had placed the subject 
beyond the pale. Britain and other European countries faced the gravest danger 
from the presence of “alien races” in their midst (Africans, Asians, and Arabs, 
as well as Jews), which was leading to the destruction of their culture and of 
their national heritage. The Jews had allegedly poured millions into supporting 
“race-mixing,” in the hope of securing their global domination by weakening 
nationalist identities throughout the world. Self-defense against this “Jewish” 
peril had been sapped by the Holocaust, which had given Nazism and other 
forms of self-assertive racial nationalism a bad name. If the mass annihilation 
of the Jewish people could be deconstructed as a myth, then movements like the 
National Front in Great Britain could once again become feasible options.¹⁸ This 
mania for rehabilitation has clearly been a major consideration in the widespread 
17 Harwood, Did Six Million Really Die?, 19; Butz, Hoax of the Twentieth Century, 37. The assault 
on the authenticity of the Anne Frank diary is an obsession with many Holocaust deniers. The 
Swedish antisemite and negationist, Dietlieb Felderer in 1978 in his own Bible Researcher 
Press published an attack on the diary; it was republished by the Institute of Historical Review 
under the title, Anne Frank’s Diary—A Hoax. The French “revisionist” Robert Faurisson two years 
later published Le Journal d’Anne Frank est-it authentique? (Paris 1980). See David Barnouw 
and Gerrold ven der Stroom, eds., The Diary of Anne Frank. The Critical Edition (New York 1989), 
84–101, which deals with the Holocaust deniers and others who have raised doubts about the 
diaries, by providing exhaustive and detailed documentation of all editions.
18 For the British far Right background, see Gill Seidel, The Holocaust Denial; and on the 
ideological continuities between old and new fascists, see Michael Billig, “The Extreme Right: 
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adoption of Holocaust denial by extreme Right groups worldwide during the past 
four decades.
It was, however, in France that Holocaust “revisionism” put down its firmest 
roots and attained for awhile a modest degree of academic respectability. Already 
in 1948, the prominent French fascist, Maurice Bardèche had published his 
Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise (Nuremberg or the Promised Land), which bluntly 
insisted that World Jewry and the Allies had instigated World War II; they had 
shamelessly falsified facts at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, and invented the 
fiction of the gas chambers.¹⁹ But it was a former socialist, Paul Rassinier, himself 
a prisoner at Buchenwald and other concentration camps, who first gave “revi-
sionism” a certain plausibility for true believers.²⁰ Rassinier was partly motivated 
by a bitter hatred of communism, which gradually drove him toward developing 
an apologia for Nazism. Initially, he did not deny the Holocaust, though he dis-
missed all survivor testimony about death camps as grossly exaggerated. After 
1950, Rassinier began to attack Jewish historians and scholars as “falsifiers” and 
to bitterly denounce Israel and world Jewry for hugely magnifying the death toll 
to increase their “ill-gotten gains.”²¹
By the early 1960s, Rassinier was adamant that the “genocide myth” had 
been invented by the “Zionist establishment.” At the same time, in his writings 
he transformed the Nazis from perpetrators into benefactors, insisting that there 
was no official German policy of extermination. He even managed to praise the 
“humane” behavior of the SS. Already in 1955, Rassinier’s book, Le mensonge 
d’Ulysse (Ulysses’s lie), with a preface by Albert Paraz (a neo-fascist friend of the 
fanatically antisemitic French writer Céline), had been published by an extreme 
Right firm. So were his books on the trial of Adolf Eichmann and Le Drame des 
Juifs Européens (The drama of European Jews, 1964), which categorically denied 
the existence of the gas chambers. By the mid-1960s, Rassinier had become 
closely identified with the French far Right. In 1964, he lost a libel case against 
Continuities in anti-Semitic Conspiracy in post-war Europe,” in The Nature of the Right, edited 
by R. Eatwell and N. O’Sullivan (London 1989).
19 Bardèche was the brother-in-law of the French literary fascist Robert Brasillach (hanged for 
collaboration in 1945), and edited the neo-fascist journal Défense de L’Occident. A number of 
his books and articles in the early postwar period anticipated “revisionist” theses. See Pierre 
Vidal-Naquet and Limor Yagil, Holocaust Denial in France. A Unique Phenomenon (Tel Aviv: Tel 
Aviv University, Project for the Study of Anti-Semitism, 1995), 27–31.
20  For Rassinier, see Vidal-Naquet and Yagil, Holocaust Denial, 31–35; and Finkielkraut, 
L’Avenir d’une négation, 118–31.
21 Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory, 31–38 for an analysis of Rassinier’s bizarre 
calculations.
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Bernard Lecache (head of the International League against Antisemitism [LICA]), 
who had publicly accused him of making common cause with neo-Nazis in his 
revisionist writings.
Rassinier’s most influential successor in France durig the following decade 
was Robert Faurisson, formerly a professor of literature at the University of Lyon, 
and a critic who claimed to be entirely apolitical while in practice whitewashing 
the Germans and constantly invoking the enormous power of the Jews. In 1978, 
Faurisson published his first major article denying the existence of gas chambers. 
That same year, Darquier de Pellepoix (former commissioner for Jewish questions 
in the Vichy government) created a scandal in France with his notorious remark, 
“Only lice were gassed in Auschwitz.”²² Two years later, on December 17, 1980, 
Faurisson declared on French radio:
The claim of the existence of gas chambers and the genocide of Jews by Hitler constitutes 
one and the same historical lie, which opened the way to a gigantic political and financial 
fraud of which the principal beneficiaries are the state of Israel and international Zionism, 
and the principal victims the Germans and the entire Palestinian people.²³
In 1981, Faurisson published his Mémoire en défense contre ceux qui m’accusent 
de falsifier l’histoire: la question des chambres de gaz, with a preface by the 
American Jewish scholar, virulent anti-Zionist and left-wing libertarian, Noam 
Chomsky. Although Chomsky claimed that he had not read Faurisson’s work, he 
publicly deplored efforts to silence Faurisson, saying that he was the target of “a 
vicious campaign of harassment, intimidation, slander,” and strongly supported 
his right to free speech. Chomsky absurdly referred to Faurisson as a liberal and 
praised his associate Serge Thion (a prolific left-wing Holocaust denier) as a “lib-
ertarian socialist scholar.” Amazingly, Chomsky even wrote that he could see “no 
hint of antisemitic implications in Faurisson’s work” or in denial of the Holo-
caust as such.²⁴ Nor did Chomsky, himself a savage critic of the United States and 
22 On the background to the scandal, see Henry H. Weinberg, The Myth of the Jew in France, 
1967–1982 (New York 1987), 59–64; see also the book’s introduction by Robert S. Wistrich.
23 C. Columbani, “Des universitaires s’affrontent sur le cas Faurisson,” Le Monde, 30 June 
1981; Nadine Fresco, “Les Redresseurs de Morts,” Temps Modernes (June 1980); Vidal-Naquet 
and Yagil, Denial, 49–60.
24 On Faurisson and Chomsky, Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory, 65–73 (first published 
in 1981); and the booklet by Werner Cohn, The Hidden Alliances of Noam Chomsky (New York 
1988), 11–12. The Holocaust deniers of the Institute for Historical Review approvingly published 
Noam Chomsky’s article, “All Denials of Free Speech Undercut a Democratic Society,” in its 
house organ, the JHR 7, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 123–27.
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Zionism for decades, find anything antisemitic in the claim that the Holocaust “is 
being exploited, viciously so, by apologists for Israeli repression and violence.”
Faurisson’s writings were distributed in France by both the extreme Right, 
associated with the Parisian bookstore Ogmios, and the extreme Left publishing 
house La Vielle Taupe (The old mole) under the leadership of Pierre Guillaume.²⁵ 
Not surprisingly, Guillaume and Ogmios joined forces in 1987 to found a quar-
terly journal specializing in Holocaust denial, Annales d’Histoire Révisioniste. For 
the extreme Left, neither antisemitism nor identification with Nazi ideology or 
nostalgia for totalitarianism was the primary motivation for their assault on the 
“myth” of the gas chambers. They began from a dogmatic revolutionary position 
that Nazism was no worse than Western bourgeois capitalism and that both were 
equally guilty of crimes against the working class. By adopting the arguments 
of Rassinier and Faurisson, the revisionist far Left around Guillaume and Thion 
believed it could undermine the postwar anti-fascist consensus of the democratic 
world, based on the idea that Nazism and fascism were somehow unique evils.²⁶ 
If there were no gas chambers, they argued, then there was nothing unique about 
Nazi oppression. Eccentrics on the anarchist Left like Gabriel Cohn-Bendit even 
suggested that Soviet propaganda had concocted the “legend” of the gas cham-
bers to cover up Stalinist crimes and make the Gulag (the Soviet prison camp 
system) seem less oppressive. Stalin in their eyes was no better than Hitler—a 
position also widely shared on the far Right and among some German and Euro-
pean conservatives.
Faurisson’s attractiveness to the far Left and even to some liberals in France 
was increased by the court trials he underwent between 1979 and 1983, which in 
the eyes of civil libertarians made him into a victim of censorship and repression, 
not to mention a symbol of free speech. Like Butz in the United States, Fauris-
son claimed to be challenging the “religious dogma” of the Shoah in the name 
of “enlightened” visions of science, progress, and a dispassionate search for the 
truth. Holocaust “revisionism,” in a pathetic parody of the Dreyfusard struggle 
for “revision” a century earlier, assumed the mantle of martyrdom for dissident 
views, of a sect wrongly persecuted solely for its pursuit of truth and justice.²⁷ The 
25 See Pierre Guillaume, Droit et Histoire (Paris 1986); and Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory, 
ix–xxi.
26 See Serge Thion, Vérité Historique ou vérité politique (Paris 1980); Finkielkraut, L’avenir, 
135ff; Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory, 19, 24–25, 71–72.
27 The analogy and its bitter ironies are touched on in Jeffrey Mehlman’s perceptive 
introduction to Assassins of Memory, ix–xxi.
 Introduction: Lying about the Holocaust   11
ultimate lie was now masquerading under the banner of Emile Zola’s passionate 
war-cry of 1898 that “the truth was on the march.”
Another strategy adopted by “revisionists” of all colors is to emphasize that 
there have been several holocausts in history (the lower case is deliberate), and 
that the Jews cannot therefore claim a monopoly on suffering. The left-wing 
lawyer Jacques Vergès, who defended the Nazi criminal Klaus Barbie in France 
in the late 1980s, consistently compared French colonial oppression in Algeria 
with the Holocaust precisely in order to relativize and neutralize its uniqueness.²⁸ 
Although Vergès stopped short of denying that the Holocaust actually happened, 
there were others who used such relativist arguments as part of a more wide-rang-
ing effort to negate the Shoah. Thus Pierre Guillaume and his followers could find 
no difference between the Holocaust and American internment of Japanese-born 
U.S. citizens during World War II; between French official harassment of Spanish 
Republicans or anti-Nazis before 1939, and German concentration camps in 
wartime; or between what happened to millions of Russians, Poles, and Ukraini-
ans who were shot or died in German camps, and the fate of the Jews.
The infiltration of the universities by so-called “negationists”was particu-
larly striking in France. In 1985, Henri Rocques, who had been active in extreme 
Right movements for decades, received a doctorate in history with honors from 
the University of Nantes for a dissertation that challenged the existence of gas 
chambers at Bełżec, rejecting the eyewitness testimony of Kurt Gerstein on the 
subject.²⁹ The judges for his dissertation included some distinguished academi-
cians, who were mostly influenced by the ideas of the French New Right. Among 
Rocques’s sympathizers was Bernard Notin, a professor of economics at the Uni-
versity of Lyon, who, writing in 1989 in a prestigious journal, relied on Faurisson 
and Thion when calling into question the number of Jewish victims in World War 
II.³⁰ Not only in the academy could one find such syntheses of rightist or left-
wing extremism. Negationist publications like Révision in the late 1980s (though 
harassed by government legislation) were even more radical than their prede-
cessors in the 1970s, with roots in the anarchist Left as well as the New Right. 
Holocaust denial provided the link between conspiracy theories about Jews and 
28 Jacques Givet, Le Cas Vergès (Paris 1986); Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memo-ry, 129–36.
29 Henri Rocques, Les confessions de Kurt Gerstein: Étude Comparative des Différentes 
Versions (Ph.D. diss., University of Lyon, III, 1985). On the Rocques affair, see Henry H. 
Weinberg, “Revisionism: The Rocques Affair,” Midstream 33, no. 4 (April 1987): 11–13; and 
Vidal-Naquet and Yagil, Holocaust Denial in France, 61–64 for useful information about Rocques 
and the academicians at the University of Nantes who unanimously approved his dissertation.
30 See Henry Rousso,  Le dossier Lyon III. Le rapport sur le racisme et le négationnisme à 
L’université Jean-Moulin (Paris 2004), 134–71. On the Rocques affair, see ibid., 95–133.
12   Robert Solomon Wistrich
freemasons, anticommunism, and virulent anti-Zionism. It has indeed become 
one of the most attractive weapons for those determined to demonize Jews and 
defame the State of Israel.
Holocaust denial in France, as in other European countries, was linked from 
the outset to efforts on the far Right to restore the “positive” image of Nazism and 
prewar fascism. Its impact grew from the early 1980s with the rise of the ultrana-
tionalist Front National of Jean-Marie Le Pen, which became solidly entrenched 
in the French political landscape. The Front National did not, it is true, openly 
and officially circulate Holocaust denial propaganda, but it has had a clear inter-
est in minimizing and casting doubt on the Shoah. Negationism also appealed to 
a number of anarchists, dissident Marxists, and ex-Trotskyists, as well as to some 
Catholic integrists and disoriented liberals.
A revealing example of how Holocaust denial crosses political boundaries 
can be found in the scandal involving Abbé Pierre, a missionary Catholic, pop-
ulist defender of the poor and former member of the Résistance. Abbé Pierre, 
an extremely popular media star in France, was already in his eighties when he 
came out in support of his old friend Roger Garaudy, whose 1995 book, Les Mythes 
Fondateurs de la politique Israélienne, was an unadulterated piece of Holocaust 
denial. Garaudy, an ex-Stalinist, ex-Catholic, and leftist convert to Islam, was 
immensely appreciated in the Arab world for his vitriolic hostility to Israel and 
the “Judeo-Christian” West, further reinforced by Les Mythes Fondateurs—which 
was not only anti-Zionist but clearly anti-Jewish. When Abbé Pierre nonetheless 
rallied to Garaudy’s Holocaust “revisionism,” it caused a considerable stir.³¹
In pre-unification West Germany, as in France, efforts to repudiate the Holo-
caust had begun in the 1950s, and ever since it has become a staple theme of 
neo-Nazis, German nationalists, the far Right, and the Deutsche National Zeitung. 
But it was only in the 1970s that books published by Germans which openly 
denied the Holocaust, began to attract attention. In 1973, a former SS officer and 
neo-Nazi, Thies Christopherson (who had actually worked on the periphery of 
Auschwitz in 1944), published his scurrilous Die Auschwitz Lüge (the Auschwitz 
lie).³² He was followed by the jurist Wilhelm Stäglich, whose book, Der Aus-
chwitz-Mythos (The Auschwitz myth, 1979), led Göttingen University to deprive 
him of the title of doctor. Both authors were determined to prove that the Holo-
caust was a propaganda hoax designed to stigmatize and shame the Germans 
31 “Le faux pas de l’abbé Pierre,” L’Express, 25 Apr. 1996, 33; Eric Conan and Sylviane Stein, 
“Ce qui a fait chuter l’abbé Pierre,” L’Express, 2 May 1996, 20–25.
32 See Schmidt, The New Reich, 224–27 for some information on Christopherson.
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into an unjustified sense of guilt.³³ The aim of the deniers was to decriminalize 
German history by presenting a more favorable picture of National Socialism and 
above all by denying the existence of the gas chambers.
Since the late 1980s, the emphasis in Germany moved, however, to more sci-
entific and technical arguments to prove the impossibility of mass murder in any 
of the death camps. Hence the macabre concern with the capacity of the crema-
toria, the time needed to burn a body, and the properties of Zyklon B poison gas. 
In 1992, Germar Rudolf, a chemist then employed at the prestigious Max Planck 
Institute for Solid State Research, wrote an expert opinion on “The Formation 
and Provability of Cyanide connections in the ‘Gas Chambers’ of Auschwitz.” 
Rudolf’s “chemical analyses” had been commissioned by one of Germany’s 
veteran and best-known neo-Nazis, Otto Ernst Remer, a former major-general in 
the Wehrmacht, who had suppressed the July plot of the German resistance to 
assassinate Hitler in 1944.³⁴ In 1992, Remer stood trial for denying the genocide 
of the Jews, and the Rudolf Report (rejected by the court) was part of his defense. 
In an accompanying letter to the report, Remer wrote that in an age of religious 
freedom, “all of us must oppose the ‘holocaust religion’ which the courts have 
forced upon us.”³⁵
Also in 1992, the then-chairman of the extreme Right NPD, Günther Deckert, 
was fined and given a suspended sentence for inciting racism and insulting 
the victims of the Holocaust. In June 1994, in a judicial review of the case that 
rescinded the sentence, Deckert was described as a man of “strong character 
with a sense of responsibility,” who was motivated by the understandable wish 
“to strengthen resistance among the German people to Jewish claims based 
on the Holocaust.” The Karlsruhe High Court’s empathy extended to Deckert’s 
bitter resentment of financial, moral, and political reparations fifty years after 
the war, and the judgment even considered his historical “revisionism” to be 
an extenuating circumstance. The judge’s substantiation several times called 
Jews “parasites” who had misused their situation as survivors to place a heavy 
financial burden on the German people. This ruling aroused a storm of public 
indignation.³⁶ It was denounced as a disgrace by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and 
condemned at the time by the German justice minister. By December 1994, it had 
33 Wilhelm Stäglich, Der Auschwitz-Mythos (Tübingen 1979). Stäglich’s approach is more 
straightforwardly Nazi.
34 N.a., Gutachten über die behaupteten Gaskammern von Auschwitz (Bad Kissingen, October 
1992).
35 For a portrait of Remer, see Schmidt, The New Reich, 105–11.
36 On the Deckert case, see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 and 15 Aug. 1994.
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been reversed by the federal German court. The Deckert case underlined the fact 
that in Germany, Holocaust denial was not only an expression of extreme Right 
nationalists and illiterate skinheads, but also served as a code for a new kind of 
antisemitism offering a bridge between the old and newer generation of Nazis. 
However, since 1994, a bill has been enacted which permits sentences of up to five 
years in jail for denying the Holocaust. One of the first to be imprisoned under this 
act was Ewald Althans, a leading Munich-based neo-Nazi activist of the younger 
generation, who openly spouted Holocaust denial propaganda in a documentary 
film, Profession: Neo-Nazi, subsequently banned throughout most of Germany.³⁷
Open or latent antisemitism is undoubtedly the key factor behind the spread 
of Holocaust denial. At the same time, “revisionists” play on the widespread 
German desire to be released from shame and guilt, to “normalize” the Nazi past, 
and reassert a robust patriotism. Even notable scholars like the German historian 
Ernst Nolte have used arguments in their writings which are clearly taken from 
the “revisionists.” Nolte, for example, has stubbornly and irrationally insisted 
that a statement by Dr. Chaim Weizmann (president of the World Zionist Organi-
zation) in September 1939 that Jews would support Britain and the democracies 
amounted to a declaration of war on Germany, thereby justifying Hitler’s treat-
ment of them as hostages. This is a classic negationist thesis. Moreover, Nolte has 
argued that the Holocaust (except for the “technical detail” of the gas chambers) 
was no different from any other massacres in the twentieth century. Even more 
provocatively, he suggested that the Nazi genocide was nothing but a pale copy 
of the Soviet Gulag—the Bolshevik extermination of the kulaks and other class 
enemies; indeed, for Nolte, the Nazi extermination of Jews was essentially a pre-
ventive measure against “Asiatic” barbarism from the East.³⁸
These relativizing arguments of Nolte gave rise to the well-known Historiker-
streit (battle of the historians) in Germany in the mid-1980s. They were sharply 
rejected by most established German historians. Nevertheless, Nolte received 
considerable support from a younger generation of conservative and nationalist 
historians, scholars, and writers, who regard his claims as constituting a liber-
ating act. This has been especially troubling, since in a book published in 1993, 
Nolte wrote that the “radical revisionists [i.e., Holocaust deniers] have presented 
37 On Althans, see Schmidt, The New Reich, 200–201.
38 On Nolte, the West German Historikerstreit, and its implications, there is already a 
significant literature. See Richard J. Evans, In Hitler’s Shadow. West German Historians and the 
Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past (New York 1989), 24–91. A good example of Nolte’s own 
approach can be found in Ernst Nolte, “Between Myth and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the 
Perspective of the 1980s,” in Aspects of the Third Reich, edited by H. W. Koch (New York 1985), 
17–38.
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research which, if one is familiar with the source material and the critique of the 
sources, is probably superior to that of the established historians in Germany.”³⁹
By contrast, in the former Soviet Union, under Communist rule, there was 
no denial of Nazi war crimes, at least with regard to the fate of the Soviet popu-
lation as such. However, Soviet writings consistently masked the fact that Jews 
were murdered only because they were Jews, presenting them instead as Rus-
sians, Ukrainians, and citizens of different European countries. Hence there was 
no monument under Soviet rule to the overwhelmingly Jewish victims of the Babi 
Yar massacre on the outskirts of Kiev in September 1941, or at other Holocaust 
sites. The specificity of the Shoah was deliberately dissolved under the rubric 
of millions of Soviet victims of all nationalities who suffered under German fas-
cism.⁴⁰ Things changed for the worse in the 1970s when a group of “anti-Zionist” 
publicists, sponsored by the Soviet government, began to propagate the slander 
that Zionist leaders had callously “collaborated” with the Nazis in the murder of 
their own people. This was part of an intensive antisemitic campaign by the USSR 
and the Communist bloc to present the state of Israel, Zionists, and pro-Israel 
diaspora Jews as fascists who had cynically manipulated the Holocaust in order 
to cover up their own crimes.⁴¹
Some Soviet “anti-Zionist” publicists also began to challenge the veracity of 
the figures concerning the number of Jews killed in the Shoah. In June 1982, Lev 
Korneev wrote: “The Zionists’ vile profiteering at the expense of the victims of 
Hitlerism places in doubt the number, which is current in the press, of 6 million 
Jews who were allegedly destroyed during World War II.” For Korneev and his 
ilk, there were no limits to Zionist perfidy.⁴² This was also a favorite theme of left-
wing revisionists in the West like Lenny Brenner (an American Jewish Trotskyist), 
whose book, Zionism in the Age of the Dictators (1983), was based on the premise 
39 Ernst Nolte, Streitpunkte, Heutige und Künftige Kontroversen um den Nationalsozialismus 
(Berlin 1993), 304.
40 Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historians (Cambridge, Mass. 1981), 68–87; 
William Korey, “Soviet Treatment of the Holocaust: History’s ‘Memory Hole,’” in Remembering 
for the Future: The Impact of the Holocaust on the Contemporary World (Oxford 1988), 1357–
1365.
41 For a detailed analysis of this phenomenon, see Robert S. Wistrich, Hitler’s Apocalypse. 
Jews and the Nazi Legacy (London 1985), 194–225.
42 Ibid., 205–206, 214, 217. Korey, “Soviet Treatment,” deals with Korneev in his 1988 article, 
and in his book, Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism (London 
1995). The article by Korneev which best represented the Soviet-style revisionism appeared in 
Voenno-Istoricheski Zhurnal (6 June 1982) examining the Second World War and the “myths of 
Zionist propaganda.”
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that Zionism and Nazism were essentially congruent. The Zionists, he insinuated, 
had cynically profited from the Holocaust after their leaders had first colluded in 
the genocide of Jews.⁴³ Brenner’s main political purpose was to morally delegit-
imize Israel and Zionism. He found a worthy successor in the ranting of another 
American Jewish leftist, Norman Finkelstein, whose best-selling book, The Holo-
caust Industry, has been a godsend to the far Right, far Left, and Arab antisem-
ites.⁴⁴
With the end of the Cold War and the overthrow of Soviet communism, the 
trend toward Holocaust denial has steadily grown in Russia and Eastern Europe. 
The revolutions of 1989 restored free speech and thereby provided new openings 
for political antisemitism and for popular prewar conspiracy theories like the Pro-
tocols of the Elders of Zion to be revived. Moreover, some post-Communist coun-
tries, such as Croatia and Slovakia initially looked to wartime models on which 
to build their newly found statehood. During World War II, as satellites of Nazi 
Germany, they had briefly enjoyed the illusion of national independence, carrying 
out genocidal policies against Jews, as well as Serbs and Gypsies. The nationalist 
efforts at rehabilitating Father Josef Tiso in Slovakia or Ante Pavelić in Croatia 
inevitably involved excusing, denying, or even justifying their genocidal actions. 
In 1989, Croatia’s president, Franjo Tudjman, wrote a book entitled Wastelands of 
Historical Reality, which not only greatly minimized Jewish casualties during the 
Holocaust, but also displaced the blame for Croat massacres of Serbs in World 
War II onto the Jews.⁴⁵ In Slovakia, despite recent efforts to commemorate the 
murdered Jews and publicize the real story of the Holocaust, there are still many 
Slovaks who regard their wartime leader, Monsignor Tiso, as a national hero and 
martyr. To bolster this belief, they falsely claim that the Slovak rulers were forced 
by the Nazis to deport Jews, and were unaware of the true nature of the crimes 
being committed in the East.
43 See Robert S. Wistrich, “Perdition: a ‘tawdry political pamphlet,’” Patterns of Prejudice 21, 
no. 4 (Winter 1987): 48–50 for an analysis of left-wing “revisionism” in Great Britain, prompted 
by the controversy over Jim Allen’s play Perdition about the Holocaust, Zionism, and the 
Kasztner Affair. Allen, a British Trotskyist, was much influenced by Brenner’s theses.
44 See Ruth Ellen Gruber, The Struggle. The Rehabilitation of Fascist Heroes in Europe (New 
York: American Jewish Committee, 1995), 32 pp; and on Slovakia, the very detailed survey 
by Zora Bútorová and Zuzana Fialova, Attitudes towards Jews and the Holocaust in Slovakia 
(Bratislava: Center for Social Analysis, 1993). For the wider picture, see Randolph Braham, ed. 
Antisemitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe (New York 
1995).
45 Norman G. Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry (New York 2000). The German edition 
reached the top of the best sellers list; Gruber, The Struggle, 22–23.
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In Romania, the drive to rehabilitate the wartime leader and ally of Hitler, 
Marshal Ion Antonescu, also produced serious distortions of the Holocaust. 
Already under the Communist dictator Nicolai Ceausescu, the official party line 
was to pretend that the Romanian Holocaust did not happen, though the deporta-
tion of Jews to Auschwitz from Hungarian-controlled northern Transylvania was 
deliberately emphasized in order to embarrass Hungary. After 1990, right-wing 
politicians and much of the media harshly attacked President Iliescu whenever 
he criticized the Antonescu regime or seemed sympathetic to Jewish efforts to 
have Romanian complicity in the Holocaust recognized. His attendance at the 
opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. 
over a decade ago was denounced by Romanian nationalists as a “pitiable lack of 
dignity in front of the global Zionist trend of stigmatizing peoples and nations in 
order to control humankind unchallenged.”⁴⁶ Since 2000, the tendency to deny 
that Romanians were complicit in murdering the Jews during the Holocaust was 
still present, even at the highest level.⁴⁷ The 2005 report by an independent group 
of scholars on the Holocaust in Romania nonetheless represented an important 
breakthrough in this regard.
In Poland, on the other hand, the blatantly antisemitic Catholic radio station, 
Radio Maryja (directed by Father Tadeusz Rydzyk), which enjoys a mass audience 
of several million listeners, has accused Jews in Poland and beyond of being part 
of a global “Holocaust industry.” In July 2007, Father Rydzyk even asserted that 
the Polish president was in the hands of the “Jewish lobby”who were supposedly 
pressing extravagant restitution claims against Poland.
In Hungary, attempts to rehabilitate the wartime leader, Admiral Miklós 
Horthy, which coincided with his reburial amid much public fanfare in Septem-
ber 1993, led to serious distortions that ignored his complicity in the deportation 
of Jews from Hungary. True, on October 5, 1994, the Hungarian government did 
officially apologize for its country’s role in the Holocaust. On the other hand, 
antisemitism in recent years has grown apace in Hungary, some of it connected 
with Holocaust denial. When the Hungarian Jewish novelist and Auschwitz survi-
vor, Imre Kertész, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2002, he was the 
butt of sharp criticism on the Right. A year earlier, he told the Spanish newspaper, 
46 Michael Shafir, “Marshal Ion Antonescu and Romanian Politics,” Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty Research Report, 3, no. 6 (11 Feb. 1994); see also Carol Iancu, La Shoah en Roumanie 
(Montpellier 2000); and Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, Mihail E. Ionescu, eds., Final Report of the 
International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania (Bucharest 2005).
47 On the notorious interview of Romanian President Iliescu in which he denied there was a 
Holocaust in Romania, see Haaretz, 27 Aug. 2003.
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El País: “Today I live in a very anti-Semitic [Hungarian] society that does not like 
Jews. I always felt that they forced me to be Jewish.”⁴⁸ In Hungary, as in the Baltic 
States and elsewhere in post-Communist Europe, the role played by Jews in the 
Soviet-dominated system before 1989 has been used to downplay the extent of 
local collaboration in the Nazi Holocaust.
Negationism enlists a wide variety of strategies and assumes many different 
forms adapted to the history and political cultures in which it operates. It none-
theless developed into an international movement with its own networks, gather-
ings, public forums, propaganda, and pseudo-scientific journals. Since the mid-
1970s, when it first began to crystallize in an organized way and achieve a certain 
cultural legitimacy, it managed to attract considerable media attention. Though it 
failed to penetrate the broad mainstream of informed public opinion and serious 
scholarship in the United States or Europe, it made some inroads in its drive to 
be accepted as an “alternative school” of history, especially through the internet. 
Cyberspace is today the chosen highway of the Holocaust deniers, especially in 
the United States. They have learned to use the Internet as a tool to amplify and 
to spread their bigoted arguments and poisonous theories to a mass audience. 
An early pioneer in exploiting the World Wide Web for this purpose was the Ger-
man-born Canadian hatemonger, Ernst Zündel, an inveterate showman who ran 
a mini-multimedia empire out of Toronto. Though finally extradited to Germany, 
Zündel was able for several decades to cast himself as a heroic warrior “against 
the lie of the century,” seeking to vindicate Hitler and the Nazis while maligning 
the Jews.⁴⁹ The Internet provided him with a way to circumvent increasingly strin-
gent European legislation designed to punish neo-Nazi propagandists and Holo-
caust deniers. Similarly, the Institute for Historical Review in California devel-
oped its own web sites to promote the notion that the Holocaust was a Zionist (or 
Stalinist) fiction. One of the institute’s most active collaborators, Bradley Smith, 
exploited the Web as an extension of his “Campus Project” to promote lies about 
the Holocaust at American colleges and universities. His aim was to legitimize 
denial as an authentic part of Holocaust study by perverting the commitment of 
universities to open inquiry and academic freedom.
On American campuses a decade ago, the advertisements sponsored by 
Smith’s deceptively-named Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust sparked 
an intensive debate about the limits of free speech. Through a misguided under-
standing of the First Amendment, some campuses even accepted his texts, despite 
their blatant falsification of history and gross insult to the memory of survivors. 
48 “Exista medios para dominar al hombre, El País, 11 Mar. 2001.
49 ADL, Hitler’s Apologists, 37–40.
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In these deliberate misinformation campaigns, deniers learned to present them-
selves as martyrs for free speech, fearlessly challenging the “religious dogmas” 
and the so-called taboos of what they called the Holocaust establishment and its 
“thought police.”⁵⁰
The “truths” of the deniers were, of course, fabrications which ignored a 
huge mass of evidence that ran counter to their conclusions. As part their aca-
demic façade, they would borrow freely from one another in a never-ending 
merry-go-round of incestuous falsehoods, while pompously cultivating a veneer 
of scientific objectivity. The “revisionists” were often engaged in rehabilitating 
Nazism, fascism, and racism, under the guise of free speech and seeking “the 
truth.” Antisemitism played a crucial role in this endeavor—especially in the Arab 
world—since the Holocaust “hoax” was defined from the outset as a Jewish or 
Zionist conspiracy.⁵¹ For others, anti-Zionism, allied to an unconditional pro-Pal-
estinian enthusiasm was the primary driving force. This is particularly common 
on the Left and has begun to infiltrate parts of the liberal mainstream. For the 
anti-globalist Left, anarchists, Trotskyists, and Third World ideologues, their 
eagerness to indict Western colonialism at any price and to highlight other injus-
tices they feel have been overshadowed by the Holocaust, acts as an additional 
motivation.⁵²
But the most potent and widespread form of Holocaust denial today is 
undoubtedly to be found in the Middle East.⁵³ Arab and Muslim Judeophobes 
have annexed the symbols and expressions of European antisemitism, including 
Holocaust denial, as an integral part of their war against Israel.⁵⁴ In recent years, 
50 See, for example, the full-page advertisement published in Student Life (Washington 
University, St. Louis), 18 Feb. 1992. Written by Bradley R. Smith, it is entitled “The Holocaust 
Controversy: The Case for Open Debate.” For the increasing use of the Internet, see ADL, Web of 
Hate. Extremists Exploit the Internet (New York: 1996), 25ff.
51 For a probing analysis of the links between Arab anti-Zionist and antisemitic demonology, 
the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, and Holocaust “revisionism,” see Pierre-André Taguieff, Les 
Protocoles des Sages de Sion. Faux et Usages d’un Faux (Paris 1992), 295–363.
52 On Auschwitz and the Third World, see the discussion in Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of 
Memory, 126–36.
53 Goetz Nordbruch, The Socio-Historical Background of Holocaust Denial in Arab Countries, 
ACTA no. 17 (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, 
Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2001); see also Pierre-André Taguieff, La Judéophobie des 
Modernes. Des Lumières au Jihad mondial (Paris 2008); Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession: 
From Antiquity to the Global Jihad (New York: Random House, 2010).
54 See Ibrahim Alloush, director of the Free Arab Voice website http://freearabvoice.org   He 
told the JHR (May–June 2001) that the Arab world was a fertile ground for “revisionist seeds.”
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this has become one of the central planks of Muslim Arab antisemitism.⁵⁵ One 
finds a growing readiness among Muslims to believe that the Jews consciously 
invented the “Auschwitz lie,” the “hoax” of their own extermination, as part of 
a diabolical plan to overwhelm Islam and achieve world domination. In this 
super-Machiavellian scenario, the satanic archetype of the conspiratorial Jew—
author and beneficiary of the greatest “myth” of the 20th century—has achieved a 
gruesome and novel apotheosis.
One of the attractions of Holocaust denial to Arab Judeophobes lies in what 
they believe to be its radical challenge to the moral foundations of the Israeli 
State. Palestinian Arab leaders and intellectuals are particularly prominent in 
this endeavor. Thus, Palestinian Hamas leader Khalid Mash’al, appearing on 
Al-Jazeera TV on 16 July 2007 wished “to make it clear to the West and the German 
people” that they were being “blackmailed because of what Nazism did to the 
Zionists, or to the Jews.” For Mash’al, it was self-evident “that what Israel did to 
the Palestinian people is many times worse than what Nazism did to the Jews, 
and there is exaggeration, which has become obsolete, regarding the issue of the 
Holocaust.” This is evidently what motivated Mahmoud Abbas (better known as 
Abu Mazen), the chief PLO architect of the Oslo peace accords and head of the 
Palestinian Authority. In 1984 he authored a work entitled The Other Side: The 
Secret Relationship between Nazism and the Zionist Movement that accused Israel 
of deliberately inflating the number of Jews killed in the Holocaust. He openly 
questioned whether gas chambers were really used for extermination. Abu Mazen 
bluntly suggested that the number of Jewish victims of the Shoah was “even fewer 
than one million.”⁵⁶ But Abu Mazen is a “moderate” compared to the former 
Moroccan army officer, Ahmed Rami, who in the 1980s began to develop his own 
fully-fledged Holocaust denial campaign from Stockholm, where he founded 
Radio Islam. Under the cover of “anti-Zionism” and of defending the Palestinian 
cause, Rami called for “a new Hitler” who would rally the West and Islam against 
the cancer of “Jewish power,” and free it forever from the mendacious yoke of 
“Talmudism” and the “Holocaust industry.”⁵⁷
55 Eliahu Salpeter, ´Anti-Semitism among the Arabs,” Haaretz, 9 Feb. 2000.
56 See ADL, Holocaust Denial in the Middle East. The Latest Anti-Israel Propaganda Theme 
(New York 2001), 5–6. Abu Mazen never retracted his Holocaust denial book despite a request 
to do so from the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles. He told the Israeli newspaper Maariv 
that he wrote the work at a time when the PLO was “at war with Israel.” After Oslo, he claimed, 
he would not have made such remarks.
57 See Per Ahlmark, “Reflections on Combating Anti-Semitism,” in The Rising Tide of Anti-
Semitism, edited by Yaffa Zilbershats (Givat Shmuel: Bar Ilan University, 1993), 59–66. Mr 
Ahlmark, who co-founded the Swedish Committee against Anti-Semitism, has called Rami’s 
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In Iran, too, Holocaust denial spread since the early 1980s, alongside Stürm-
er-like caricatures of the “Talmudic Jew,” the obsessive promotion of the Proto-
cols of the Elders of Zion, and repeated calls to eradicate the Zionist “cancer” from 
the planet.⁵⁸ It was a logical step for militant Khomeini-style radicalism which 
since 1979 had totally demonized Zionism, seeing it as a uniquely malevolent 
and insidious 20th-century reincarnation of the “subversive and cunning spirit of 
Judaism.”⁵⁹ Hence, it is no surprise to find the present-day leader of Iran, Ayatol-
lah Ali Khamenei proclaiming to his people:
There is evidence which shows that Zionists had close relations with German Nazis and 
exaggerated statistics on Jewish killings. There is even evidence on hand that a large 
number of non-Jewish hooligans and thugs of Eastern Europe were forced to emigrate to 
Palestine as Jews...to install in the heart of the Islamic world an anti-Islamic State under the 
guise of supporting the victims of racism....⁶⁰
Iranian President Ahmadinejad has escalated this negationism to a new level of 
brazenness by repeatedly attacking the Holocaust since 2005 as a “myth” or as 
“Zionist propaganda.” Many Iranian journalists, taking their cue from him, have 
repeated that the “Zionist lobby” uses the Holocaust “as a club with which to beat 
and extort the West.”
In December 2006, Iran even hosted a much-publicized conference of the 
world’s best-known Holocaust deniers. The Iranian Foreign Minister, Manouchehr 
Mottaki, opened the proceedings, stating that “If the official version of the Holo-
caust is thrown in doubt, then the identity and nature of Israel will be thrown in 
doubt.” All the participants questioned whether the Holocaust had taken place, 
trivialized it and insisted that the event had been grossly manipulated to serve 
Israel’s financial and political interests.
Holocaust denial statements “the most vicious anti-Jewish campaign in Europe since the 
Third Reich.” Rami has been prosecuted in Swedish courts on three occasions. He was again 
convicted and fined in October 2000.
58 See Imam (March1984 and May 1984)—a publication of the Iranian Embassy in London; 
also n.a., The Imam against Zionism (n.p.: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Islamic Republic 
of Iran, 1983) for the Ayatollah Khomeini’s malevolent view of Israel. See Emmanuel Sivan, 
‘Islamic Fundamentalism, Antisemitism, and Anti-Zionism,” in Anti-Zionism and Antisemitism in 
the Contemporary World, edited by Robert S. Wistrich (London 1990) 74–84.
59 Olivier Carré, L’Utopie Islamique dan l’Orient Arabe (Paris 1991), 195–201; Robert S. 
Wistrich, “The Antisemitic Ideology in the Contemporary Islamic World,” in Rising Tide, 67–74.
60 Jerusalem Post, 25 Apr. 2001. A year earlier, a conservative Iranian newspaper, the Tehran 
Times, had insisted in an editorial that the Holocaust was “one of the greatest frauds of the 
20th century.” This prompted a complaint by the British MP Louise Ellman to the Iranian 
ambassador in London: Agence France-Presse, 14 May 2000.
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The Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, had adopted this line at least six 
years earlier, telling the New York Times:
[W]e believe the number of six million is exaggerated. The Jews are using this issue, in many 
ways, also to blackmail the Germans financially.... The Holocaust is protecting Israel.⁶¹
Other Palestinians have become explicitly “revisionist” in their perceptions of 
the Holocaust. Hassan al-Agha, professor at the Islamic University in Gaza City, 
declared on a PA cultural affairs television program in 1997:
[T]he Jews view it [the Holocaust] as a profitable activity so they inflate the number of 
victims all the time. In another ten years, it do not know what number they will reach.... As 
you know, when it comes to economics and investments, the Jews have been very experi-
enced even since the days of The Merchant of Venice.⁶²
Seif Ali al-Jarwan, writing a year later in the Palestinian newspaper, Al Hayat 
al-Jadeeda, also invoked the shadow of Shylock, representing “the image of the 
greedy, cunning, evil, and despised Jews” who succeeded in brainwashing Amer-
ican and European public opinion:
They concocted horrible stories of gas chambers which Hitler, they claimed, used to burn 
them alive. The press overflowed with pictures of Jews being gunned down...or being 
pushed into gas chambers.... The truth is that such persecution was a malicious fabrication 
by the Jews.⁶³
Another example of this popular genre can be found in an article by the editor of 
Tishreen (Syria’s leading daily). He accused the Zionists of cynically inflating the 
Holocaust “to astronomic proportions” in order to “deceive international public 
opinion, win its empathy and blackmail it....” Israel and the Jewish organizations, 
he wrote, encourage “their distorted version of history” in order to squeeze ever 
more funds from Germany and other European states in restitution payments. But 
they also use the Holocaust “as a sword hanging over the necks of all who oppose 
61 New York Times, 26 Mar. 2000. Sabri added: “It’s certainly not our fault if Hitler hated the 
Jews. Weren’t they pretty much hated everywhere?”
62 Quoted in ADL, Holocaust Denial in the Middle East, 12.
63 Al Hayat al-Jadeeda, “Jewish Control of the World Media” (trans. by MEMRI), 2 July 1998. A 
crossword puzzle in the same Palestinian newspaper, 18 Feb. 1999 asked readers to guess the 
name of the “Jewish center for eternalizing the Holocaust and its lies.” The correct answer was 
“Yad Vashem”—the official Israeli Holocaust memorial and research center in Jerusalem.
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Zionism.”⁶⁴ This Zionist effort to paralyze human memory and critical discussion 
was, however, bound to fail:
Israel, that presents itself as the heir of Holocaust victims, has committed and still commits 
much more terrible crimes than those committed by the Nazis. The Nazis did not expel a 
whole nation nor bury people and prisoners alive, as the Zionists did.⁶⁵
The European “revisionist” most frequently mentioned as a source for Arab Holo-
caust deniers has been the French left-wing intellectual (and convert to Islam) 
Roger Garaudy. Indeed, the trial and conviction of Garaudy in France in 1998 for 
“négationisme” made him a hero in much of the Middle East.⁶⁶ Among his admir-
ers was the former president of Iran, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who in a 
sermon on Tehran Radio, declared himself fully convinced that “Hitler had only 
killed 20,000 Jews and not six million,” adding that “Garaudy’s crime derives 
from the doubt he cast on Zionist propaganda.”⁶⁷
Rafsanjani is the same “moderate” cleric who proclaimed on “Jerusalem Day” 
in Iran that “one atomic bomb would wipe out Israel without a trace,” while the 
Islamic world would only be damaged rather than destroyed by Israeli nuclear 
retaliation.⁶⁸ In the Iranian case, Holocaust denial is openly linked to extreme 
anti-Zionism, antisemitism, and terrorism driven by the cult of jihad which seeks 
the eradication of the “tumor called Israel.” This combination is potentially all 
the more lethal in the light of Iran’s frantic efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. It 
is characteristic of this fanatical mind-set that the real Nazi Holocaust inflicted 
upon the Jews should be so strenuously denied by those that would repeat it.⁶⁹
The Garaudy Affair exposed over ten years ago the scale and vitality of Holo-
caust denial in the Arab world. Arabic translations of Garaudy’s work became 
64 Muhammad Kheir al-Wadi, “The Plague of the Third Millennium,” Tishreen, 31 Jan. 2000.
65 Ibid.
66 Al-Ahram, 14 Mar. 1998, defended Garaudy by arguing inter alia that there was “no trace 
of the gas chambers” which were supposed to have existed in Germany. In point of fact, there 
were no gas chambers erected in Germany itself—the death camps were primarily located in 
Poland.
67 ADL, Holocaust Denial in the Middle East, 8–9.
68 The remarks were made at Friday prayers held at the University of Tehran on Dec. 15, 2001 
and widely reported in the world press. A day earlier on Iranian TV, Rafsanjani stated: “The 
establishment of the State of Israel is the worst event in history. The Jews living in Israel will 
have to migrate once more.”
69 It is no accident that European Holocaust deniers like the Austrian engineer, Wolfgang 
Fröhlich, and the Swiss Jürgen Graf, are welcomed and resident in Iran. See ADL, Holocaust 
Denial in the Middle East, 7–8.
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best-sellers in many Middle Eastern countries, though in France he was convicted 
of inciting racial hatred.⁷⁰ Some Arab professionals eagerly offered their ser-
vices to help Garaudy. The binding ideological cement behind this outpouring 
of solidarity was a Protocols-style antisemitism which branded the Holocaust as 
a Zionist invention. Hence the favorable reaction to Garaudy’s thesis by so many 
Arab newspapers and magazines or by prominent clerics like Sheikh Muhammad 
al-Tantawi, politicians like the late Rafiq Hariri, or Egyptian intellectuals such as 
Mohammed Hassanin Haikal.⁷¹
Palestinian intellectuals, clerics, and legislators have also displayed great 
reluctance to incorporate any aspect of the Shoah into their teaching curricula, 
evidently fearing that it might strengthen Zionist claims to Palestine.⁷² Hatem 
Abd al-Qadar, a Hamas leader, explained in an internal Palestinian debate that 
such instruction would represent “a great danger for the formation of a Palestin-
ian consciousness.” The Holocaust was a threat to Palestinian political dreams 
and religious aspirations. It could undermine the promise by Allah that the whole 
of Palestine was a sacred possession of the Arabs. Other Palestinian intellectuals 
invoke “doubts” about the “veracity” of the Shoah in the West, or call for a more 
concentrated focus on Zionist “terror,” “cruelty,” and “massacres” of Palestin-
ians; or they insisted that any reference to Jewish victims of the Holocaust must 
be minimized, if not excluded.⁷³
According to the Palestinian intellectual Abdallah Horani, Israel and the 
Zionists should not be offered Palestinian assistance to propagate their “lies” and 
their “false history” of the Shoah. The Holocaust is thereby reduced to an Ameri-
can-Israeli plot to efface Palestinian national memory in favor of the globalizing 
“culture of peace” and to prepare the ground for the ideological-cultural penetra-
tion of Palestine by the West. The head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, 
70 Roger Garaudy, Les Mythes Fondateurs de la politique israélienne (Paris 1995). A former 
Catholic, then a Communist, Garaudy became a Muslim in 1982 and married a Jerusalem-born 
Palestinian woman. On the echoes in France, see Pierre-André Taguieff, “L’Abbé Pierre et Roger 
Garaudy. Négationisme, Antijudaïsme, Antisionisme,” Esprit, no. 8–9 (1996): 215; Valérie 
Igounet, Histoire du Négationisme en France (Paris 2000), 472–83.
71 Mouna Naim in Le Monde, 1 Mar. 1998.
72 MEMRI Report, 20 Feb. 2001.
73 Al-Risala (Gaza), 13 Apr. 2000. In Al-Risala, 21 Aug. 2003, Abdelaziz al-Rantisi—then 
the second most important leader of the Hamas—insisted that the Zionists had invented 
and diffused the “Holocaust lie” to divert attention from their wicked crimes against the 
Palestinians. I heard him say something similar in Gaza in May 2003, when we interviewed him 
for a British Television Channel Four documentary, “Blaming the Jews,” for which I acted as the 
chief historical advisor.
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Sheikh Nafez Azzam, summed up in cosmic theological language this perverse 
form of Holocaust denial: “To teach the Shoah in Palestinian schools contradicts 
the order of the universe.”⁷⁴
Since the 1990s, Holocaust denial has indeed become a much broader and 
widespread phenomenon throughout the Middle East. After 2000, one can find 
increasing numbers of high-ranking Iranian, Syrian, Palestinian, Hamas and 
Hizbollah officials making Holocaust denial statements.⁷⁵ In the Egyptian, Jor-
danian, and Saudi media, where antisemitism is rampant, negationist rhetoric 
concerning the wartime massacres of European Jews has become a very common 
theme.
Holocaust denial is a particularly malevolent form of racist incitement—the 
most up-to-date rationalization for hating Jews, thinly disguised under the mask 
of revising history. Not for nothing have the deniers been called assassins of 
memory, fanatics engaged in a new kind of symbolic genocide against the Jewish 
people. Where the mobs once cried “Death to the Jews,” the deniers now cynically 
proclaim that “the Jews never died” and “this truth will make you free.” Beyond 
their antisemitic assault on Jewish memory, there is an even more fundamental 
negation of the basic premises of enlightenment itself, an implicit leveling of all 
values, and the nihilistic destruction of historical reality.
74  Al-Istiqlal, 20 Apr. 2000.




Denying the Shoah in Post-Communist 
Eastern Europe¹
In post-Communist East Central Europe today, ideologies and politicians compete 
in a relatively free political market; there is no longer one history but several. The 
literati are also relatively free to “offer” their vision of past, present, and future. 
Attitudes towards the Holocaust do not, of course, determine the region’s outlook. 
But insofar as facing collective responsibility is part of any “democratic game,” 
there is an indirect influence on its politics. In post-Communist East Central 
Europe, there are still suspicions of an intended “collective incrimination.” There 
is, in fact, nothing specifically “East-Central European” about that. However, 
what is specific about the region is its former Communist legacy. And this collec-
tive legacy partly facilitates, partly explains, and rationalizes Holocaust denial 
and its “comparative trivialization.”
In a book on contemporary Slovakia, Shari J. Cohen forged the concept of 
the “state-organized forgetting of history” to describe the former Slovak Commu-
nist regime’s Orwellian manipulation of the historical record to serve its politi-
cal purposes.² For reasons that need not preoccupy us in this context, I disagree 
with Cohen’s generalization, among other reasons because “forgetting” history 
implies obliteration rather than manipulation. I believe Nancy Whittier Heer’s 
1971 study on Communist history-manipulation remains to this day as relevant as 
it was when its focus-object (the Soviet Union) was still with us.³ But “state-or-
ganized forgetting” is fully applicable when it comes to the East Central Euro-
pean Communist regimes’ “de-Judaization” of the atrocities perpetrated by the 
Nazis and/or their local emulators or official allies, as amply demonstrated by 
contributors to a volume edited by Randolph L. Braham after the demise of those 
regimes.⁴ This makes the task of Holocaust negationists easier, and the receptiv-
ity to “Holocaust trivialization” arguments higher than it would otherwise be in 
the Western parts of the continent, where the phenomenon of organized forget-
1 I would like to acknowledge the support of the J. and O. Winter Fund of the Graduate Center of 
the City University of New York for research conducted in connection with this project.
2 Cohen, Shari J., Politics without a Past. The Absence of History in Poscommunist Nationalism 
(Durham, N.C. 1999), 85–118.
3 Nancy Whittier Heer, Politics and History in the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Mass. 1971).
4 Randolph L. Braham, ed., Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in 
Postcommunist Eastern Europe (New York 1994).
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ting has been by no means absent; but where, for its legacy to be challenged, it 
took a generational change, rather than a change of regime.⁵
Except for the very first postwar years, Soviet historiography and its imposed 
model strove to both “nationalize” and to “internationalize” the Holocaust. 
Nationalization amounted to transforming Jewish victims into local victims, 
while internationalization derived from those regimes’ ideologically-determined 
“definition” of Fascism. In an essay written in 1985, French historian Pierre Vidal-
Naquet noted that the History of the Great Patriotic War by Boris Tepulchowski, 
while mentioning the gas chambers at Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Treblinka, never 
indicated that these had been put in place mainly to serve the purpose of the Jews’ 
physical elimination; instead, Tepulchowski wrote that six million “Polish citi-
zens” had been murdered by the Nazis. As for the extermination of Jews on Soviet 
territory proper, it was covered in just two lines.⁶ Thanks to the poet, Evgenii Yev-
tushenko, the case of Babi Yar, where Soviet authorities constantly sought to blur 
the record of the victims’ Jewish identity, acquired world notoriety. When in 1961, 
Yevtushenko bewailed the fact that “no monument stands over Babi Yar,” little 
did he know that “no monument” was better than “any monument.” The one 
finally erected in 1976 on the site of the massacre specified that between 1941 and 
1943, the Germans had executed there “over 100,000 citizens of Kiev and prison-
ers of war.” There was no trace here of specific Jewish suffering.⁷
Similarly, the 1947 Polish parliament’s decision to set up a memorial at Aus-
chwitz described the site as one where “Poles and citizens of other nationalities 
fought and died a martyr’s death.” Twenty years later, a monument was erected 
at the site, carrying inscriptions in nineteen languages, including Yiddish, 
telling visitors that “Four million people suffered and died here at the hands of 
the Nazi murderers between 1940 and 1945” (a gross exaggeration). Jews were 
appended to the long list of “other nationalities” that had “suffered” at the hands 
of the German perpetrators, and, as Michael C. Steinlauf ironically observes, 
that list was “alphabetically and therefore democratically” ordered, with Żydzi 
coming last. It was only after the fall of Communism that the inscription would 
5 See Henri Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, de 1944 à nos jours (Paris 1990), 12; Tony Judt, 
“The Past Is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe,” in In The Politics of 
Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath, eds. István Deák, Jan T. Gross, and Tony 
Judt (Princeton 2000), 293–323.
6 Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Assassins of Memory: Essays on the Denial of the Holocaust (New York 
1992), 94.
7 William Korey, “Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in the USSR/CIS,” in Anti-
Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, ed. Randolph L. 
Braham. (New York 1994), 207–24.
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be changed, to read “Let this place remain for eternity as a cry of despair and a 
warning to humanity. About one and a half million men, women, children and 
infants, mainly Jews from different countries of Europe, were murdered here. The 
world was silent.”⁸
Hungary was no different. Under Stalinism, “the Holocaust was virtually 
sunk into the Orwellian black hole of history.”⁹ As István Deák puts it, “World 
War II was officially remembered as the era when ‘communists and other pro-
gressive elements’ had struggled against, or became the victims of, ‘Hitlerite and 
Horthyite fascism.’ Somehow, there seemed to have been no Jews among these 
heroes and victims; instead, all were ‘anti-fascist Hungarians.’”¹⁰
Failure to deal with the Jewish dimension of the Holocaust can also be traced 
to the general failure of Communist regimes to provide a viable definition of “Fas-
cism”—a term under which all the radical Right European regimes in the interwar 
period were misleadingly grouped together. Up to the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the universally-accepted and imposed definition of Fascism was that provided by 
Georgi Dimitroff in his 1935 Comintern report, which had Fascist regimes being 
little else than “the open terrorist dictatorship of the most reactionary, most chau-
vinistic and most imperialist elements of finance capital.”¹¹ That was “explaining 
Fascism away,” by carefully avoiding revelation of the overarching support that 
Italian Fascism, Nazism, and other radical authoritarian forms of government 
had enjoyed among all social classes.¹² But its advantage, from the Marxist per-
spective, rested in enabling the ruling parties to present themselves as having 
been the “vanguard” of popular democratic resistance in a population allegedly 
largely opposed to those regimes. The revolutionary character of generic Fascism 
could thus be buried in ideological jargon, for after Lenin, the “revolution” was 
no less monopolized than was the actual Communist hold on power. Fascism 
could not, by definition, be anything else than “counter-revolutionary.”
8 Michael C. Steinlauf, “Poland,” in The World Reacts to the Holocaust, ed. D. S. Wyman 
(Baltimore 1996), 81–155, p. 145.
9 Randolph L. Braham, “Assault on Historical Memory: Hungarian Nationalists and the 
Holocaust,” in Hungary and the Holocaust: Confrontation with the Past. Symposium 
Proceedings. Washington, D.C. 2001.
10 István Deák, “Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Hungary,” in Anti-
Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe, ed. R. L. 
Braham.( New York 1994), 99–124, p. 111.
11 Georgi Dimitroff, The United Front Against War and Fascism: Report to the Seventh World 
Congress of the Communist International 1935 (New York 1974), 7.
12 A. J. Gregor, Interpretations of Fascism (New Brunswick, N.J. 1997), 128–78.
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This categorization left its mark, and not only on Communist historians. 
Milan S. Ďurica, a Slovak scholar teaching history at a theological faculty, for 
example, in 1992 defended the record of the Nazi-allied Jozef Tiso regime, empha-
sizing that labeling it Fascist would be wrong. There never was sufficient autoch-
thonous Slovak capital in the “Parish Republic,” it being largely concentrated 
in Hungarian-Jewish-German hands, he wrote; and Fascism, according Ďurica is 
“the reign of terror by financial capital, the most reactionary imperialistic move-
ment of the chauvinist upper bourgeoisie allied with nationalism.”¹³
As A. James Gregor has argued, a “perfectly plausible case can be made that 
Stalinism was the ideology of a developmental national socialism, the ‘socialism’ 
of an economically backward nation. As such, it shared more than superficial 
similarities with the Fascism of Mussolini.”¹⁴ As I pointed out elsewhere, Stalin’s 
“socialism in one country” was the first ideologically-formulated justification of 
what would eventually become known as “National Communism.”¹⁵ This, in fact, 
is also the core argument of a book published by Mikhail Agursky, a Soviet-time 
dissident who emigrated to Israel in the 1970s.¹⁶ It is in this spirit that Vera Tolz 
concluded that in Russia “Nationalism took the form of National Bolshevism..., 
the most extreme manifestation of which was Iosif Stalin’s highly anti-Semitic 
campaign against cosmopolitanism in the late 1940s and early 1950s.”¹⁷
Nor was National Communism confined to the former Soviet Union’s borders. 
“Objectively speaking” (as Stalin would have put it), it became the dominant doc-
trine adopted against Soviet domination. Tito’s “heresy,” as we know from Zbig-
niew Brzezinski, had National Communism at its core, as did the Hungarian rev-
olution of 1956 (at least in its early stages), and the return to power in that same 
year of Władisław Gomułka in Poland.¹⁸ Eventually, that latter event would beget 
the phenomenon of General Mieczysław Moczar’s “Endo-Communism,” combin-
ing “the assimilation of ideas with direct linkage to the prewar Endecja” with 
“proletarian rhetoric”—producing a “peculiar marriage of authoritarian Commu-
13 Cited in Pavol Mešťan, Anti-Semitism in Slovak Politics (1989–1999) (Bratislava 2000), 
93–94.
14 A. James Gregor, The Faces of Janus: Marxism and Fascism in the Twentieth Century (New 
Haven 2000), 42, 128–65.
15 Michael Shafir, “Reds, Pinks, Blacks and Blues: Radical Politics in Post-Communist East 
Central Europe,” Studia politica 1, no. 2 (2001): 397–446, p. 400–401.
16 Mikhail Agursky, The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR (Boulder, Colo.: 
Westview, 1987).
17 Vera Tolz, “The Radical-Right in Post-Communist Russian Politics,” in The Revival of Right-
Wing Extremism in the Nineties, ed. P. H. Merkl and L. Weinberg (London 1997), 177–202, p. 179.
18 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass. 1960).
 Denying the Shoah in Post-Communist Eastern Europe   31
nism and chauvinist nationalist tendencies,” among which antisemitism figured 
prominently.¹⁹
But in reality, the marriage was hardly “peculiar.” Under Nicolae Ceauşescu, 
Romania would not only undergo a similar process, but would by far overtake 
Poland, with the world outlook of the interwar Fascist Iron Guard encoded in all 
but official acknowledgment in party documents, and reflected in party-super-
vised historiography. With the exception of Czecho slovakia (or rather its Czech 
part), no country in East Central Europe remained unaffected by “the plague.” 
Enver Hoxha’s Albania and Ceauşescu’s Romania (joined in the 1970s by Bulgar-
ia’s “xenophobic communism”) stood out in their attempts to substitute nation-
alist for ideological legitimacy.²⁰ As one scholar put it, “national communism, 
though it may seem to be a political oxymoron, became increasingly the norm 
by the 1970s and certainly by the 1980s as the Marxist-Leninist regimes sought to 
hold on to power in face of collapsing political legitimacy.”²¹
A large part of the post-Communist East Central European political spectrum 
is still occupied by parties of “radical continuity” and—to a lesser, but not incon-
siderable—extent by parties of “radical return.” The former are the offspring of 
National Communism liberated from its earlier Communist ideological straight-
jacket, while the latter advocate a return to the values embraced by the interwar 
radical Right.²² All radical continuity formations are “successor parties” of the 
former Communist rulers, which does not necessarily imply that all successor 
parties are radical continuity formations. However, what all successor parties 
share is access to what Michael Waller calls “organizational continuity,” includ-
ing, above all, access to material resources.²³ Neither radical return formations 
nor the conservative or neo-conservative formations which identify themselves 
with historically-reborn mainstream parties, benefit from such access. Reject-
ing, as they do, continuity with Communism, they must replace it with other 
19 Steinlauf, “Poland,” 115.
20 See Michael Shafir, “Xenophobic Communism: The Case of Bulgaria and Romania,” The 
World Today 45, no. 12 (1989): 208–12; Vladimir Tismaneanu, “The Ambiguity of Romanian 
National Communism,” Telos 60 (1984): 65–79; idem, “The Tragicomedy of Romanian 
Communism,” East European Politics and Society 3, no. 2 (1989): 329–76; Mary Ellen Fischer, 
Nicolae Ceausescu: A Study in Political Leadership (Boulder, Colo. 1989).
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resources, among which “historic continuity” figures more prominently than it 
does in the case of the successor parties. At first sight, this has little to do with 
Holocaust denial and with its comparative trivialization. On closer scrutiny, 
however, both radical return and conservative formations, or intellectuals identi-
fying with them, are often found to be part of the Holocaust-denying landscape.
In other words, the legacy of state-organized forgetting and National Com-
munism extends far beyond those who under the former regime identified with 
its values and continue to do so in the post-Communist setting. The partisans 
of radical return (from whom most outright negationists stem) are perhaps the 
fiercest in opposing the legacy of Communism. However, the former regime has 
made their discourse more persuasive than might otherwise have been the case 
by having failed to address the issue of the Holocaust, or (as will be seen) by 
deflecting the blame for its perpetration onto either the Germans or onto a com-
bination between them and the traditional “historic enemy.” This, for example, 
was the case of Romania, where, under Ceauşescu, references to Jewish extermi-
nation were singularly confined to Hungarian-occupied northern Transylvania, 
with no mention whatever being made of the extermination of Jews in Transn-
istria under Marshal Ion Antonescu’s regime, and/or solely attributed there to 
the Germans.²⁴ Why then, should Iron Guard leader Corneliu Zelea Codreanu and 
Antonescu, Admiral Miklós Horthy and Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi, Pres-
ident Tiso or Croat Ustasha leader Ante Pavelić not reemerge as model figures of 
national heroes, whose only fault rests in their having supported or allied them-
selves with those who were fighting Communism and/or the traditional enemy of 
their nation?
What is more, with Antonescu, Szálasi, and Tiso having been executed as war 
criminals (or Codreanu having been assassinated at the orders of King Carol II in 
1938), they may fit very well into the natural post-Communist search for replacing 
manipulated state-organized martyrdom on the altar of proletarian internation-
alism with martyrdom in the name of national, anti-Communist values. Ľudovit 
Pavlo, chairman of the Slovak League of America and a partisan of Tiso’s reha-
bilitation, was most genuine in giving vent to this quest for martyr-hero models. 
In 1996, in an article included in a volume of collected papers published in 
Bratislava, Pavlo wrote quite bluntly: “I was pleased that Tiso died a martyr’s 
24 Victor Eskenasy, “The Holocaust and Romanian Historiography: Communist and Neo-
Communist Revisionism,” in The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry, ed. R. L. Braham (New York 
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Postcommunist Eastern Europe, ed. Randolph L. Braham (New York 1994), 82–159.
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death because we gained a saint and a hero.... I was afraid [after the war] that 
Tiso would be sentenced to life imprisonment because, with the passage of time, 
he would probably had fallen into oblivion.” Tiso-defender Gabriel Hoffmann, 
in a book he edited together with his brother Karel in 1994, concluded, “after the 
study of hundreds of documents,” that all accusations leveled at Tiso were lies 
and that he was “not a criminal, but a saint.” The Vatican, Hoffmann wrote, will 
one day still canonize Tiso.²⁵
Tiso, who was a Catholic priest, finds himself in the company of laymen 
Codreanu and Antonescu. In 1993, when an Iron Guard “inheritor party” calling 
itself New Christian Romania was set up in Bucharest, participants in its founding 
congress demanded that Codreanu be canonized; the same demand was made in 
1998 by a Cluj-based foundation of radical return leanings.²⁶ In 2001, a partici-
pant in a symposium marking the tenth anniversary of the setting up of Roma-
nia’s most conclusive exemplification of a radical continuity party—the Greater 
Romania Party (PRM)—proposed that Antonescu be canonized by the Romanian 
Orthodox Church.²⁷
“Mainstream” party leaders face a double dilemma when coming to forge 
what Hungarian sociologist András Kovács termed in Hungary’s case “creating 
an identity on a symbolic level.” I believe this insight can be generalized beyond 
Hungarian borders. Democratic parties can either opt for placing themselves 
somewhere along the Western political spectrum or  express a relationship with 
certain emblematic periods, events or individuals in the country’s own history. 
Formations whose option is mainly introvert, fight the battle among themselves 
“for the appropriation of history” in which they attempt to demonstrate historical 
tradition and continuity. But a second dilemma emerges once the introvert option 
has been made, namely whether (and to what extent) to distance themselves or 
not from the less seemly aspects of remote or immediate history. Opting for dis-
tancing themselves from figures such as those mentioned above is in many cases 
tantamount to renouncing historic legitimacy. For what historic legitimacy can 
one claim if, as a Slovak or a Croat politician, one casts aside any continuity with 
the only time when an independent Slovak or Croat state has existed? And while 
claiming “anti-Communist historic legitimacy” is possible in the case of historic 
parties or neo-conservative formations in Hungary or Romania, it is not easy to 
25 Cited in Mešťan, Anti-Semitism in Slovak Politics, 159, 164.
26 See România mare, 29 Jan. 1993.
27 William Totok, “Sacrificarea lui Antonescu pe altarul diplomaţiei,” Parts 1–4, Observator 
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do so when Antonescu and Horthy are largely perceived as the embodiment of 
anti-Communist postures.
Even in the case of Poland or the Czech Republic (which, unlike Hitler’s allies 
were themselves victims of aggression and decimation), the Holocaust poses the 
problem of “competitive martyrdom”—that of one’s own nation versus that of 
the Jews. In the Polish case, moreover, politicians, intellectuals, and indeed, the 
Catholic Church, must cope with a legacy of non-institutionalized, large-scale 
popular antisemitism, as well as with that of the partly-institutionalized antisem-
itism of formations such as the Endecja. Under these circumstances, it is quite 
tempting to slide into one shade or another of comparative trivialization.
Holocaust Negation
Outright negation of the Holocaust is rare, but not insignificant. In general, it is 
supported and inspired by the aged, extreme nationalist exiled community, many 
members of which are linked with exile associations. These people have access to 
Western negationist literature and some go as far as to participate themselves in 
the negationist drive. The Western inspiration is, however, not always acknowl-
edged. Viewed from this perspective, one could possibly speak of “honest” and 
“dishonest” negationists. Politicians usually belong to the latter category. A case 
in point is Stanislav Pánis, the former leader of the Slovak National Unity Party 
and later a deputy representing the Slovak National Party in the Czechoslovak 
Federal Assembly.²⁸ In an interview with Norwegian television in 1992, Pánis 
said it would have been “technically impossible” for the Nazis to exterminate six 
million Jews in camps—a clear echo of French negationist Robert Faurisson’s con-
tentions. Pánis also claimed that Auschwitz was nothing but an “invention” of 
the Jews to make possible the flow of compensation to Israel. His political career 
did not suffer as a result of these statements, and in the late 1990s, he even served 
as a Deputy Culture Minister.²⁹
28 Fred Hahn, “Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist 
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In Romania, Greater Romania Party (PRM) leader Corneliu Vadim Tudor in 
March 1994 professed to have “learned that English and American scientists [sic!] 
are contesting the Holocaust itself, providing documentation and logical argu-
ments proving that the Germans could not gas six million Jews, this being tech-
nically and physically an impossibility.” The Holocaust, he added, was nothing 
but “a Zionist scheme aimed at squeezing out from Germany about 100 billion 
Deutschmarks and to terrorize for more than forty years all those who do not 
acquiesce to the Jewish yoke.”³⁰ In November 2000 Tudor’s party became the sec-
ond-strongest formation in the Romanian parliament and the PRM leader made it 
to a runoff with Ion Iliescu for the position of head of state.³¹
Not all Holocaust negationist politicians in East Central Europe, however, 
went unpunished. In general, the less significant politically their formation 
appeared to be, the greater the chance that they would eventually face some 
sort of judicial accounting. The most famous case in point is perhaps that of 
Poland’s Bolesław Tejkowski, leader of the neo-Fascist Polish National Common-
wealth-Polish National Party. In 1995, he was given a two-year suspended sen-
tence for insulting “the Polish authorities, the Jewish people, the Pope and the 
Episcopate.” In Tejkowski’s eyes not only Poland’s entire post-Communist lead-
ership was made up of Jews and “closet-Jews,” but the Polish Pope (Karol Wojtyła) 
was himself Jewish. The Holocaust, he claimed, was a Jewish conspiracy that had 
made it possible for the Jews to hide their offspring in monasteries during World 
War II, in order for them to be baptized and take over the Church from within. 
This, he said, was how Wojtyła became a Catholic priest.³² Outlandish as this may 
sound, it was nonetheless not singular. In Hungary, two other radical return pub-
lications, Hunnia Füzetek and Szent Korona, “unmasked” Cardinal Páskai as being 
allegedly Jewish; and precisely the same argument was produced in Romania by 
30 România mare, 4 Mar. 1994.
31 Michael Shafir, “The Greater Romania Party and the 2000 Elections in Romania: How 
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Radu Theodoru, who “revealed” that Wojtyła’s name was in fact “Katz.”³³ In other 
words, the Jews are the authors of the Holocaust—an “argument” by no means 
limited to the outright negationists, as we shall yet observe.
For obvious reasons, Poland is the least prone of East European nations to 
outright negationism, Tejkowski’s case notwithstanding. Too many of the exter-
mination camps had been on Polish soil and negation would be to question the 
largely consensual Polish martyrdom itself. And yet negationist articles began 
appearing in 1994 and 1995 in Szczerbiec (The sword), the publication of the 
extreme Right formation that calls itself National Revival of Poland (NOP). That 
radical return party was led by Adam Gmurczyk and claims to be the reincar-
nation of the prewar violently antisemitic youth organization, National-Radical 
Camp, that was outlawed in 1934. The NOP is a member of the neo-Nazi Inter-
national Third Position and Szczerbiec lists such notorious Holocaust deniers as 
Derek Holland and Roberto Fiore on its editorial board. It printed several “clas-
sics” among outright deniers in the West.³⁴ The NOP, following the so-called 
Western “revisionist” tactics, also established a National-Radical Institute, which 
in 1997 published a volume under the title The Myth of the Holocaust, consisting 
of translations from the most infamous Western Holocaust deniers. One of the 
regular contributors to Szczerbiec, Maciej Przebindowski, in 1997 went so far as 
to emulate his Western inspirers by claiming that “a group of researchers from 
the National-Radical Institute” had conducted field work at Auschwitz-Birkenau, 
concluding that the extermination in gas chambers was an impossibility.³⁵
Politicians, however, are not alone in indulging in outright Holocaust nega-
tion. The phenomenon is spread far more in publications that may or may not 
have a direct party affiliation, and in journals or weeklies translating, adopting, 
and embracing the argument of Western negationists. In 1999, a Polish historian, 
Dariusz Ratajczak, who worked as a researcher at the recently-founded Univer-
sity of Opole, was put on trial for having published a book that espoused the 
“Auschwitz lie” theory. Dangerous Topics, embracing the so-called Fred Leuch-
ter Report, claimed, among other things, that Zyklon-B gas had been used in 
the camps solely for “disinfecting” purposes. Other arguments of the improp-
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erly-called “revisionists” were also reproduced in the volume. In his defense, 
Ratajczak claimed that he did not necessarily agree with the arguments of the 
revisionists, but considered it necessary to make known all points of view on the 
Holocaust. “My only objective,” he said, “was to present a phenomenon called 
‘Holocaust Revisionism,’ without an author’s commentary.” The court found the 
claim unconvincing, given Ratajczak’s own comments in the volume, but it none-
theless dismissed the case. The small number of copies (230) produced in the 
book’s first print run, it said, was too “insignificant” to cause any “serious degree 
of social harm,” and between the first and the second, larger print, Ratajczak had 
publicly distanced himself from the revisionists.³⁶ Yet just days after the verdict 
was pronounced, Ratajczak was the guest star at a political meeting organized 
by the extreme Right National Party, whose active member he was. Furthermore, 
his views were embraced and defended by such figures in the “respectable aca-
demic world” as Professor Ryszard Bender, who teaches history at the Catholic 
University of Lublin. Though he had represented the Communist Party in parlia-
ment in the 1980s, Bender later switched allegiance to the Right and was for some 
time a Senator and the chairman of the State Council on Radio and Television.³⁷ 
Bender accused the “Jewish lobby” of persecuting Ratajczak and went so far as 
to deny that Auschwitz had been an extermination camp. He was eventually dis-
ciplined by his university and Ratajczak himself was fired from the University of 
Opole. Almost instantly, he was offered a job at the Higher School of Journalism 
in Warsaw.³⁸
Criminal proceedings were also initiated in Hungary against negationists 
Albert Szabó and István Györkös. Szabó claimed that the Holocaust is a hoax and 
that European Jews have all emigrated to America. Györkös, for his part, has had 
contacts with U.S. Nazi and Austrian neo-Nazi leaders and, in his publications 
denied the Holocaust had ever been perpetrated. Both are leaders of the radical 
return Hungarianist Movement, an organization claiming descent from Szálasi’s 
Hungarian National Socialist Party-Hungarianist Movement—the official name 
of the Arrow Cross.³⁹ Szabó, leader of the Hungarian People’s Welfare Alliance 
(MNSZ), has a great number of relatives in Israel, whom he visited several times—
as fellow radical Right competitor István Csurka disclosed.⁴⁰ This may explain 
36 RFE/RL Newsline, 17 Nov. 1999; PAP, 7 Dec. 1999.
37 Pankowski, “From the Lunatic Fringe,” 78–79.
38 Ibid., 79–80.
39 Ruth Ellen Gruber, The Struggle of Memory: The Rehabilitation and Reevaluation of Fascist 
Heroes in Europe (New York 1995), 20.
40 László Karsai, “The Radical Right in Hungary, ïn The Radical Right in Central and Eastern 
Europe Since 1989, ed. Sabrina P. Ramet (University Park, Md. 1999), 133–46, p. 145.
38   Michael Shafir
why some politologists felt the need to indulge in psychiatric theorizing in this 
particular case. Together with Györkös, in March 1996, a tribunal acquitted Szabó 
of violating a law banning incitement to racial hatred and the use of prohibited 
Nazi symbols, on grounds of constitutional provisions protecting freedom of 
speech.⁴¹
In Hungary, negationist articles were quite frequently printed in the weekly 
Szent Korona and in the monthly Hunnia Füzetek. The former ceased publication 
in 1992, and its editor-in-chief, László Romhányi, was convicted in 1993 for various 
crimes, as were several members of the weekly’s staff. In 1991 Hunnia Füzetek 
carried an article by Australian-exiled Arrow Cross sympathizer Viktor Padányi, 
written in the best “scientific” tradition of Holocaust denial. The article—includ-
ing the main theses of a book Padányi had published in Australia—stated that 
out of the one-and-a-half million Jews acknowledged to have lost their lives in 
World War II, 1.2 million had been killed by the Soviets and “just” 300,000 by the 
Nazis. The latter had anyhow acted only in self-defense, because the Jews had 
“been working” for the “enemy” both inside Germany and outside its borders. 
The monthly’s editor-in-chief, Ferenc Kunszabó and one of its regular contribu-
tors, János Fodor, were charged in 1993 with “incitement against a community,” 
but the court ruled that to convict them would be tantamount to restraining the 
freedom of the press.
In Romania, translations of negationist articles were printed in both radical 
continuity and radical return publications. What is more astonishing is the 
fact that intellectual figures generally perceived to identify with democratic, 
pro-Western postures came out in defense of negationist literature dissemination. 
For example, the PRM weekly Politica serialized translations by Leonard Gavriliu 
from the French periodical Annales d’histoire révisionniste in eight consecutive 
issues between February and March 1995. The radical return publication of the 
now defunct Movement for Romania, Mişcarea, in November 1994 published an 
article by Silviu Rareş reviewing such “milestones of Holocaust contestation” as 
the works of David Irving, Maurice Bardèche, Paul Rassinier, Pierre Guillaume, 
Richard Harwood, Udo Walendy, and Ernst Zündel, as well as of Faurisson and 
Butz. Roger Garaudy’s The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, with its well-known 
negationist tunes, was welcomed not only by the radical return monthly, Puncte 
cardinale, but also by Professor Nicolae Manolescu, at that time a leading National 
Liberal Party (PNL) figure, as well as by “mainstream” journalist Cristian Tudor 
Popescu, editor-in-chief of one of Romania’s largest circulation dailies, Adevărul. 
For Popescu, criticism of Garaudy’s works abroad amounted to nothing less than 
41 OMRI Daily Digest, 5 and 11 Mar. 1996.
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questioning “freedom of thought” and the condemnation of The Founding Myths 
was on par with passing sentence on Descartes.⁴²
On its outer cover, the Romanian version of Garaudy’s book carried the 
author’s reactions to the protests with which the volume was met: “It is not my 
fault if those who accuse me have set up a world-business specializing in selling 
their grandparents’ bones.” The book had landed its author before a court of 
justice in France—he was sentenced to a 120,000 Francs fine—and its Swiss 
distributor came before a similar court in Switzerland. If the book’s Romanian 
defenders could argue, as Manolescu did, that Garaudy did not entirely negate 
the Holocaust in The Founding Myths, having only objected to “some exaggera-
tions,” the claim could no longer be made for a 1999 translation of his volume—
The Trial of Israeli Zionism: Unmasking the International Zionist Conspiracy, in 
which the negationist argument is fully embraced.⁴³
No one among Romanian authors embraced more eagerly and more fully the 
negationist argument than Radu Theodoru. A former air force officer, founding 
member of the PRM, and for some time one of Tudor’s deputies, Theodoru was 
expelled from the PRM after he quarreled with Tudor. For a brief period in 1993, he 
became chairman of the extraparliamentary Party of Social Democratic Unity but 
eventually dedicated himself fully to the negationist cause, occasionally combin-
ing this obsession with attacks on the country’s Hungarian minority—depicted as 
being “in league” with the Jews.⁴⁴
Theodoru is an “honest negationist.” “I am the partisan of the revisionist 
school headed by the French scientist [sic!] Robert Faurisson,” he wrote in 1995 
in the weekly Europa. He added that Faurisson “is the victim of disgusting moral 
and physical pressures, only for having questioned the existence of the gas cham-
bers.” Theodoru then proceeded to produce the list of Western negationists and 
their main “demonstrations,” starting with the “Leuchter Report,” and then going 
back to Léon Degrelle, the leader of the Belgian Rexist Fascist movement and his 
1979 “open letter” to Pope John Paul II. In that letter, Degrelle—who served as a 
volunteer in the Walonia Waffen SS unit on the Eastern front—claimed that as an 
eyewitness he could testify that there had been neither gas chambers nor any 
42 Cristian Tudor Popescu, “Cazul Garaudy: Libertatea gândirii taxată drept antisemitism,” 
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mass annihilation of Jews in Hitler’s Third Reich and in the territories occupied by 
Germany. The Jews, he insisted, had been killed by American and British bomb-
ings.⁴⁵ Degrelle produced two “comparative columns” which demonstrate that 
the “real genocide was that committed by the British-American bombings, by the 
two American A-bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by the mass assassinations 
in Hamburg and Dresden” and not at Auschwitz, used by “Zionist propaganda to 
squeeze out of defeated Germany fabulous amounts of money.” It was “Zionist 
propaganda” that had “imposed on [international] public opinion the fabulous 
number of six million assassinated Jews.” According to Theodoru, however, the 
“revisionist school” “demonstrates” that the number of victims packed into a 
gas chamber could physically never have reached the number of gassed victims 
attributed to the Nazis. As is well known, this is one of Faurisson’s main claims. 
The “revisionist school” he wrote, is nothing short of “an A-bomb thrown by con-
scientious historians on the propagandistic construct put in place by the crafts-
men of the Alliance Israélite Universelle.” The “school” had “demonstrated that 
at Auschwitz and the other camps no genocide by gassing had occurred.” The 
“revisionists” had succeeded in raising basic questions about the “‘tribute’ paid 
by postwar Germany to Israel and world Jewish organizations—from pensions to 
all sorts of subventions.”⁴⁶
The article in Europa was said to be the first in a serialized new book by The-
odoru, whose title was announced as Romania, the World and the Jews. The book 
itself was published in 1997, but under the title Romania as Booty, and it appar-
ently sold well enough for a second, enlarged version, to be brought out by a 
different publisher in 2000, with the article in Europa serving as the volume’s 
introduction.⁴⁷
But Romania as Booty by no means exhausted Theodoru’s outright nega-
tionist offensive. In a volume published in 2000, whose title was obviously of 
Garaudian inspiration, he further expanded on the argument. In Zionist Nazism, 
Theodoru told his readers the Holocaust has been turned into “the most prof-
itable Jewish business” that ever existed, a business that has “enriched the 
so-called witnesses, who fabricated a series of aberrant exaggerations and patho-
logical descriptions of life in Nazi camps.” The managers of that “business” had 
“introduced the Holocaust in school curricula, Ph.D.s were being written on the 
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subject, writers engaged in fiction on the topic make a nice profit from it,” and 
“so-called documentary movies such as [Claude Lanzmann’s] Shoah. There were 
nothing but subtle or gross mystifications” alongside the holding of “so-called 
scientific conferences” and articles in the mass media. This profiteering combina-
tion managed to “set in place a complex system of misinformation, of brain-wash-
ing, of psychological pressure” and “succeeded in imposing forgery as an emo-
tional reality.” The reaction of “human dignity” to this state of affairs, Theodoru 
went on to write, “is called Historical Revisionism” and its courageous partisans 
had been turned into “the target of Nazi Zionism, which employs against revi-
sionist historians physical terror, media lynching, judicial terror, assassination 
attempts, social isolation, economic strikes.” The revisionist output “analyses 
the whole Nuremberg trial, proving that it has been a trial of the revenge of the 
victors over the vanquished. I myself characterize it as the trial of German Nazism 
by Zionist Nazism. To be more precise, the trial staged by Judaic Nazism against 
Aryan Nazism. Nothing but a scuffle among racists.”⁴⁸
Deflective Negationism
Such radical negationism generally remains on the fringe, but “deflective nega-
tionism” is far more diffuse. Rather than negating the Holocaust, it transfers the 
guilt for the perpetration of crimes to members of other nations, or minimizes the 
role of one’s own nation to the level of a mere “aberration.” It is self-defensive, 
and particularistic rather than universal. It is possible to distinguish between 
several sub-categories of deflective negation, according to its target. Restricting 
perpetration of mass murder to the Germans is the easiest and perhaps most 
natural form of deflective negationism. Next comes the deflection of guilt onto 
allegedly insignificant aberrations, especially by “collaborators.” Last but by 
no means least, guilt for the Holocaust is also deflected on the Jews themselves. 
All three sub-categories involve, at the same time, a conscious or unconscious 
amount of “Holocaust minimization,” such as we also find in the comparative 
trivialization of the Shoah.
The Polish story is perhaps the most dramatic, for they were victims and 
“bystanders” at one and the same time. The former dimension is deeply imbedded 
in collective memory; the latter is often subject to deflection. As Steinlauf aptly 
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formulated it, the Communist-induced legacy of ignoring the Jewish dimension 
of the Holocaust has meant that for decades, its meaning “had become Polish vic-
timization by the Holocaust” (author’s emphasis).⁴⁹ In addition, victimization in 
the “imagined” Polish community is perhaps more pronounced than elsewhere, 
undoubtedly reflecting objective historical facts.⁵⁰ When literature professor Jan 
Błoński in 1987 first called on his countrymen to “stop being defensive, plead-
ing innocence” about the Holocaust and “accept our responsibility,” his call, as 
expected, met with harsh reactions. For it was not easy to demolish the myth 
that had transformed the genuine sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Polish tol-
erance of the Jews into one claiming that “that tradition continued uninterrupted 
over the centuries.”⁵¹ “We welcomed Jews to our home, but made them live in the 
basement,” Błoński wrote, adding (in an obvious reference to the Emancipation) 
that “When they sought to enter the drawing room, we promised we would let 
them in on the condition that they would stop being Jews, or ‘become civilized,’ 
as the expression went in nineteenth century Poland, but certainly not only in 
Poland.” However, “When some Jews expressed willingness to follow this advice, 
we started talking about a Jewish invasion.” Then came the Holocaust, when “we 
lost our home and the occupiers began killing Jews on its premises. How many 
of us decided that this was none of our business? There were also those (I leave 
criminals out of account) who secretly were glad that Hitler solved the Jewish 
‘problem’ for us.” Does this, Błoński asked, amount to “complicity in genocide?” 
The definitive answer, he believed, was negative. “Why talk about genocide, 
then? About complicity? My answer is this: taking part and complicity are not 
the same thing. One may be associated in guilt without actually taking part in the 
crime.” The Holocaust in Poland, according to Błoński, would have been “made 
more difficult” on its perpetrators, were it not for the “indifference and moral 
paralysis [of] the society that witnessed it.”⁵²
Błoński’s article was a landmark in the evolution of both Polish-Jewish 
relations and Polish attitudes toward the Holocaust. To review that evolution is 
beyond the focus of this study. But as Polish historian Dariusz Stola has noted, 
by the 1990s, the debate in Poland on the Holocaust had increasingly turned into 
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Polish-Polish debates, contrary to the previous decades, when they had been 
mostly Polish-Jewish controversies. Many Poles are nowadays ready to face the 
seemingly irreconcilable equation that “a victim can sometimes be a victimizer” 
and that Nazi intentions towards the Poles were inhuman, but still different from 
the plan of the “Final Solution” of the Jewish question.
Deflective negationism is nonetheless a tempting option. Nothing illustrated 
this better than the reactions to the publication (in 2000 in Poland, in 2001 in the 
West) of Jan T. Gross’s account of the July 1941 massacre of Jedwabne’s 1,600-strong 
Jewish community by their Polish neighbors.⁵³ The massacre had been subjected 
to confinement in the Communist “black hole of history.” Indeed, Gross’s book 
does not reveal facts that were unknown in the first decade of Poland’s Commu-
nist rule—it only provides additional information on them. Neither does the book 
in any way generalize Jedwabne into an accusation of overall Polish complicity 
in the Nazi crimes, though Jedwabne was actually not a singular case. Four days 
earlier, close to 1,000 Jews were killed by their neighbors in the nearby town of 
Radziłów. Some of the Jedwabne massacre perpetrators had, in fact, been put on 
trial and convicted in 1949 and in 1953, with one death sentence pronounced but 
never carried out.⁵⁴ The monument put on site by the Communists in the 1960s 
acknowledged the Jewish identity of the victims, but claimed that “Gestapo and 
Hitlerite gendarmes burned alive 1,600 people.”⁵⁵ A similar inscription was put in 
place in Radziłów, whose Jewish victims were said to have perished at the hand 
of the Fascists.⁵⁶ Nothing could be further from the truth. Most of Jedwabne’s 
victims were forced into a barn that was set on fire by their Polish neighbors. The 
Germans were certainly present in the vicinity, but ironically, the German mili-
tary post not far from Jedwabne was the safest place for the Jews to seek refuge 
in, some owing their lives—for the time being at least—to that military post.⁵⁷ 
There were, according to Gross, less than a dozen German soldiers in Jedwabne 
when the atrocity was committed, and they did no more than take photographs 
of it. According to the account of a Jewish eyewitness, the same had happened in 
Radziłów, where the arrival of German soldiers saved the lives of eighteen Jews.⁵⁸ 
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A few other Jews were saved in both places by local Poles who hid them from the 
wrath of their neighbors.
The Jedwabne memorial was replaced in 2001 with another marker, in a cer-
emony boycotted (for reasons yet to be discussed) not only by the town’s pop-
ulation—with the exception of its mayor—but also by the Catholic Church. The 
ceremony was attended by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who apologized 
for the crime “as a citizen, and as president of the Republic of Poland.”⁵⁹ But the 
new memorial still eschews identifying the perpetrators. It is erected “in memory 
of the Jews of Jedwabne and surrounding areas, men, women, and children, fel-
low-dwellers of this land, murdered and burned alive at this site on 10 July 1941.”⁶⁰ 
On the eve of the ceremony, a Western agency reported that a sign on the door of 
a Jedwabne grocery store read: “We do not apologize. It was the Germans who 
murdered Jews in Jedwabne. Let the slanderers apologize to the Polish nation.” It 
was signed by the “Committee for the Defense of the Good name of Poland,” an 
organization close to the ultraconservative League of Polish Families.⁶¹
Deflective negationism is also prompted by the pursuit of immediate or short-
term popularity by politicians. That they may oscillate, even contradict them-
selves in their own pronouncements on the Holocaust is therefore no surprise. 
Each pronouncement is aimed at serving the immediate needs of the hour. Former 
Polish President Lech Wałęsa, for example, in an apparent spontaneous addi-
tion to his prepared speech, when addressing the Israeli Knesset in 1991 added 
“Please forgive us,” triggering the applause of the Israeli parliamentary deputies, 
but also the wrath of many of his countrymen. In 1995, when Poland observed the 
fiftieth anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, Wałęsa knew better. Presiding 
over ceremonies in Kraków’s Jagiellonian University on the morning of January 
26, and in the afternoon over a gathering of Nobel Peace Prize laureates, Wałęsa 
made no specific reference to Jews or the Holocaust. The inscription at Auschwitz 
had, in the meantime, changed—but not so the mentality of an electorate brought 
up in the belief that the Holocaust was, above all, one of the Polish nation. 
Indeed, a public opinion poll released in that year showed that 47 percent of 
Wałęsa’s countrymen believed that Auschwitz was, above all, the place of Polish 
martyrdom and only 8 percent were of the opinion that most of the victims there 
had been Jews. It was only in late afternoon, when ceremonies took place at Aus-
chwitz itself, and after protracted negotiations with the world Jewish leaders who 
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were present, that Wałęsa amended a prepared speech, adding “especially the 
Jewish nation” after having originally deplored the “suffering of many nations.”⁶²
Another example in point is provided by Hungarian Premier Viktor Orbán and 
by his entourage. Orbán emulated the policies of his predecessor, József Antall, 
who was of the opinion that if Holocaust issues in post-Communist Hungary must 
be addressed at all, they should concentrate on Hungarian rescuers of Jews rather 
than on the Jewish suffering and decimation.⁶³ Antall, of course, had a personal 
stake in this issue. He was the son of a “Righteous Among the Nations,” and pre-
cisely because of that, he could not be suspected of antisemitism.⁶⁴ But he was 
undoubtedly aware that the electorate to which he would appeal was generally 
inclined to idealize Hungary’s pre-Communist past and tended to regard Jews as 
perpetrators of Hungary’s own martyrdom at the hand of Communists. Moreover, 
not many Hungarians were willing to regard the Jews as victims of their country-
men’s antisemitic passions. Ministers of his cabinet attended the 1993 ceremony 
of reinterment of Horthy’s remains and Antall himself later visited the grave. 
Before doing so, the premier referred to Admiral Horthy as having been a “Hun-
garian patriot” who “should be placed in the community of the nation and the 
awareness of the people.”⁶⁵
Not that Horthy should be placed in the same “league” as Antonescu, Tiso, or 
Pavelić. Yet no less than 550,000 Jews were exterminated in “Greater Hungary.” 
Most of them perished before the Germans deposed Horthy in October 1944. The 
harsh anti-Jewish legislation enacted under his rule, the loss of life of between 
40,000 and 45,000 so-called “labor servicemen,” the murder of “alien” Jews 
deported to Kamenets-Podolski in 1941, and the massacres in and around Újvidék 
in 1942 cannot be laid at the door of the Germans. True, the extermination of the 
bulk of Hungarian Jewry had long been delayed, and Horthy may have personally 
played some role in that delay and in briefly halting deportations to Auschwitz 
in July 1944.⁶⁶ But when it occurred—mostly after the German occupation of the 
country in March 1944, the deadly deportations were executed with astonishing 
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efficiency involving the large-scale collaboration of the Hungarian authorities, 
particularly the gendarmerie.⁶⁷ At least nominally, Horthy was still head of state 
(“Regent”) throughout a good part of that period. Not that Antall (himself a histo-
rian) or his successor were unaware of these facts. But the two were responding to 
the electorate’s ignorance or prejudices regarding the Holocaust in pursuit both 
of political popularity and creating a post-Communist identity.
In 1998, after a visit to the Hungarian pavilion in the Auschwitz exhibit, 
Orbán, decided to reconstruct the pavilion which had been built by the Commu-
nist regime, finding it both inappropriate and neglected. The plans, submitted 
by a commission headed by István Ihász, a museologist with well-known nation-
alist credentials, were little else than “a pro-Horthy apologia designed to sani-
tize the Nazi era in general and the Hungarian involvement in the Final Solution 
in particular.” The commission envisaged portraying the “virtual symbiosis of 
Hungarian Jewish life since the emancipation of Jews in 1867, downplaying the 
many anti-Jewish manifestations as mere aberrations in the otherwise chivalrous 
history of Hungary. It focused attention on the positive aspects of Jewish life, the 
flourishing of the Jewish community between 1867 and 1944, the rescue activities 
of those identified as Righteous, and Horthy’s saving of the Jews of Budapest.” At 
the same time, the planned exhibition “blamed almost exclusively the Germans 
for the destruction of the Jews.”⁶⁸ The exhibition was canceled after protests 
from the country’s Federation of Jewish Communities. Reacting to the decision, a 
spokesman of the federation said the country’s Jewish communities did not wish 
to see the project halted, but “to see it is done right.”⁶⁹
It was Orbán’s advisor Mária Schmidt, who shortly thereafter again triggered 
the community’s protests, after stating in a Le Pen-like manner that the Holocaust 
had been but a “marginal issue” of the history of World War II. Yet Orbán issued 
a statement largely exonerating Schmidt and expressing his “full confidence” in 
her.⁷⁰ Schmidt had some sort of “vested interest” when she made the statement. 
She had been a leading member of the commission that attempted to “cleanse” 
out of the Auschwitz exhibit the Horthy atrocities against the Hungarian Jews.⁷¹
Deflective negationism is also manifest in Hungary (but not only there) under 
the form of transforming the Nazi-allied country into a victim of the Germans, 
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or, as Braham put it, “turning Germany’s last ally into its last victim.”⁷² All these 
manifestations emerged from the option of Antall’s Hungarian Democratic Forum 
(MDF) to display historic continuity—one later embraced by Orbán’s Alliance of 
Young Democrats (FIDESZ) as well.
Deflective negationism is also embraced in Hungary by the radical Hungar-
ian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), which, for all practical purposes, became an 
ally of FIDESZ after the 1998 parliamentary elections. Like the conservatives, 
MIÉP leader Csurka acknowledges and deplores the Holocaust, but even more 
than them, denies any Hungarian responsibility for it, branding anyone who does 
so a “traitor” whose only aim is to tarnish the reputation of the Hungarian people 
and break its self-respect. While Csurka displayed a “concealed, coded” antisem-
itism and his remarks on the Holocaust were frequently aimed at brandishing 
the spectre of “Jewish revenge” on an “innocent” Hungary, the conservative dis-
course of the József Antall and Viktor Orbán governments was not antisemitic 
“in terms of intentions.” It “honestly” condemned the persecution of Jews and 
it considered the Holocaust to have been “a tragic event in Hungarian history.” 
However, since these governments strove to demonstrate the historical continuity 
of anti-Communist conservatism as the most important character-istic of the Hun-
garian political system prior to the German occupation, this conservative type of 
discourse also ended up being deflective. While there is a distinction between 
“political antisemitism” (the MIÉP type of discourse) and “historical conserva-
tism” (the MDF-FIDESZ discourse), both are liable to fall down in confronting the 
dark episodes in the national heritage.
Romanian deflective negationism shares with Hungary the drive to transform 
the country into a victim, rather than a state sharing the antisemitic credo of the 
Nazis, and participating in the perpetration of massive crimes. Unlike Hungary, 
however, the drive to do so in Romania dates back to Communist times. In 1986, 
for instance, the Bucharest weekly Luceafărul was telling its readers that “the 
main feature of the Holocaust in northern Transylvania was anti-Romanian and 
not antisemitic.”⁷³ After the fall of the former regime, a carefully selective collec-
tion of documents from the State Archives was published under the title Romania, 
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the Great Victim of World War Two.⁷⁴ The roots of this perception lie in the Com-
munist period.
In the post-Communist period, at least two Romanian historians acknowl-
edged Romanian responsibility for the perpetrated massacres. Dinu Giurescu 
concluded that 108,000 Romanian Jews were exterminated by the Romanian 
authorities but his figures do not include the extermination carried out among 
Ukrainian Jews.⁷⁵ Florin Constantiniu estimated the destruction (apparently of 
both) at “some 200,000.”⁷⁶ Andrei Pippidi tended to accept as more accurate 
the estimate of 120,000 by German historian Christa Zach.⁷⁷ Jewish historians of 
Romanian origin residing in the United States or in Israel have produced figures 
that are considerably higher. Radu Ioanid estimates that some 250,000 Jews (as 
well as some 20,000 Roma) perished at the hands of the Romanian authorities, 
whereas Jean Ancel came up with an estimate of 410,000, of which 170,000 are 
Ukrainian Jews.⁷⁸ In its Final Report of 2005, the International Commission on 
the Holocaust in Romania concluded that “between 280,000 and 380,000 Roma-
nian and Ukrainian Jews were murdered or died during the Holocaust in Romania 
and the territories under its control. An additional 135,000 Romanian Jews living 
under Hungarian control in Northern Transylvania also perished in the Holo-
caust.”⁷⁹
As part of its analysis, the Final Report critically examined all forms of dis-
tortion, negationism, and minimalization of the Holocaust in postwar Romania 
in addition to clarifying the facts concerning the actual scale of Romanian partic-
ipation in the mass murders during World War II.⁸⁰
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*  *  *
A slightly more versatile form of deflective negationism consists in admitting 
some national participation in crimes, but considering the perpetrators to have 
been “on the fringe” in the country’s otherwise spotless history of relations with 
the Jews. In Hungary, the “aberration” is considered to be Arrow-Cross Nyilas; 
in Romania the role is played by the Legiune, as the Iron Guard was also called. 
For Ceauşescu-inspired historiography, the Iron Guard had nothing Romanian 
about itself, it only “slavishly emulated its Hitlerite tutors” and indulged into 
“antisemitic diversionism.”⁸¹ The treatment by the Communists, as well as by the 
post-Communists, of the pogrom carried out in Iaşi in late June 1941 is an example 
of deflection to fringe. In this particular case, however, the “fringe” is said to have 
collaborated as perpetrators with the Germans.
The fact that President Ion Iliescu would embrace the “fringe approach” was, 
however, somewhat unexpected. Iliescu’s contortionist exercises in dealing with 
the legacy of the Holocaust are worth contemplating. In a speech at the Coral 
Temple in Bucharest on January 21, 2001, marking the sixtieth anniversary of 
the Iron Guard pogrom in Bucharest, the president said the Iron Guardist “aber-
ration” had been a “delirium of intolerance and anti-Semitism.” Yet, he added, 
that brief “delirium” excepted, there has been no Romanian contribution to “the 
long European history” of persecution of the Jews, and it was “significant” that 
there was “no Romanian word for pogrom.” Furthermore, he hastened to add, it 
was “unjustified to attribute to Romania an artificially inflated number of Jewish 
victims for the sake of media impact.” Romania’s distorted image, according to 
Iliescu, was likely to be corrected when “Romanian [i.e., rather than Jewish] his-
torians will tackle the subject.”⁸²
Hardly six months had passed, however, when Iliescu’s “unique aberration” 
of 1941 grew slightly larger. With Romania banging on NATO’s doors, and despite 
the protests in the United States and Israel triggered by the Antonescu cult in 
Romania, Iliescu attended a ceremony marking the Iaşi pogrom where he felt 
compelled to declare that “no matter what we may think, international public 
opinion considers Antonescu to have been a war criminal.”⁸³ Iliescu’s statement 
in Iaşi triggered protests not only from the PRM, but also from among members 
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of his own party, such as Senator Adrian Păunescu.⁸⁴ Back in 1993, both the PRM 
and Păunescu (at that time first deputy chairman of the Socialist Labor Party) 
had harshly criticized Iliescu for having participated in ceremonies marking the 
Holocaust at the Coral Temple. The PRM protested earlier that year when Iliescu 
had attended the opening of the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, 
where, so it claimed, the “Romanian people” was unjustifiably accused of having 
participated in the Holocaust against Jews.⁸⁵ However, at a speech dedicated to 
Holocaust Remembrance Day in Romania on 12 October 2004, President Iliescu 
declared himself fully committed to learning the lessons of the Holocaust and 
disseminating them in school curricula, through the media, and to the younger 
generation. This would not only render overdue homage to the Jewish community 
of Romania, but be of fundamental importance in developing the democratic con-
science and civic spirit of the Romanian nation.
Such declarations are an important development, but they have not been able 
to overcome the persistence and revival of Holocaust denial in post-Communist 
Eastern Europe. This syndrome is often linked to suspicions of “anti-Polonism,” 
“anti-Romanianism,” “anti-Lithuanianism” or “anti-Hungarianism,” in a word, 
to a Jewish conspiracy to accuse or make culpable the nation as a whole. Cardi-
nal Glemp had, for example, blamed Jews in the past for using the Holocaust in 
the cause of “anti-Polonism.” “We want,” Glemp told journalists on the eve of 
the 2001 Jedwabne commemoration, “to apologize for all the evil that was per-
petrated by Polish citizens on citizens of the Judaic faith” in Jedwabne. However, 
Glemp added, “we want to include in our prayers the other evil, that was perpe-
trated on Polish citizens of the Catholic faith, and in which Poles of the Judaic 
faith had a part.”⁸⁶
Apologetics is still rampant, not only in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, but 
also in countries like Slovakia. Stefan Polaković—a leading ideologist of Slovak 
“clerico-fascism”—argues that the Hlinka Slovak People’s Party (HSĽS) and 
Tiso himself cannot be blamed for the party’s eventual emulation of National 
Socialism. Polaković was active in the United States as a prominent leader of the 
Slovak Liberation Committee.⁸⁷ Like other postwar exiled leaders, he frequently 
visited Slovakia, participating in conferences and symposia aimed at “cleans-
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ing” Tiso’s reputation and that of the state he headed. In an article published 
in the “respectable” Literárny týždennik in early 1993 under the title “What was 
Populism all about?,” Polaković argued that the HSĽS’ “populism” was, and 
continues to be, wrongly associated with Nazism. In fact, he claims, association 
with Nazi Germany was only a “cosmetic defect” and Tiso’s Catholic state would 
have entered the annals of respectable statehood, were it not for what he calls 
in a euphemism “the deterioration of the political situation” after 1939. By that 
he means the emulation of National Socialism, the introduction of anti-Jewish 
measures, and the subsequent deportations of Jews to extermination camps, 
though Polaković never calls the child by its name. It was, he claims, the fault of 
Prime Minister Vojtech Tuka and that of Hlinka Guard commander-in-chief Alex-
ander Mach that “tainted the image of modern Slovak statehood.” It was Tuka 
who embarked upon an emulation of National Socialism and “triggered off the 
inhumane solution of the Jewish issue.” But in the same breath, Polaković also 
argues that Nazism in Slovakia had been merely “formal,” inasmuch as the HSĽS 
was a single party with a “leader” at its head and the Hlinka Guard members 
were wearing uniforms.⁸⁸ Much of the same argument was brought out during 
his lectures in Slovakia by Dr. Jozef M. Kirschbaum, a major figure in Slovakia’s 
wartime government and the secretary-general of Tiso’s Party of National Unity: 
he insisted that there was no antisemitism in the Slovak state, and the “Jewish 
question” was solely in the hands of the Germans and Tuka.⁸⁹
Deflecting guilt for the Holocaust onto the Germans alone and deflecting it 
to the “fringe,” in theory at least, does not have to involve antisemitic postures. 
Shifting the guilt to the Jews, however, is undoubtedly a reflection of the propen-
sity. One can practically find in its different variations all the well-established 
forms of antisemitism, ranging from religious to the politically reactive in such 
manoeuvres. This syndrome includes the widely popular argument that the Jews 
provoked the Holocaust because of their deep involvement with Communism. 
Also frequent at “scientific” colloquia, in volumes and in articles in the press 
produced by the defenders of extreme nationalism and/or its interwar record, is 
the deicidal justification of the Holocaust. In a 719-page volume produced in 1997 
by the Friends of President Tiso in Slovakia and Abroad association and similar 
groups in Slovakia itself, we learn from a chapter “On the Jewish Question” that 
the Holocaust was the price the Jews had to pay for having crucified Jesus Christ. 
There is, however, room for hope. According to Jozef Štítničan, in an article called 
“The Jewish Tragedy,” he writes that the Jews “over-valued themselves, believing 
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they are more than the others.” They thought that with the help of their Messiah, 
they would be able to rule the world. To this day, Jews still believe they are the 
chosen people. Even after “annihilation in the gas chambers,” they believe this 
and have “set up a state for themselves,” to which they have no right. They can, 
however, be saved if “we win them over to collaborate in Christ’s design.”⁹⁰ In a 
similarly-argued article in the PRM weekly România mare in 1993, a Romanian 
lady was writing that the criminal structure of the Jews is reflected in “the cruci-
fixion of Christ” and their consequently being “a deicidal people.”⁹¹
Another “explanation” for the Holocaust is taken straight from the “ency-
clopedia” of conspiracy theories, claiming that “world Jewish power produced 
Hitler.” Áron Mónus, the publisher of the Hungarian translation of Mein Kampf, 
makes this argument in an epilogue to the volume, as well as in a book he 
authored under the title Conspiracy: The Empire of Nietzsche. The title of the first 
chapter in the volume is conclusive in itself: “Freemasonry Encouraged the Holo-
caust.” Chapter two asserts that “Adolf Hitler Was in the Pay of Jewish Freema-
sons,” and the following chapter is on “Adolf Hitler, the Quack Zionist Agent.” 
Similar views come out of Slovakia. According to an article on Freemasonry in 
Zmena in 1992, international Jewry and Zionism nurtured Hitler and provoked the 
war in order to facilitate the setting up of the Jewish state. This was also the argu-
ment of historian Arvéd Grébert’s contribution to the 1992 volume, An Attempt at 
a Political Profile of Jozef Tiso. It was Zionism itself that had the greatest interest 
in provoking antisemitism in order to prepare the ground for claiming the State 
of Israel. Róbert Letz, a senior lecturer at Bratislava’s Comenius University also 
blames Zionism, but from a different perspective. Were it not for Zionism, Jews 
would have assimilated and the Holocaust could have been avoided.⁹² Ladislav 
Pittner, who was Slovak Interior Minister representing the KDH till May 2001, 
and whose father was a committed Tiso supporter, argued similarly in 1998 that 
Zionism might have been behind the pogroms in Russia in order to convince Jews 
to leave for Palestine. Pittner went on to “reveal” that German Admiral Wilhelm 
Canaris had “very clear documentation indicating that Hitler and Himmler had 
Jewish ancestors.”⁹³ In Romania, Theodoru argued that Hitler had been “merely a 
puppet” in Jewish hands, and writer Ioan Buduca concurred, seeing antisemitism 
90 Mešťan Anti-Semitism in Slovak Politics, 182–83.
91 Cited in Voicu Zeii cei ră i, 128–29.
92 Mešťan, Anti-Semitism in Slovak Politics, 85, 119–20, 144.
93 Cited in ibid., 194.
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as a Zionist ploy to advance the purpose of Jewish emigration.⁹⁴ Others, like Ilie 
Neacşu, editor-in-chief of the weekly Europa, blamed the Holocaust on the “fact” 
that after World War I, the descendants of Judah had become masters over the 
German economy, culture, and politics.⁹⁵
Many library shelves would be needed to store the countless number of books 
and articles in media outlets (many of them identified with pro-Western postures) 
that “explain” Holocaust-related events in Romania through such reactive ratio-
nalizations. From outright negationists like Theodoru to the “selective negation-
ists,” there is agreement that Jewish disloyalty is what had triggered Antonescu’s 
reactive massacre of Jews. The main argument rests on the large-scale support 
allegedly rendered by Jews to the Soviet occupation forces in Bessarabia and 
northern Bukovina in 1940, and on the alleged Jewish participation not only in 
humiliating or torturing the retreating Romanian army, but in the physical liqui-
dation of Romanian military personnel. Viewed from this perspective, the July 
1940 Dorohoi and Galaţi pogroms, the pogrom in Iaşi, the atrocities committed in 
Transnistria (whenever they are acknowledged, even in minimalist terms) can all 
be explained in terms of self-defense and/or spontaneous revenge on the Jews for 
their deeds in 1940. The latest in a long series of such arguments has come from 
Paris, where exiled writer Paul Goma, the most prominent and most courageous 
dissident under Ceauşescu, put it in simplistic and grossly distorted, terms: in the 
beginning, there was anti-Romanianism.⁹⁶
The reactive explanation was quite clearly backed from the outset in post-Com-
munist Romania by historians who under the previous regime had worked for the 
Communist Party’s Institute of History, or for Army’s Center for the Research and 
Study of Military History and Theory headed by the executed president’s brother, 
Ilie Ceauşescu. It figured prominently in a volume published in 1992 by two 
Romanian historians from the army’s own Academy for Higher Military Studies.⁹⁷ 
It was also prominently displayed in a volume by historian Gheorghe Buzatu as a 
sequel to a tome on the Second World War’s “secret history” published in the last 
94 Ioan Buduca, “Care-i buba? (Where’s the sore point?),” România literară 15 (22–28 April 
1998).
95 Ilie Neacşu, “Rabinul suferă de hemoroizi” (The rabbi suffers from hemorrhoids), Europa, 
6–13 April 1993.
96 Paul Goma, “Basarabis şi problema” (Bessarabia and the problem), Vatra, nos. 3–4 (2002): 
34–41; nos. 5–6 (2002): 32–46.
97 Ioan Scurtu and Constantin Hlihor, Anul 1940: Drama românilor dintre Prut şi Nistru (1940: 
The drama of Romanians between the rivers Prut and Dniester) (Bucharest 1992).
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years of Communist rule.⁹⁸ By then, the latter author’s views on the Holocaust 
had already acquired notoriety. They were succinctly expressed by the title of a 
booklet Buzatu published with the Iron Guardist publishing house Majadahonda. 
Rather than being a perpetrator of the Holocaust, Romania had been its victim. 
It had undergone a Holocaust at the hand of the Jews, and the year 1940 marked 
its beginning.⁹⁹ The booklet would eventually become a separate chapter in a 
volume based on research Buzatu had conducted in Soviet archives.¹⁰⁰ Although 
this tome purports to deal with Romanians in the Kremlin’s Archives, most of its 
“heroes” are Jews who served Soviet power and would later become prominent 
leaders in post–World War II Romania.
This leads me to a particularly obnoxious form of deflective manipulation in 
which Jews are themselves the perpetrators of the Holocaust. In his Wastelands 
of Historical Truth (1988), late Croatian President Franjo Tudjman, who claimed 
to be a historian among his other callings, set out to exonerate his fellow Croats 
from responsibility for participation in the Holocaust.¹⁰¹ The infamous Jasenovac 
concentration camp, where several tens of thousands of Serbs, Jews, and Roma 
perished during the Pavelić regime, was for Tudjman a “myth” blown out of all 
proportion. Its main purpose was to back the theory of “the genocidal nature of 
every and any Croat nationalism,” to “create a black legend of the historical guilt 
of the entire Croat people, for which they must still make restitution.” (Similar 
efforts at “unmasking” of alleged “culpabilization” of the nation as a whole were, 
as we have seen, present in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania). Tudjman nonethe-
less stood out in his deflectionist postures, which were not very far from outright 
negationism. This was due to his questioning of the figure of six million, which he 
deemed to be “based too much on emotionally biased testimonies, as well as on 
one-sided and exaggerated data resulting from postwar settling of accounts,” and 
to his cynical allegations that Jews had actually been the main perpetrators in 
Jasenovac. They are said to have “managed to grab all the more important jobs in 
the prisoner hierarchy,” and to have taken advantage of the fact that the Ustasha 
trusted them more than they trusted Serbs. Tudjman concluded that “The Jew 
remains a Jew, even in the Jasenovac camp.... Selfishness, craftiness, unreliabil-
ity, stinginess, deceit, are their main characteristics.” To “demonstrate” that 
98 Gheorghe Buzatu, Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial (From the secret 
history of World War II) (Bucharest 1995).
99 Gheorghe Buzatu, Aşa a început holocaustul împotriva poporului român (How the Holocaust 
against the Romanian people started) (Bucharest 1995).
100 Gheorghe Buzatu, Românii în arhivele Kremlinului (The Romanians in the Kremlin’s 
archives) (Bucharest 1996).
101 Franjo Tudjman, Wastelands of Historical Truth (1988).
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Jews rather than the Ustasha Croats were the main perpetrators, Tudjman must, 
however, make figures more plausible for prisoners to be able to accomplish the 
deed. He thus dismissed not only the 700,000 figure advanced by the Serbs, but 
also the 60,000 victims claimed by Croat historians. No more than 30–40,000 are 
said to have perished in the camp, some at the hands of the Ustasha, but most 
at the hands of Jews, who controlled the liquidation apparatus.¹⁰² In a letter to 
Croatia’s Jewish community in February 1994, Tudjman, (who had put the word 
Holocaust in quotes when implicitly criticizing world Jewry efforts to prevent Kurt 
Waldheim’s election as Austrian president), eventually apologized for these sec-
tions in his book.¹⁰³ But in subsequent revised versions of Wastelands, the basic 
argument did not much change, though the more offensive sections were some-
what diluted.¹⁰⁴
Tudjman is not a unique case in the annals of Holocaust denial. He does, 
however, stand out for having made the allegation from the position of being 
Croatia’s most prominent politician. Similar examples come from the psychically 
deranged lunatic fringe that can by no means be compared with Tudjman. In an 
article published in his native Hungary, Australian-exiled Viktor Padányi had 
also claimed that the management of the camps had fallen into Jewish hands. 
And this, according to Gabriel Hoffmann, was also the case of the Sered forced 
labor camp in Slovakia where, he claimed in a 1998 article in Zmena that he 
had been interned himself before having converted. In Sered, not only did Jews 
administer the camp themselves, but the place was run by a certain “Hauptober-
sturmführer Zimmermann,” who in reality was no one else than “the dreaded 
Simon Wiesenthal.” Wiesenthal was supposedly there with a false identity and 
wearing a German uniform. He ordered the murder of Jews suspected of collabo-
ration with the Nazis and had forced Hoffmann himself to kill prisoners by lethal 
injection.¹⁰⁵
102 Cited in Radmila Milentijevic, “Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust 
in Postcommunist Yugoslavia,” in Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in 
Postcommunist Eastern Europe, ed. Randolph L. Braham (New York 1994), 225–50, pp. 234–36.
103 See Robert S. Wistrich, Antisemitism in the New Europe (Oxford 1994), 15n; Gruber 
Struggle of Memory, 24.
104 See, for example, Franjo Tudjman, Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy (New 
York 1996).
105 Cited in Mešťan, Anti-Semitism in Slovak Politics, 188.
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Selective Negationism
Selective negationism stands somewhere between outright and deflective nega-
tionism. It does not deny the Holocaust as having taken place elsewhere, but 
excludes any participation of members of one’s own nation in its perpetration. 
The fringe ceases to exist in selective negationism. It shares with deflective nega-
tionism its prominent function of externalizing guilt. And just as outright nega-
tionists may occasionally indulge in deflective denial, deflective negationists may 
embrace the discourse of selective negation (and vice versa).
Nowhere in post-Communist East Central Europe is selective negationism 
so blatant as in Romania. According to its champions, not only was Antonescu 
innocent of any crimes against the Jews, but the Iron Guard never touched a 
Jewish hair! The Romanian champions of selective negationism are not (as one 
might have expected) semi-educated marginals. Two of the most emblematic 
figures among them are university professors, one being a historian specializ-
ing in modern Romanian history, the other teaching Romanian linguistics at the 
University of Bucharest. The Iaşi-based history professor, Gheorghe Buzatu, has 
been a deputy chairman of the PRM, deputy chairman of the Romanian Senate, 
and chairman of the Marshal Antonescu Foundation, of which Theodoru was 
executive chairman. Until September 2001 Buzatu was also director of a histori-
cal institute in Iaşi affiliated with the Romanian Academy. He was forced to resign 
from the latter position after the publication, at his own initiative and under the 
institute’s auspices, of a venomous racist and particularly antisemitic book by a 
fellow-PRM deputy.¹⁰⁶
As Buzatu put it in an interview with the Movement for Romania weekly Miş-
carea in 1995, “there has been no Holocaust in Romania during World War II,” 
with the exception of Hungary-occupied Transylvania.¹⁰⁷ Until a few years ago, 
Buzatu was, however, willing to admit that the Guard had indulged in crimes, 
though they were presented as a Romanian national reaction to the rise of Bol-
shevism and its crimes, with which Jews had been prominently associated.¹⁰⁸ As 
he put it in an article in the PRM weekly România mare: “Crime Begets Crime.”¹⁰⁹ 
He has since, however, embraced Ion Coja’s selective negationism. For Coja, an 
106 See RFE/RL Newsline, 23, 24, and 28 Aug. 2001; and Mediafax, 11 Sept. 2001.
107 Mişcarea, no. 7 (1–15 April 1995).
108 See Michael Shafir, “Marshal Antonescu’s Post-Communist Rehabilitation: Cui Bono?” in 
The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews During the Antonescu Era, ed. Randolph L. 
Braham (New York 1997), 349–410, pp. 383–84.
109 Gheorghe Buzatu, “Crima naşte crimă”(Crime begets crime), România mare, 22 Dec. 1995.
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emblematic figure in Romanian historical denial, the Iron Guard never commit-
ted any of the atrocities attributed to it. Indeed, it was not even antisemitic!¹¹⁰ 
The January 1941 pogrom by the Iron Guard in Bucharest, Coja claims, never hap-
pened. Its 120 victims, some of whom were hanged on hooks at the slaughter-
house with the inscription “Kosher meat” on them are all an invention. The best 
proof is that when the Communists took power, nobody was put on trial, although 
so many Jews were then in the party leadership. Jews may have died during the 
January uprising against Antonescu, but nobody has ever proved that the crimes 
were actually committed by the Iron Guard.¹¹¹
The assassination of historian Nicolae Iorga in those days was not commit-
ted by the Iron Guard either, but ordered by the KGB, which had infiltrated the 
movement. Moreover, according to Coja, it was a well-kept secret that the KGB 
was in the hands of the “occult.” The same “occult” elements would eventually 
order the assassination of Nicolae Ceauşescu, as indeed it would commission the 
liquidation of Romanian-born scholar Ioan Petru Culianu in the United States in 
May 1991, being aware that the scholar had discovered the secrets of the Jewish 
occult and Communist world domination.¹¹²
In mid-2001 Buzatu and Coja chaired a symposium in Bucharest whose title—
telling in itself—was “Has There Been a Holocaust in Romania?” The symposium 
was divided into two panels, the first examining the “questionable” occurrence 
of the Shoah in Romania; the second, the reasons for the existence of a “power-
fully institutionalized anti-Romanianism.” As an outcome of the second panel, a 
Romanian League for the Struggle Against Anti-Romanianism, headed by Coja, 
was set up. The symposium’s resolution was published, among other places, in 
the Iron Guardist journal Permanenţe (no. 7, July 2001) in both Romanian and 
“Pidjin English.” The document was signed “pro forma” by Coja and emblemati-
cally assumed the selective negationist posture. Its authors, it was stated, “want 
to make clear that we have nothing to do with those people and opinions contest-
ing as a whole the occurrence of the Jewish holocaust [sic!] during World War II.” 
It said that Jews “have suffered almost everywhere in the Europe [sic!] of those 
years, but not in Romania,” and it added that “the testimony of trustworthy Jews” 
demonstrates that “the Romanian people had in those years a behavior honoring 
the human dignity [sic!].”
110 See Voicu, Teme antisemite în discursul public, 117–23.
111 Ion Coja, Legionarii noştri (Our Legionnaires) (Bucharest: Editura Kogaion, 1997), 156–69.
112 Ion Coja, Marele manipulator şi asasinarea lui Culianu, Ceauşescu, Iorga (The grand 
manipulator and the assassination of Culianu, Ceauşescu, Iorga) (Bucharest 1999).
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In support of their affirmations, the participants brought several “argu-
ments.” They started by presenting excerpts from what they claimed was the 
1955 testimony before a Swiss court of the former leader of the Romanian Jewish 
Community in Romania, Wilhelm Filderman. The document has never been pro-
duced and whether it really exists at all is uncertain. The trial involved five Roma-
nian exiles who had attacked the Bucharest diplomatic representation in Bern, 
briefly took it over and in the course of the attack killed the legation’s driver. The 
authorities in Romania and abroad launched a large-scale campaign against the 
attackers and those Romanian exile personalities who testified in the attackers’ 
defense. However, Filderman’s name was never mentioned during that campaign.
Filderman is said to have told the court that “During the period of Hitler’s 
domination of Europe, I was in permanent touch with Marshal Antonescu. He 
did all he could to ease the lives of Jews exposed to Nazi Germans’ persecutions. 
I must underline that the Romanian population was not antisemitic and that the 
misfortunes suffered by the Jews were the work of the German Nazis and the Iron 
Guard. Marshal Antonescu withstood successfully the Nazi pressure that was 
imposing hard measures against the Jews.” Filderman added that owing to Anto-
nescu’s “energetic intervention,” the deportation of more than 20,000 Jews from 
Bukovina was stopped and that it was due to Antonescu’s “political strategies” 
that the assets of the Jewish people were placed under a transitionary adminis-
trative regime, making them [seemingly] appear as lost, in order to conserve them 
and ensure their future restitution at the ripe time.”
On the face of it, this might be considered a shattering testimony. In fact, it 
was an obviously misleading one, highly unlikely to have been made by a man 
familiar with all the details of the events of those years. On Antonescu’s orders, 
90,344 Bukovinian Jews had been deported to Transnistria.¹¹³ The 20,000 Buko-
vinian Jews allegedly mentioned by Filderman owed their lives to the interven-
tion of Cernăuţi Mayor Traian Popovici rather than to Antonescu.¹¹⁴ And above 
all, the Germans were never involved in the physical deportation of Jews from 
Romania, since this was entirely a Romanian-handled matter. So whom could 
Antonescu’s “energetic intervention” have possibly targeted? As for the safe-
guarding of Jewish properties with an eye to better times, it is sufficient to consult 
the many documents on Filderman’s protests and interventions to realize that, at 
113 Radu Ioanid, Evreii sub Regimul Antonescu (The Jews under the Antonescu regime). 
(Bucharest 1997), 233.
114 Matatias Carp, Cartea neagră (The black book), vols. 2–3 (Bucharest 1996).
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best, this reflected a lost memory.¹¹⁵ But it is also sufficient to read the memoirs of 
Radu Lecca, the man in charge of “Aryanizing” Jewish assets (and who claims to 
have been the “savior of Romanian Jewry” after depleting it) to be edified to what 
extent such a claim can hold.¹¹⁶
At Antonescu’s trial in 1946, Filderman testified that “The Antonescu gover-
nance resulted in the death of 150,000 Bukovinian and Bessarabian Jews,” adding 
that “the actual number of victims might be larger.” Antonescu himself said at the 
trial that according to “my own calculations, no more than 150,000–170,000 Jews 
were deported” to Transnistria.¹¹⁷ But above all, as Lya Benjamin points out, the 
testimony attributed to Filderman contradicted his entire activity and correspon-
dence with Marshal Antonescu and others during the war and in the immediate 
postwar period.¹¹⁸
In his address to the symposium as well as in his article on Marshal Anto-
nescu, Coja brought another “witness” to the stand of “Romanian innocence”: 
former Romanian Chief Rabbi Alexandru Şafran.¹¹⁹ Already in 1999, in his book, 
The Grand Manipulator, Coja had hinted that “a rabbi” who is an “important 
Jewish leader” has written a dedication on a book offered to the son of executed 
war criminal Gheorghe Alexianu, exonerating his father from any guilt. Alexianu 
was governor of Transnistria, and Coja claimed that the elderly Jewish leader had 
sworn Alexianu, Jr. to silence for as long as he was still alive, because “the poor 
man fears the reaction of the community, of his own faith brethren.” And the 
apprehension was justified, he added—“witness that Filderman has also left his 
declaration exonerating fully and definitively Marshal Antonescu only in his tes-
tament.”¹²⁰ The “old Jewish leader” was said to have offered Alexianu, Jr. a book 
with a dedication “in the memory of your illustrious father, who during his entire 
life and professional activity, but particularly during the dark period of the war, 
has done so much, wholeheartedly and generously, for the [Jewish] community. 
115 See Lya Benjamin, “Dr. Filderman şi regimul antonescian între realitate şi mistificare” (Dr. 
Filderman and the Antonescu Regime Between reality and Mystification), Buletinul Centrului, 
Muzeului şi Arhivei istorice a evreilor din România, no. 7 (2001): 40–46.
116 Radu Lecca, Eu i-am salvat pe evreii din România (I saved the Romanian Jews) (Bucharest: 
Editura Roza vânturilor, 1994).
117 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum/Serviciul Român de Informaţii, 267 (270) and 
16, respectively.
118 Benjamin, “Dr. Filderman.”
119 Ion Coja, “Simpozion internaţional: Holocaust în România” (1–7), România mare, 13 July–
24 August 2001.
120 Ion Coja, Marele manipulator, 299–300.
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He paid a terrible and totally unjustified price at the order of the Communists. 
May he be delivered from his whole suffering!”¹²¹
No explanation was offered as to how former Chief Rabbi Şafran had over-
come his apprehensions. Intrigued, the author of these lines asked a relative of 
the aging rabbi living in Geneva to clarify the authenticity of the claim. Instead 
of a response, Rabbi Şafran, who was almost immobilized by illness, directed me 
through his nephew to the relevant part of his memoirs. Alexianu, he wrote there, 
was “famous for his cruelty.”¹²²
The question has sometimes been raised as to how one should respond to the 
“negationists” or so-called historical “revisionists”who constantly claim to chal-
lenge our picture of the past. The response was provided long ago by Pierre Vidal-
Naquet: “one can and should enter into discussion concerning the ‘revisionists’... 
But one should not enter into debate with the ‘revisionists.’ It is no concern to 
me whether the ‘revisionists’ are neo-Nazi or extreme left wing in their politics: 
whether they are characterized psychologically as perfidious, perverse, paranoid 
or quite simply idiotic. I have nothing to reply to them and will not do so. Such is 
the price to be paid for intellectual coherence.”¹²³
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Joanna Michlic
The Jedwabne Debate:  
Reshaping Polish National Mythology
In recent decades, the subject of collective memory has become a compelling pre-
occupation of academics of various disciplines as well as non-academics. French 
historian Henry Rousso has pointed to memory as a “value reflecting the spirit of 
our time.”¹ One aspect of the study of collective memory is that of the “dark past” 
of nations in their relations with their ethnic and national minorities, the ways 
in which nations recollect and rework the memory of such a past, and how this 
memory impacts on each of their collective identities. Various new studies reveal 
that as with other uncomfortable memories haunting Europe, the Holocaust was 
repressed and excluded from public debate for a relatively long period of time.² 
The development of public debate on the subject was dependent on a political 
stability that permitted public reckoning, as well as the acceptance of self-crit-
icism within a particular collective culture.³ One can argue that in many former 
Baltic and East European communist states, such as Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, 
and the Ukraine, that such debates have yet to take place.
Between 2000 and 2002, Poland was the foremost national community under-
going such a prominent and profound public discussion, triggered by the publi-
cation of Neighbors by Jan Tomasz Gross, which describes the collective murder 
of the Jewish community of Jedwabne in northeastern Poland by its ethnic Polish 
neighbors on July 10, 1941. Rather than reviewing the historical events, or pro-
viding a critique of Gross’s book, I shall focus on the dominant Polish canon of 
remembering the Holocaust and wartime Polish-Jewish relations in the postwar 
collective memory and I will look at the extent to which the debate over Neighbors 
led to a critical reevaluation and rejection of that canon.
1 Henry Rousso, La hantise du passé: entretien avec Phillipe Petit (Paris, 1998), 14.
2 See studies on the collective memory of the Holocaust in Germany, such as Geoffrey 
Hartman, ed., Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington, Ind., 1986); Jeffrey Herf, 
Divided Memory. The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), and Siobhan 
Kattago, Ambiguous Memory. The Nazi Past And German National Identity (Westport, Conn., 
2001). On memory of the Holocaust in France, see, for example, Richard J. Golsan, ed., Memory, 
the Holocaust and French Justice: The Bousquet and Touvier Affairs (Dartmouth, 1996); and in 
Europe, see Judith Miller, One by One, by One Facing the Holocaust (New York, 1990).
3 The importance of self-criticism in the process of reckoning is raised by Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, 
Frames of Remembrance (New Brunswick, N.J., 1994.
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Neighbors represents what French historian Pierre Nora has termed a clear 
counter-memory to the accepted canon.⁴ No other previous work succeeded in 
triggering the endorsement of counter-memory by a considerable number of reli-
gious and political leaders, intellectuals, and a segment of the general public. 
Furthermore, other issues of Polish history and identity began to be reassessed, 
such as the attitude of the Polish state toward “others,” its policies of inclusion 
and exclusion, and patterns of social and cultural reconstruction. Among various 
right-wing ethno-national political and social groups, Neighbors set off a strongly 
defensive reinforcement of the dominant accepted canon of remembering the 
Holocaust and wartime Polish-Jewish relations. This canon, discussed in more 
detail below, is made up of various narratives which are both intellectually and 
morally disturbing. Thus the debate over Gross’s book can be viewed as a battle 
over memory and over regaining a more historically truthful image of Polish-Jew-
ish relations of the wartime period, and a more objective self-image of Polish 
society.
I use the term, the “Polish dark past,” to refer to that aspect of Polish relations 
with its Jewish minority which reflects negatively on the ethnic Polish major-
ity group as a witness to the Nazi genocide of Jews. Within this aspect I include 
anti-Jewish perceptions, beliefs and sentiments, and anti-Jewish acts carried out 
by individuals, or military and civilian groups. The massacre of the Jews of Jed-
wabne and other similar wartime massacres can be classified as coming from 
the most extreme spectrum of wrongdoing committed by members of the Polish 
majority against members of the Jewish minority. Of course, one should bear in 
mind that available wartime records, both Jewish and Polish show the collective 
massacres of Jews to be a much less frequent occurrence than the other manifes-
tations of the dark past.
At this point I must stress that I reject the notion that ethnic Poles were accom-
plices to the Nazi genocide of the Jews. Nevertheless, the dark past has been a key 
component of the history of Polish-Jewish relations during the Holocaust. This 
is a past that has refused to go away despite having been repressed and rejected 
from the social history of Poland for nearly sixty years. I also view this past as an 
interesting illustration of a general problem—the treatment of unwanted ethnic 
minorities in multi-ethnic societies during conditions of war and occupation.
4 For reflections on history, memory, and counter memory, see Pierre Nora, “General 
Introduction: Between Memory and History” in Realms of Memory: The Construction of the 
French Past (in English) ed. Laurence D. Kritzman, vol. 1: Conflicts and Divisions (New York, 
1997). The article first appeared in English translation as “Between Memory and history; Les 
Lieux de mémoire,” Representations 26 (Spring 1989): 13–25.
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Public Memory of the Holocaust  
in communist Poland
During the postwar communist era, the memory of the Holocaust and of Pol-
ish-Jewish relations was subjected to a massive process of reworking and manip-
ulation in the service of various political, ideological, and social needs. As a 
result, a particular representation of the Holocaust was constructed, and this was 
the accepted canon of remembering the event in Polish collective memory. It was 
expressed and cultivated at cultural events and commemorative sites, and in offi-
cial governmental speeches and historical narratives after 1945.
The process of reworking the memory of the Holocaust had already begun 
during the Stalinist period (1948–1953), at a time when the event was not per-
ceived as a convenient subject for the newly-imposed Communist regime either 
in Poland or other East European communist states, such as East Germany. The 
genocide of Jews hardly fits into the Soviet-made narratives of the “anti-fascist 
working class front,” nor the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the Second World 
War. Other factors, such as the awareness of the postwar Soviet treatment of 
Jewish matters, and the underlying issue of national unity also played a role in 
the official evaluation and presentation of the Holocaust in Poland. Thus, the 
memory of the event, as historian Michael Steinlauf put it, became marginalized 
and repressed from public memory.⁵ A good illustration was the fate of sites of 
Holocaust commemoration, such as the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Fight-
ers designed by Nathan Rappaport, erected in the city in 1948.⁶ Commemorations 
staged there were careful to de-emphasize its Jewish character and meaning, and 
it can be argued that from the very beginning, it functioned, ironically, more as 
a place of ritual forgetfulness that was to become its chief marker right up to the 
1980s.
The conviction that “one should not emphasize Jewish matters” was also 
reflected in the regime’s position on any discussion of the Polish past. To raise 
questions about Polish wartime attitudes and actions toward Jews was no longer 
permitted under the Stalinist regime. The first postwar debate of 1945–1947 in 
relation to the Jewish minority, carried out by a small group of Polish intellec-
5 Michael C. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead. Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust (New 
York, 1997), 63–74.
6 See, for example, Marcin Zaremba, “Urząd zapomnienia,” Polityka, no. 41 (13 October 2001): 
72.
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tuals of mostly left-wing orientation, was abruptly silenced in 1948.⁷ The regime 
also silenced any discussion on the issue of the emotional and moral distance of 
Polish society from the Holocaust—“witnessing the Jewish genocide without real 
witnessing,”—that had been raised in literary and non-literary works by a group 
of Polish intellectuals during the war and early postwar period.
The most crucial reworking of the memory of the genocide of Polish Jews was 
conducted later, during the second half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, in 
the era of Władysław Gomułka. During this period a gradual process of the eth-
no-nationalization of communism took place, and the “Jewish question” resur-
faced within the Party itself.⁸ Characteristically, the Polish Communist narrative 
became increasingly acceptable to the general public. In a pioneering study on 
the memory of the Holocaust in postwar Poland, Michael Steinlauf provides a 
convincing explanation for this phenomenon. This acceptance was possible, he 
argued, because “the official way of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust 
reflected, after all, a popular need.”⁹
As the 1950s progressed, the Holocaust continued to be repressed through the 
process of “internationalization of its victims.” This was nowhere more visible 
than in the commemorative rituals at the Auschwitz-Birkenau memorial site, 
where the term “Jew” was hardly mentioned: the Jewishness of the victims was 
subsumed under the nationalities of the countries from which they came. Simul-
taneously, the Holocaust was gradually reworked within a specifically Polish 
national framework with the genocide of Polish Jews frequently presented as 
simply a part of the (ethnic) Polish tragedy—expressed as “six million Poles died 
during the war.” This polonized version nurtured and strengthened the popular 
belief that the Poles had suffered more than any other nation during the war. 
In turn, the Holocaust was presented as an event parallel to the (ethnic) Polish 
tragedy of the war, with the Jewish loss of life numerically symmetrical to ethnic 
Polish losses. Thus was the distinction between the fate of Poles and Jews blurred 
and the seeds of future competition over suffering planted.
If mentioned at all, the darker side of Poland’s past was presented as a mar-
ginal social problem, limited to a small and morally degenerate group outside the 
healthy body of Polish society, as in other European nations. Moreover, research 
7 See, for example, Joanna Michlic, “The Holocaust and Its Aftermath as Perceived in Poland: 
Voices of Polish Intellectuals, 1945–1947,” in The Return of Jews to Europe, 1945–49, ed. David 
Bankier (Jerusalem, 2003).
8 On the development of the patterns of remembering the Holocaust in the communist era, 
see, for example, Lucy Dawidowicz, The Holocaust and the Histor ians (Cambridge Mass., 1981), 
88–124; and Steinlauf, Bondage, 62–88.
9 Steinlauf, Bondage, 74.
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into this part of the past was heavily censored and could be read only in a small 
number of publications produced by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw, 
which were not widely available in any case. The official position was defined 
by narratives of the solidarity of Polish society with its Jewish fellow citizens, 
emphasizing the high number of Polish rescue operations and levels of assis-
tance. In disseminating such narratives, the Communist Party was promoting 
itself as the “people’s party” in order to increase its legitimization within the 
Polish community.
It is worth mentioning that the Communist regime of the 1950s and 1960s had 
actually appropriated these narratives from the non-communist opposition of the 
earlier period. During the war, the Polish Government-in-Exile had created and 
promoted them in an attempt to maintain the good image of Poland in response 
to the horrifying news that issued from the German-occupied Polish lands. In the 
postwar era, the narratives were also frequently disseminated in Polish émigré 
circles as well as among individuals in the country who were former victims of 
Stalinist terror. Thus we find very similar positions on Polish-Jewish relations of 
the Second World War in two otherwise opposing political and ideological camps.
In the late 1960s, the “Partisan” faction within the Communist Party, led by 
General Mieczysław Moczar, was to provide the most extensive and damaging 
reworking of the memory of the Holocaust. A radical version of the dominant 
canon containing strongly anti-Jewish elements emerged, which became an inte-
gral part of the official antisemitic campaign that culminated in the so-called 
anti-Zionist/anti-Jewish purge of 1968.
The Partisans represented the strongest self-defined ethno-nationalist faction 
within the Party, and shared some ideological convictions that had been found 
in the prewar Endecja, which regarded the Jew as the major threat to Poland and 
its people.¹⁰ Thus, the Partisans saw any emphasis on the Jewish Holocaust as 
a threat to the concept of ethnic Polish wartime martyrdom and suffering. This 
in turn led to the replacement of the official narrative of “parallel” fates of Poles 
and Jews with a more radical narrative of “equal” fates. A good illustration of 
this process is the 1968 censoring of an article on Nazi concentration camps that 
had appeared two years previously in the eighth volume of the prestigious Wielka 
Encyklopedia Powszechna (Great Universal Encyclopedia). The editors of the orig-
inal 1966 article had maintained a clear distinction between the extermination 
camps in which almost all victims were Jews, and concentration and labor camps 
10 Endecja—National Democratic Party was the widely supported prewar nationalist 
movement, whose leader, Roman Dmowski, is known as the father of Polish ethnic nationalism. 
Endecja was characterised by anti-Jewish policies and practices.
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where many prisoners were (ethnic) Poles. In the Partisans’ amended version the 
distinction had completely vanished.
The Partisans’ narrative of the equal fate of Poles and Jews represents a par-
ticular competition over suffering, continuing in the strongly self-defensive posi-
tion taken in the debate over Neighbors. Historian Witold Kula was perhaps the 
first Polish intellectual to reflect critically on this competition. In 1970, Kula wrote 
the following in his diary: “In the past the Jews were envied for their money, qual-
ifications, positions and international contacts—today they are envied for the 
very crematoria in which they were incinerated.”¹¹
The Partisans constructed another narrative as well—that of the assault on 
Polish martyrdom by the West and Jews—expressed by the cry of “anti-polo-
nism.” Critical reports on the Polish treatment of its Jewish minority did indeed 
appear in the Western media in the 1960s, some of which presented a distorted 
and sensationalist image of Poles as “eternal antisemites” and “accomplices” to 
the Nazi genocide of Jews. Unsurprisingly, these biased accusations provoked 
highly defensive reactions among Poles both in émigré circles and within the 
country. The Partisans manipulated these reports in order to portray the entire 
West as anti-Polish and to suppress inquiries into the dark past. The strategy was 
pursued and further developed over the following two decades by various other 
political and social groups and individuals as well.
The Partisans also constructed anti-Jewish narratives whose purpose was 
to present Poles in a praiseworthy light vis-à-vis Jews, while promoting specific 
themes such as Polish Jews’ lack of gratitude toward Poles who had assisted 
them; the anti-Polish behavior of Jews during the war; and Jewish passivity in the 
face of the genocide—including the controversial theme of collaboration with the 
Nazis. As with the charge of anti-polonism, the anti-Jewish narratives continued 
to be used and would be further developed as time went on.
Given the fact that the Partisan faction managed to obtain control over large 
segments of the national mass media, institutions of national heritage, and edu-
cation in the late 1960s, their version of the Holocaust had considerable influence 
on public attitudes as well as on the writing of history. Michael Steinlauf asserts 
that by the late 1960s, the Holocaust had been “expelled” from public memory.¹²
With all its inaccuracies, distortions, and omissions, the dominant canon did 
serve in Polish collective memory as a source of knowledge about the Jewish geno-
cide and the behavior of Polish society during the war. Any challenge to it was of 
course suppressed by the Communist regime right up to the 1980s. Furthermore, 
11 Witold Kula, Dziennik, cited in Zaremba, “Urząd,” 72.
12 Steinlauf, Bondage, 75–88.
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there were few voices in Polish émigré circles that pursued such an attempt to 
reevaluate the past. It was only in the new socio-political climate of the 1980s that 
attempts began to crystallize as part of the process of Poland’s rediscovery of its 
Jewish minority—a process initiated by the first Solidarity movement.
The Impact of Jan Błoński
In the 1980s, a number of voices, ranging from left-wing Solidarity circles to the 
progressive Catholic intelligentsia, began to openly question the dominant trend 
of remembering the Holocaust.¹³ In the name of political and social necessity, 
they rejected any notion of equality or symmetry between the suffering of Poles 
and Jews, and in both official and underground publications raised the issue of 
the Poles’ moral accounting for the Holocaust and the country’s painful past. 
Initially, some of their voices went unnoticed, while others evoked emotional 
and intensely negative reactions. The dynamics and outcome of the first public 
debate that followed publication of Jan Błoński’s essay, “The Poor Poles Look at 
the Ghetto” (1987), demonstrated the persistence of the prevailing Polish attitude.
In his groundbreaking article, Błoński raised difficult questions about the 
“insufficient concern” of Poles about the fate of Jews during the Holocaust, 
arguing that in part it was the result of widespread anti-Jewish feelings in the 
prewar period. He suggested that the Poles had difficulty in reexamining their 
wartime relations with the Jews because they saw themselves as the primary 
victims of the German occupation, and were unable to acknowledge that they, 
too, were capable of wrongdoing.
When we consider the past, we want to derive moral advantages from it. Even when we 
condemn, we ourselves would like to be above—or beyond—condemnation. We want to be 
absolutely beyond any accusation, we want to be completely clean. We want to be also—and 
only—victims.¹⁴
Błoński’s position was rejected by most of the two hundred individuals who 
participated in the debate. Similarly, criticism was voiced by members of polit-
ical and cultural elites from widely differing ideological backgrounds, ranging 
from official Communist circles to right-wing Solidarity factions. Błoński and the 
13 On the memory of the Holocaust and Jews in Poland in the 1980s, see Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, 
Neutralizing Memory. The Jews in Contemporary Poland (New Brunswick, N.J., 1989.
14 Jan Błoński, “The Poor Poles Look At The Ghetto” (in English), Polin 1 (1989), 326–28.
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editors of Tygodnik Powszechny (in which the article was published) were accused 
of playing into the hands of Poland’s enemies and of endorsing anti-Polish pro-
paganda. A number of individuals called for Błoński to be prosecuted under the 
Polish criminal code for “slandering the Polish nation.”
The political transformation of 1989–1990, which led to Poland regaining 
full sovereignty, did not seem to effect much change in the general attitude. This 
was evident in the outcome of the first major debate on the Holocaust triggered 
by Michał Cichy’s article “Poles and Jews: Black Pages in the Warsaw Uprising,” 
published in Gazeta Wyborcza in 1994.¹⁵ Reactions differed little from those sur-
rounding Błoński’s article. 
Another good illustra tion of the persistence of the dominant canon through-
out the 1990s was the dissemination of knowledge about the Holocaust in the edu-
cational system. An analysis of primary and secondary school history textbooks, 
conducted by the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw in May 1997, showed that 
the viewpoint remained the same as in the communist period.¹⁶
By the late 1990s, however, a small but increasing number of intellectuals, 
including some historians, began to discuss less than flattering aspects of the 
Polish past, and called for a critical reexamination of the dominant notions of 
remembering.¹⁷ This counter-memory has since gained a more noticeable and 
fixed place in intellectual discourse.
The Debate over Neighbors
The publication in May 2000 of the original Polish version of Jan Tomasz Gross’s 
Neighbors marked the beginning of a fierce battle over public memory of the 
15 See, Joanna Michlic, Poland’s Threatening Other. The Image of the Jew from 1880 to the 
Present (Lincoln, Neb, 2006), 273–74.
16 Important articles on the representations of the Holocaust in history textbooks in Polish 
schools of the 1990s were published in the Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, no. 
3/4 (1997). See also Hanna Węgrzynek, The Treatment of Jewish Themes in Polish Schools (New 
York, 1998).
17 See, for example, Jan Tomasz Gross, Upiorna dekada (Kraków, 1998); Maria Janion, Do 
Europy tak, ale razem z naszymi umarłymi (Warsaw, 2000); and Feliks Tych, Długi cień zagłady 
(Warsaw, 1999). See also special issues of Więź entitled “Under One Heaven. Poles and Jews” 
(1998); various articles in Więź (July 1999); and a special issue of Znak entitled “Shoah—pamięć 
zagrożona?,” (June 2000).
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Holocaust and wartime Polish-Jewish relations.¹⁸ Gross addressed the most 
extreme aspect of the dark past by providing an in-depth description of a specific 
case, which occurred in the small town of Jedwabne on July 10, 1941. In a set of 
short socio-historical essays, he raises interrelated issues, such as the problem of 
postwar Polish historiography of the wartime period, the question of responsibil-
ity for murder, and of the Poles’ self-image as victims.
The case of the massacre at Jedwabne raises important questions about 
the thin line that exists between the desire to expel an unwanted minority, and 
the perpetration of a small-scale genocide possible only under then-prevailing 
wartime conditions. Further investigation into similar episodes in Poland and 
other East European countries may help us to better understand the wider impli-
cations of the massacre. The public debate was the most intense about any histor-
ical issue in postwar and post-communist Poland. According to the well-known 
Polish historian Marcin Kula, no other historical issue—not even the legacy of 
communism—has generated a public debate of this scope.¹⁹ Moreover, the discus-
sion continued to reverberate in the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, 
and Germany as well.
The passionate national discussion came about as a result of three main 
factors. First, Gross documented the case of the destruction of a particular Jewish 
community, not by the Nazis, but by members of the Polish collectivity—that had 
traditionally been assigned the position of bystander to the genocide of Jews. 
Second, the narrative of the destruction exposes the reader to intimate details 
of the personal histories of named individual victims. Gross’s mode of narration 
was that of bearing witness to the Jewish victims of Jedwabne who, for so long 
were remembered only by the few Jewish survivors of the massacre and by their 
families. Third (and most importantly for the dynamics of the debate in Poland) 
Gross challenged the traditional image of Poles as martyrs and heroes by showing 
them as vicious killers engaged in acts of murder. Thus, Neighbors set out a clear 
counter-memory to the accepted canon.
The debate can be seen as unique in many respects. Previous debates on 
the Holocaust that took place in the 1980s and 1990s lasted just a few months, 
whereas the debate over Neighbors continued with varying degrees of intensity 
18 Jan Tomasz Gross, Sasiedzi. Historia Zaglady Zydowskiego Miasteczka (Sejny: Pogranicze, 
2000). For reflections on Jewish reactions toward the Jedwabne massacre and Neighbors, see 
Laurence Weinbaum, The Struggle for Memory in Poland. Auschwitz, Jedwabne and Beyond 
(Jerusalem, 2001), 35–38.
19 Marcin Kula, “Refleksje na marginesie dyskusji o Jedwabnem” (unpubl. ms.). My thanks to 
Prof. Kula for giving me this article. See also idem, “Ludzie Ludziom,” Rzeczpospolita, 17 Mar. 
2001, A5.
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for several years. Earlier discussions were conducted within a limited number of 
newspapers, whereas this one took place in a wide range of national and local 
papers representing a variety of ideological profiles and social interests, as well 
as in other media, including television, radio, and the Internet. It included the 
broadcast on Polish Television Channel 2 of Agnieszka Arnold’s documentary, 
“Neighbors,” and has been referenced in commemorative events, including 
sermons of repentance and mourning for the Jewish victims.
More importantly, the debate on Neighbors was the first in which polit-
ical leaders took an active role, including then-Polish President Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski.²⁰ It was also the first in which the voice of counter-memory is not 
merely that of an individual but was also heard from leading cultural, political, 
and religious leaders as well as the general public. These developments indicate 
that the counter-memory of the Holocaust gained increased support within Polish 
society, along with a loosening of the previous dominant ritual of remembrance.
Predictably, counter-memory allows for Polish self-criticism, whereas the 
former patterns of remembrance took a defensive stance, with the more extreme 
versions of it containing anti-Jewish narratives. Even the less extreme versions of 
the defensive stance often contain an element of “yes, but....”
The self-critical position was mainly presented in well-known national dailies 
such as Gazeta Wyborcza and Rzeczpospolita, and in two progressive journals of 
the Catholic intelligentsia—the weekly Tygodnik Powszechny and the monthly 
Więź. The strongly defensive position appeared mainly in Myśl Polska, Nasz Dzi-
ennik, Niedziela, Najwyższy Czas, Tygodnik Głos, and Życie.
The debate over Holocaust memory
The intense and ongoing debate undoubtedly brought the Holocaust to the center 
of public attention.²¹ Among those willing to take a self-critical position, the 
20 See, for example, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, “Polska szlachetność i polska hańba. Z 
prezydentem Aleksandrem Kwaśniewskim rozmawiaja ks. Adam Boniecki i Krzysztof Burnetko,” 
Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 1 (15 April 2001), 8–9; idem, “Co to znaczy przepraszam,” Polityka, 
no. 28 (14 July 2001): 13.
21 The debate exposed the absence of unbiased educational tools on the Holocaust, 
coinciding with discussion of the first and unbiased Polish textbook on the subject, written 
by two high school teachers, Robert Szuchta and Piotr Trojański, who also devised the first 
program for teaching the Holocaust in Poland. Accompanying the debate was an educational 
seminar on the Holocaust for thirty teachers from the province of Podlasie, organized by the 
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Holocaust regained its historical relevance as an important chapter of 20th-cen-
tury history, with both universal and unique messages for humanity. There were 
calls for the gradual integration of the genocide of Polish Jews within the narra-
tive of Polish history, and for the potential inclusion of the history of Poland’s 
Jews into postwar collective memory. Polish sociologist Barbara Engelking and 
Israeli historian Anita Shapira had earlier pointed to the absence of reference to 
this important part of Polish history.²²
Moreover, the discussion of the massacre of the Jedwabne Jews raised the 
more general issue of the emotional and moral distance of Polish society from the 
Jewish genocide. For example, the Archbishop of Lublin, the late Józef Źyciński, 
in his article, “The Banalization of Barbarity,” called for an expression of mourn-
ing and grief for the Jewish victims:
Today, we need to pray for the victims of the massacre, displaying the spiritual solidarity 
that was missing at the hour when they left the land of their fathers.²³
One can argue that this long-awaited mourning did finally take place to some 
degree, as seen by the participation of different political and social groups in 
commemorative events for the Jewish victims of the Jedwabne massacre. One 
might assume that this would lead, in the future, to a more open, sympathetic and 
inclusive image of Polish Jews in Polish collective memory. Regrettably, the local 
community of Jedwabne itself, encouraged by their parish priest, Rev. Edward 
Orłowski, refused to take part in the official commemoration that took place there 
on July 10, 2001, an indication of their inability to reckon with the town’s bloody 
past. Instead, the townspeople reacted by clinging to and recycling the narratives 
of the old version of remembrance often taking the extreme defensive position.²⁴
Institute of National Remembrance. See Adam Szostkiewicz, “Powiedzcie to synom” and Piotr 
Pytlakowski, “Historia pewnego podręcznika,” both in Polityka, no. 16 (2001).
22 Barbara Engelking, Zagłada i Pamięć. Doświadczenia Holocaustu i jego konsekwencje 
opisane na podstawie relacji autobiograficznych (Warsaw, 1994); Anita Shapira, “Holocaust: 
Private Memories, Public Memory,” Jewish Social Studies 4, no. 2 (1998): 40–58.
23 Józef Życiński, “The Banalisation of Barbarity,” Więź, special edition: “Thou Shalt Not Kill” 
(2001): 257.
24 On responses of the local Jedwabne population toward news of the massacre and toward 
Gross’s book, see Anna Bikont, “My z Jedwabnego,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 23 March 2001, 10–15; 
“Proszę tu więcej nie przychodzić,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 31 March–1 April, 2001, 10–12; and “Mieli 
wódkę, bron i nienawiść,” Gazeta Wyborcza, June 15, 2001, 10–14. See also, Jarosław Lipszyc, 
“Sąsiedzi i ich wnuki,” Midrasz, no. 6 (June 2000): 41–44; Stanisław Przechodzki, “Szatan 
wstąpił do Jedwabnego,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 5 April 2001, 18; and Adam Wilma, “Broda mojego 
syna,” Gazeta Pomorska, 4 August 2000.
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Even more disturbing was the presence of the strongly self-defensive position 
along the entire spectrum of right-wing politicians and in what has been termed 
the “closed” Catholic Church.²⁵ In this segment of the Polish population, the 
Holocaust is still seen as constituting a major challenge to communal well-being, 
as a means of undermining recognition of Polish martyrdom, and as the “ulti-
mate victimization of Poles by Jews.” Members of the self-defensive position have 
frequently cited the Polish edition of Norman Finkelstein’s aggresively polemical 
book, The Holocaust Industry, as if it were the authoritative work on the subject.²⁶ 
The terms “Holocaust business” and “Holocaust gesheft” have been incorporated 
into the narratives that defend the old canon of remembrance and criticize Neigh-
bors.²⁷
The collective self-image of Poles
Gross’s presentation of Poles in Neighbors seriously undermined the cherished 
self-image of Poles as being above all heroes and victims. Just such a deconstruc-
tion, Gross argued, is a necessary prerequisite for recreating a healthy sense of 
Polish nationhood, which for such a long period hid the uglier aspects of its past 
and thus lived a lie. The debate also brought forth angry reactions concerned with 
defending Poland’s good name and blaming others for setbacks and difficulties. 
Well aware that this collective defensiveness is not solely a Polish problem, Gross 
25 See, for example, Antoni Macierewicz, “Oskarżam Aleksandra Kwaśniew skiego,” Tygodnik 
Głos, no. 14 (17 April 2001); Klub Konserwatywny w Łodzi, “Stanowisko w związku ze sprawą 
Jedwabnego” Tygodnik Głos (7 July 2001); Rev. Jerzy Bajda “Przepraszać? Kto kogo?” Nasz 
Dziennik, 14 March 2001. Rev. Prof. Waldemar Chrostowski, “Kto utrudnia dialog? Rozmowa 
Pawła Paliwody,” Życie, 10 April 2001.
26 For a critical analysis of Norman Finkelstein’s, Holocaust Industry, and his adoption by 
antisemites, including in Poland, see Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession. Anti-Semitism 
from Antiquity to the Global Jihad (New York, 2010). See also Jerzy Sławomir Mac, “Czerwona 
podszewka. ‘Przedsiębiorstwo Holocaust’ to połączenie nazistowskiej i komunistycznej 
propagandy,” Wprost, 23 Sept. 2001, 78–79.
27 For example, Bishop Stanisław Stefanek of Łomża, Bishop Józef Michalik and Rev. Edward 
Orłowski of Jedwabne have all used the term “Holocaust business” in their sermons and 
comments. Right-wing journalist Henryk Pająk also published a book entitled Jedwabne 
Geszefty (Lublin, 2001), 2nd ed.
 The Jedwabne Debate: Reshaping Polish National Mythology    79
wrote that “like several other nations, in order to reclaim its own past, Poland will 
have to tell its past to itself anew.”²⁸
In the self-critical camp, non-historian intellectuals, in particular, have 
voiced support for forming a new self-image of Poles to include the warts along-
side the heroic and suffering past. As a leading figure in the progressive Catholic 
intelligentsia, Jarosław Gowin, put it in his article “Naród—ostatni węzeł” (The 
last strand of our nation), “We have the responsibility of passing on our heri-
tage to future generations: while passing on the memory of us as heroes is our 
duty, passing on the memory of Polish crimes against others should constitute a 
warning for the future.”²⁹
In her article “Zbiorowa wyobrażnia, wspólna wina” (Collective imagina tion, 
common guilt), the psychologist Krystyna Skarżyska has described the psycho-
logical roots of the inability to reckon with the stained past and the ensuing neg-
ative consequences, and like Gross, called for a deconstruction of the dominant 
collective self-image:
It is understandable that we experience psychological discomfort when our own commu-
nity is blamed for serious sins. An inclusion of cruelty towards others into national col-
lective memory is entirely in discord with one’s own self-image. Its acceptance is almost 
impossible for people who are convinced that they have invariably been the victims and the 
victims only…. What is urgently required is a debate on our collective memory and social 
identity and an attempt at deconstructing our past self-image.”³⁰
Individual voices from the “Open Catholic Church” and members of political 
parties such as the Union of Freedom (Unia Wolności) have also embraced this 
call.³¹ In the case of the formerly communist Social Democratic Alliance (SLD), 
28 Quoted from Jan Tomasz Gross, Neighbors. The Destruction of the Jewish Community in 
Jedwabne Poland, English ed. (Princeton, N.J., 2001), 169.
29 Jarosław Gowin, “Naród-ostatni węzeł,” Rzeczpospolita, 18 January 2001.
30 Krystyna Skarżyska, “Zbiorowa wyobrażnia, wspólna wina,” Gazeta Wybor cza, 25–26 
November 2000.
31 Representative of the Open Catholic Church are: Rev. Michał Czajkowski, “Czysta 
Nierządnica. Dlaczego należy przepraszać za Jedwabne,” Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 21 (27 
May 2001): 1, 5; Rev. Adam Boniecki, “Bronię księdza Michała,” Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 
21 (27 May 2001), 4; Rev. Wojciech Lemański, “Chrystus w zgliszczach stodoły,” Więź (June 
2001): 78–85; Rev. Stanisław Musiał, “Jedwabne to nowe imię Holokaustu,” Rzeczpospolita, 
10 July 2001; Bishop Henryk Muszyński, “Biedny chrześcijanin patrzy na Jedwabne,” Tygodnik 
Powszechny, Kontrapunkt, no. 1/2 (25 March 2001), 13. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek, “Prawda 
Jedwabnego,” Wprost, 13 May 2001, 8. Among members of Unia Wolności who participated in 
the debate were Jacek Kuroń and Henryk Wujec. Kuroń and Wujec, together with Rev. Michał 
Czajkowski and Jan Nowak-Jeziorański, issued an appeal for active participation in prayers of 
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its General Council in March 2001 issued a letter to its members and supporters 
under the meaningful title: “We are not inheritors only of glory” (Dziedziczymy 
nie tylko chwałę). Furthermore, Poland’s president, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, 
also embraced the call, as seen in various pronouncements, including a speech 
delivered on July 10, 2001 at the official state ceremony for the Jewish victims of 
the Jedwabne massacre, in which he said:
Thanks to the great national debate on the crime of 10 July 1941, much has changed in our 
lives in this year 2001, the first year of the new millennium. We have come to realise our 
responsibilities for our attitudes towards the black pages of our history. We have understood 
that those who counsel the nation to reject this past serve the nation ill. Such a posture 
leads to moral destruction…. We express our pain and shame and give expressions to our 
determination in seeking to learn the truth. We express our courage to overcome the bad 
past and our unbending will for understanding and harmony.³²
Another aspect of the Polish self-image that has been challenged has been the 
widely-held notion of the Poles’ historic toleration and hospitality toward its 
ethnic and national groups.³³ The major deconstruction, however, has occurred 
in studies of Polish-Jewish wartime relations. The prevailing narrative of Polish 
solidarity with its Jewish citizens has been shown to be untruthful.³⁴ The new 
narrative that incorporates the blacker pages of Polish history in World War II is 
one of the most important achievements of the debate.
Judging by opinions expressed in letters and Internet discussions that have 
been published in Gazeta Wyborcza, Polityka, Tygodnik Powszechny and Wprost, 
the counter-memory of Polish-Jewish relations has found acceptance among the 
general population, particularly among young people.³⁵ Polls conducted both 
before and after the official July 10, 2001 commemoration indicated that many 
repentance in Jedwabne on July 10. The appeal was published in Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 16 
(22 Apr. 2001): 5.
32 This is a fragment from the official speech by Aleksander Kwaśniewski on July 10, 2001 at 
the commemoration in Jedwabne; published in Gazeta Wyborcza, 10 July 2001.
33 See, for example, Janusz A. Majcherek, “Ciemne karty polskiej historii,” Tygodnik 
Powszechny, Kontrapunkt, no. 1/2 (25 Mar. 2001): 16.
34 See, for example, Joanna Tokarska-Bakir, “Obsesja niewinności,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 13–14 
January 2001, 22–23; idem, “Nasz człowiek w Pieczarach. Jed wabne: pamięć nieodzyskana,” 
Tygodnik Powszechny no. 13 (31 Mar. 2002), 1, 4.
35 According to opinion polls conducted by Pentor, among Poles between 15 and 25 years 
of age, 23.3 percent of respondents stated that they felt “satisfaction that the truth about 
the massacre of the Jedwabne Jews was revealed and that the victims were honorably 
commemorated.” On the whole, 68 per cent of respondents felt that the revelation of the 
participation of Poles in the murder was an important event; Wprost, 22 July 2001, 26.
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segments of society are still uncertain about accepting the dark past as an intrin-
sic element of the collective self-image. Furthermore, the polls indicated signifi-
cant confusion over the issue of who the perpetrators of the Jedwabne massacre 
actually were.³⁶ This confusion resulted largely from the representation of the 
massacre by the nationalist camp, which claimed the act had been committed by 
Germans. Data from the forensic investigation of the massacre by the Institute of 
National Remembrance, chaired by Prof. Leon Kieres, was manipulated in order 
to press this view. For example, the first reports about the discovery of German 
bullets at the main site, where a partial exhumation of human remains was carried 
out at the end of May and beginning of June 2001, was heralded as definitive evi-
dence of German culpability. Later analysis showed that the bullets had come 
from completely different historical periods.³⁷ Simultaneously, anti-Jewish narra-
tives—particularly those alleging Jewish collective support for the Soviet regime 
between September 1939 and 1941 and in the postwar period—have been used 
as a strategy to minimize and justify the massacre. A fusion between the thesis 
of German involvement in the Jedwabne crime and the narrative of “Judeo-com-
munism” has led to a disturbing revisionist interpretation of the Jewish geno-
cide. Jedwabne’s parish priest, Rev. Edward Orłowski and Senator Jadwiga Sto-
karska of Łomża Province maintained that the Germans killed the Jews because 
of their Communist affiliation and because the Jews had been fighting against the 
Germans on behalf of the Soviet Union.³⁸
In the self-defensive camp, Neighbors was dismissed as “a lie and an attempt 
to slander the good name of Poland,” and yet another Jewish (or Jewish-Ameri-
can) conspiracy against Poland as well as confirmation that the Jew always wants 
to harm the Pole.³⁹ Even those nationalists who are capable of acknowledging 
36 According to an opinion poll conducted by CBOS in August 2001, 28 percent of respondents 
stated that only Germans/Nazis were responsible for the massacre of the Jedwabne Jews; 
12 percent stated that a few Poles together with the Germans participated in the massacre; 
4 percent stated that the Poles were forced by the Germans to commit the massacre; 8 per 
cent stated that only Poles were responsible for the massacre; and 30 per cent were unable to 
say who was responsible. Report of CBOS (Warsaw, 2001). I would like to thank Prof. Andrzej 
Paczkowski for giving me a copy of the report.
37 See “New Evidence of A Polish Massacre,” BBC NEWS, 19 December 2001.
38 Jadwiga Stokarska, “Kampania oszczerstw,” Nasz Dziennik, 19 March 2001, and Edward 
Orłowski “Niech zwycięży prawda. Conversation of Rev. Pawel Bejger with Rev. Orłowski,” 
Tygodnik Młodzieży Katolickiej “Droga,” 13 March 2001.
39 See, for example, Leon Kalewski, “Opowieści niesamowite. Part 1 and 2” Nasza Polska, 
21 November 2000 and 19 December 2000; Jerzy Robert Nowak, “Kto fałszuję historię,” Nasz 
Dziennik, 13 May 2000; Piotr Gontarczyk, “Gross kontra fakty,” Życie, 28 February 2001; and Jan 
Engelgard, “Antynarodowa histeria,” Myśl Polska, 30 March 2001.
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the role of Poles in the crime, still find it hard to accept the image of Poles as vil-
lains, and tend to focus on the more positive narratives of Polish solidarity with 
its Jewish citizens.
What prevents them from accepting a more honest and balanced image? One 
explanation is the strong commitment to preserving Poland’s national honor and 
reputation.⁴⁰ Adherents of the strongly self-defensive position display a similar 
commitment to Poland’s honor, but add anti-Jewish prejudice as well. It is not 
always easy to differentiate between the mildly and strongly defensive positions.⁴¹
Why does the self-image of Poles as heroes and victims hold such power in the 
collective memory? The image has enjoyed a long-established history in  Polish 
collective self-awareness ever since the first half of the 19th century. Rooted in 
the romantic national myth of Poles fighting for their own and others’ freedom, 
it played an important political and social role throughout the long era in which 
Poland was partitioned and Poles struggled for independence. During the Second 
World War, this image became a powerful mirror for Polish society and that 
war—as in no other period in modern history—reinforced the dual sense of being 
heroes and victims. It nourished a justifiable pride in Polish resistance, both in 
the armed struggle against the Nazis, and the preservation of underground social 
and political institutions. The Poles did, after all, suffer high human losses—an 
estimated 5–7 per cent of the ethnic Polish population died as a result of the war.
One can also argue that the war itself was perceived as the embodiment of 
Polish collective martyrdom and heroism. Hence, any meaningful investi gation 
of Polish attitudes and behavior toward its Jewish minority in that period cannot 
be easily tolerated. The heroic self-perception exerted a powerful hold during the 
postwar communist period, especially at its end, when it was transformed into 
the image of Solidarity fighting the Communists.⁴² With this background in mind, 
we can better understand the present difficulty in accepting the massacre of Jews 
in Jedwabne as an integral part of the Polish collective self-image.
Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. The debate on Neighbors has 
been interpreted in opposing ways that can basically be described as “optimistic” 
40 On the positive correlation of national honor and reputation and the lack of collective self-
criticism, see, Irwin-Zarecka, Frames, 8–82.
41 In his short typology of different positions within the debate, the distinguished Polish 
historian Andrzej Paczkowski was the first to indicate that in some cases the borders between 
the positions are not clearly defined; see Andrzej Paczkowski, “Debata wokół “Sąsiadów”: 
próba wstępnej typologii,” Rzeczpospolita, no. 71 (24 March 2001).
42 On the perception of the Second World War in public memory in the 1980s and 1990s, see 
Tomasz Szarota, “Wojna na dobre samopoczucie,” Gazeta Wyborcza, 6 September 1996.
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and “pessimistic.” Optimists have given particular attention to the development 
of the self-critical aspect, and have come to view it as a cathartic discussion that 
must change the Polish way of remembering the Holocaust, Polish-Jewish rela-
tions, and the Polish self-image of the wartime period.⁴³ In their opinion, the 
debate put an end to the taboo subject of Polish-Jewish relations. Pessimists, on 
the other hand, noted the strength of the self-defensive position which attacked 
Gross’s book “as anti-Polish lies aiming at the extortion of billions of dollars from 
hapless Poles.” They concluded that the dynamics of the debate confirmed the 
firm grip of the past over the present and the consequent inability on the part of 
Polish society to undergo a process of modernization of its mentality. This view 
assumed that the case of Jedwabne would soon be forgotten by the public and 
“anti-Semitism will become part of the daily norm of life.”⁴⁴
These two interpretations, however, do not give a realistic picture of the 
changes occurring within Polish society, but were, rather, expressions both rea-
sonable expectations and hopes, as well as understandable disappointment.
The debate was both a reflection and part of the process of the democratiza-
tion of Polish political and social life, which could not have taken place imme-
diately after the country regained full sovereignty with the overthrow of Com-
munism.⁴⁵ It also mirrored the reemergence of two competing models of Poland. 
One is that of a pluralistic civil society inclusive of the memory of the “others” 
that make up Polish society, which was able to acknowledge wrongdoing done 
by Poles. The second is an ethnocentric model that excludes the “other” and nur-
tures the narrative of the unique suffering of ethnic Poles. In the past, the plural-
istic model had been underdeveloped and underrepresented in political culture, 
but it is now gaining greater legitimacy. The ethnic model dominated postwar 
Poland for many decades and is still popular among right-wing political elites 
and in the Closed Catholic Church.
Adherents of the pluralistic civil concept of Poland refer to the Jew as the 
“Polish Jew,” “our co-citizen,” and “co-host of this land”—an important change in 
the public discourse.⁴⁶ By contrast, among adherents of the ethnocentric model, 
43 See, for example, Krzysztof Darewicz, “Debata o Jedwabnem zmieni Polaków,” 
Rzeczpospolita, 2–3 May 2001, 3; and the comments of Marian Turski cited by Tony Wesołowski 
in “Jedwabne, Poland,” Christian Science Monitor, 18 April 2001.
44 See the editorial opinions in the discussion published in the high quality cultural-social 
journal ResPublica Nowa: Marcin Król, Paweł Śpiewak, and Marek Zaleski, ResPublica Nowa, no. 
7 (July 2001).
45 Ewa K. Czaczkowska, “Byłem sam, będą nas setki,” Rzeczpospolita, no. 159 (10 July 2001).
46 See Polityka no. 26 (30 June 2001): 88, for the remarks of Leon Kieres about Polishness and 
Jewishness.
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the Jew is still referred to as “the Jew”—a term, which in this context has the neg-
ative connotation of standing in opposition to the Pole. One cannot understand 
the dynamics and meaning of the debate without taking into account these two 
contesting concepts. Both can be viewed as different mediums of transmission of 
the memory of the Holocaust and of the Polish collective self-image, or, as repre-
senting two contesting memories.⁴⁷ 
At present these two memories can be viewed as still running in parallel. Yet 
the fact that the counter-memory has been endorsed by some of the leading rep-
resentatives of the political and cultural elites and by the Open Church raises 
the likelihood that it will continue to play an increasingly greater role in shaping 
public memory.
In his remarks on public memory of the Holocaust in Poland between 1989 
and 1995, Michael Steinlauf posited the unpredictability of what Poles might do 
with the memory of the Holocaust, and of how this memory might shape Polish 
history and consciousness.⁴⁸ Still, he expressed the hope that this memory 
“would be used in the service of renewal rather than repression.” The dynamics 
of the debate over Neighbors suggests that a renewal has definitely taken place, 
but one also accompanied by repression. Only time will show if this repression 
will become a marginal phenomenon.
47 I borrow the term “medium of transmission of memory” from the leading sociologist of 
memory, Maurice Halbwachs, who contends that memory is an activity deeply affected by its 
medium of transmission; Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory (New York, 1980).
48 Steinlauf, Bondage, 144.
Simon Epstein
Roger Garaudy, Abbé Pierre,  
and the French Negationists
The Roger Garaudy affair, was the most famous of the cases of negationism in 
France in the 1990s. It boosted Garaudy to the rank of chief propagator of denial of 
the Shoah, following in the footsteps of Paul Rassinier, who made himself known 
in the 1950s, and Robert Faurisson, whose hour of glory came in the 1980s. In 
addition, the Garaudy affair marks the point of intersection between negationism 
and a particularly virulent anti-Zionism. For both of these reasons—its place in 
the history of negationism in France and its “anti-Zionist” specificity—this affair 
deserves to be examined in detail, in all its phases of development. Central to 
such an analysis is the somewhat unusual biography of the chief protagonist.
Born in 1913 to a working-class family, Roger Garaudy was first tempted by 
Protestantism before becoming a Marxist in 1933. A teacher of philosophy at the 
secondary school in Albi, in the Tarn, he became an active militant in the ranks of 
the French Communist Party (PCF). He was arrested in September 1940 and trans-
ferred to the detention camps of the Vichy regime in Southern Algeria. Elected 
to the French Parliament after the war, he progressed through the Communist 
hierarchy and became one of the intellectuals most representative of, and loyal 
to the PCF. Director of the Center of Marxist Studies and Research (CERM) from 
1959 to 1969, he addressed himself to promoting dialogue between Marxists and 
Christians. He sought to prove that Communism was compatible with humanism, 
in compliance with the “politics of openness” advocated by Maurice Thorez, the 
Communist leader.
Garaudy’s connection to the Jews began during World War II. While interned 
in the Algerian camps, he met Bernard Lecache, then President of the Interna-
tional League Against Antisemitism (LICA), and became his friend. In 1948, in the 
name of the French intellectuals, Garaudy laid a bouquet of flowers on the tomb 
of Jewish revolutionary Gaston Crémieux, in the Jewish cemetery of Marseilles.¹ 
In a speech in Paris, in 1951, he condemned “those who burned innocents in the 
ovens of the crematoria.”²
His rejection of antisemitism was intensely expressed twenty years later, 
especially from 1968 to 1970, when Garaudy broke ranks with the French Com-
munist party and got himself thrown out by its executive organs. His disagree-
1 “Marseilles rend hommage à la mémoire de Gaston Crémieux,” Droit et liberté, 1 July 1948.
2 “Puissante manifestation antiraciste à la Mutualité,” Droit et liberté, 30 Mar. 30–5 Apr. 1951.
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ment with Communist leadership mostly had to do with Party strategy in France 
after May 1968, and his concern over Soviet repression in Czechoslovakia. In the 
series of anti-Establishment speeches and writings in which he exposed his point 
of view, he repeatedly raised the question of antisemitism in Eastern Europe. 
In April 1968, before the Central Committee of his Party, he also denounced the 
honors awarded in the Soviet Union to the anti-Jewish pamphleteer Kitchko. He 
took up the same theme in a letter to the Political Bureau in September of the 
same year. He spoke out on the question of antisemitism in Poland, which burst 
out in the spring of 1968 in response to the Six Day War and as a result of the 
student agitation which shook the Polish universities. His remarks were based on 
an appeal signed principally by Aragon and Jean-Paul Sartre, which proclaimed 
that “under the pretext of anti-Zionism, a new antisemitism has been developing 
for the last several months in Poland, with the support of at least some of its 
leading circles.” He also evoked the question of the rights of Soviet Jewry.³
The Communist Party journal, l’Humanité, accused him of “revisionism” in 
the sense of deviation from Marxist orthodoxy and the official Soviet line. Garaudy 
expressed himself for the last time before his comrades at the 19th Congress of the 
French Communist Party, on February 6, 1970. Facing a silent and hostile audi-
ence, he mentioned yet again, among the last criticisms which he was to make of 
the Communist system—the “anti-Zionist” antisemitism in Eastern Europe.⁴ His 
speech was rebroadcast on television, which gave his parting words a particularly 
dramatic resonance. He was expelled shortly thereafter, putting an end to what 
the French press of the time labeled the “Garaudy affair”⁵ and which—as we now 
know—was only the first of several “Garaudy affairs.”
Let us dwell for a moment on these two important elements of his biogra-
phy. Garaudy, during the 1950s, had mentioned the “ovens of the crematoria” in 
his speeches. And Garaudy, between 1968 and 1970, rose up against antisemi-
tism disguised as anti-Zionism. Indeed, less than two months after his famous 
speech of February 1970, he even took a trip to Israel, at the invitation of the Tel 
Aviv Museum. He met with several leftist personalities. He declared that he had 
detected, in the Jewish State, “a wish for peace, a desire for a political solution.” 
His ideological non-conformism and his positions against antisemitism gained 
3 Roger Garaudy, Toute la vérité (Paris, 1970). The references to antisemitism in Poland or the 
USSR appear on pp. 10, 53, 63, 125–35.
4 Ibid., 65.
5 Michèle Cotta, “Affaire Garaudy,” L’Express, 25 May 1970; see also the inquiry by Jean-
François Kahn in the same issue.
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him the approval of his Israeli interlocutors.⁶ Garaudy, during his visit, played 
an unknown but very important role in the internal politics of the state of Israel: 
he tried to organize a meeting between Nahum Goldman, the head of the World 
Jewish Congress and the World Zionist Organization, and Gamal Abdul Nasser, the 
Egyptian president. Golda Meir, then prime minister of Israel, strongly opposed 
the idea and refused to allow Goldman to meet Nasser. As a consequence, the pro-
posal came to naught. Historians are well aware of this proposal and the debate 
it generated, but no one is aware that the original suggestion came from Roger 
Garaudy.⁷
Garaudy’s search for spirituality gradually led him to a “progressive” social 
Catholicism; later, disappointed by Christianity, he converted to Islam in the early 
1980s, taking the first name of “Raja.” His switch to Islam was accompanied by a 
tumble into absolute anti-Zionism, precipitated by the Lebanon War and the siege 
of Beirut by the Israel Defense Forces in the summer of 1982. In 1983, he pub-
lished L’Affaire Israël (The Israel affair), which constitutes one of the most violent 
attacks against the Jewish State ever disseminated in France. His grievances 
were aimed not only at the policies of Israel’s government—which he accused of 
murderous imperialism—but at Israeli society and the fearsome “racism” raging 
through it. Seeking the origin of the structural flaws of the State of Israel, Garaudy 
lambasted the Zionist movement for both its ideological principles and its politi-
cal strategies. As for the constituent defects of Zionism, he claimed their sources 
lay in the “biblical myths” on which Jewish tradition was founded.⁸ Garaudy was 
to develop that question of the organic bonds which lead from the biblical Jewish 
past to the present-day “criminal” policy of Israel in another work, La Palestine 
[Palestine], published three years later.⁹
The first Gulf War (January–February 1991) bolstered his anti-Zionist radical-
ization, pushing Garaudy into an antisemitism which he barely tried to conceal. 
He had already begun to approach the New Right by the end of the 1980s; in 
March 1991, he participated in a colloquium held by GRECE [Research and Study 
Group for European Civilization, a think-tank of far Right intellectuals].¹⁰ He also 
6 Maurice Politi, “A bâtons rompus avec Roger Garaudy,” L’Information d’Israël, 3 Apr. 1970.
7 Roger Garaudy, Mon tour du siècle en solitaire. Mémoires (Paris, 1989), 326–27; Nahum 
Goldman, Autobiographie (Paris, 1971), 362–63; Maariv, 6 Apr. 1970, 7 Apr. 1970, 8 Apr. 1970, 
9 Apr. 1970.
8 Roger Garaudy, L’Affaire Israël (Paris, 1983).
9 Roger Garaudy, La Palestine, Terre des messages divins (Paris, 1986).
10 On Garaudy’s ties with the New Right: Yves Camus and René Monzat, Les Droites nationales 
et radicales en France (Lyon, 1992), 75, 262, 269.
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contributed to a magazine called Nationalisme et République, one of the main 
forums of the French antisemitic ultra-right.
At that point, Garaudy was ready for his Mythes fondateurs de la politique 
israélienne (Founding myths of Israeli politics), which he published for the first 
time (as a special, privately printed issue of a magazine) at the end of 1995. Its 
publisher was Pierre Guillaume, whose bookshop and publishing house, La 
Vieille Taupe (The old mole), was one of the most solid and stable bastions of 
negationism in France. The ideology supported by Guillaume and his ultra-left 
colleagues, in the 1960s and 1970s, was based on the assumption that the crimes 
of the Nazis could not have been worse (and were undoubtedly of less impor-
tance) than the crimes committed by the liberal democracies or the Soviet Union 
during World War II or at any other moment in history. This axiom led far Leftists 
in France to the writings of Paul Rassinier, the pioneer of postwar negationism. 
They published their own texts and provided fervent and unfailing support to 
Robert Faurisson and to other negationist authors.¹¹ By publishing his book with 
La Vieille Taupe, Garaudy left the domain of exacerbated anti-Zionism and of 
barely camouflaged antisemitism, making an official entry into the negationist 
nebula.
He left La Vieille Taupe after publishing the updated edition of his text in 
March 1996—a slightly sweetened version, which he distributed as self-published 
“samizdat.”¹² The prestigious label of “samizdat” is, of course, a symbol of oppo-
sition to totalitarian thought which persecutes all those who dare contest the 
established truth with regard to Zionism or genocide. The intent was both to com-
plicate the task of suppression by the courts and to promote public interest in the 
book and further its distribution.
The book begins with a protestation of innocence. Like many supporters of the 
Jews who switch over into antisemitism, Garaudy evoked the pro-Jewish phases 
of his course of life. He mentioned his friendship for Bernard Lecache when they 
were both interned in camps in Southern Algeria. He recalled the courses they 
had presented together for their companions in captivity, which discussed “the 
greatness, the universality, and the liberating power” of the Hebrew prophets.¹³
11 On the negationism of La Vieille Taupe, Pierre Guillaume, and his ultra-left friends: 
Valérie Igounet, Histoire du négationisme en France (Paris, 2000), 188–98, 248–93, 457–88. 
This study provides a wealth of information and analyses on multiple aspects of French 
negationism. It is, however, more limited with regard to the Garaudy affair.
12 Roger Garaudy, Les mythes fondateurs de la politique israélienne (Roger Garaudy, Samizdat, 
1996).
13 Ibid., 10.
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His reasoning is not easy to follow, because the text is tangled and very 
poorly articulated. Garaudy knows how to write; he knows how to compose a 
book; he has published a very large number of works on a variety of subjects. But 
his Founding Myths is badly edited and poorly organized. Nonetheless, in the dis-
orderly profusion of facts and quotations which pile up from one page to the next, 
it is possible to distinguish three major sets of arguments, each of which con-
stitutes part of his book: an absolute anti-Zionism, heading very quickly toward 
antisemitism; an undeniable negationism; and a furious anti-Israelism, which is 
also nourished by the most classic anti-Jewish stereotypes.
His pathological anti-Zionism is founded on a ferocious (to say the least) crit-
icism of biblical Judaism. Garaudy became a Catholic, and then a Muslim, but 
his book shows him as a materialistic atheist, weaving the Bible into some of his 
essential topics. Monotheism, he explains, does not belong to the Jews alone, but 
can be found in multiple forms in the Middle East and other parts of the world. 
Accordingly, the Jews cannot avail themselves of their status as the Chosen 
People, nor claim any divine promise in their favor.¹⁴ His reflections are based on 
scientific rationalism, which he applies to the constituent dogmas of the Jewish 
faith, but which he would be very cautious about applying with the same rigor to 
the dogmas of Islam, or even those of Christianity.
On the other hand, many of his assertions rest on a literal reading (rather 
than a critical analysis) of the biblical text. Garaudy no longer contests the valid-
ity of the account; he no longer invokes historical context; he no longer questions 
the dates; he no longer compares Jews with other peoples or other periods. What 
he does, at this point, is to revile the massacres which the Hebrews committed 
during their wandering in the desert and when they came into Canaan. After 
citing references to biblical battles from the holy text, Garaudy launches into 
the incessant crimes of which he currently accuses the Israelis.¹⁵ In doing so, he 
establishes a double bond of causality and continuity between the carnage of yes-
teryear and that of today. The suggestion is that the Jews are a cruel and bloody 
people by nature: they were that way a long time ago, against the poor Canaanites, 
and they are so, once again, in the twentieth century, against the unfortunate Pal-
estinians. The latter, who are the legitimate descendants of the Canaanites, thus 
have to suffer (for the second time in three millennia!) the dreadful conquest of 





In the course of these “historico-theological” pages, Garaudy crosses the line 
which separates his anti-Zionism, unbridled as it may be, from antisemitism. It 
is true that, in all his questions, he does no more than take up or amplify themes 
already developed in his previous books, The Israel Affair and Palestine. Garaudy, 
in Founding Myths is not engaged in innovation but in plagiarizing himself.
Negationism itself, which did not appear in the earlier books was, however, 
the subject of the central part of his book. In a first chapter of this second part, 
entitled “The Myth of Zionist Anti-Fascism,” Garaudy drew his inspiration from 
the literature of the extreme Left, which claims there was “collaboration” between 
the Zionist leaders and the Nazis; the quotations he uses are those habitually 
called into service by this type of writing. Suddenly, in the flood of quotations 
which seek to demonstrate that the Zionists collaborated with Fascists and Nazis, 
Chaim Weizmann (President of the World Zionist Organization) appears, declar-
ing war on Germany in 1939!¹⁶ This so-called “declaration of war” has already 
been abundantly studied. We know it plays a leading role in negationist reason-
ing, because it enables an explanation of why the Nazis, out of legitimate self-de-
fense, were forced to mistrust the Jews and hold them hostage. Garaudy, in this 
passage, mixed up two systems of reference. Like the extreme anti-Zionist (but 
not negationist) Left, he attempts to prove that the Zionists did nothing against 
Fascism. At the same time, he raises the argument that Weizmann had declared 
war on the Nazis and that the latter, faced with such a threat, absolutely had to 
defend themselves. The incompatibility of these two themes is evident. It leads 
Garaudy to accuse the Zionists of having been partners in the “extermination” of 
the Jews of Europe, and then to explain that this mass murder never took place 
and is no more than a myth disseminated by those same Zionists.
In the other chapters in the section concerning World War II, Garaudy used 
all the arguments and citations to be found in negationist literature. He criticized 
the Nuremberg trials for their victors’ justice, their asymmetry (German crimes 
are judged, but not those of the Allies), their irregularities (the confessions were 
obtained by torture). Most of all, he reproached the Allies for having invented 
the “myth” of the six million exterminated Jews with a view to charging defeated 
Germany with an absolute crime exceeding anything known by humankind up to 
that time.
Garaudy endorsed the classic negationist scenario, according to which the 
Nazi intention was to deport the Jews to the East for forced labor, but not to exter-
minate them. He denied that the testimonies of survivors were of any value and, 
of course, manipulated the statistics on the victims. He summarized the basic 
16 Ibid., 66–67.
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negationist theses concerning the nonexistence of the gas chambers. Attacking 
the “myth of the six million,” Garaudy evoked all the victims of the war, placing 
particular emphasis on the bombardment of Dresden and the destruction of Hiro-
shima. He also dwelt on the victims of European colonialism throughout con-
temporary history. Having added up all those dead, he expresses his indignation 
at the Jews’ attempt to seek a privileged status for their particular suffering by 
fraudulently inflating the number of their deceased and inventing extermina-
tion systems which never existed outside their imagination. The term “genocide” 
seemed excessive to him as a description of what the Jews went through during 
World War II. At the same time, he thought it perfectly appropriate to present as 
genocide what the Jews did to the Canaanite populations in Biblical times.¹⁷
The third part of his book, like the first, resembles his former writings on the 
“Jewish question” and on Zionism. He reviled the State of Israel from all possi-
ble angles, in its domestic politics and relations with the Arab world in general 
and the Palestinians in particular. He attacked the “world Zionist lobby,” paying 
special attention to two of its poles—American and French Jewry. Garaudy shows 
how the American Jews “control” the media and the political life of their country, 
enabling them to promote policies which run counter to American interests, while 
at the same time managing to transfer considerable funds to the State of Israel. 
Garaudy then takes on the “Zionists” in France. They, too, are masters of the 
media and of politics. They use their power to terrorize those who, like Garaudy 
himself, have dared to challenge their might or to denounce the myths on which 
they build their power and through whose strength they intend to keep it. Let us 
add that his apocalyptic description of “Zionist” domination of the United States 
and France is accompanied by two pages which, written in an indignant hand, 
refute the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.¹⁸ Garaudy thus succeeds in this tour de 
force which consists of adhering to the direct logic of the Protocols, while at the 
same time denying their authenticity.
The first publication of this text by La Vieille Taupe did not immediately make 
waves. Aside from a very brief article in the Monde des livres in January 1996, the 
book went virtually unnoticed.¹⁹ Meanwhile, however, legal proceedings were 
launched against Garaudy, under the “Gayssot” Law of July 1990 which prohibits 
the questioning of crimes against humanity and thus enables a legal response 
to negationism. This judicial action, combined with the spectacular rallying of 
17 Ibid., 151–67.
18 Ibid., 249–50.
19 “Roger Garaudy négationniste,” Le Monde, 26 Jan. 1996.
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Abbé Pierre, was to launch one of the most resounding affairs in the history of 
negationism in France.
Like Garaudy, Abbé Pierre (Henry Grouès) is a former “friend” of the Jewish 
people. He was a member of the Résistance during World War II and has repeat-
edly recalled how he helped persecuted Jews to slip across the Swiss border. He 
several times expressed his rejection of antisemitism and racism. Speaking in 
1949 at a meeting of support for the State of Israel, he observed that “for him, 
the Resistance began the day when, at the cathedral of Grenoble, the police came 
in to track down people whose only offense was to have been born in the Jewish 
faith.” He described his first clandestine crossing of the border, in an effort to save 
Jews. He concluded that “anyone who asks me to come and speak for liberty, for 
the survival of a people, may be sure that I will answer the call.”²⁰ As a Member 
of Parliament for the MRP (Popular Republican Movement, a reformist Christian 
Democratic party) in Meurthe and Moselle, he spoke out on questions of antisem-
itism.²¹ His support for Zionism and for the young State of Israel was unfailing. 
Thus, in December 1948 he participated in a meeting organized by the French 
League for a Free Palestine, an organization linked with the nationalist-right 
Irgun Zvai Leumi (Etzel).²² He was one of the Catholic Members of Parliament 
who supported Israel on the question of the holy places in Jerusalem.²³
Abbé Pierre had first become famous around 1954 for his public campaigns 
in the war on poverty. The general prosperity of the 1960s and early 1970s took 
the urgency out of his campaigns which seemed anachronistic and out of step 
with the growing affluence during the years of economic growth. The shock of the 
two consecutive oil crises (1974 and 1979), as well as the reappearance of unem-
ployment and poverty which characterized the 1980s, rehabilitated the virtues 
of philanthropic militancy, especially on behalf of the homeless. His “compan-
ions of Emmaus” were to enjoy new-found fame in a French society once again 
threatened by misery and destitution. His warm personality—that of a simple and 
devoted man—was to transform him into an adored symbol of human fraternity 
and solidarity in a capitalist society pitiless toward the weak, the unfortunate, 
and the outcasts within it. Let us add that Abbé Pierre always expressed opposi-
tion to the extreme Right and the National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen.
20 “Dans un puissant meeting, Paris exprime sa solidarité avec Israël en lutte pour son 
indépendance,” Droit et Liberté, 1 Feb. 1949.
21 See also his letter on the subject of a local matter of antisemitism in Droit et Liberté, 30 
June 1950.
22 David Lazar, L’Opinion française et la naissance de l’Etat d’Israël 1945–1949 (Paris, 1972), 
135–36.
23 Ibid., 190–91.
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Abbé Pierre was thus at the height of his popularity when he came to the aid 
of Garaudy, whom he had known and esteemed for 50 years. He spoke out in favor 
of freedom of expression, as Noam Chomsky had done in the Faurisson affair. 
He also took a stand on a much more fundamental level, citing the “biblical” 
massacres. In a letter dated 15 April 1996, he expressed confidence in his friend 
Garaudy and saluted his “astonishing, brilliant and scrupulous erudition.” He 
stated his hope for a great debate with “real historians” on the questions raised. 
He then went on to express some strange considerations on the Jews, mentioning 
the Book of Joshua and the “Shoah” which the Jews had supposedly wrought in 
Antiquity against other peoples of the region. Abbé Pierre attacked the wrongs of 
Jewish particularism, while admitting that the policy of the Church with regard 
to Judaism had some share in the syndrome.²⁴ Abbé Pierre’s letter of support, 
brought to the attention of the public in a press conference skillfully orchestrated 
by Garaudy’s lawyer, Jacques Vergès, gave rise to a far-ranging polemic.²⁵
Abbé Pierre, a member of the Honors Committee of the International League 
Against Racism and Antisemitism (LICRA), came to the headquarters of that orga-
nization on April 24 to explain himself. In a tense atmosphere, he admitted that 
he had not read the incriminated text, pleading fatigue and his advanced age; 
nonetheless, he declared that his confidence in Garaudy was unchanged. More 
than anything else, he expressed his hope that a debate would be held on certain 
points of history—a statement which indirectly echoed the negationists. They had 
always demanded an open confrontation between two “schools of history”—that 
which claimed that the gas chambers existed and that which doubted it. Thus, 
while proclaiming his affection for the Jews, Abbé Pierre nevertheless supported 
debate on the “issues” raised by Garaudy.²⁶
In an interview several days later, he persisted in his refusal to dissociate 
from Garaudy and made equivocal comments on what he called the “question 
24 Text reproduced in Roger Garaudy, Droit de réponse. «Le lynchage médiatique de l’Abbé 
Pierre et Roger Garaudy» (Roger Garaudy, Samizdat, 1996), 29–32.
25 Nicolas Weill, “L’Abbé Pierre soutient les aberrations négationnistes de Roger Garaudy,” 
Le Monde, 20 Apr. 1996; also Nicolas Weill, “L’Abbé Pierre confirme son soutien aux thèses 
négationnistes de Roger Garaudy,” Le Monde, 21–22 April 1996. The Swiss essayist Jean Ziegler 
and Fr. Michel Lelong also lent their support to Garaudy, but quickly withdrew it. Jean Ziegler’s 
retraction, Le Monde, 23 Apr. 1996; Fr. Lelong’s retraction in a letter to Le Monde, 5–6 May 
1996.
26 Nicolas Weill, “Le recul de l’Abbé Pierre sur son soutien à M. Garaudy est jugé ambigu par 
la LICRA,” Le Monde, 26 Apr. 1996. Nicolas Weill was later to publish a very interesting account 
of the evening of April 24 at LICRA: Une Histoire personnelle de l’antisémitisme (Paris, 2003), 
95–101.
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of the gas chambers.” He corrected himself at once, however; the next day, in a 
communiqué, he stated that he “[did] not by any means intend to leave in doubt, 
for any reason whatsoever, the atrocious reality of the Shoah and the millions 
of Jews exterminated because they were Jews.” He mentioned that he had saved 
Jewish lives during the war and that he “firmly condemn[ed] all those who, for 
various reasons, wish, in any manner whatsoever, to deny, falsify or trivialize the 
Shoah, which will always remain a blot of indelible shame in the history of our 
continent.” Still, he spoiled his profession of faith by indicating that he main-
tained his confidence in Garaudy, who, he said, was committed to “admitting 
any error which would be proven to him.” That last sentence, harmless though 
it may have looked, had the effect of wiping out the force of the rest of the com-
muniqué that could have saved him, because it transferred the burden of proof 
to Garaudy’s adversaries. His retraction was accordingly considered insufficient 
and unacceptable by the leaders of LICRA. On May 1, he was expelled from the 
Honors Committee of the anti-racist association.²⁷
This multiplicity of contradictory and confused statements bears witness 
to the intensity of the internal drama which Abbé Pierre, under pressure from 
several different directions, was experiencing. It is also symptomatic of the tor-
tuous path from philosemitism to antisemitism. In historical perspective, Abbé 
Pierre was actually no more than the latest avatar in a long line of militants 
belonging to LICRA (or LICA, as it was formerly known) who crossed the line 
and turned toward antisemitism. As for Garaudy, a friend of the founder of LICA, 
congratulated by the Jews for his denunciation of antisemitism in 1968–1970, he 
came from the same camp, as it were, and followed a similar path.
The Jewish community responded forcefully. Henri Hajdenberg, President of 
the Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France (CRIF), firmly voiced 
the official protest of the Jewish community in France, while making contact with 
the Catholic hierarchy. The writer Marek Halter was concerned about a “poor 
man’s negationism, this sort of jealousy which results in all the damned of the 
earth, of all times, having a problem with the Jews, who monopolize empathy.” 
Serge Klarsfeld, for his part, wondered about Abbé Pierre’s claim to have saved 
Jews during the war: “The declarations which he has just made authorize us to 
demand clarifications on the exact role which he could have played during the 
war with regard to saving Jews. We can wonder whether he did save Jews.” In 
much the same vein, Antoine Spire spoke out about an inquiry which he had 
27 Michel Castaing, “L’Abbé Pierre retire son soutien aux thèses de Roger Garaudy,” Le Monde, 
2 May 1996; “L’Abbé Pierre a été exclu du comité d’honneur de la LICRA,” Le Monde, 3 May 
1996; “L’Abbé Pierre ne fait plus partie de la LICRA,” Le Droit de vivre (Jan.–May 1996): 12–13.
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made some ten years before, showing that Abbé Pierre had invented a role as 
a Résistance member much more prominent than that which he had played in 
reality.²⁸
Le Canard enchaîné (one of the first papers to denounce the publication of 
Garaudy’s book) proceeded in its own way—that is, with humor. It imagined a 
negationist logic, applied in 2050, on the question of knowing whether Abbé 
Pierre really existed. True, there were photographs, but nothing is easier to falsify 
than a photograph. As to the number of homeless, it should naturally be regarded 
with caution: certain figures spoke of 400,000, others of 200,000. Such a gap 
obviously constituted proof that no homeless persons ever existed. Using ridicule 
to combat the phenomenon, the article exposed the intrinsically absurd nature of 
negationist reasoning by applying it to subjects other than the Shoah, and espe-
cially those dear to the negationists themselves or their friends. The same issue 
of the satirical journal launched a violent attack on “Roger-la-Honte” (Roger-the-
shame), taking wicked pleasure in recalling that Garaudy, a Communist intellec-
tual of the early 1950s, was one of those who had denied with fervor the existence 
of the Soviet camps.²⁹
Bernard Kouchner, in an open letter addressed to Abbé Pierre, noted that 
Garaudy, throughout his life, had always supported the worst oppressors: Stalin 
in the Soviet Union, Qaddafi in Libya, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, and that “his 
lifeline, like a downward slope, inclines toward the worst.” Kouchner was a close 
friend of Abbé Pierre, and the two had even published a book together in 1994. 
He now invoked that friendship in order to demand that Abbé Pierre get a grip on 
himself and part company with Garaudy.³⁰
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, a left-wing Jewish historian of renown, also spoke out. 
His writings had dealt a blow which, if not fatal, was at least quite severe, to the 
popularity of Robert Faurisson’s theses in the early 1980s. This important work, 
Les assassins de la mémoire (The assassins of memory, 1987), had the effect of 
dismantling the internal mechanism of the revisionist “method.” Vidal-Naquet 
showed no mercy for Garaudy, who “was always a specialist in never-mind-
what,” having converted “first to Protestantism, then to Communism, then to 
Catholicism, then to Islam. This is not exactly an example of intellectual stabil-
ity.” Vidal-Naquet cited a few examples of the grave errors which abounded in 
28 On the Jewish community reactions, see Tribune juive, 9 May 1996, 16–19.
29 Frédéric Pagès, “L’Abbé Pierre a-t-il vraiment existé?” and Patrice Lestrohan, “Roger-la-
Honte,” Le Canard enchaîné, 30 Apr. 1996.
30 Bernard Kouchner, “Mon père, je t’écris ces mots parce que j’ai un devoir d’affection,” Le 
Monde, 30 Apr. 1996.
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Founding Myths, calling it “an oppressive book, made up of frightening historical 
misunderstandings.” He evoked the ultra-leftist intellectuals who, following Paul 
Rassinier, fed French negationism with their writings. He severely criticized Abbé 
Pierre, for the support which he lent to Garaudy and no less for his aberrant ref-
erence to the biblical Joshua’s “Shoah.” Going on to cite the demagogy of Le Pen 
and the extreme Right, he expressed his fears that the “position taken by Abbé 
Pierre will open the floodgates of antisemitic pressure.”³¹
This brings me to Florent Brayard’s impressive first book, which was a study 
on Paul Rassinier, one of the dominant figures among the first generation of 
French and other negationists.³² The appearance of his book in 1996 coincided 
with the uproar of the Garaudy-Abbé Pierre affair. As a specialist on the history of 
Holocaust denial, Brayard explained that “revisionist production, since its origin, 
has swung back and forth between paucity and the most dishonest falsification,” 
He said that Garaudy had done no more than to line up quotations borrowed from 
the works of his predecessors in negationism, like a parrot who “also forgets to 
indicate whose phrases it repeats.” Garaudy’s compilation
well illustrates the stick-in-the-mud nature of revisionist discourse: Rassinier, who created 
it, was also the first to repeat himself relentlessly, followed by Faurisson repeating Rassinier 
repeating himself. The zealots of that ideology, in turn, repeated and are still repeating what 
Rassinier and Faurisson said.
Brayard went on to contrast the scientific ineptitude of the revisionists’ discourse 
with the public relations effectiveness of their strategy. The “revisionists” were 
actually seeking to provoke public scandals, preferably accompanied by judicial 
repression, which would enable them to plead their cause in the name of freedom 
of expression and conscience. Such “affairs” gave rise to irrational doubts which 
could only be to their benefit: this was the “revisionist trap” denounced by Bra-
yard.³³
The “set-up” theory regarding the shaping of public opinion was also exposed 
by historian Philippe Videlier. After having drawn a parallel from the antisemi-
tism of Drumont’s day and the Dreyfus affair to present-day negationism, he 
revealed the tactics adopted by the staff of La Vieille Taupe in order to publicize 
Garaudy’s work and ensure maximum distribution. He also demonstrated the 
31 François Bonnet and Nicolas Weill, “Pierre Vidal-Naquet analyse les relais dont disposent 
les négationnistes,” Le Monde, 4 May 1996.
32 Florent Brayard, Comment l’idée vient à M. Rassinier. Naissance du révisionnisme (Paris, 
1996).
33 Florent Brayard, “Le piège révisionniste,” Le Monde, 31 May 1996.
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links which since the early 1990s had tied Garaudy to the extreme Right.³⁴ More-
over, other inquiries had succeeded in identifying, in the immediate entourage 
of Abbé Pierre, ultra-leftist militants who had incited him to take a public stand 
in Garaudy’s favor. These were former members of the Italian Red Brigades, who, 
having tired of their terrorist activities of the 1970s, had faded back into France. 
Having infiltrated Abbé Pierre’s vast network of institutions, they now occupied 
important administrative and managerial functions. Their influence on Abbé 
Pierre, according to Eric Conan, was considerable.³⁵
Self-replicating as always in times of crisis, the debate on the strategy to use 
in dealing with the negationists became even more fierce, focusing on the issue 
of legal restraints on the proliferation of denial. A hostile position towards the 
Gayssot Law was expressed by historian Madeleine Rebérioux, Honorary Presi-
dent of the Ligue des droits de l’homme [League for Human Rights]. She consid-
ered that the general anti-racist law passed in 1972 was powerful enough to repress 
antisemitism, whereas a specific action under the Gayssot Law would have the 
effect of transforming the negationists into martyrs and sowing “rampant doubt” 
in people’s minds.³⁶ Simone Weil agreed that the law “lets the negationists appear 
as martyrs, victims of an official truth. Thanks to it, the negationists will be able 
to drive the debate on freedom of expression off course.”³⁷ Although some critics 
of the law came from a liberal background, most originated in the extreme Right, 
which—for easily comprehensible reasons—had never stopped fighting the law 
since the day of its enactment. Communist parliamentarian Jean-Claude Gayssot 
and former Communist Senator Charles Lederman, who had drafted the law, 
responded by insisting that the 1990 law was an extension of the anti-racist law 
passed in July 1972. It was intended, like any legislation of that type, to protect 
“society against the intolerance and inhumanity which constitute the systematic 
construction of racism, antisemitism and xenophobia.”³⁸
Support for Abbé Pierre and Garaudy was by no means negligible. It came, for 
example, from the ranks of the National Front, whose leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, 
had already announced his “revisionist” view on the “details” of the history of 
World War II. The National Front press based its campaign on freedom of speech 
and the universal right to expose ideas to the general public. This support was not 
34 Philippe Videlier, “Nouvelle affaire négationniste. Zones d’ombre et coup monté,” Le 
Monde diplomatique (June 1996).
35 Eric Conan and Sylviane Stein, “Ce qui a fait chuter l’abbé Pierre,” L’Express, 2 May 1996.
36 Madeleine Rebérioux, “Contre la loi Gayssot,” Le Monde, 21 May 1996.
37 Interview with Simone Weil in L’Evénement du Jeudi, 27 June–3 July 1996.
38 Jean-Claude Gayssot and Charles Lederman, “Une loi contre l’antisémitisme militant,” Le 
Monde, 26 June 1996.
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unanimous among the splinter groups which held a neo-Nazi ideology further 
to the right than Jean-Marie Le Pen. Some of them reproached Abbé Pierre for 
the “hatred” which he had supposedly shown many years ago for the Alsatians 
enlisted in the Waffen SS. Others accused him of having retreated before the 
anti-negationist wave in the media.³⁹
The Church, for its part, was at a loss. It certainly took a firm stand early 
in May 1996 in a statement issued by the office of the Episcopal Committee for 
Relations with Judaism. The Committee rejected “the very grave confusion and 
the scandal which result from the support thus expressed” by Abbé Pierre for 
Garaudy. “The fact that the extermination took place is uncontested; it truly was 
genocide, because men, women, children and old people were condemned to 
death. The gas chambers existed and the Nazis used a coded language to conceal 
their heinous crime,” the statement continued, concluding that “for all these 
reasons, we regret and deplore Abbé Pierre’s undertaking to support Mr. Garau-
dy.”⁴⁰ The use of the word “deplore,” rather than a stronger and more appropri-
ate word such as “condemn” or “denounce,” reveals the uneasiness felt by the 
Episcopal Committee at the thought of totally breaking away from Abbé Pierre.⁴¹ 
Another sign of discomfort lay in the fact that Cardinal Lustiger, the archbishop 
of Paris, waited until mid-June 1996 before launching a public accusation against 
Abbé Pierre. This gave the latter a rather long reprieve, which was probably 
intended to grant him an opportunity to correct himself. Still, we must note that, 
tardy as it may seem, Cardinal Lustiger’s reaction was categorical and unambig-
uous.⁴²
Garaudy, throughout this period, did not remain inactive. In June 1996, 
he published a brief work entitled Droit de réponse (Right of response), which 
denounced the “media lynching” of which he claimed that he and Abbé Pierre 
had been the victims.⁴³ His work repeats, in summary form and in a style meant to 
be clear and easy to read, the principal themes set forth in Founding Myths. It men-
39 On this subject, the information set forth by Jean-Yves Camus in Tribune juive, 9 May 1996.
40 “L’Eglise doit s’interroger sur ses responsabilitiés,” Le Monde, 2 May 1996; also Henri 
Tincq, “La hiérarchie catholique ne veut pas être entraînée dans la polémique suscitée par 
l’abbé Pierre,” Le Monde, 30 April 1996.
41 One illustration of this discomfort: Jacques Gaillot, “Lettre à l’abbé Pierre,” Le Monde, 26 
Apr. 1996.
42 Henri Tincq, “Mgr. Lustiger adresse un blâme public à l’abbé Pierre et dégage la 
responsabilité de l’Eglise. L’archevêque de Paris dénonce une attaque contre Israël et les juifs” 
Le Monde, 21 June 1996.
43 Roger Garaudy, Droit de réponse. “Le lynchage médiatique de l’Abbé Pierre et Roger 
Garaudy” (Roger Garaudy: Samizdat, 1996).
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tions the “collaboration of the Zionist leaders with Hitler” and “Israeli terrorism” 
and laments the fact that these questions, although abundantly addressed in his 
book, had not become the object of any public debate. On the other hand, a ver-
itable “witch hunt,” set in motion by a powerful “Jewish lobby,” had ceaselessly 
harassed him for “negationism,” and it was this defamatory accusation which 
he insisted on opposing. His text recalled that he had been interned during the 
war with Bernard Lecache, President of LICA, and that he had received the Medal 
of Deportation. It then, however, returned to two crucial questions: the number 
of victims, and the existence of the gas chambers. While angrily protesting the 
accusations of negationism against him, Garaudy’s behavior was precisely that of 
the negationists: excitedly denying that he was an antisemite, while expressing 
doubts about the mass murder and the existence of the gas chambers; massively 
reducing the number of assassinated Jews; and attributing the losses to the tribu-
lations of deportation, typhus epidemics in the camps, Allied bombardments, or 
the unfortunate circumstances of war.
Garaudy’s work blasted the Zionists, accusing them of trying to downplay or 
ignore the non-Jewish victims of Nazism. According to him, the book of Joshua, 
was a major inspiration for Israeli policy. Typically, he becomes infuriated at a 
journalist who dared to compare his book to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion: 
had he not himself written, in a work published ten years before, a refutation of 
“that ignoble forgery”? With his diatribe against the Protocols still ringing in our 
ears, he hastens, one page later, to denounce “an extremely powerful lobby in the 
United States” and “an extremely powerful lobby in France” for subjugating the 
policies of both countries to the interests of the world Jewish community. Thus he 
denies antisemitism even while nourishing it.
Garaudy would also invoke the great names in the struggle against antisem-
itism in order to turn them against the Jews. Thus, he makes two references to 
Dreyfus.⁴⁴ The first is in the context of denouncing the international tribunal of 
Nuremberg, which supposedly trampled the elementary rules of justice no less 
severely than the judges who once condemned Alfred Dreyfus. On another occa-
sion, Garaudy castigated the “actual incitements to murder” launched against 
the revisionists by their adversaries, “just as they had found no other way to 
gag Dreyfus than by throwing him in prison.” Garaudy’s pamphlet includes two 
44 This reference to Dreyfus seems to be a constant in Roger Garaudy’s work. In this way, 
his book of 1970, which recalls his increasing clashes with the Communist Party, opens with 
a quotation from the judges in the Dreyfus Affair, repeating that “the question will not be 
asked....”
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pieces of supporting testimony, one by a Protestant minister and the other by a 
former deportee.
Abbé Pierre, meanwhile, had left France. Badly shaken by the inflammatory 
polemic, he judged it preferable to withdraw to the Benedictine monastery in 
Praglia, near Padua, Italy.⁴⁵ In the initial period of his stay in Italy, he unfailingly 
persisted in his support of Garaudy, who even came to visit him at the monastery. 
He publicly condemned an “international Zionist lobby” which was allegedly 
exerting its influence on the Catholic Church in France.⁴⁶ In mid-June 1996, he 
was still fulminating against Zionism, explaining how the infamous world lobby 
was acting for the establishment of “the Empire proclaimed to Abraham,” which 
was to extend from the Nile to the Euphrates.⁴⁷ “And what if Abbé Pierre was 
right?,” asked enigmatic yellow and black posters put up in Paris in the second 
half of June 1996.⁴⁸
Was this be “a victory for the revisionists,” as was pessimistically announced 
in late June 1996 by L’Evénement du Jeudi? The weekly publi cation interviewed 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Bernard-Henri Lévy, and Pierre-André Taguieff, who 
expressed their distress at the support for the re visionists in public opinion. 
According to one survey, 24% of the French were critical of Abbé Pierre, but 9% 
approved of him, and 64%—no small number—continued to like him.⁴⁹
But then in July 1996, at a moment where the revisionists seemed to have 
achieved an impressive success, Abbé Pierre, for one last time, astonished both 
the protagonists of the affair and outside observers. After several weeks in Italy, 
he decided to make honorable amends and devote himself to an unequivocal 
retraction, unlike his confused earlier efforts. Noting that his words had been
exploited by currents which are playing dangerous games with the risks of antisemitism 
and neo-fascism or neo-Nazism, which I have fought against and will always fight against, 
I have decided to take back my words, accepting only the opinions issued by the Church 
experts, and, asking the forgiveness of anyone whom I might have injured, I leave the 
honesty of everyone’s intentions to be judged only by God.
45 “Ses compagnons veulent croire à un exil provisoire de l’abbé Pierre,” Le Monde, 31 May 
1996.
46 Michel Castaing, “L’abbé Pierre s’en prend à un ‘lobby sioniste international,’” Le Monde, 
2–3 June 1996.
47 “L’abbé Pierre met en cause le ‘mouvement sioniste,’” Le Monde, 19 June 1996.
48 Erich Inciyan, “Un mystérieux affichage de soutien à l’abbé Pierre,” Le Monde, 26 June 
1996.
49 See the dossier published by L’Evénement du Jeudi, 27 June–3 July 1996.
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In a letter to Garaudy, supplementing his declaration to the press, he insisted that 
his name no longer be linked, “in any way,” to his friend’s book.⁵⁰ Abbé Pierre 
had abandoned the field and made a definitive retreat.
The viewpoint of Robert Faurisson
In the flood of words and writings inspired by the Garaudy–Abbé Pierre affair, 
the most revealing reactions were those of Robert Faurisson, a leading figure of 
French negationism. He followed the developments of the affair very closely, 
with an understandable interest. He devoted several press releases to it when it 
first broke out; he even published a detailed analysis of the entire crisis, entitled 
“Bilan de l’affaire Garaudy-abbé Pierre, janvier–octobre 1996” (Balance sheet of 
the Garaudy–Abbé Pierre affair, January–October 1996).⁵¹ These texts illustrate 
common distinguishing factors between two categories of negationists, exposing 
some of the tensions in the movement.
Faurisson had been upset from the very beginning. Garaudy, in the first 
version of his text, had mentioned his name only once, “and not only that, but 
[mentioned him] only as a professor who had been a victim of anti-revisionist 
repression, but does not let us know exactly why: not one book, not even one 
article by that professor is mentioned.” The section of Founding Myths which 
refers to World War II, while certainly “inspired by revisionism,” was far from 
pleasing him. “Those 75 pages were written in haste; they are composed of dis-
jointed pieces; the account is rather disconnected; omissions abound, and there 
are even errors,” he wrote, with no compassion for the author or empathy for the 
book.⁵² Faurisson also noted that his name had completely disappeared from the 
second edition of Founding Myths—the “samizdat” edition. This concealment, 
complained Faurisson, was even more significant because “the original text had 
been revised in such a way as to attenuate its revisionist nature.”⁵³ Faurisson was 
painfully aware of having been plagiarized, because the contestation of the gas 
chambers presented by Garaudy had been “entirely taken from my own writings, 
50 “L’abbé Pierre retire ses propos sur le livre de Roger Garaudy,” Le Monde, 24 July 1996.
51 Faurisson’s documents on the affair are reproduced in Robert Faurisson, Ecrits 




including citations!”⁵⁴ This was the reason behind his refusal to provide Pierre 
Guillaume with an “important document” (its content unrevealed) that Garaudy 
needed for his polemic: “I am answering him by stating that his client has no 
other option but to ask me for the document himself.... I am expressing to him 
my astonishment at having been treated that way and at not even having received 
a copy of Founding Myths. I am informing him that, as he knows, the revisionist 
part of that book is no more than a compilation of my own writings.”⁵⁵
When he learned that Abbé Pierre was lending his support to Garaudy, Fau-
risson responded with a communiqué which reflected an obvious lack of enthu-
siasm for those who, “for the last few months, have been flying to the aid of the 
revisionist victory.” He went on to deplore the fact “that it was necessary to wait 
for 1996 to see those people realizing what should have been blindingly clear to 
the entire world since 1979: the imaginary genocide of the Jews, principally per-
petrated by means of the supposed Nazi gas chambers, is no more than a historic 
lie.” He mistrusted the newcomers, saying that he was waiting for them “to claim 
that they had not said what they said, that they had not written what they wrote: 
I am waiting for those people to give themselves over to the more popular senti-
ments of anti-Nazism (what courage!).” He concluded by recalling the principles 
of revisionist orthodoxy: “I find that those people’s statements are continually 
beside the point. We must call a spade a spade: this genocide and these cham-
bers are a deception.” Naturally, he ended his communiqué on an anti-Jewish 
note: “I will add that, if I were Jewish, I would be ashamed to think that, for more 
than half a century, so many Jews have propagated or allowed the propagation 
of such a deception, with the support of the leading media throughout the entire 
world.”⁵⁶
Faurisson was accordingly not surprised to see Garaudy and his lawyer 
issuing declarations which rejected Nazism and negationism. He had no indul-
gence for Abbé Pierre’s “multiple acts of contrition” or “protestations of good 
faith.” Faurisson was especially annoyed that Abbé Pierre felt it necessary to pub-
licly distance himself from his own pioneering work.⁵⁷ For all these reasons, he 
felt both “happy and bitter.” “I am happy because I see trendy people subscribing 
to what I have worn myself out repeating for almost quarter of a century,” he ini-
tially explained. “But I also feel bitterness because, for 22 years, those people and 
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cially because “those eleventh-hour actors, Garaudy and Abbé Pierre, are also 
giving themselves over to the more popular sentiments of anti-Nazism.”⁵⁸
On the margins of the Garaudy affair, Faurisson allowed himself to make 
some general comments on the French revisionists. In an epic proclamation, he 
wondered “how, at the end of the day, a handful of men and women, succeeded 
in breaking a leaden silence imposed upon the entire world by the richest, most 
powerful and most severely feared group of the entire West? This group is the 
Jews.”⁵⁹ He then sent a warning to Garaudy and Abbé Pierre, reminding them 
that “the Jews never forgive the least transgression of their taboo. Excuses, retrac-
tions, explanations, flatteries will constitute no reparations for the offense com-
mitted against them. They will be merciless. They will strike even harder against 
anyone who, even for an instant, has bowed before them.”⁶⁰
He was accordingly not astonished to see his prediction come true, when 
Abbé Pierre published his definitive retraction in July 1996, and when Garaudy 
declared that he had distanced himself from negationism while admittedly con-
tinuing to propagate it. “It is regrettable that Roger Garaudy and Abbé Pierre did 
not show more courage. The moment the media tempest in France began to rise 
against them, they began to beat a retreat.... We will hold no grudge against them. 
We must keep the violence of these times in mind; the strongest stand in fear of 
them [the Jews]; how much more so should men of their age [fear them].”⁶¹
Faurisson’s epilogue on the entire affair adopts a tone which is at once con-
descending, morose and fatalistic: “Two octogenarians, who thought they knew 
life and humankind, suddenly discovered, with childlike surprise, that, in reality, 
their past existence was a rather facile one. Both of them, within a few short days, 
were forced to pass an exceptional test: the one to which Jewish organizations 
habitually subject persons who have the misfortune of arousing their wrath.” 
Faurisson then held forth on the Jews who, out of “ancestral reflex,” involve in 
their struggle all the media under their control. Faurisson expanded on Jewish 
hatred, calling it “inextinguishable” and “one of the most formidable of all.” It 
was quite a normal thing, he said, for Garaudy and Abbé Pierre, each in his own 
way and under such pressure, to have “cracked” under the test.⁶²
Faurisson has often proclaimed his belief in the final victory of revisionism, 







firmed, however, that the great majority of French society in the mid-1990s was 
not prepared to follow Garaudy or Abbé Pierre down the negationist path.
Garaudy did not, in fact, “crack” or abandon his theses. His 1998 trial was to 
arouse a new wave of polemics. He was charged with “complicity in contesting 
crimes against humanity” and “incitement to racial discrimination, hatred and 
violence.” Garaudy did admit to the Correctional Chamber of Paris that he was 
hostile toward Zionism, but not toward Judaism. He even stated that he favored 
“the unity of the three Semite religions.” He also explained why the quotes from 
Rassinier and Faurisson in the first edition of his book (December 1995), had 
disappeared from the second (March 1996): “I did not want to shift the focus 
of this book. It was translated in 23 different countries. I did not think I should 
encumber it with names unknown outside France.”⁶³ The debate centered on the 
definition of the “Final Solution” and the question of the gas chambers. “I saw 
death pass before my eyes when I was interned in the Sahara, but I never had 
the idea of building a business on my grandfather’s bones,” Garaudy insisted, 
while pouring scorn on the anti-racist organizations.⁶⁴ The latter, he said, were 
stressing the negationist, and not just the “anti-Zionist,” nature of his writings.⁶⁵ 
His counsel, Jacques Vergès, criticized the Gayssot Law, which “claimed to freeze 
History, whereas History is in a state of perpetual revision.” Vergès denounced 
the primacy accorded to the genocide of the Jews, relative to all of the other geno-
cides, and compared his client’s trial to a witch-hunt.⁶⁶
In the verdict handed down on 27 February 1998, the court rejected the 
charge of incitement to racial violence or hatred, which constituted half a victory 
for Garaudy. On the other hand, with regard to negationism, the court ruled that 
“Roger Garaudy gave himself over to a virulent and systematic contestation of the 
very existence of the crimes against humanity committed against the Jewish com-
munity, borrowing liberally, in order to do so, from what the abundant revisionist 
literature had already published on the subject.” Garaudy was sentenced to pay 
relatively heavy fines.⁶⁷
63 Acacio Pereira, “M. Garaudy comparaît pour ‘complicité de contestation de crimes contre 
l’humanité,’” Le Monde, 10 Jan. 1998.
64 Idem, “Roger Garaudy ‘doute’ toujours de l’existence des chambres à gaz,” Le Monde, 
11–12 Jan. 1998.
65 Idem, “Une amende de 150,000 francs est requise contre Roger Garaudy,” Le Monde, 17 Jan. 
1998.
66 Idem, “Les défenseurs de Roger Garaudy s’attaquent à la loi Gayssot,” Le Monde, 18–19 
Jan. 1998.
67 Idem, “Le philosophe Roger Garaudy est condamné pour contestation de crimes contre 
l’humanité,” Le Monde, 1–2 Mar. 1998.
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The coverage of the trial by Le Monde gave rise to an interesting semantic 
debate which centered on the way in which Garaudy should be defined. The title 
of a first article, which referred to him as an “anti-Zionist philosopher,” provoked 
a riposte by several renowned intellectuals.
The use of the euphemism “anti-Zionist” in your title is a distortion of meaning, just as 
the title of “philosopher” seems improper for Mr. Garaudy’s work. You have made a choice 
which calls journalistic ethics into question, a choice with particularly grave political 
effects. Intellectual honesty is first and foremost a question of vocabulary.⁶⁸
The polemic was strengthened when it became clear that Le Monde was persisting 
in its attitude when it announced the sentenced passed against the “philosopher 
Garaudy.”⁶⁹ Robert Redeker, a philosopher himself and member of the editorial 
board of Temps modernes, spoke out in turn. He denied that negationism was a 
philosophy, because it was, in fact, “intellectual banditry.” Accordingly, Garaudy 
should have been called a “negationist ideologue” and not a “philosopher.”⁷⁰ 
Garaudy replied by protesting against his “excommunication from philosophy” 
and inserted himself, on his own authority, into the category of Galileo, Einstein, 
and Descartes.⁷¹
In his efforts to justify his Founding Myths and to establish that he was neither 
a negationist nor an antisemite, he filed an appeal. The second trial was opened 
on 14 October 1998, before the Court of Appeals in Paris. Alain Finkielkraut, the 
sole witness called by the anti-racist organizations, demonstrated the negation-
ism shown by Garaudy, who “republishes the arguments in whose name the 
Jews were killed.... There is nothing more offensive than to evict the survivors 
from their misfortune and the dead from their death.” Garaudy claimed to have 
received a letter of support from renowned violinist Sir Yehudi Menuhin in July 
1998 and basically repeated the essentials of his earlier arguments.⁷² He did so in 
vain: the Court of Appeals did not merely confirm the verdict handed down in Feb-
ruary. It increased the sentence, giving Garaudy six months’ suspended imprison-
68 See the letter “Détournement de sens” signed by Elisabeth de Fontenay, Alain Finkielkraut, 
Henri Raczymov, Jacques Tarnero, and Michel Zaoui in the “Letters from Readers” section 
of Le Monde, 1–2 Feb. 1998. See also Thomas Ferenczi, “Des titres malencontreux,” ibid. 
The headline referred to was “Le philosophe antisioniste Roger Garaudy reçoit le soutien de 
journaux arabes,” Le Monde, 13 Jan. 1998.
69 See note 67.
70 Robert Redeker, “Roger Garaudy est-il un philosophe?,” Le Monde, 13 Mar. 1998.
71 “Une lettre de Roger Garaudy,” Le Monde, 7 Apr. 1998.
72 Nicolas Weill, “Jugé en appel, Roger Garaudy persiste à défendre, à la virgule près, les 
thèses de son livre contesté” Le Monde, 16 Oct. 1998.
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ment on top of his fines. His publisher, Pierre Guillaume, was also found guilty 
and sentenced.⁷³ Garaudy, indefatigable, went on to pursue his fight against the 
courts, but his sentence was confirmed by the Cour de Cassation (Superior Court 
of Appeals) in September 2000. He then turned to his last recourse—the European 
courts—but again without success.
Rejected by French public opinion and condemned by French justice, 
Garaudy was nonetheless fêted and enthusiastically flattered in the Arab world, 
where his “anti-Zionist” and negationist writings were particularly appreciated. 
As early as 1996, he toured Syria and Jordan and other Arab countries to present 
his book. Visiting Egypt in October 1996, he was appointed an honorary member 
of the Federation of Writers. His arrival, of course, was exploited by the intellec-
tual and political forces which were campaigning against the normalization of 
relations between Egypt and Israel.⁷⁴ His 1998 trial was marked by a new flurry 
of supportive testimony in the Arab world. The Association of Palestinian Writers 
expressed its “solidarity with the thinker and man of letters Roger Garaudy for 
his courageous struggle in favor of creative freedom.”⁷⁵ The Islamic movement in 
Israel viewed his trial as part of a vast conspiracy by world Jewry against Islam.⁷⁶ 
Triumphantly received at the International Book Fair in Cairo on 15 February 
1998, he stated, in the same breath, that he was not an antisemite and that “95% 
of the Western media” were “controlled by the Zionists.”⁷⁷ Many Arab journals 
expressed their support of him. “The months of January and February [1998] were 
particularly auspicious for the former theoretician of the French Communist Party, 
who had converted to Islam. From Cairo to Teheran, from Damascus, Amman, 
and Beirut, to the autonomous Palestinian territories, Abu Dhabi and Tripoli, the 
mobilization in his favor was surprising,” reported Mouna Naim. Iranian leaders 
expressed fury at the attitude of the Westerners, who reproached them for perse-
cuting Salman Rushdie for his Satanic Verses, yet put Garaudy on trial. Only a few 
rare voices in the Arab world distanced themselves from the massive support lent 
to the Founding Myths.⁷⁸
The impact of Garaudy’s declarations and trial was deep, and constituted 
part of the tendency toward demonization of the State of Israel and the Jewish 
73 “La condamnation de Roger Garaudy est alourdie en appel,” Le Monde, 18 Dec. 1998.
74 On his tour of Egypt in October 1996, see “Local Hero,” Jerusalem Report, 14 Nov. 1996.
75 Acacio Pereira, “Le philosophe antisioniste Roger Garaudy reçoit le soutien de journaux 
arabes,” Le Monde, 13 Jan. 1998.
76 Haaretz, 20 Jan. 1998.
77 “Roger Garaudy reçu en héros en Egypte,” Le Monde, 16 Feb. 1998.
78 Mouna Naim, “Critiqué, jugé, sanctionné pour ses theses en France, l’ancien théoretician 
de PC est décoré et louangé dans les pays arabes,” Le Monde, 1–2 Mar. 1998.
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people over the past fifteen years—a tendency which has only gained in strength 
since October 2000. Garaudy has continued to enjoy a vast popularity, above and 
beyond intellectual and political circles in the Arab world, contributing to the 
propagation of anti-Jewish hatred throughout the Middle East.⁷⁹
79 On the impact of Garaudy’s writings among Muslims, see Goetz Nordbruch, “The Socio-
Historical Background of Holocaust Denial in Arab Countries. Reactions to Roger Garaudy’s The 
Founding Myths of Israeli Politics,” (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study 
of Antisemitism, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, ACTA No. 17, 2001).

Alain Goldschläger
The Trials of Ernst Zündel¹
The United Nations’ Conference on Racism, held in Durban in September 2001, 
was a sad reminder of the virulent antisemitism more readily associated with 
Europe in the 1930s. Speeches of free flowing hate, pictures borrowed from Nazi 
propaganda, and public insults were common. There was, of course, a modern 
touch: T-shirts with antisemitic slogans allowed people to wear their hatred on 
their chests. In the midst of bitter discussions, especially among the non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs), the subject of the Holocaust became central. 
Several attempts were made to trivialize, if not to deny the Holocaust. There were 
also proposals to use the word “Holocaust” as a generic term applicable to many 
other events—specifically, the equation of six hundred Palestinian deaths during 
first year of the second Intifada with the murder of six million Jews by the Nazis. 
This decontextualization of the Holocaust is not new; it is, rather, the latest effort 
in a trend that began in the early 1950s, immediately after the initial shock wore 
off from the discovery of the death camps and the massacres perpetrated by the 
Nazis. In the recent past, the word “Holocaust” has been used by different groups 
to describe the mass deaths that have resulted from nuclear weapons or from the 
Cambodian and Rwandan genocides. If these uses of the word blur the ideology 
behind the Nazi atrocities, they at least preserve the horrific magnitude. However, 
the present efforts to equate Israel’s actions to the Holocaust grossly distort and 
trivialize history.
The Holocaust is a unique event that has marked not only Jewish conscious-
ness, but also world history; it is the symbol for cruelty toward Jews. To equate 
other acts of genocide to it and to reduce it to the scope of a “normal” massacre 
is to denigrate its particularities and atrocities. If we wish to properly memorial-
ize human suffering, then each act of genocide must be placed in its historical, 
social, and human context. Amalgamating all massacres into one category only 
denies the particular lessons in each of these events and, in the end, prevents 
humanity from learning the lessons of history.
Assaults against the memory of the Holocaust are no longer taboo. The reduc-
tion of the Holocaust to just another “detail” of history (to quote Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, leader of the Front National and a former presidential candidate in France) 
1 The author would like to thank Prof. Robert Wistrich for his editing work which greatly en-
hanced the text; Alan Shefman, former director of the League of Human Rights of B’nai B’rith; 
and Adina Goldberg for helping me with many legal points.
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or—as was the case with the Syrian delegation to Durban—its total denial, must 
be seen on the world’s political stage as an attempt to delegitimize the State of 
Israel. The open denial of the Holocaust by neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and 
Arab governments reveals their perception that attacking this symbol critically 
injures the Jewish people and thwarts Israel’s national interests. These groups 
believe that Holocaust denial can effectively change the course of the future, 
perhaps even rejuvenate Nazi ideology, undermine the moral values of the West, 
and reduce Western support for Israel and Jewish causes. Therefore, Holocaust 
denial must be seen as hate propaganda against Jewish people wherever they live 
and against the State of Israel.²
In Canada, these issues gained public attention through two well-publicized 
trials of the neo-Nazi “revisionist” Ernst Zündel. These lawsuits were among the 
first major public confrontations with the historical, ethical, and social ques-
tions embodied in Canada’s new Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The delicate 
balance between the freedom of speech (including the expression of overt lies), 
the respect and dignity of a minority, and the preservation of public peace was at 
the center of these proceedings.
The trials raised a number of acute questions concerning Holocaust denial. For 
example, does it constitute an active form of hate propaganda against an identifi-
able group? While the answer may appear clear today, this was not automatically 
the case at the time of the trials; no European legislation had been established to 
treat and define Holocaust denial as a criminal offense per se. Furthermore, Holo-
caust denial had not yet become a prime weapon for neo-Nazi groups in Europe 
and North America, though it was increasingly present in their literature. Simi-
larly, no Arab or Muslim government in the mid-1980s had employed denial as a 
weapon against the State of Israel, even though they printed and distributed the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion as “proof” of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.
The Zündel trials also challenged the effectiveness of the legal system in 
fighting hate propaganda and the limitations on legitimate, but antagonistic, 
speech. Indeed, this issue goes to the heart of many important democratic values. 
Namely, it questions the balance between public peace, and the right of groups 
and individuals to freely express potentially hurtful ideas. In practical terms, 
when does the freedom of one infringe on the freedom and safety of another? 
This discussion was especially interesting because in Canada there is a tendency 
2 Deborah Lipstadt wrote in 1993: “I knew that I was dealing with extremist antisemites 
who have increasingly managed, under the guise of scholarship, to camouflage their hateful 
ideology.... It is intimately connected to a political agenda.” See Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the 
Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory (New York, 1993), 3.
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to keep an equal distance both from the absolute concept of free speech (often 
advocated by American scholars and the American justice system) and the more 
controlled application of the idea prevalent in Western Europe.
A third question that became crucial to the deniers and their opponents was 
the manipulation of the justice system and the media for propaganda purposes. 
Ernst Zündel, like Robert Faurisson before him, found the press very eager to 
open their pages and broadcasts to what were seemingly scandalous trials, high 
on emotions and theatrics.³ By trying to remain unbiased and balanced, much 
of the media appeared to confer equal legitimacy to the opposing views. More-
over, the thundering declarations of Zündel and other deniers made eye-catching 
headlines; the press could not resist the temptation to print them. The mere con-
sideration of the deniers’ cases by the entire legal system, including the Supreme 
Court of Canada, also seemed to legitimize these extreme positions.
The scholarly questions that historians, linguists, political scientists, and 
philosophers debate regarding the transfer of historical knowledge found no 
place in the courtroom. Clearly, scientific methodology and accuracy were not on 
the agenda of Holocaust deniers, even if they claim that their goal is to “restore” 
history. As we shall see, the aim of this alleged scientific discussion is not a better 
understanding of historical facts but the promotion of a political and social 
agenda. Hence the need for a more levelheaded debate that should take place 
among politicians, journalists, and philosophers. Of course, this discussion must 
also consider the social impact that these trials had on the Jewish community 
and Canadian society. The study by Gabriel Weimann and Conrad Winn of the 
Canadian media during the Zündel trials provided the beginning of an answer, 
but more attention should be devoted to this phenomenon.⁴
3 A suspended Professor of French Literature at the University of Lyon, Faurisson published 
Memoire en defense contre ceux qui m’accusent de falsifier l’Histoire (Paris, 1980); Reponse 
à Pierre Vidal-Naquet (Paris, 1982); and, Is the Diary of Anne Frank Genuine? (Torrance, Calif., 
1985). His article in Le Monde (1979) marked the emergence of Holocaust revisionism from a 
small circle of devotees into the public conscience and made Faurisson emblematic for the 
movement.




Our story begins in November 1983, when Mrs. Sabina Citron, at the time the 
president of the Canadian Holocaust Remembrance Association, privately filed 
charges in Toronto against the publisher Ernst Zündel, pursuant to Section 177 of 
the Criminal Code (later reclassified as Section 181):
Everyone who willfully publishes a statement, tale or news that he knows is false and that 
causes or is likely to cause injury or mischief to a public interest is guilty of an indictable 
offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years.
Ernst Zündel had published two pamphlets entitled Did Six Million Really Die? 
and The West, War and Islam. The Association asserted that the texts not only 
contained falsehoods about the extermination of European Jews but denied the 
factuality of the Holocaust, thus creating “injury or mischief to a public inter-
est.”⁵ In this case, the injured parties were the Canadian Jewish community in 
general and more specifically, Holocaust survivors and their families. Citing the 
public interest, the Attorney General of Ontario, Roy McMurty, decided to take 
over and prosecute the case.
Section 171 of the Criminal Code (under which Zündel was charged) had 
barely been considered by the courts before this case. Thus, there was no existing 
jurisprudence regarding its intent, scope, application or reach.
The defendant, Ernst Zündel, was born on 24 April 1939 on a farm in Calm-
bach, in the Black Forest region of Germany. In his autobiography, Zündel wrote 
that he emerged from this inconspicuous background with memories of personal 
suffering during Germany’s defeat—including “hunger, cold and sickness” under 
the French military occupation. His parents were apolitical. In 1953, he enrolled in 
a trade school and obtained a diploma as a photo retoucher three years later. He 
came to Canada in 1958 as a landed immigrant to avoid peacetime conscription 
in West Germany, but did not surrender his German citizenship.⁶ He arrived in 
Montreal where he met Adrian Arcand, the former leader of the National-Socialist 
Christian Party, who had been imprisoned during World War II for his fascist activ-
5 We used and recommend the detailed account of the trials by Leonidas Edwin Hill, The Trial 
of Ernst Zündel: Revisionism and the Law in Canada (Los Angeles, 1989), 165–219.
6 Because Canada allows dual citizenship, Zündel could have kept his German citizenship. 
In 1993, thirty years after eligibility, he applied for Canadian citizenship The Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration opposed this, labeling Zündel a “threat to the security of Canada.” 
This began a series of legal proceedings that ended only in December 2000 when the Supreme 
Court of Canada refused the hear Zündel’s appeal.
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ities, and who took the young Zündel under his wing.⁷ The extensive library that 
Arcand bequeathed to Zündel contained much antisemitica. Zündel entered the 
publishing business, moved west, became “the best photo retoucher in Toronto,” 
and was employed by mainstream companies. He also started to write and publish 
his own texts and those compatible with his neo-Nazi and white supremacist ide-
ology. Zündel’s Samisdat Publishing Company disseminated literature that called 
Hitler a great man and leader, claiming that no gassing of any group ever took 
place in German camps, and that the “Holocaust” was actually a moneymaking 
hoax. Zündel printed antisemitic pamphlets distributed in Canada, the United 
States, and in the former West Germany. He also sold Nazi memorabilia. Zündel 
believed in an international Jewish conspiracy against Germany and the Allies on 
behalf of the State of Israel. In 1982, the Federal Republic of Germany refused to 
renew his passport.
Douglas Christie (Zündel’s lawyer) was a native of Winnipeg, living in Vic-
toria, British Columbia. Christie was known for an abrasive style as well as his 
positions against federal government policies such as bilingualism, the metric 
system, and the replacement of the Union Jack with the Maple Leaf flag. He 
founded the Western Canada Concept, a separatist political party. He surprised 
many at the trial with his preparation and knowledge of details. His legal argu-
ments, however, were often questionable, seemingly aimed more at making a 
public and political stand than at arguing the merits of the case.
Prosecutor Peter Griffiths had to prepare for the trial while dealing with his 
normal workload. Support from the academic community and Jewish organiza-
tions partially compensated for Griffiths’ relative lack of time and resources for 
preparation. The rulings of the judge show that Griffiths was successful on most 
issues. His competence and effectiveness were not that much appreciated by the 
press during the trial but have become more evident with time. As for Judge Hugh 
Locke, he could refer to very few precedents because the law had not been applied 
before. He declined to take “judicial notice” of the historicity of the Holocaust 
at the beginning of the trial, thereby leaving the basic facts open to argument. 
Because the question had already been raised in the early stages of the trials, 
7 Adrian Arcand (1899–1967) founded the Parti National Social-Chrétien (National Social 
Christian Party), a party that promoted fascist ideology in Quebec. In 1938, he became 
the leader of the Canadian coalition of fascist parties under the banner of the National 
Unity Party. Arcand was arrested in May 1940 for plotting to overthrow the state and was 
interned for the duration of the war. After release, he returned to the same path and ardently 
promoted antisemitism. Zündel considered Arcand to be his “political mentor.” See Lita-Rose 
Betcherman, The Swastika and the Maple Leaf (Toronto, 1975).
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he was obliged to hear the evidence on this issue from both sides. All of Judge 
Locke’s other rulings favored Griffiths’ position.
The First Trial
The first trial started on 7 January 1985. The prosecution presented its case from 
11 January to 2 February, followed by the defense. The guilty verdict was rendered 
on 28 February and Zündel was sentenced on 25 March. At the opening of the 
trial, Christie asked for a ruling on the compatibility of Section 177 with the new 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Through this preliminary discussion and argu-
mentation, Christie indicated that the entire trial would be a testing ground for 
many legal and ethical questions; he was looking for the exemplary value of the 
exercise in a larger context.
Christie, quoting article 19 of the United Nations Declaration of Human 
Rights, interpreted Section 177 (181) as an unreasonable restriction on the freedom 
of speech, which he saw as an absolute right. He argued that the law made the 
courtroom the only place where historical truth could be decided. However, Grif-
fiths asserted that there are reasonable limitations to freedom of speech and that 
it could indeed “cause some damage to the public interest.” Judge Locke ruled in 
favor of Griffiths’ position, but the question was re-opened during the appeals.
The second ruling sought by the defense dealt with the right to question 
prospective jurors about their attitudes toward Jews and Judaism, Freemasons, 
Germans, the war, the Holocaust, concentration camps, and gas chambers. Chris-
tie asked Judge Locke to exclude Jews and Freemasons from the jury and to permit 
the questioning of prospective jurors about their links with such people. Christie 
added that the publicity surrounding the trial made it impossible to find jurors 
who had not already formed an opinion on Zündel’s guilt.
Griffiths thought that acceptance of the defense’s position would disenfran-
chise citizens. The prosecutor was even more troubled about how Jewishness 
could be determined. Using Hitler’s criteria would be an insult. In addition, what 
standards would categorize one as a Freemason? Griffiths also emphasized the 
unquestionable existence of the Holocaust and the concentration camps, though 
he did not request at that time a ruling on “judicial notice” of the Holocaust. 
Christie then argued that no judicial notice should be taken regarding the facts 
discussed in Zündel’s pamphlets.
In his ruling, Judge Locke concluded that the questions proposed by Christie 
were offensive. The judge also indicated that prior knowledge does not automati-
cally make a person unfit for jury duty. He expressed his trust that a selected juror 
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would perform according to his or her oath. Specifically stating that he did not 
want to emulate American court practices in this regard, Locke explained that 
the selection process was not established to find the kind of juror one wishes, but 
to select an honest and open-minded person. He also found it unacceptable to 
“disenfranchis[e] a substantial segment of our society...from the right and duty to 
sit as a juror in a court of criminal jurisdiction in a democratic country.” The posi-
tion taken by the defense and the implication of discrimination did not enhance 
the serenity of the court procedures. A jury of ten men and two women was then 
selected, according to the standard procedure.
The prosecution opened its case with a general description of the war as well 
as the concentration and death camps through its expert witness, Raul Hilberg.⁸ 
With impressive erudition and comprehensive knowledge, Hilberg testified to the 
obvious mistakes, falsities, and the numerous absurdities expressed in Zündel’s 
texts and positions. He was followed by a number of Holocaust survivors who 
were asked to describe the conditions and the daily life in the camps; among 
them was Professor Rudolf Vrba.⁹ Some witnesses were also called specifically to 
counter Zündel’s assertions about a Jewish-Freemason conspiracy whose activi-
ties included the control and manipulation of Canada’s current banking system. 
Griffiths sought not only to overturn these claims, but to prove that Zündel knew 
that they were false.
During cross-examination, Christie tried to cast doubt on the testimony of 
the prosecution’s witnesses. He underlined the unreliable nature of the survivors’ 
memories and the dangers of accepting their testimonies at face value. Hilberg 
responded to Christie with detailed explanations in order to demonstrate that 
Zündel’s assertions were “concoction, contradiction and untruth mixed with half-
truth.” Christie replied that all the historical and testimonial books presented as 
evidence by Hilberg and the survivors were mere opinion and, as such, inconclu-
sive in all aspects.
Christie tried several techniques to discredit the testimony from Holocaust 
survivors about the concentration camps. First, he aggressively labeled the wit-
nesses as co-conspirators who knowingly falsified their testimony to further the 
8 Raul Hilberg (at the time, Professor of History at the University of Vermont) was among the 
world’s foremost authorities on the Holocaust. He had authored several books, including The 
Destruction of European Jewry (New York, 1961), and Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders: The 
Jewish Catastrophe 1933–1945 (New York, 1992).
9 Professor Rudolf Vrba (then Associate Professor of Pharmacology at the University of British 
Columbia) was a survivor of Auschwitz (June 1942–April 1944). He wrote, with Alan Besic, The 
Conspiracy of the Twentieth Century (Bellingham, Wash., 1989), an extended version of I Cannot 
Forgive (London, 1963).
116   Alain Goldschläger
goals of a Judeo-Masonic conspiracy. He suggested that their stories had simply 
been learned by rote and were uttered for Machiavellian reasons. Hence, any 
discrepancy or minor error discredited the entire testimony, and exposed the 
manipulation. Consequently, argued Christie, their testimony revealed the scope 
of a conspiracy capable of producing so many, and seemingly coordinated recol-
lections. He claimed that the witnesses purposely adapted their stories to meet 
the needs of secret manipulators who sought to refashion the truth and engaged 
in a war against the non-Jewish world. Christie added, with characteristic irony, 
that these witnesses were more victims of the conspiracy than of the Nazis; they 
were dupes of a conspiracy that had not hesitated to sacrifice them for its own 
purposes. Christie insisted that the witnesses should rebel, join the ranks of the 
revisionists, and fight against their coreligionists. According to this argument, the 
voracity of the conspiracy justifies the Holocaust deniers: if the conspiracy goes 
to these extremes, it is because the stakes are of vital importance.
At its most cynical, the defense advanced the following notion: if not all Jews 
died, then none was destined to die. The very existence of survivors clearly indi-
cates, according to Zündel, that there was no systematic purpose to Nazi action; 
if deaths occurred, they were accidental or natural, or the result of unrelenting 
Allied bombing of supply trains. Christie employed counterfactual interpreta-
tions to distort events that are already part of the historical record. For example, 
he tried to reinterpret the selection process upon arrival at Auschwitz—widely 
understood as a barbaric act in which the lives of the victims were decided at the 
whim of the executioners. The defense argued, however, that instead of count-
ing the number of people eliminated because of poor health or uselessness as 
laborers, one should accept that German officers saved many for work, and thus, 
contributed to the Jews’ survival. Since all of this was done according to rules of 
necessity, no one should imply a malicious intent to these soldiers and even less 
to the policy of resettlement for work.
Christie liberally applied the notion of mass hysteria to try to explain the sup-
posedly unrealistic number of deaths and the convergence of testimonies given 
by Holocaust survivors. Several witnesses for the defense referred to “hysteria” in 
the immediate postwar period, particularly during the Nuremberg trials. Christie 
insisted that, in time of war and revenge, exaggerated rumors and stories circu-
late widely; he even made a few points with the jury by using the notion of hys-
teria to explain some discrepancies or inconsistencies in testimonies from survi-
vors, much to their dismay.
Throughout the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, Christie 
revealed a greater knowledge of the literature of the Holocaust than expected. 
Although it had been agreed in preliminary discussions between the lawyers that 
the trial should not turn into a “battle of the libraries,” Christie introduced more 
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than one hundred books, even after the judge limited the selection to books pub-
lished in English. In the process, he revealed that Zündel had read widely and, 
thus, could not (as pointed out by Griffiths) claim ignorance of many reported 
facts. Although Christie quoted his sources correctly in some cases, he misused 
or misplaced them in many more instances. Griffiths, in fact, could not refute 
the vast number of quotations.¹⁰ In addition, Christie argued that all scholarly 
references were mere opinions. He claimed, therefore, that the large amount of 
evidence was only the repetition of one opinion and not additional, corroborative 
evidence. For him, all new explanations or documentation were simply the prod-
ucts of scholarly imagination, disconnected from reality.
Christie asserted in his opening statement that Zündel did not believe that 
six million died in the “so-called” gas chambers. No less, Zündel intended to 
prove the Holocaust had not happened. Had Christie argued that Zündel could 
not know the real history of the Holocaust and truly believed his two pamphlets 
represented the facts, the defense would have been extremely strong. Consider-
ing the safeguards included in the law, Zündel would have most likely escaped 
conviction with this argument. Zündel’s good faith would have been a sufficient 
defense against prosecution. Indeed, the flaw in the Canadian law becomes 
apparent here: to achieve a conviction, the prosecution has to prove the intent 
and the desire to hurt; it has to enter the mind of the accused and prove that the 
goal was specific injury. It must prove that the defendant not only knew that his 
words were lies but that he intended to use those lies as a weapon.
Zündel and Christie adamantly argued that the war did not lead to the exter-
mination of Jews and that Judeo-Freemason conspirators had manufactured all 
of the stories of organized murders and genocide. Zündel and Christie thereby 
attempted to repudiate all evidence of the systematic destruction of European 
Jewry. Indeed, Christie did not ask the jury to decide between two sets of contra-
dictory evidence but to reject anything and everything presented by survivors, 
scholars, and experts of any kind. They were invited to accept without nuance 
Zündel’s theory, together with charges of conspiracy, concealment of truth, the 
manipulation of data, and the falsification of written, visual, and physical doc-
uments.
Witnesses for the defense were an assortment of outcasts and (mainly) 
amateur historians with an obvious agenda. Three were university professors 
(although not historians) who had lost their academic positions: Robert Fau-
10 See the brilliant account by Nadine Fresco, “Les redresseurs de morts. Chambres de gaz: la 
bonne nouvelle. Comment on revise l’histoire,” Les Temps Modernes, no. 407 (1980): 2150–
2211, on the type and frequency of intellectual and factual manipulations used by deniers.
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risson; Gary Botting, a professor of English at Red Deer (Alberta); and Charles 
Weber from the University of Tulsa. There was the Canadian Holocaust denier 
James Keegstra; Ditlieb Felderer, a Swede who offended jurors with a satirical and 
macabre deposition on Auschwitz; Udo Walendy and Thies Christopherson—two 
elderly Germans with poor English skills who had been prosecuted for Holocaust 
denial in Germany. There was also the Reverend Ronald Marr, a Baptist minis-
ter who favored free speech; and the pathetic Frank Walus, a locomotive fitter 
misidentified and prosecuted in the United States as a Gestapo agent. During 
cross-examination, Griffiths did not hesitate to highlight their dubious academic 
credentials or criminal records. He exposed both their ignorance of historical 
events and how they manipulated facts to create false conclusions.
The most important testimony came from Ernst Zündel himself at the end of 
the trial. During his lengthy presence on the stand, Zündel displayed contempt 
for all points of view but his own and showed signs of the hatred for which he 
stood accused. In his eyes, enmity against the German people, rather than the 
Jews, was the root of all evil. He tried to persuade the jury of Hitler’s numerous 
and admirable talents and spoke of the French Canadian antisemite, Adrian 
Arcand, with the highest esteem. At this point, Griffiths introduced, with great 
effect, some of Zündel’s recent writings (such as The Hitler We Love and Why). 
The prosecutor insisted that these publications promoted antisemitism, admira-
tion for Hitler, and violence in the Federal Republic of Germany. Griffiths asserted 
that Zündel’s purpose was political in nature and not the benign dissemination of 
scholarly historical research. Thus, Zündel’s use of false information was a con-
scious and voluntary act of hate propaganda. Throughout it all, Zündel, more 
than anyone else, torpedoed his own defense by nakedly exposing his feelings 
and intents.
During the trial, one of the most important discussions concerned the 
number of victims. The controversy had started with the first “revisionist,” Paul 
Rassinier. The French Socialist camp survivor had calculated in the early 1960s 
that Auschwitz had at most 50,000 victims of all backgrounds and no more than 
360,000 perished in all the camps combined. Faurisson, who testified at Zündel’s 
trial, wrote: “My estimation is the following: the number of Jews exterminated 
by the Nazis is happily equal to zero.”¹¹ All deniers argue about these numbers; 
their estimates are both varied and entirely fanciful. The common denominator, 
however, is reduction of the quantity of victims. Since we will never know the 
precise number, it is quite easy to argue, as the deniers do, that there is room for 
11 Robert Faurisson, interview in Storia Illustrata (Aug. 1979): 197.
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variation. While this is true, that variance does not sanction the elimination of 
historical reality or trivializing the scope of the tragedy.
This kind of discourse by Holocaust deniers has one obvious goal and also a 
more subtle one. The transparent goal is to minimize the scope of the horror by 
deflating the level of murder to a “normal” civilian victim count for a war. This 
places the number of murdered Jews near (and often less than) that suffered by 
other populations during the war, especially the Germans. As regrettable as it 
may be, say the deniers, loss of life is a normal consequence of war and therefore 
cannot be construed as a demonic attack against a single part of the population. 
Because there is a definite link between the number of dead and the idea of a 
systematic extermination of a specific group, to deny the number is to deny the 
existence of such a policy.
But there is a more pernicious side to the deniers’ arguments. By focusing 
on numbers in demographic charts and using pseudo-demography, the scope of 
the killing and the suffering is marginalized. The debate is reduced to data, not 
human beings: 1,000,000 or 100,000 deaths become a statistical equation. The 
dispute over numbers fosters a process of blurring and, as such, contributes to 
the notion that history is an abstract construct, that we cannot know the reality 
of the past but only “the story of history.” Christie thereby argued that figures and 
calculations are subjective and not a basis for historical certainty. History is only 
what the present is able to conceive and, therefore, allows for competing interpre-
tations of equal validity. Deniers insist that their version of history can be placed 
at the same level of plausibility as any other, especially the official one.
Deniers also accept at face value the terminology used by the Nazis to hide 
their actions and reject the possibility that the Third Reich ever devised a lan-
guage of concealment. Deniers do show, however, fertile imaginations and exces-
sively critical minds when deciphering a text or image from an Allied source. 
For example, they accept the Nazi description of the Einsatzgruppen as special 
defense troops whose mission was only to fight and retaliate against resistance. 
Consequently, all executions performed by these troops on the Eastern Front were 
justified and complied with the normal rules of war. Because the Einsatzgruppen 
were formed and trained to kill Jews, they were responsible for the murder of 
over one million Jews in Russia—and the removal of their actions from the histor-
ical debate is indeed crucial for deniers.¹² Their very existence, their operational 
12 Ronald Headland, calculated a total of 1,152,731 victims by the end of 1942; see Messages 
of Murder: A Study of the Reports of the Einsatzgruppen of the Security Police and the Security 
Service 1941–1943 (Rutherford, N.J., 1992). Raul Hilberg reached a similar number; see 
Documents of Destruction (Chicago, 1971), 3:1219.
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orders, and written military reports are an indictment of the entire Nazi regime 
and an obvious indicator for the policy of systematic extermination so vigorously 
called into question.
Given the importance of the Einsatzgruppen for Holocaust deniers, they do 
not hesitate to rewrite the reports: they replace the word “Jew” with “partisan” 
to fit the category of anti-guerrilla warfare. They claim that the murderous Nazi 
actions were not part of a unique plan of extermination. Only misguided people 
seeking to denigrate the German army could imagine differently. The number 
of dead that can be attributed to German actions are therefore manipulated to 
match descriptions of a defensive action. Jews seized by the Einsatzgruppen are 
said to have been executed as members of the underground or as saboteurs, not 
as Jews, and their death is a consequence of resistance. Consequently, claim the 
deniers, the entire subject of the Einsatzgruppen is irrelevant to the discussion 
and should not be raised.
Denial of the existence of death camps is, of course, especially vital. Hence 
the nature of the camps is reduced to providing work for Jews and others. If there 
were deaths, they must be attributed to a variety of conditions—to anything but 
a systematic attempt to kill. For deniers like Zündel, the camps which actually 
existed were maintained properly, providing as clean and comfortable conditions 
as the war would allow.
But it is the gas chambers which are the overriding symbol of the Nazi Holo-
caust. It is thus of prime importance for deniers to erase their very existence or to 
redefine their use. Indeed, the text that marks the birth of the revisionist move-
ment, Le Mensonge d’Ulysse (1950) by Paul Rassinier, elaborately questioned the 
existence of gas chambers. Contemporary deniers explain the physical presence 
of such chambers in the camps as additions made later to justify the story of 
mass killing or as depots that used Zyklon-B to disinfect and delouse clothes and 
possessions. They dispute even the killing capacity of the gas for human beings. 
Here again, convoluted discussions of the killing potential of each gas chamber 
provoked long diatribes by deniers, downgrading the total number of victims, 
further disconnecting the facts from their interpretations.
Adopting a pseudo-scientific approach, deniers suggest that if Zyklon-B was 
indeed used to kill, the walls of the chambers would be impregnated by the gas.¹³ 
They usually present a series of so-called experts who scientifically “prove” the 
lack of residual gas in the structures. No recognized scientist, working in his or 
her own field, has, however, supported these conclusions of Holocaust deniers. 
13 See Robert Van Pelt, The Case for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial (Bloomington, 
Ind., 2002).
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On the contrary, this line of argument was thoroughly discredited by Jean-Claude 
Pressac who provided an important account of the gas chambers, their purpose, 
design, financing, construction, and use. After securing access to the SS archives 
confiscated by the Russians, he combined these with Polish, German, and Israeli 
sources. Pressac employed all the available technical, industrial, and practical 
data to confirm the existence of the gas chambers and their terrible effective-
ness.¹⁴
Zündel argued that the number of dead could not have been cremated by 
the ovens at Auschwitz because they were not large enough, and the task would 
require a large amount of coal, the presence of which is not recorded. According 
to him, the present fragility of the buildings testifies to the impossibility of using 
them so intensely for the described function. Zündel added that the small number 
of cremated corpses were actually victims of typhus that had to be destroyed to 
prevent the spread of the disease.
He dismissed testimony about cries, screams, and the smell of burning 
human bodies as effects of the imagination or propaganda, reported only after 
the war to mould the myth of innumerable deaths. Yet again, mass hysteria was 
being blamed for the macabre descriptions found in survivors’ accounts.
Zündel’s text, The West, War and Islam, was less central to the trial, but it 
was still important since it revealed his worldview and placed the entire trial in a 
more contemporary context. Zündel argued for a link between Hitler and Yasser 
Arafat and predicted a new Holocaust. The Jews, the Freemasons and the Com-
munists were alleged to be organizing a war of extermination against the Islamic 
world. Since Zündel was joining the Arab campaign, his action had to be seen as a 
“courageous attempt” to battle Zionist propaganda in North America and Europe. 
During his testimony, Zündel indicated that Freemasonry was in fact anti-Chris-
tian, controlled by Jews and Satanists, and had promoted bloody revolutions in 
America, France, and Russia. Its power over the banking system was absolute 
and it continually expanded by control over the members of many philanthropic 
organizations like the Rotary Club, the Lions, etc. When questioned by Christie at 
the trial, Freemasons insisted that their activities were limited to charitable and 
philanthropic causes. A senior vice-president of the Royal Bank of Canada also 
appeared and vehemently denied that his bank or the International Monetary 
Fund gave unsecured loans for ideological reasons to countries with bad credit 
credentials.
14 Jean Claude Pressac, Les Crematoires d’Auschwitz: La machinerie du meurtre de masse 
(Paris, 1993). Pressac is a pharmacist, who initially went to Auschwitz to prove that the gassing 
did not occur, but he reversed his stand.
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The jury could not determine whether this second text qualified as hate pro-
paganda and in the final judgment, this charge was dismissed. Nevertheless, the 
proceedings dealing with this item, as well as Zündel’s personal deposition, were 
laced with antisemitic undertones and may have had an effect when the jury con-
sidered the question of hatred towards Jews.
Long seen as a symbol of the anxiety and suffering of Holocaust victims, the 
Diary of Anne Frank was a particularly common target of “revisionists.” Zündel 
was no exception, and repeatedly claimed that the diary was a hoax. Robert Fau-
risson, who testified for the defense, elaborated on the subject whereas Zündel 
took the traditional denier’s position that Anne Frank’s father had concocted the 
Diary after the war.
The jury eventually entered a guilty verdict regarding Zündel’s pamphlet Did 
Six Million Die? On 25 March 1985, Judge Locke sentenced Ernst Zündel to fifteen 
months imprisonment with the stipulation not to write or publish, directly or 
indirectly, on the Holocaust and related subjects for three years. On the day of 
sentencing, Zündel arrived at court carrying a large cross bearing a sign with the 
inscription “Freedom of Speech.” Judge Locke spoke plainly and called Zündel a 
well-heeled racist, who promoted the Big Lie and pushed for a revival of Aryan 
Nazi grandeur that would prevent “civilized behavior in our Canadian multicul-
tural society.” He insisted that the verdict had consequences for the entire Cana-
dian community and not only for the nation’s Jews.¹⁵ Since Zündel had remained 
a German citizen in spite of his long stay in Canada as a landed-immigrant, dif-
ferent voices (like the Canadian Jewish Congress) asked for the commencement 
of expulsion procedures—an automatic step for anyone convicted and sentenced 
to six months or more in prison.
The Appeal and Second Trial
An appeal was filed with the Ontario Court of Appeals and was heard from 22–26 
September 1986. Christie introduced more than five dozen grounds for appeal. 
The upper court found most of these without merit and specifically accepted the 
ruling that section 177 (now 181) did not violate a person’s freedom of expression 
as guaranteed by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Five grounds for appeal 
were recognized. The only serious one involved Locke’s instruction to the jury 
15 Judge Locke added: “[Zündel] published not for the purpose of honest public debate, 
but rather with the fixed intention of destabilizing the Canadian community. Mr. Zündel has 
slandered the memory of innocent murdered human beings.”
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about Zündel’s knowledge of the false contents in his pamphlet. On 23 January 
1987, the court ruled in favor of the appeal. The Canadian Government immedi-
ately decided to prosecute again.
The second trial took place in Toronto from mid-January until early May 1988, 
with a one-week interruption in February and another in March. Ernst Zündel 
again asked Douglas Christie to assume his defense. John Pearson was the gov-
ernment’s chief counsel in place of Griffiths. His tactic was to emphasize Zündel’s 
links with Nazi ideology and modern neo-Nazi groups; this would establish the 
intent to publish the false contents of the pamphlet. Justice Ronald Thomas, a 
district court judge, chaired the proceedings. At the start of the trial, he made two 
important rulings. First, he forbade media coverage. This effectively eliminated 
the type of grandstanding that Zündel had enjoyed at the first trial. Except for 
intermittent and vague reports in the daily Toronto Star and the weekly Canadian 
Jewish News, the trial did not make the headlines and, indeed, was barely noticed 
by the general public. This strongly contrasted with the first trial, which occupied 
the press almost on a daily basis and was at the center of public attention. Crude 
or inflammatory reports from first trial had provoked numerous reactions. During 
the second trial, the Jewish community was particularly pleased by the lack of 
offensive articles in the nationally distributed newspapers.
Thomas’s second important ruling involved “judicial notice.” Although the 
Ontario Supreme Court stated that Judge Locke had used his discretion properly 
by refusing to take “judicial notice” of the facts of the Holocaust in the first trial, 
Judge Thomas now took “judicial notice” of the same issue. He instructed the jury 
to accept as historical certainty the mass murder of Jews by the Nazis, though he 
left open the questions of scale, method, and official policy. This decision dra-
matically changed the nature and scope of the trial, making the testimony of sur-
vivors unnecessary. Many of Christie’s theatrics as well as the public wounding of 
Jewish survivors and their families were thus avoided.
Pearson began by reading, in extenso for the record, the book The Hitler We 
Love and Why that Zündel wrote under the pseudonym Christof Friedrich, as well 
as one of his earlier writings, UFOs: Nazi Secret Weapons? He also read the tes-
timony of Raul Hilberg from the first trial; unwilling to undergo another session 
of Christie’s rude questioning, Hilberg did not appear this time. The prosecution 
then called Professor Christopher Browning as an expert witness.¹⁶ The professor 
16 Christopher Browning was then Professor of History at Pacific Lutheran University at 
Tacoma. His writing includes Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution 
in Poland (New York, 1992), and Fateful Months: Essays on the Emergence of the Final Solution 
(New York, 1985).
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dissected the errors and falsehoods of Zündel’s pamphlet during three of his five 
days in court. Christie’s aggressive attacks on the scholarly credibility of Brown-
ing—including the fact that some of his research had been funded by Jewish 
groups and published by the Wiesenthal Center—were repelled by Browning’s 
erudition and bearing. Douglas Christie called twenty-three witnesses. Many, 
like Robert Faurisson, Ditlieb Felderer, and Botting, had testified in the first trial. 
Some of them were not called as experts; instead, Christie invited their “opinion 
evidence.”¹⁷ Because the appeals court had agreed that visual reconstruction of 
the camps should have been accepted in the first trial, Felderer was allowed to 
present slides of Auschwitz that included a supposed swimming pool, a dance 
hall, and a music auditorium. Under cross-examination, Walendy admitted that 
he had sent comments and remarks to Zündel about Did Six Million Really Die?, 
thus enhancing the suspicion that Zündel was fully aware of some errors and 
falsehoods in the pamphlet and that he had knowingly published a questionable 
text.
The defense’s strategy seemed to be less coordinated than in the first trial. 
For example, Weber wavered on the issue of the Diary of Anne Frank, while Robert 
Faurisson maintained a strong stand on the question; the latter claimed that it 
was, at least in part, a hoax. Faurisson also attacked Hilberg’s scholarship. He 
tried, as did Botting, to reinforce the subtle nuances used in the previous trial 
about the presentation of opinions as facts. These kind of distinctions escaped 
most of the other witnesses, who insisted that Zündel’s writings were a true ren-
dition of history and that the Holocaust was a fraud.
Two new witnesses appeared before the court. Fred A. Leuchter, an Amer-
ican engineer of doubtful credentials, presented his report. After visiting a few 
concentration camps, he alleged that, from an engineering point of view, the 
buildings could not adequately perform the task described and asserted that 
there were no residual traces of gas in the walls.¹⁸ After Leuchter came the star 
witness: David Irving, the English historian who had written extensively about 
Hitler and was a leading Holocaust denier. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Irving’s 
books had initially proposed an image of Hitler as a moderate and fair leader 
who aimed only at restoring Germany’s power, while his assistants perpetrated 
17 Udo Walandy wrote Truth for Germany: The Guilt Question of the Second World War 
(Torrance, Calif., 1981). He also translated into English and edited Auschwitz im IG-Farben-
Prozess: Holocaust-Dokumente? (Vlotho/Weser, 1981).
18 The transcript of the trial includes Leuchter’s full report. Several shorter or updated versions 
were published in London and reprinted in the Journal of Historical Review. They were also 
available on the now-forbidden Zündel website.
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criminal acts without his knowledge. While accepted by Faurisson and others as 
an asset to their movement, Irving did yet not share their vision regarding the 
genocide. Notwithstanding criticism from established historians (Martin Gilbert, 
Hugh Trevor-Roper, Gerald Fleming and Martin Broszat), he remained a part of 
the academic debate. Because of his status, he became the star of right-wing and 
neo-Nazi groups. But in the late 1980s, Irving crossed the line to Holocaust denial 
after reading and publishing Fred Leuchter’s reports in his Focal Point Publi-
cations. On cross-examination, Irving accepted that his views about Hitler had 
indeed changed and that he was closer to Zündel’s opinion than some of his writ-
ings indicated.
Pearson proved himself an efficient cross-examiner. He forced witnesses 
to admit their errors as well as their ignorance of historical facts and of tech-
nical matters. He also successfully linked witnesses to Zündel’s antisemitism, 
anti-Zionism, to the White Power movement in North America, and neo-Nazism 
in Europe. The prosecutor exposed Zündel as an ardent Nazi, fully aware that 
he was publishing racist propaganda and an active promoter of Nazi ideology, 
regardless of historical truth. Pearson insisted that the discussion was not about 
securing a more authentic knowledge of history; rather, it concerned the dissem-
ination of a political agenda regardless of its harm to society.
As for Christie, he did not attempt, as in the first trial, to argue principally for 
freedom of speech. Rather, his case centered on Zündel’s belief that the Holocaust 
did not occur, that the camps were a postwar invention and that the number of 
Jewish dead was grossly exaggerated. Evidently for strategic reasons, he argued 
that these were “honest beliefs” and emphasized that the law protects opinions 
regardless of their accuracy.
After listening to the closing arguments, Judge Thomas instructed the jury at 
length, emphasizing that the question was not whether Zündel’s beliefs revived 
Nazism but if he published books that he knew contained falsehoods. The jury 
convicted Zündel and he was sentenced to nine months in prison. Judge Thomas 
concluded: “It is not the Holocaust that was a fraud; Ernst Zündel is a fraud.” An 
appeal was immediately filed.
The Court of Appeals for Ontario heard the case beginning in September 
1989 and rejected the appeal in February 1990. Its decision confirmed the proper 
conduct of Zündel’s second trial, including the use of judicial notice. Christie 
then introduced an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, which two years later 
on 27 August 1992 decided (in a vote of four against three) that the appeal of Ernst 
Zündel had merit. It found that section 181 of the Canadian criminal code was 
unconstitutional because it “infringes on the guarantee of freedom of expres-
sion” and that “the content of the communication is irrelevant.” The majority 
emphasized that, at the time of its creation, this law was designed to prevent 
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“deliberate slanderous statements” but that to combat “propaganda or racism is 
to go beyond its history.” The court expressed concern about the wording of the 
law. It felt that the scope covered by the words “statements, tales or news” was 
ambiguous when it referred to historical and social speech. It also felt that the ter-
minology “injury or mischief to a public interest” was vague and thus potentially 
applicable to too large a social or political group. Between the lines, the judgment 
seemed to question the need for protection from lies and falsehoods as long as 
physical force is not used.
In a lengthy and strongly worded statement, the dissenting opinion opposed 
every aspect of the judgment. It asserted that section 181 was precise enough for 
reaching its target—punishment of intentional lies and falsehoods used to harm 
specific groups. It also argued that the term “public interest” was sufficiently 
defined and thus the limitation imposed by the section was reasonable. Taking a 
wider perspective, the dissenters determined that the law had an important role 
in achieving social harmony: “A democratic society capable of giving effect to the 
Charter’s guarantees is one which strives towards creating a community commit-
ted to equality, liberty, and human dignity.” It held that “racism is a current and 
present evil in this country” and thus, section 181 played “a useful and import-
ant role in encouraging racial and social tolerance.” The dissenting opinion 
concluded that “where racial and social intolerance is fomented through the 
deliberate manipulation of people of good faith by unscrupulous fabrication, a 
limitation on the expression of such speech is rationally connected to its eradica-
tion.” As a consequence of the Court’s judgment, section 181 of the criminal code 
was declared as having “no force or effect.” In spite of some strong statements by 
the different courts concerning the repugnance of Zündel’s message and attitude, 
he was not actually convicted of the charges brought against him. While Zündel’s 
successful appeal ended the charges rendered against him under section 181, it 
was not the end of his legal problems.
Epilogue
In March 1991, Zündel sponsored a neo-Nazi conference in Munich. German 
police broke it up, arrested Zündel and charged him with defaming “the memory 
of the dead” and “inciting racial hatred.” Because of the German laws aimed 
at Holocaust deniers, Zündel and his friends have been convicted on a regular 
basis. A few months later, Zündel was again convicted of inciting racial hatred for 
distributing a video “The Auschwitz Lie.” He was fined 12,600 Deutsche marks 
(approximately US $6,000) and expelled from Germany. In 1993, Zündel formally 
requested Canadian citizenship. After a report by the Canadian Security Intel-
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ligence Service (CSIS) found that Zündel was a “security risk,” the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration of Canada refused the request.
Then, in 1995, Sabina Citron—the initiator of the previous trials against 
Zündel—filed a private complaint at the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal against 
Zündel for defamatory libel and conspiracy to promote anti-Jewish hatred. The 
Toronto Mayor’s Committee on Community and Race Relations joined her, esti-
mating that it had reasonable grounds to believe that Ernst Zündel was posting 
hate messages on his website, the “Zündelsite.” These messages were in direct 
violation of section 13(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act (CHRA). This section 
forbids discrimination against persons or groups on the grounds of race, religion, 
national or ethnic origin, or sexual orientation by telephonic dissemination of 
messages that are likely to expose a person or persons to hatred or contempt. 
The tribunal condemned Zündel for contravening the Canadian Human Rights 
Act and ordered him to stop using the Internet for promoting hate. It pointed out 
that the Internet cannot be a place where hate is uncontrolled and unpunished.¹⁹
The Zündel trials transpired in the new legal environment created by the prom-
ulgation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982), which set out to balance 
the rights of individuals with those of society. The Charter also sought equilib-
rium between the rights of minority and majority groups—a particularly crucial 
issue in Canada, where the official policy of multiculturalism is seen as the center 
of national identity. Thus, the legal decision on hate literature embodied in these 
trials was an important test for the courts, for Canadian society, and the self-im-
age that Canadians want to maintain. In the international arena, Canada has 
always seen itself as a prime protector and promoter of civil and political rights 
for individuals. Therefore, editorialists and jurists like Alan Borovoy (general 
counsel of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association) voiced concern during the 
trials that Canada might restrain civil liberties within its borders and thus create 
a discrepancy between its domestic actions and its international stand.
The basic concern has been that while it may be reasonable to desire a ban 
against extreme opinions and hatred, any such laws would equally impair the 
legitimate expression of dissenting views. Furthermore, once the principle of 
intervention and control is established, it will be applied to subsequent cases, 
some far removed from any expression of racial or religious hatred. Basic human 
rights will be jeopardized: the voices of strikers, demonstrators, anarchists and, 
of course, all forms of artistic or aesthetic endeavors will be bent to the “will of the 
majority.” Heated questions like gay rights, abortion, or violence against women 
19 The full text of the judgement can be found on http://www.chrt_tcdp.gc.ca /decisions/
docs/citron_e.htm.
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are seen as areas where laws against hate literature could easily be abused to 
silence one side or the other.
One disturbing aspect of this position is the assertion that words alone 
cannot provoke harm. While linguists reach new conclusions about the impact 
of  language on reality, western legislators seem able to recognize and act only 
against physical evidence of wrongdoing or in terms of narrow definitions of per-
sonal defamation. Verbal violence against a corporate group, like hate literature 
against a minority, seems to be outside their designation of harmful enterprise.
This prompted noted law professor Irwin Cotler to observe that the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms has emerged as a paradoxical weapon: designed to protect 
minorities from hate-mongers, it ends up being used by the latter in court to 
protect their message of hate from being suppressed.²⁰ If legislation on hate liter-
ature becomes, in practice, more a shield for racism than a sword against hate, its 
opponents and proponents will have reversed their roles. Furthermore, Professor 
Cotler placed the discussion in the larger frame of human rights and their protec-
tion. Indeed, hate propaganda is more than just a legal question but an assault on 
human dignity and basic human rights as well as social peace.
The Press
At Zündel’s first trial the press handled its reportage in a problematic fashion. 
The headlines were particularly provocative, presented in a journalistic style 
designed to grab readers’ attention. For more than a month, these headlines 
simply repeated the most outrageous statements in order to attract attention, 
without offering an opposing view. The sensationalist trend was quite disturbing 
because it occurred almost daily for at least two months.²¹
20 Irwin Cotler, Nuremberg Forty Years Later: The Struggle against Injustice in Our Time 
(Montreal, 1995), 223. Cotler is a professor of law at McGill University, and since 1999, a 
member of Canada’s parliament, serving for a time as Minister of Justice.
21 A survey of the Globe and Mail, the nationally distributed newspaper of the financial and 
political establishment, reveals the following headlines: “Lawyer For Zündel Tries to Stop Jews 
from Being Jurors” (9 Jan. 1985); “Can’t Reveal Freemasonry Data, Policeman Testifies at Zündel 
Trial” (15 Jan.); “Holocaust Scholar Quoted ‘Madman’, Publishing Trial Told” (17 Jan.). Other 
newspaper headlines followed the same pattern: “Nazi Camp Survivor Wrong on Death, Trial 
Told” (Toronto Star, 12 Jan.); “Freemasons not ‘Satanic,’ Officer Tells Holocaust Trial” (Toronto 
Star, 15 Jan.) “Expert’s Admission: Some Gas Death ‘Facts’ Nonsense” (Toronto Sun, 17 Jan.), 
“Science ‘Has Not Proved’ Gas Use” (Toronto Sun, 18 Jan.); “No Scientific Proof Jews Gassed, 
Trial Told” (Toronto Star, 18 Jan.) “Genocide A Myth, Jury Told” (Vancouver Sun, 6 Feb.) “Nazi 
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Once the trial ended, the Canadian media offered a flurry of articles and 
almost unanimously expressed repulsion for Zündel’s ideas, highlighting the 
potential danger of hate propaganda for Canadian multiculturalism. The dis-
cussion concentrated mostly on the appropriateness of using the courts to fight 
racism and the need for more education on the history of World War II and the 
Holocaust. The media now took the opportunity to present historical facts in a 
more serious fashion. For a few weeks, especially in their larger weekend issues, 
newspapers commented extensively on the trial and condemned Zündel’s posi-
tion.
The press eventually reached an informal consensus that the trials had 
indeed given Zündel a platform for disseminating his dangerous ideas. Frank 
Jones, a columnist for the Toronto Star, wrote on 1 March 1985
Quietly, like a thief in the night, the insidious ideas of Zündel and his gang have sneaked 
their way into the consciousness of the young who may not know better and into the minds 
of some of their elders grasping for any straw to justify their prejudice.
Editorials expressed the fear that harm had been done to Canada’s social fabric 
and the principles of multiculturalism.
A lingering question remains: Did the trials actually promote antisemitism 
and racial tension in Canada? This issue was examined by Gabriel Weimann and 
Conrad Winn (Hate on Trial: The Zündel Affair, the Media and Public Opinion in 
Canada) who studied the reaction in the press and the public immediately after 
the first trial, particularly whether it had increased antisemitism. In an elabo-
rate statistical analysis, the authors came to several conclusions. First, except 
for Quebec, the public was well aware of the trials and the issues and had not 
gravitated toward Zündel’s viewpoint. The authors speculated upon the reasons 
for this phenomenon. One factor may have been that the people most suscepti-
ble to Zündel’s arguments did not follow the news closely. For those freer from 
prejudice and more attuned to the press, the trial reinforced their stand as well 
as their knowledge of the Holocaust. As Weimann and Winn noted, “the trial 
seems to have reduced prejudices against Jews in a European context but not to 
have affected prejudices against Jews” in Canada.²² The more revealing conclu-
sion is that the trial made people who were normally sympathetic towards Jews 
more aware of those with doubts about the Holocaust. Consequently, there was a 
Gas Chambers Unproven, Court Told” (Vancouver Sun, 7 Feb.). Even the Canadian Jewish News 
did not escape the trend. Its headlines read: “Witness: Good Food, Theater, Pool At Auschwitz” 
(21 Feb.); and, “No Nazi Genocide Policy, Defendant Tells Court” (28 Feb. 1985).
22 Weimann and Winn, Hate on Trial, 163.
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common perception that Holocaust denial is spreading in society. While stating 
that the trial had made them personally less prone to anti-Jewish reactions, many 
respondents thought that its “climate” made their neighbors more susceptible to 
antisemitic attitudes. The survey found that anti-Jewish prejudice and ignorance 
of Jewish issues were still a problem in Canada. On the other hand, it demon-
strated that
Large numbers of Canadians were knowledgeable and unprejudiced in the Western prov-
inces,... university graduates, especially women, were almost devoid of prejudice.
More negatively, it showed that young people were “strikingly ignorant of the 
Holocaust and were twice as inclined as people in their middle years to blame 
Jews for their victimization.”²³
Much of Holocaust denial literature relies on the myth of a Judeo-Masonic 
conspiracy aimed at global control and the enslavement of the non-Jewish world. 
The deniers add that the rest of the world will see the dark design only after the 
conspirators reach their goals. They insist that religious and moral forces must 
unite in an all-encompassing fight of light against darkness, ethics against immo-
rality, freedom against slavery, and Christianity against Judaism.
This antisemitic conspiracy theory allows every event to be set in an all-en-
compassing universal context. The media and entertainment industry are 
allegedly targeted by Jews because they are a means to control public opinion 
and break the moral fiber of the nation. Thus, the Jews are also able to silence any 
voice of opposition that sought to reveal the truth about their machinations. With 
this conspiracy theory, deniers like Zündel could fit all of their arguments into a 
distorted, preexisting explanation of history. Within the system, everything was 
clear; from outside of the system, everything became fantasy. Typically, deniers 
construct history backwards, forming premises for conclusions they have already 
accepted. For example, they argue that since the Zionists sought to create a Jewish 
state, they needed support among the Western powers. But because that support 
did not exist, the Jews invented a reason to induce sympathy. Specifically, they 
had fabricated a story of genocide to compel the West to offer support. To gener-
ate the illusion of a genocide, they had to provoke a world war. This was achieved 
by causing Germany’s ruin in two ways: first, the humiliating armistice condi-
tions imposed after the defeat in World War I, followed by the Great Depression. 
The Jews had earlier instigated World War I to ensure Germany’s defeat in 1918. In 
this reading of history, 1948 explains the Second World War, which explains 1929, 
which explains 1918, and so on. 
23 Ibid., 163–64.
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In their description of World War II, the Holocaust deniers repeatedly claimed 
that it was a defensive war against “belligerent Jews” who were trying to enslave 
Europe. The Germans, with their strong link to “Aryan” roots, were simply the first 
to recognize the danger.
Deniers like Zündel have consistently painted the Germans as the victims of 
calumny, forced to carry the blame for crimes they did not commit and to pay 
damages for losses that never occurred. In reality, it is the Jews who should be 
required to pay for the suffering they relentlessly inflicted upon Germany. As 
the principal (if unrecognized) aggressor against Nazi Germany, the Jews were 
responsible for all war damages. Hence, Zündel and other deniers present their 
actions as a response to Jewish persecution and their fight as a crusade to defend 
innocent victims.
Conclusion
Holocaust deniers have long been adept at attracting media interest and public 
attention. Like David Irving in England, Ernst Zündel seemed to savor legal pro-
ceedings. The courtroom kept him in the public eye, perpetuating an image of a 
“martyr for truth” persecuted by Jewish lobbyists and their acolytes. Trials also 
helped him to collect funds for legal and illegal activities. This, of course, raises 
some troubling questions about the use of the legal system as a tool for hate pro-
paganda. This problem confronts all democracies and there is no simple solution. 
The issue is not really “freedom of speech,” as many fringe groups would have 
us believe but the abuse of the judicial system as part of a media circus. Most of 
Zündel’s and Irving’s antics happened before or during legal proceedings; once 
the verdict is in, their voices seem to fade. They reclaim the position of “victim” 
only at the next trial.
One might wonder why public ridicule, scorn, and humiliation do not deter 
“revisionists” and other fringe groups. They seem to seek the largest possible 
audiences, regardless of the negative reactions they may face. The answer is 
found in a simple calculation. If a revisionist can reach 100,000 listeners through 
a radio broadcast, and if he gains the interest of only one-half of one thousandth, 
this still represents fifty potential candidates for indoctrination. Even with the 
scorn of the remaining 99,950, this would still be construed as a great success. 
Hence, there may have been a kernel of truth in Zündel’s boast that the million 
free dollars in advertising guaranteed him “victory” regardless of the verdict in 
the trial. Furthermore, the trials reinforced his status in the far Right milieu, and 
thus helped to raise funds for the cause and for himself.
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Moreover, in his quest for exposure, Zündel effectively used the power of the 
Internet. Like several other extreme political groups, he quickly realized that the 
worldwide web could bypass national legislation and allow the transmission of 
controversial and, indeed, heinous messages with impunity. The legal system 
reacted slowly, but new legislation is now in place in Germany, Britain, France, 
and some other countries that prohibits the dissemination of Holocaust revision-
ism. The question of cross-border transmission on the Internet remains firmly on 
the agenda of the legal system.
“Revisionist” discourse has consistently tried to undermine the dignity of 
the Jewish people and to legitimize the emergence of open antisemitism. It may 
be condemned as extremist and racist, but it has nonetheless generated ques-
tions about the role and the morality of Jews in other areas—as demonstrated by 
the unceasing attacks against Israel in the media. Holocaust deniers like Zündel 
systematically accused the Jews of today of carrying out the same crimes as did 
the Nazis. Using a fabrication like the Protocols, he focused his hate propaganda 
against the so-called “Jewish conspiracy” to dominate the world.
Zündel predicted in The West, War and Islam that a new Holocaust was on 
the horizon. He wrote that a Jewish conspiracy threatened the enslavement of the 
Arabs and called for a radical response. This included the glorification of Hitler 
and the presentation of the German people as victims. Obscuring the systematic 
extermination of the Jews and other “non-Aryans” remains a prerequisite for 
the rebirth of Nazism as a viable ideology and a political alternative. Once this 
is done, as Zündel advocated since the beginning of his career, neo-Nazis and 
antisemites in general can think about how to complete the “Final Solution” that 
they deny ever existed.
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Milton Shain and Margo Bastos
Muslim Antisemitism and Anti-Zionism  
in Postwar South Africa¹
One of the fundamental goals of apartheid was the social and intellectual separa-
tion of South Africa’s so-called racial groups—Africans, “Colored,” Indians, and 
whites. Although the first three groups, generally lumped together as “blacks,” 
interacted with whites in the workplace, in domestic work arrangements, and in 
other informal settings, they never engaged seriously in the normal social sense. 
Thus the Muslim community, residing mainly (although not exclusively) in the 
Western Cape region, was far removed from its “white” neighbors.² Rigid sep-
aration between Muslims and white South Africans, including Jews, began to 
erode only in the late 1980s.³ Socioeconomic boundaries continue to exist; it will 
take decades to erode that informal but almost hermetic veil. One major change, 
however, is that a public platform is now afforded to all voices and viewpoints, 
including those of the Muslim population. During the 1990s, an articulate (and 
for some, disturbing) voice of Islam began to be heard by more and more South 
Africans.
Shortly after its formation in 1996, a Muslim vigilante movement known as 
People against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) made international news when 
a well-known Cape Town gangster, Rashaad Staggie, was shot, doused with gas-
oline, and burned alive in front of hundreds of onlookers.⁴ Similar militancy was 
evident at a number of anti-Israel and anti-Zionist protests held in the 1990s, 
where “one Zionist, one bullet,” was the common refrain—echoing the well-
known Pan-Africanist Congress slogan, “one settler, one bullet.” For whites in 
general and for Jews in particular, the sight of placard-waving Muslims, many 
in kaffiyahs, conjured up images of Iran, Algeria, and the West Bank and gave 
1 Our thanks to Abdulkader Tayob for his thoughtful comments. Needless to say, the opinions 
and conclusions offered here are those of the authors alone.
2 South African Muslims, mostly Sunni, numbered 553,585 (1.4 percent of the total population) 
in the 1996 census. Muslims were considered part of the “Colored” population; they are the 
descendants of 17th-century political prisoners brought to the Cape from Indonesia—ex-slaves, 
19th-century immigrants, and the offspring of black/white miscegenation. See Ebrahim Moosa, 
“Islam in South Africa,” in Living Faiths in South Africa, ed. Martin Prozesky and John de Gruchy 
(Cape Town, 1995).
3 See John Kane-Berman, South Africa’s Silent Revolution (Johannesburg: South African 
Institute of Race Relations, 1990).
4 See Cape Times, 5 Aug. 1996.
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rise to a perception that Muslim fundamentalism was on the rise. To some extent 
this perception was accurate, since South African Muslim militancy also reflected 
worldwide developments. At present, there is both greater animosity toward 
the Jewish State and increased antisemitism. However, it would be incorrect to 
assume that Muslim–Jewish cordiality characterized the past. Rather, the geog-
raphy of apartheid, coupled with state repression and the relatively insular and 
non-confrontational character of the conservative Muslim elite,⁵ was what once 
enabled Jews to feel a false sense of harmony with South African Muslims.⁶
Generally ignored by the white and Jewish media, Muslims in South Africa 
had long expressed anti-Zionist feelings; as early as 1925, the Muslim Outlook had 
criticized “Jewish capitalists” for allegedly forcing Arab peasants off the land.⁷ 
Whereas the white-owned and Eurocentric media sympathized wholeheartedly 
with the Jewish state from its establishment in 1948, Muslims viewed the new-
found state as a catastrophe⁸ and castigated Israeli military victories against Arab 
forces as barbaric.⁹ Sharing in the humiliation of their “brothers and sisters,” 
South African Muslims used “Zionism” as a term of opprobrium and perceived 
Israel as an aggressor state.¹⁰ Muslim expressions of frustration and anger, 
however, rarely entered the public (that is, white) domain.
But by the time Israeli forces occupied southern Lebanon in 1982, a new gen-
eration of Muslims had begun to challenge its more conservative elders. Inspired 
by new radical teachings and by the African student uprising in Soweto in 1976, 
5 Muslim politics in the 1950s and 1960s revolved mainly around issues of Orthodoxy. See 
Abdulkader Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa (Cape Town, 1995), ch. 2.
6 The historiography of South African Jewry has, by and large, ignored Muslim–Jewish 
relations. Among the exceptions are Gideon Shimoni’s “South African Jews and the Apartheid 
Crisis,” American Jewish Year Book 88 (1988): 3–58; which made use of interviews of prominent 
Muslims, conducted by Tzippi Hoffman and Alan Fischer, in idem, eds., The Jews in South Africa: 
What Future? (Johannesburg, 1988). For more recent coverage on Muslim attitudes toward 
Jews, see Jocelyn Hellig, Anti-Semitism in South Africa Today (Tel Aviv: Project for the Study of 
Anti-Semitism, 1996), and Milton Shain, “Antisemitism and South African Society: The Past, the 
Present, and the Future,” inaugural lecture, University of Cape Town, 1998.
7 Muslim Outlook, 18 Apr. 1925.
8 See Muhammed Haron, “The Muslim News (1960–1986): Expression of an Islamic Identity in 
South Africa,” in Muslim Identity and Social Change in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Louis Brenner 
(London, 1993), 222.
9 See, for example, the article titled “Barbarity of the Jews,” which appeared in the Muslim 
News, 14 July 1967 (“1948 and 1967 show that despite centuries of wandering in Europe [the 
Jews] have not lost their barbaric tendencies which previously incurred the wrath of God”). See 
also ibid., 28 July 1967.
10 See, for example, Muslim News, 28 July 1967; Tayob, Islamic Resurgence in South Africa, 85.
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and buttressed by Khomenism and the international Muslim struggle against 
imperialism, younger Muslims increasingly rejected the more accommodating 
behavior of the Muslim establishment. Historically, many of the Muslim elite had 
identified with the white ruling class, taking refuge in a self-defined sense of reli-
gious and cultural superiority.¹¹ Notwithstanding, “progressive” Islamic groups 
also existed, some of them dating back to the 1950s: in the Transvaal, there was 
the Young Men’s Muslim Association (1955) and the Universal Truth Movement 
(1958); in Natal, the Arabic Study Circle (1950) and the Islam Propagation Centre 
International (1957); and in the Western Cape, the Cape Muslim Youth Movement 
(1957) and the Claremont Muslim Youth Association (1958).¹²
In the Transvaal and Natal, the emphasis was on promoting wider under-
standing of Islam. In the Cape, however, Islamic groups were far more political. 
For instance, the Islamic Mission, a newsletter sponsored by the Claremont Muslim 
Youth Association, serialized the anti-state writings of Abdul A’la Mawdudi (1903–
1979) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966).¹³ The fortnightly Muslim News, together with 
other Muslim publications, increasingly vilified Zionist “intrusion” and focused 
attention on “the tragedy of Palestine,” regularly displaying photos of Israeli sol-
diers attacking Arab children and eyewitness accounts of “Israeli atrocities.”¹⁴ 
Significantly, local Muslims were also warned about “Zionist designs.” Readers 
were implored to avail themselves of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion and to 
familiarize themselves with its contents.¹⁵
Among the prominent anti-apartheid activists in the Cape was a cleric, Imam 
Adbullah Haron, who had a profound influence on South African Muslims.¹⁶ Yet 
his death in police custody in 1969 was met with silence on the part of the Muslim 
clergy, and this in turn left younger Muslims feeling betrayed and disillusioned.¹⁷ 
The search began for a “socially relevant Islam,” as epitomized in the formation 
11 See Farid Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism (Oxford, 1997), 20.
12 See Tayob, Islamic Resurgence, 82–83. The Claremont Muslim Youth Association was 
initially part of Call of Islam, a short-lived umbrella group of Muslims who opposed the Group 
Areas Act. See Farid Esack, “Three Islamic Strands in the South African Struggle for Justice,” 
Third World Quarterly 10, no. 2 (1988): 473–98.
13 See Tayob, Islamic Resurgence, ch. 3; and Desmond Charles Rice, “Islamic Fundamentalism 
as a Major Religiopolitical Movement and its Impact on South Africa” (M.A. thesis, University of 
Cape Town, 1987), 438–52.
14 See, for example, Muslim News, 23 Aug. 1963, 22 May 1964, and 22 Sept. 1968.
15 Muslim News, 10 Apr. 1971.
16 See Rice, “Islamic Fundamentalism,” 452.
17 See Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 52. See also the interview with Abdurrashid 
Omar in Hoffman and Fischer, Jews in South Africa, 143–49.
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of the Muslim Youth Movement in 1970 and the Muslim Students Association in 
1974.¹⁸ A range of Islamic activities was increasingly coordinated and guided by 
what was understood to be an authentic modern Islamic paradigm that, while 
not focusing on apartheid, did not entirely ignore it.¹⁹ In calling for an “Islamic 
way of life,” groups such as the Muslim Youth Movement “reflected the black con-
sciousness movement’s appeal to an authentic black identity in South Africa.”²⁰
Although substantial opposition to the new Islamism persisted, particularly 
among those consolidating Deobandi thought in the Transvaal and in Natal, 
“progressive” forces did have an impact.²¹ On occasion, the state even inter-
vened, several times banning the publication of anti-Zionist articles in the Muslim 
News.²² Muslim militancy was particularly evident in the wake of the United 
Nations resolution of 1975 that equated Zionism with racism, which was hailed 
as a victory for the Palestine Liberation Organization and a defeat for the United 
States and Israel.²³ By the late 1970s, a Palestine Islamic Solidarity Committee 
had been established in Durban and the Muslim Youth Movement had embarked 
on an Islamic campaign that included study programs, camps, and manuals.²⁴ 
The material for these programs, much of it provided by Islamic groups abroad, 
targeted Zionism, secularism, capitalism, and Communism as the major threats 
to Islam.²⁵
Added impetus to South African Muslim militancy was provided by the 
success of the Iranian revolution in 1979. In its wake, the writings of Ali Shari’ati 
(1933–1977) and the Ayatollah Khomeini were included on Muslim Youth Move-
ment reading lists. Although Iran was not seen as a model for South African 
Muslims, a group called Qibla was founded in 1980 that was patently inspired by 
the overthrow of the Shah. “Islamic Revolution in South Africa” became a popular 
slogan in Cape Town. Meanwhile, Muslim demonstrations against Israel and 
Zionism at the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand 
18 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 33. For a detailed examination of the Muslim Youth 
Movement, see Tayob, Islamic Resurgence.
19 Tayob, Islamic Resurgence, ch. 4, esp. 118–19.
20 Ibid., 122.
21 Ibid., ch. 4.
22 See Haron, “The Muslim News (1960–1986),” 222–23.
23 See, for example, Muslim News, 28 Nov. 1975; interview with Ibraheem Mousa in Hoffman 
and Fischer, Jews in South Africa, 171–74.
24 On the Islamic Solidarity Committee, see Haron, “The Muslim News (1960–1986),” 223.
25 See Tayob, Islamic Resurgence, 140.
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(following the Sabra and Shatilla massacres in Lebanon in 1982) revealed the 
extent of anti-Zionism among younger South African Muslims.²⁶
In 1983, the ruling National Party drafted a new constitution that granted 
limited political representation and the right to vote to “Coloreds” and to Indians. 
Muslims were included in the proposed franchise (Africans—some 70 percent 
of the population—were not). The proposed constitution, which came up for a 
vote in November 1983, was opposed by a broad coalition of groups that urged a 
boycott. Even the conservative Muslim Judicial Council, the largest representative 
body of imams and sheiks in the Western Cape, refused to support the National 
Party’s initiative.
The nascent Muslim consensus concerning a “no-vote” on the constitution 
crumbled, however, with the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF), an 
umbrella organization that included not only non-Muslim groups but also Com-
munists, “amoral” secularists, and Zionists.²⁷ The inclusive nature of the UDF 
presented a fundamental challenge to Muslims.²⁸ For a short period the Muslim 
Judicial Council, almost by default, affiliated itself with the UDF, as did Al Jihad, a 
small, self-styled Shia group. The Muslim Youth Movement, however, denounced 
it, while Qibla expressed opposition to its absence of revolutionary ideology. Even 
the Muslim News saw the UDF as “ideology-less” and “dangerous.” According to 
an article in the paper: “This is the WCC [World Council of Churches] cum Zionist 
and Stalinist politics which the MJC is playing at. This is not the ‘Call of Islam,’ it 
is the call of the Shaytaan [Satan] to take the oppressed of this country to a solu-
tion [from] Washington and Moscow.”²⁹ Affiliation with the UDF, for many, was 
tantamount to selling out Muslim identity.
The ulama, the conservative Muslim clergy, was also opposed to the UDF. 
As Farid Esack notes, the ulama had a well-established modus vivendi with the 
apartheid state, seeking
to avoid fitnah (disorder), to obey the political authorities, to identity with the lesser of the 
two evils (i.e., with apartheid rather than communism) and to hold on to the known, in this 
26 See Varsity: Official Student Newspaper of the University of Cape Town 41, no. 9 (Aug. 
1982).
27 The UDF was essentially an internal wing of the then-banned African National Congress, 
whose leaders at the time were in exile.
28 See Abdulkader I. Tayob, “Muslims’ Discourse on Alliance against Apartheid,” Journal for 
the Study of Religion 3, no. 2 (Sept. 1990): 31–47; and Esack, “Three Islamic Strands.”
29 Muslim News, 13 July 1984, cited in Tayob, “Muslims’ Discourse on Alliance against 
Apartheid,” 38–39.
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case, sexist and exclusivist clerical theology, rather than the unknown of communitarian 
theological reflections on the Qur’anic text.³⁰
In essence, the UDF was seen as a threat to Islam; the conservative Muslim estab-
lishment was not prepared to see Christians, Jews, and the “Other” (however 
defined) as partners in its political struggle. Interfaith solidarity was considered 
sinful, harboring the potential, in the words of Adil Bradlow, to “reduce Islam to 
the level of a religion in the western sense of the word.”³¹
Bradlow argued that affiliation with the UDF would “prevent the presentation 
of Islam [to the oppressed] as the major liberating power” and would be “tanta-
mount to an act of shirk [polytheism], associating others with Allah, for He Alone 
is ‘Sovereign.’”³² As Esack explains, such opposition to interfaith solidarity was 
rooted the notion that anything non-Islamic was, ipso facto, void of virtue, while 
any freedom outside the parameters of Islam was of no consequence.³³
Notwithstanding, there were other Muslims who were determined to share 
in the anti-apartheid struggle with others, including Christians and Jews. This is 
not to say that they jettisoned the religious basis of their opposition to apartheid. 
Instead, building on a more humanistic and inclusive tradition—including the 
writings of Shari’ati and Taleqami (1910–1979)—these Muslims found justification 
for their views within Islam. In particular, leaders of the Call of Islam (established 
in 1984 by a breakaway group from the Muslim Youth Movement and the Muslim 
Students Association) represented a specifically South African Islamic face 
within the UDF. Their message, spread through mass rallies, pamphleteering, 
and involvement in political funerals, directly challenged the Muslim establish-
ment.³⁴ One of their leaders, Ebrahim Rasool (Western Cape secretary of the UDF) 
argued that the UDF would “create the conditions whereby Muslims will take their 
rightful place in the struggle. It does not simply take an appeal from the Qu’ran to 
create revolutionaries among Muslims.”³⁵ More significantly, Rasool and others 
advocating interfaith solidarity drew upon Islamic tradition and Qur’anic texts to 
30 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 254.
31 Adil Bradlow, “United Democratic Front: An Islamic Critique” (1984), 9, cited in Esack, 
Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 41. See also Ebrahim Moosa, “Muslim Conservatism in South 
Africa,” Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 69 (1989): 79.
32 Bradlow, cited in Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 41.
33 Ibid., 41.
34 Although the Muslim Youth Movement also took an anti-apartheid stance, it did not align 
itself with any political movement.
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legitimize their stance. “The Qu’ran makes it clear that non-Muslims per se are 
not our enemy,” Rasool argued. “[Enemies] of Islam must be defined by the way 
in which they undermine Islamic values. Values like justice.”³⁶
In debates concerning interfaith solidarity, however, the position of the 
“Other,” including the Jew, proved most contentious. While it would be wrong to 
suggest that there was an obsession with the presence of Jews, the Zionist ques-
tion did complicate attitudes. By the 1980s, “progressive” South Africans shared 
a powerful mood of Third World anticolonialism. Within this framework the ille-
gitimacy of Zionism was an important component, especially given South Afri-
ca’s close technological, scientific, and military ties with the Jewish state, which 
dated back to the mid-1970s.³⁷
Qibla capitalized on this mindset in its opposition to the UDF. Describing 
the organization as Zionist-controlled and operating at the behest of the interna-
tional Jewish financial conspiracy, Qibla was able to tap into a deep-rooted anger 
that identified Zionism as the “citadel of imperialism.” Indeed, for some observ-
ers, Jewish and Zionist manipulation was responsible for apartheid.³⁸ The Muslim 
press regularly wrote about international financial machinations centered on 
Zionism. Even local newspapers, noted Sheikh Nazeem Mohammed, president of 
the Muslim Judicial Council, were “controlled by the Jews.”³⁹ These conspiratorial 
ideas were taken further by Ibraheem Mousa, a journalist and academic, who 
spoke of Jews as being “in control of a large stash of economic power in South 
Africa.”⁴⁰ Even those Jews committed to the struggle against apartheid were never 
fully trusted. The majority of Jews, claimed Sheik Mohammed, had “obviously 
thrown in their lot with the Afrikaners” and “identified themselves undoubtedly 
with the white people. There are those who are not aligned, but it has no effect on 
the entire Jewish community.”⁴¹ Charitable endeavors on the part of Jewish insti-
tutions during times of crisis—for instance, following the destruction of shanties 
in Crossroads, a black township outside Cape Town—were also viewed with skep-
ticism.⁴²
36 Interview with Ebrahim Rasool in Hoffman and Fischer, Jews in South Africa.
37 In 1976, Prime Minister B. J. Vorster came to Israel on a state visit that yielded 
technological, scientific, and military agreements between the two countries. See James 
Adams, Israel and South Africa: The Unnatural Alliance (London, 1984), 17.
38 See interview with Ebrahim Rasool in Hoffman and Fischer, Jews in South Africa.
39 See interview with Nazeem Mohammed, ibid.
40 See interview with Ibraheem Mousa, ibid.
41 See interview with Nazeem Mohammed, ibid.
42 See interview with Ebrahim Rasool, ibid.
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In the late 1980s, Muslims in the “Colored” areas began to take part in mass 
demonstrations, with the result, according to the BBC, that “the streets of Cape 
Town resembled those of Tehran.”⁴³ Once Prime Minister Fredrick W. de Klerk 
lifted the ban on illegal organizations in February 1990, marches became even 
more common.⁴⁴ Bosnia, Kashmir, and “Palestine” were the main topics of 
protest, and both the U.S. and Israeli embassies were frequent targets of picket-
ing.
In May 1990, the Call of Islam initiated a conference that attracted Islamic 
organizations from throughout the country.⁴⁵ Although there were some indi-
cations that more progressive positions were being accepted, even by critics of 
modern Islamic thought, a powerful strain of anti-state discourse persisted at the 
conference. Qibla continued to reject proposals for a negotiated settlement with 
the South African government. Its leader, Achmat Cassiem, also called for exclu-
sivist Islamic unity in an appeal that attracted many conservative and radical 
Muslims.
The clearest indication of Islamic resurgence was the ongoing conflict 
between Jewish and Muslim students at the Universities of Cape Town and Wit-
watersrand. At a number of solidarity meetings for Bosnian Muslims, American 
and Israeli flags were burned.⁴⁶ Jews, notes Esack, “were invariably equated with 
blood-sucking Zionists, and Christians with imperialists.”⁴⁷ Shortly before South 
Africa’s first democratic elections in April 1994, Cassiem founded the Islamic Unity 
Convention, a movement that claimed to be a union of 200 groups, although in 
essence it was a “front for marginalized religious figures and a few small organi-
zations who accept[ed] the pre-eminence of Qibla and its leader.”⁴⁸ Muslim unity 
was proclaimed a “cardinal article of faith,” and the community was implored to 
boycott the election. Although this call was ignored, the “pure Islamic solution” 
became increasingly attractive as a moral malaise swept post-apartheid South 
Africa.
A visit in May 1994 by Yasir Arafat kept the Middle East firmly in focus. Speak-
ing in a mosque in Johannesburg, Arafat told South African Muslims that “jihad 
will continue…. [Y]ou have to fight and start the jihad to liberate Jerusalem, your 
43 Cited in Esack, ”Three Islamic Strands,” 486.
44 See Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 224.
45 See Tayob, Islamic Resurgence, 182–83.
46 See Allie A. Dubb and Milton Shain, “South Africa,” in American Jewish Year Book 94 
(1994): 375.
47 Esack, Qur’an, Liberation and Pluralism, 225.
48 Farid Esack, “Pagad and Islamic Radicalism: Taking on the State?” Indicator SA 13, no. 14 
(Spring 1996): 9.
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sacred shrine.”⁴⁹ The following year, placards reading “Kill a Jew and Kill an 
Israeli” and “Jewish Blood” were displayed outside the Israeli embassy in Cape 
Town.⁵⁰ At an international Muslim conference titled “Creating a New Civilisation 
of Islam,” held in Pretoria in April 1996, speakers referred to Jews as a powerful 
economic force and blamed Zionists for all of society’s evils. A few months later, 
anti-Israel and antisemitic mailings were received by the Union of Orthodox Syn-
agogues in Cape Town. These condemned “Nazionist barbarity” and quoted the 
Qur’an: “Strongest among men in enmity to the believers wilt thou [Mohammed] 
find the Jews and the pagans.”⁵¹
It was in this context that PAGAD, a Qibla-inspired movement, emerged.⁵² 
Against a background of unemployment and poverty and the breakdown of law 
and order in the aftermath of apartheid, Muslims began to participate in marches 
to the homes of known drug dealers. PAGAD, however, also had a more explicit 
political platform, as evidenced by its flaunted ties with Hamas and Hizbollah. 
According to Esack, such ties were expressions of identification with the Muslim 
community worldwide (the ummah). It was also indicative of a powerful anti-Zi-
onism that constantly drew parallels between the former apartheid state and 
Israeli oppression of Palestinians.⁵³
In January 1997, following a bombing in a mosque in Rustenburg, members 
of the Muslim community accused the Mossad of responsibility. A month later, 
Qibla led a vociferous march on the Israeli embassy, culminating in the usual 
Israeli flag-burning. A similar march took place in Johannesburg, organized by 
the Islamic Unity Convention. On the eve of Yom Kippur that year, Muslims held 
pro-Hamas demonstrations outside a Pretoria mosque and placed a full-page 
advertisement in the Pretoria News criticizing the newspaper’s “biased and one-
sided version of events in the Middle East.”⁵⁴ An incident in Hebron (in which a 
Jewish extremist distributed posters depicting Mohammed as a pig) led to heated 
49 See Milton Shain, “South Africa,” American Jewish Year Book 96 (1996): 357.
50 “South Africa,” Antisemitism World Report 1996 (London: Institute for Jewish Policy 
Research and American Jewish Committee, 1996), 311.
51 “South Africa,” Antisemitism World Report 1997 (London: Institute for Jewish Policy 
Research and American Jewish Committee, 1997), 356.
52 See Esack, “Pagad and Islamic Radicalism,” 9.
53 Ibid., 10. In 1996, there were reports that Hamas delegates were planning to meet with key 
South African politicians. Although the report later turned out to be erroneous, further reports 
that Hamas had training camps in South Africa were treated seriously (though never confirmed) 
by the national unity government led by the African National Congress. See Milton Shain, 
“South Africa,” American Jewish Year Book 97 (1997): 419.
54 See Milton Shain, “South Africa,” American Jewish Year Book 98 (1998): 402.
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protests in Pretoria and Cape Town. Shortly thereafter, a home that housed a 
Jewish book center in Cape Town was firebombed, and phone threats were made 
against a Jewish home for the elderly and a synagogue. Although Imam Rashied 
Omar, the vice president of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, issued a 
condemnation, the Muslim Judicial Council kept its silence.
Tension between Muslims and Jews was exacerbated by the continued 
stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. When the mayor of the Cape 
Metropolitan Council, the Reverend William Bantom, was invited to attend an 
international mayoral conference in Israel in May 1998, Muslim organizations 
(supported by the African National Congress provincial caucus) pressured him 
not to go. Israeli jubilee celebrations in Cape Town that month were marred by 
Muslim protestors, led by Qibla, who shouted “One Zionist, one bullet” and “Viva 
Hizbollah and Hamas.”⁵⁵ In an exchange of letters to the Cape Times, Sheikh 
Achmat Sedick, the secretary general of the Muslim Judicial Council, condemned 
South African participation in the jubilee; Seymour Kopelowitz, the national 
director of the Jewish Board of Deputies, countered that anti-Israel demonstra-
tions were “clearly aimed at South African Jews and not towards people living 
many thousands of miles away in the Middle East.”⁵⁶
South Africa’s refusal to issue a visa to Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, spiritual 
leader of Hamas, sparked another round of protests.⁵⁷ In a telephone interview 
from Kuwait that was broadcast on a Cape Town Muslim radio station, Yassin 
denounced all Zionists as terrorists. Qibla protested against the government deci-
sion outside the gates of Parliament, and Sheikh Ebrahim Gabriels of the Muslim 
Judicial Council declared that Muslims “did not recognise the Israeli State which 
was founded illegally on Palestinian land.”⁵⁸
The radicalization of Islam in South Africa from the 1970s onwards was 
marked by a distinctly negative shift in Muslim attitudes toward South African 
Jews and by increasing public protest in line with the “normalization” of South 
African society in the 1990s. Such protest, it should be noted, took place in a con-
ducive atmosphere: leaders of the African National Congress, whose links with 
the PLO dated back to their years in exile, continued to maintain close ties with 
55 In addition, the Islamic Students Society at the University of Cape Town staged a protest 
opposite the Isaac and Jesse Kaplan Centre for Jewish Studies and Research in order to mark 
the 50th anniversary of the nakba (catastrophe) that had befallen the Palestinian people in 
1948. See “The Battle of Kaplan,” Iqraa, 29 May 1998.
56 Cape Times, 5 and 11 May 1998.
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58 See SA Jewish Report, 22 May 1998.
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the organization in the post-apartheid era and fully supported the aspirations of 
the Palestinian people (although recognizing as well Israel’s right to exist).⁵⁹ Not-
withstanding, Muslim protests had a resonance beyond mere empathy for fellow 
Muslims in the Middle East.
The historic relationship between Jewish and Muslim South Africans incor-
porated within it the potential for conflict. Certainly in the Western Cape, some of 
the Muslim anger against Jews was underpinned by landlord–tenant relations in 
the inner city; by encounters within the textile industry (where Jews were promi-
nent as employers and Muslims as workers); and, of course, by the general anger 
concerning white privilege with which Jews were understandably associated. As 
Ebrahim Rasool noted with regard to more recent times, “the Jewish community 
is also by and large the business community, the owners of the big shops, the 
factories. More often than not, our relationship with the Jewish community is one 
where we are around negotiating tables with them. Our workers striking at their 
factories and so forth.”⁶⁰
A dialectical relationship thus operated between negative stereotyping that 
was rooted in historic encounters, radical teachings, and specific realities. This 
said, the most important factor influencing Muslim–Jewish relations in the last 
quarter-century is undoubtedly Zionism and the Jewish community’s public and 
unequivocal support for Israel. Even without the historic ties between the apart-
heid state and Israel, tensions would have been unavoidable. Conflict, however, 
was ensured by the coincidence of the Pretoria-Jerusalem axis at the very time 
that liberation circles were framing their struggle in terms of an attack on global 
imperialism that was centered on the United States and Israel. By the 1980s, 
antisemitism—intimately linked to anti-Zionism—appeared to be deeply rooted. 
Taj Hargey, a Muslim academic, explained the connection in terms of an “incom-
petent clergy” that was unable to deal with Zionism intellectually and rationally 
and thus resorted to “sheer emotive” antisemitism. “So they go onto the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion. They mention other scurrilous material, usually long noses, 
being stingy—the Shylock imagery of Jews.”⁶¹
One sees here a range of attitudes, a “cultural code,” to use Shulamit Volkov’s 
terminology.⁶² Volkov was referring to a cluster of ideas widely shared by Germans 
59 In this regard, it is noteworthy that Yasir Arafat was applauded when he equated Zionism 
with racism in an address he gave before the South African parliament in August 1998.
60 See interview with Ebrahim Rasool in Hoffman and Fischer, Jews in South Africa, 115.
61 See interview with Taj Hargey, ibid., 155.
62 See Shulamit Volkov, “Antisemitism as a Cultural Code: Reflections on the History and 
Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany,” Leo Baeck Year Book 33 (1978): 25–46.
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from the 1890s, including old-style nationalism, a conser vative anti-emancipa-
tory worldview, and antisemitism. In contrast, the Muslim cultural code incorpo-
rated anti-imperialism, a general rejection of Western liberalism, capitalism, and 
socialism, and a virulent anti-Zionism. In both the German and the South African 
cases, antisemitism was a shorthand label for a batch of ideas.
Given this package, it is easy to see the connections between anti-Zionism and 
antisemitism. Classic anti-Jewish motifs are often embedded in Muslim anti-Zion-
ist discourse and propaganda. For some Muslim critics, Zionists are diabolically 
evil and hatred for Israel goes beyond the bounds of normal political conflict. 
Consider Achmed Deedat, author of Arabs and Israel: Conflict or Conciliation? 
(1989), who runs the Islamic Propagation Centre International in Durban. This 
is a well-funded organization, reportedly aided by the Bin Laden family, that for 
decades has disseminated anti-Hindu, anti-Christian, anti-Zionist, and antise-
mitic leaflets to thousands of households.⁶³ With regard to Jews, the emphasis 
is on power, cunning, and duplicity—themes that were underscored by Bernard 
Lewis in his attempt to unravel the nexus between antisemitism and anti-Zion-
ism.⁶⁴ Here, as elsewhere, it is clear that South African Muslim hostility is not 
confined to anti-Zionism. At one march in Cape Town, for example, Darwood 
Khan, a member of the African National Congress regional executive, was heard 
shouting, “Hitler should have killed all the Jews.”⁶⁵
The narrow line between anti-Zionism and antisemitism is also evident in 
Holocaust denial, which in recent years has made an appearance among the 
South African Muslim community. In March 1997, for instance, a program on a 
Qibla-oriented Muslim radio station in Cape Town suggested that the Holocaust 
was exaggerated and that the peace process in the Middle East was an American 
Zionist swindle.⁶⁶ A year later, the same radio station featured an interview with 
Yaqub Zaki, a British Muslim ideologue who claimed that the “million plus” Jews 
who died during the Second World War had succumbed to infectious disease. 
Zaki, spends much of his time engaged in elaborate speculation concerning 
Jewish conspiracies; for instance, that the Bolshevik Revolution was funded 
by the Jewish banking firm of Kuhn, Loeb, and Company; or that Woodrow 
Wilson was an adulterer whom Jews threatened to expose in order to promote 
63 See The Mercury, 26 Sept. 1998; Shain, “South Africa,” American Jewish Year Book 97 
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their nefarious goals; and that the Freemasons, controlled by Jewish financiers, 
were the force behind the Balfour Declaration, insisting that Communism and 
Zionism were opposite sides of the same coin. The ultimate insult was provided 
by the radio interviewer, who expressed hope that “tonight’s in-depth analysis of 
Zionism in Israel has cleared the opacity that there might have been with regard 
to what truth is and what falsity is.”⁶⁷
There can be little doubt that Muslim-Jewish relations have deteriorated in 
the past three decades. On the one hand, the Muslim community should not be 
viewed as a monolith. As noted, various intellectual discourses can be heard 
within the community, some of them innovative and “progressive,” with an 
emphasis on Islamic humanism, universalism, and interfaith cooperation. On the 
other hand, all Muslim groups share a hostile critique of Zionism. In some cases 
this hostility is separated from antisemitism; in others, Zionism and Judaism are 
conflated into a combination that incorporates notions of international Jewish 
finance and imperialism.⁶⁸ This phenomenon was noted more than a decade 
ago by Farid Esack. “Nothing that the Jews do will be enough for Muslims,” he 
explained, when asked if Jews would be accepted by the Muslim community if 
they renounced all recognition and support for Israel.⁶⁹
Esack’s depressing assessment still seems to hold. At one end are conser-
vative Muslim forces, battered by the impact of democracy and liberalism, who 
seek an Islamic solution to their community’s problems—refusing to recognize 
the post-apartheid state even as they take advantage of South Africa’s newfound 
tolerance and freedom.⁷⁰ At the other end are the majority of Muslims who wish 
to accommodate Islam within the secular South African state.⁷¹ The battle lines 
between these two stands are evident in the PAGAD phenomenon. Beginning 
with marches and action against crimi nals, the movement then moved into the 
terrain of punishing “religious gangsters.” In September 1998, the home of a pro-
gressive Islamic scholar, Ibraheem Mousa, was firebombed. This sort of action, 
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coupled with general threats and other forms of violence, generated a ground-
swell of feeling against PAGAD.⁷²
The current lines of division appear to replicate those of the early 1980s: inter-
faith cooperation versus an “Islamic solution.” It is possible that those seeking 
cooperation with other faiths will gain the upper hand and rid the Muslim com-
munity of vigilantes who, in the final analysis, pose a serious threat to the very 
community they wish to protect. Attitudes toward the “Other” are embedded in 
this struggle. Should the accomodationists win, interfaith cooperation and the 
building of bridges between the Muslim and Jewish communities is a possibil-
ity. Jewish behavior, however, seems far less relevant in this equation. Muslim–
Jewish relations in South Africa have been defined by processes largely beyond 
Jewish behavior or actions. Indeed, it is changes within the wider polity, both 
in the global and South African sense and in the specifically Muslim sense, that 
have in essence defined and informed Muslim attitudes and behavior.
Epilogue
Given the emergence of Holocaust denial, together with the conspiratorial cast 
of mind, the opening of the Cape Town Holocaust Centre in 1999 posed an 
obvious challenge for Jameel McWilliams, a reporter from Muslim Views, who 
was amongst a group of reporters invited to an opening press briefing. Despite 
an attempt to be balanced in an article on the exhibition, McWilliams suggested 
underlying notions of Jewish culpability while hinting at Holocaust denial. 
Thus he explained that he was sorry more attention had not been devoted to the 
Weimar period, which he believed would have provided an understanding of Hit-
ler’s actions. “The hyper-inflation is one [reason for the collapse of the Weimar 
republic and Hitler’s subsequent rise to power], because rightly or wrongly, the 
Jews were blamed for it.” While admitting to being moved by visuals of the death 
camps, McWilliams nevertheless argued that these camps were the subject of con-
troversy. “A lively ‘numbers game’ has long been in play, and the exact purposes 
of the camps debated,” he noted. Nonetheless, McWilliams did acknowledge that 
“even if these things are disputed” the camps were “terrible places.”⁷³
72 Between January and October 1998, there were 165 incidents of urban violence attributed to 
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In a subsequent series of articles in Muslim Views, McWilliams made clear his 
real sentiments about the Holocaust. Global conspiracies, Zionist imperialism, 
Jewish dishonesty, and Holocaust denial all came to the fore. To be sure, McWil-
liams introduced “revisionist” historiography and questioned the sacred nature 
of the “six million” figure—a form of “Holy Writ” as he put it. For those wishing 
to face the “truth,” The Myth of the Six Million by Feygele Peltel Myendzizshetski; 
The Hoax of the Twentieth Century by Arthur Butz; The Six Million Swindle by 
Austin Joseph Rapp; and Did Six Million Really Die? by Richard Harwood were 
recommended.⁷⁴ Issues of hygiene in the camps were introduced for those reflect-
ing upon the “legendary figure of six million Jews dead in the Holocaust,” and 
stress was placed on non-Jewish victims of the Nazis. “Auschwitz was crowded by 
people who had only the most basic idea of hygiene. The result was the spread of 
disease, especially typhus, which is caused by lice,” wrote McWilliams. “So how 
many really did die?” he asked:
Probably this can never be known with certainly, but it is an interesting fact that the Yar 
Vashim [sic] memorial in Jerusalem lists about one and a quarter million. What happened to 
the other four and three quarter million? Debunkers of the Six Million Myth, who describe it 
as the biggest hoax since the Donation of Constantine…generally concur that approximately 
one million Jews died in the camps from all causes.
If six million did indeed die in the camps, the probability is high that most of them 
were non-Jews.
McWilliams went on to explain that the furnaces at Auschwitz were necessary to 
burn dead bodies to prevent the spread of disease. “We are constantly reminded 
of the suffering of the Jews by the media, by Hollywood, particularly Steven Spiel-
berg. But where is the evidence that the Germans gassed six million Jews? Was 
there even a deliberate policy of extermination by the Nazis of European Jewry?”⁷⁵
As noted above, Holocaust denial is a form of antisemitism and intricately 
tied to the anti-Zionist struggle. Thus it is not surprising that McWilliams accused 
Zionists of creating a guilt syndrome and repeating “the ‘Six Million’ like a 
mantra, the chanting of which becomes more intense with the passing of time. 
It is now more than half a century since the camps were liberated and one would 
have expected voices to have been louder then rather than now. Could it have 
something to do with the desire and necessity to present Israel to the world as 
a legitimate state?”⁷⁶ In the final article in the series, McWilliams discussed the 
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silence and skepticism of the Catholic Church with regard to the Holocaust as well 
as the use of the “Six Million” as a “red herring” to divert attention from Israeli 
“aggression” against the Palestinians. Regarding the Vatican, McWilliams sug-
gested that the very silence of Pope Pius XII was an indication that the Holocaust 
never occurred. It was, he maintained, too big an operation to be conducted in 
secrecy and the Vatican “would have known about it and would have spoken out, 
but it didn’t.”
The nexus between Holocaust denial and anti-Zionism was again apparent 
when McWilliams claimed Zionists invariably justified “driving the Arabs out of 
Palestine” by reference to “the legend of the Six Million.” “But what is so special 
about the suffering of the European Jews?” he asked. “What about the rest of us 
who lived for five years under Nazi occupation? What about all the other inmates 
of the concentration camps who died in them, possibly outnumbering Jews by 
far? What about the three million plus who died in occupied Europe? One could 
go on and on and yet we are constantly bombarded by the media with reminders 
of Six Million.” In an attempt to consolidate his thesis, McWilliams noted that the 
“disgusting treatment which has been meted out to the Palestinian Arabs would 
cause an international outcry if indulged in by anyone other than the Zionists. 
But how often do we hear about Deir Yassin, Sabra and Shatilla, in which entire 
Arab villages were massacred?”⁷⁷
Muslim anger and conspiratorial thinking in South Africa reached a new 
apogee just before and during the United Nations World Conference against 
Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerances (WCAR) in 
Durban in August 2001. Aided by what was palpably huge international support, 
the occasion turned into “an extension of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” and an oppor-
tunity “to insert wording into draft resolutions portraying Israel and Zionism as 
racist and minimizing Jewish suffering and anti-Semitism.” South Africa was a 
tempting context in which to equate Zionism with racism, especially given apart-
heid South Africa’s ties with the Jewish State.⁷⁸
Prior to the conference Cape Town witnessed a 15,000-strong Muslim march 
in Cape Town that brought the city to a halt. The group marched to parliament to 
protest against what they termed atrocities committed against the Palestinians 
by Israel. The march was clearly part of a build up to the UN conference and 
included banners proclaiming Zionism as Racism and Sharon as a war criminal. 
Hamas was praised in the united struggle against Zionism. Sheik Achmat Sedick, 
secretary general of the MJC, appealed to the South African government to restore 
77 Muslim Views (Feb. 2000).
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the “Zionism is Racism” resolution to the agenda of the WCAR and called for 
South Africans to “take immediate action against Israel by breaking off all diplo-
matic and trade relations”⁷⁹
It became obvious as the conference approached that it would be, in the words 
of the SA Jewish Report editorial, “A Jamboree of Hypocrisy.” Rather than dealing 
constructively with “the international scourge of racism” the gathering would 
be “a jamboree of resentment, hatred and narrow politics”, noted the Jewish 
weekly.⁸⁰ Shortly before the Conference the Jewish Board of Deputies lodged a 
strongly-worded complaint with the South African Non-Governmental Orga-
nization Coalition, the official coordinating body of South African NGOs, after 
several of its representatives visited the Palestinian territories in early July on a 
“fact finding mission” as guests of a pro-Palestinian group. The group declined 
to meet with Israeli officials and afterwards publicly attacked Israel, despite not 
having the right to make political statements on behalf of all South African NGOs.
Predictably the NGO Forum of the Conference lambasted Israel in an ugly 
display of venom and anti-Zionism. According to Lara Grawitz, the South African 
Union of Jewish Students Zionist Officer, “neutral” delegations were influenced 
by the Palestinian media campaign at the youth summit. Attempts to present a 
positive view of Zionism were drowned out by Palestinian conference-goers who 
pushed the equation of Zionism with Racism and Israel as an apartheid state. 
The Jewish case was rapidly sidelined.⁸¹
Although the conference was an international event, local Muslim groups 
threw in their lot with the anti-Zionist feeding frenzy. This was “anti-Semitism 
in the guise of anti-Zionism,” exclaimed Marlene Bethlehem, national president 
of the Jewish Board of Deputies, when commenting on the conference. Various 
other Jewish spokespersons condemned the charade. Judge Dennis Davis noted 
that the conference omitted the question of Israel’s security and instead replaced 
South Africa with Israel as an apartheid society. “The onslaught on Israel and the 
Jewish people is an absolute scandal and it is racism and anti-Semitism of the 
worst kind,” explained Mervyn Smith, former national president of the Jewish 
Board of Deputies. “It is a mobilization of sentiment that knows no emotional or 
hypocritical barriers.”⁸²
The irony of a conference meant to combat racism and prejudice turning into 
a “hate-fest” was not lost on the SA Jewish Report. The result, it noted laconically, 
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“has been to demonstrate how alive and potent one of the most ancient forms of 
racism—anti-Semitism—is, in that it can be spread by formal international bodies 
like the UN.”⁸³ “Radical Islam is on the march, and Israel has been identified as 
the ‘little Satan’ and lumped together with America, the ‘big Satan.’ Both are seen 
as enemies to be destroyed at all costs in a holy war,” noted the SA Jewish Report 
three weeks later.⁸⁴ The sale of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion at the confer-
ence, distributed through the Muslim-run Ahlul Bait Foundation of South Africa, 
confirmed this judgment.
Given the cast of mind evident at Durban, it is not surprising that, following 
the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and on the Pen-
tagon, conspiratorial ideas were taken further by Muslim commentators. After the 
initial perfunctory condemnation of the attacks, Muslim Views declared with the 
use of familiar rhetoric that the occasion was a “defining moment for Muslims.” 
The United States was criticized for its “Islamophobic” reaction and accusatory 
claims were made against media coverage in the wake of the event. The “almost 
immediate naming of Bin Laden as chief suspect and Islamophobic reactions 
around the world,” was condemned and the United States was accused of polariz-
ing the international community. Third World and Islamic countries were consid-
ered potential targets of United States retaliation. This would, explained Muslim 
Views, exacerbate conflict in the Middle East. While offering sympathy to the 
victims and their families, the MYM and MJC warned against “hasty conclusions, 
especially after the discovery of the true perpetrator of the Oklahoma bombing.” 
The Media Review Network, an Islamic group, merely expressed concern that 
“Muslim terrorists” would be unfairly blamed.
As the analysis continued, Muslims criticized television coverage for being 
dominated by CNN and local talk shows were accused of “displaying a fair level 
of ignorance and prejudice of Islam and Muslims.” No mention was made of the 
numbers killed in the attacks, although readers of Muslim Views were provided 
with a report from the Council on American-Islamic Relations stating that there 
had been three hundred attacks on Muslims in America and that the FBI had 
harassed American Muslims in a mosque. In short, the emphasis of Muslim 
comment was not on the horrific nature of the attack but rather on the repercus-
sions for Muslims. Thus attacks on Muslims and racial profiling on airlines were 
the focus of comment; the FBI’s implication of 19 suspects with Middle Eastern 
names was questioned. According to Muslim Views, Western hysteria masked 
any realization of the “real reason that America was attacked” and stopped any 
83 7 September 2001.
84 South African Jewish Report, 28 Sept. 2001.
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serious need to reflect on what the “US government is doing in the world.”⁸⁵ 
Invariably Zionist connections were identified. Ibn Al Fikr captured that nexus in 
a letter to Muslim Views which reminded readers that “the pilots who hijacked the 
planes are war criminals no less than Ariel Sharon. The main difference is they 
are dead and Sharon is still running amok in occupied Palestine. He continues to 
murder innocent civilians just as they did.”⁸⁶
Sharon has, of course, been in a coma for the past seven years, but the nexus 
between Holocaust denial, anti-Zionism, and antisemitism remains evident. In 
the wake of the Danish cartoon fiasco, a huge Muslim protest march took place 
in Cape Town. Although incendiary anti-Jewish and anti-Zionist speeches were 
reportedly nipped in the bud, there were displays of posters denying the Holo-
caust. “The biggest myths: Israel, the Holocaust, Freedom, Democracy” was 
inscribed on one poster, neatly capturing the Islamist worldview. What this had 
to do with a protest against cartoons bearing Muhammad’s name evidently per-
plexed a reporter for a major Afrikaans-language daily. In an article, “Is it once 
again okay not to like the Jews?,” he noted that one person in the crowd explained 
that such placards were in order because Jews should not be allowed to make 
cartoons of Muslims. The Danes and the Jews, he continued, were all in the same 
boat.⁸⁷
85 Muslim Views (Sept. 2001).
86 Ibid.
87 Die Berger, 18 Feb. 2006.

Danny Ben-Moshe
Holocaust Denial in Australia
The nature of Australian Holocaust denial organizations, their activities, and 
their place in broader far Right circles differs from similar groups in other coun-
tries. This is explained by the dominant role of the Australian League of Rights 
in far Right politics, the libertarian origins of the Australian Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU), the lack of sizeable neo-Nazi groups in Australia, and the dominance 
of anti-Aboriginal and anti-Asian issues on the far Right agenda. Unlike many 
European countries where denial is explained as a response to their wartime col-
laboration with the Nazis, this motive does not exist in Australia, which fought 
against the Nazis and their allies.
Although Holocaust denial is a fringe activity in Australia, it has significantly 
increased over the last two decades with a concomitant growth in collaboration 
between Australian and overseas Holocaust deniers, led by the three main holo-
caust denial organizations in Australia; the Australian League of Rights, the Aus-
tralian Civil Liberties Union, and the Adelaide Institute. However, until the 1980s 
there was only one racist group for whom Holocaust denial was a central focus—
the Australian League of Rights (hereafter the League). They challenged the 
“Holocaust hoax” long before it gained momentum in Europe and North America 
during the 1970s and, unlike the Australian Civil Liberties Union and Adelaide 
Institute, rather than copying the ideas and activities of overseas deniers, the 
League developed their own.
According to historian Hilary Rubenstein, “by the 1950s Holocaust denial 
was a frequent component of League of Rights propaganda” (a process overseen 
by Eric Dudley Butler who established the organization in 1946 and led it until 
his semi-retirement in 1991), a period in which he dominated Aus tralian far Right 
politics.¹ The Holocaust was explained after 1945 by Eric Butler as “a propaganda 
offensive from start to finish.”²
The League’s ge neral ideology was based on the social credit, anti-collec-
tivist, and antisemitic notions developed in the 1930s by discredited British 
economist C. H. Douglas. He had explained the Depression, and his social credit 
alternative, in terms of real power being vested in the hands of the financiers—
supposedly Jews bent on world domination. 
1 Rubenstein, Hilary, “Early Manifestations of Holocaust Denial in Australia,” Australian Jewish 
Historical Society Journal 14, no. 1 (Nov. 1997): 93–109.
2 New Times, Jan. 1991.
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The League’s anti sem itism in general, and Holocaust denial in particular, 
was a logical result of Butler’s theological world view. The “theological” frame-
work which explains the League’s Holocaust denial is illustrated in Butler’s three-
page article “The ‘Jewish Holocaust.’ Threat to Christianity” which shows that his 
denial was motivated by an attempt to exonerate Christian complicity in antisem-
itism and especially the Holocaust. He writes
If as Zionist propagandists are insisting, the alleged “Holocaust” during the Second World 
War was the culmination of two thousand years of Christian persecution of the Jewish 
people, and the roots of “anti-semitism” are to be found in “The New Testament,” partic-
ularly St. Mathew’s gospel and that Christians everywhere must accept collective guilt for 
the systematic gassing of millions of Jews in German concentration camps, it is the duty of 
Christians to face the far-reaching implications of the “The Holocaust” issue. The first thing 
that must be said is that the “holocaust” issue is not simply one of history but has become 
a religious question, one of a faith which ignores any evidence suggesting that the “holo-
caust” story may be false.³
With an estimated 2,000 activists in the League, Holocaust denial has been sup-
ported by the organization’s core supporters, although the less active would have 
been attracted to the League for its other political activities, for example lobbying 
on issues such as the debate about whether Australia should become a republic.
Holocaust Denial and Civil Liberties
The Australian Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) headed by John Bennett was the 
second organization established in Australia for which Holocaust denial became 
a primary objective. The ACLU’s main strategy is to campaign for Holocaust denial 
as a freedom of speech and civil liberties issue. Bennett, a retired lawyer in his 
late sixties, claims he used to believe in the Holocaust until he read Arthur Butz’s 
1977 book The Hoax of the Twentieth Century, recalling “it was if the blinders had 
been lifted from my eyes.”⁴ He added: “I believe, as a lawyer, that allegations—
especially those which cause offence to an ethnic group, in this case, Germans—
should not be made without supporting evidence.”⁵
Bennett achieved national coverage for denial in 1979 when the National 
Times newspaper published a 13-point memorandum he was preparing to send 
3 New Times, May 1995.
4 Supplement to Spotlight, 3 Mar. 1980.
5 Your Rights, March 1998.
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to academics based on the thesis of American professor Arthur Butz and that 
of other deniers he had read, such as Robert Faurisson and Helmut Diwald.⁶ 
Later that year Bennett made his first trip outside of Australia to attend the first 
international “Revisionist Convention” in Los Angeles organized by the Califor-
nian-based Institute for Historical Review (IHR).⁷ Bennett said of his participa-
tion, “As a bored public servant I just find it intellectually stimulating.... I’m a 
detached cynic.... [W]e’re in very short supply in this conformist society.”⁸ His 
participation in the conference led to increased involvement with the IHR, and 
his becoming an Editorial Advisory Committee member of IHR’s Journal of His-
torical Review.
Bennett’s embrace of denial led to his 1980 suspension and eventual removal 
from the Victorian Council of Civil Liberties (VCCL). He had been Honorary Sec-
retary of the VCCL since 1966, but its leadership was concerned that his personal 
views would be seen as those of the VCCL.⁹ By 1984 he established the ACLU, a 
name which has worked to Bennett’s advantage, for while the League is taboo, 
many unsuspecting media and politicians have assumed the ACLU is indeed a 
bona fide civil liberties organization for whom they have provided a platform.
The ACLU is a small organization run from Bennett’s home,¹⁰ and Holocaust 
denial appears to be part of his broader worldview. However, through his wide-
ly-available annual civil liberties guide, Your Rights, the media seek his com-
mentary on freedom of speech issues, and other Holocaust deniers take his legal 
counsel when their freedom of speech is curtailed.
Fredrick Toben and the Adelaide Institute
Although the Adelaide Institute is the most recently established of the three Holo-
caust-denying organizations, its founder and director, Fredrick Toben is Austra-
lia’s best-known Holocaust denier. The Adelaide Institute adds to the political 
work of the League and the legal work of the ACLU by offering a quasi-historical 
dimension to Holocaust denial, although none of its leaders are trained histori-
ans.
6 Rubenstein, “Early Manifestations,” 93.
7 ADL Facts, June 1980.
8 The Bulletin, 18 Sept. 1979.
9 The Age, 2 Apr. 1980.
10 Bennett, letter to Without Prejudice, 10 Apr. 1991, claimed 400 members in 1991, although 
only about 50 attended the organization’s AGM during this period, The Age, 6 Oct. 1990.
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Toben came to national attention in April 1999, when he was arrested after 
presenting Holocaust denial material to a state prosecutor in Germany, where 
denying the mass murder of European Jewry took place is considered a crimi-
nal offence. While his supporters presented him as a “martyr for truth,” it is far 
more plausible that he wanted to remake himself as Australia’s David Irving.¹¹ 
After a three-day trial in November 1999, Toben was convicted and sentenced 
to ten months in prison. Having already served seven months in a Mannheim 
prison while awaiting trial, he was freed after paying 6000 Deutschmarks (AUS 
$5000).¹² These events, and a finding against him by the Australian Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission in 2001 that material on his Inter-
net site breached the 1995 Racial Hatred Act by denigrating Jews, succeeded in 
placing Holocaust denial, in the Australian public arena in the same way actions 
against Ernst Zündel did in Canada in the 1980s. Toben documented his views 
and experiences in his book, Fight or Flight: the Personal Face of Revisionism.
Toben emerged as a player in the international “revisionist” movement with 
Willis Carto, describing him as “the pre-eminent Australian holocaust denier.”¹³ 
His activities were reported in varying degrees by Ernst Zündel and the IHR. The 
Adelaide Institute Internet site is one of six that Bradley Smith’s Committee for 
Open Debate on the Holocaust highlighted in their “revisionist archive.”¹⁴
Toben had arrived in Australia in 1945 with his family from Germany as a 
one-year-old. After gaining undergraduate degrees from Melbourne University in 
Australia and Wellington University in New Zealand, he undertook postgraduate 
studies in Germany, receiving a Ph.D. in philosophy from Stuttgart University. In 
advancing Holocaust denial he portrays himself, his ideas, and his organization 
in academic terms. “I wrote my thesis on Karl Popper” he claims, “and I therefore 
cannot accept closed thinking.”¹⁵
His denial extends beyond the Holocaust, with Toben arguing,
The mind-set of those who believe in the existence of homicidal gas chambers is the same 
as that of scientists who believe in the HIV equals AIDS hypothesis. It is a deeply totalitar-
ian mind-set which lacks the flexibility and honesty that is the hall-mark of truly civilised 
people.”¹⁶
11 http://www.adelaideinstitute.org accessed 13 Nov. 1999.
12 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 Nov. 1999.
13 http://www.williscarto.com/toben.html accessed 8 July 2002.
14 wysiwyg://13/http://vho.org/Archive.html accessed 3 July 2002.
15 Letter to B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation Commission, 2 Nov. 1990.
16 Truth Missions, 2 May 1994.
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Toben was an employee of the Victoria Department of Education and Training in 
Melbourne until his dismissal in 1985 on grounds of incompetence and disobedi-
ence, a move he challenged and claims to have won in the courts.¹⁷ After driving 
a school bus for four years, he gained relief work in Adelaide where he settled, 
with the Adelaide Institute being his full-time occupation for several years. 
Unemployed, Toben began to move in far Right circles, specifically that of the 
League, whose 1990 national seminar he addressed on the subject of Aboriginal 
land rights and multiculturalism.¹⁸ His involvement with the League would have 
undoubtedly exposed him to their views on Holocaust denial, and subsequently 
on February 9, 1994 he produced a one-page flyer called Truth Missions which was 
handed to members of Adelaide’s Jewish community attending a charity premier 
of Schindler’s List. By June 1994, Truth Missions was renamed the Adelaide Insti-
tute—a Holocaust-denying publication which evolved into an organization of the 
same name and objective, offering conferences, speakers, and the most compre-
hensive Australian denial Internet site.
To add credibility to his cause, Toben modeled the name of his publication 
and organization on the respected think-tank, the Sydney Institute. This strat-
egy has been vindicated, with the Adelaide Institute referred to in the media as 
a think-tank, and with Toben described as a historian, despite having no formal 
history qualifications. Unlike the League or the ACLU, the estimated 250 members 
of the Adelaide Institute are dedicated Holocaust deniers. As with the ACLU, the 
Adelaide Institute is run inexpensively out of Toben’s suburban home, with 
income generated through membership fees, and some members being in a posi-
tion to provide extra financial support.¹⁹
Antisemitism
All three groups of deniers claim that they are engaged in historical enquiry and 
open debate. However, a broader analysis demonstrates clear hostility toward 
Jews. Indeed, the evidence suggests that their Holocaust denial is an extension 
of their antisemitism. This is particularly glaring in their reliance on and belief in 
the authenticity of the Protocols. This is indeed a logical part of Holocaust denial 
17 http://www.adam.com.au/fredadin/travel_diary.html accessed 4 Dec. 1999.
18 New Times, Nov. 1990.
19 Adelaide Institute associate Michael Mazur, for instance, pledged to financially assist their 
international conference described below (Adelaide Institute, no. 80 [Oct. 1998]).
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philosophy, for if the Shoah did not happen there must have been a massive 
worldwide Jewish conspiracy to perpetuate the fraud.
The Protocols were published in Melbourne in 1945 by the social credit move-
ment,²⁰ and a year later, Butler authored The International Jew—an Australian 
version of the false document. While conceding that the authenticity of the Pro-
tocols may be disputed, Butler clearly endorsed its portrayal of the Jewish plot 
for global control. The League became the main Australian distributor of the 
Protocols, viewing events through its prism of a global Jewish conspiracy. ACLU 
vice-president Jonathan Graham regularly refers readers to the Protocols in his 
column in the far Right publication, The Strategy, claiming it is “not a forgery but 
a blueprint which can be seen being put into action....”²¹
Toben’s deputy until November 2000 was the Berlin-born David Brockschmidt, 
who had an unusual background for a Holocaust denier. His parents were 
declared Righteous Among the Nations for helping supply trucks to Oscar Schin-
dler during the war, and he spent eleven years working for the British army in the 
Rhine region as a civilian, and two years in Israel from 1977–1979 before settling 
in Australia.²² Brockschmidt describes “the schemes of the International Jews” 
engaged in a “world-wide conspiracy for the overthrow of civilisation and for the 
reconstruction of society on the basis of arrested development, of envious malev-
olence, and impossible equality.”²³ This is based on his belief in “the cunning and 
crafty behaviour of powerful Jewish groups in the financial world, in the world 
media, in global culture, in world politics and in practically all aspects of life,”²⁴ 
while simultaneously referring to the “anti-Gentile Babylonian Talmud” as “the 
root of evil.”²⁵
In Tasmania, the Adelaide Institute’s Olga Scully has made the distribution 
of the Protocols a regular part of the Adelaide Institute’s work, together with car-
toons portraying ugly hooked-nose Jews sitting on piles of money and tricking the 
world into their conspiracy.²⁶ When distribution of the Protocols led to a hearing 
20 Rodney Gouttman, “The Protocols and the Printer,” Journal of Australian Jewish Historical 
Societies 11 (1990): 155–59.
21 The Strategy, June 1999.
22 Intelligence Survey, July 1995.
23 Adelaide Institute, Aug. 1995.
24 Open letter to the leaders of world Jewry, 20 June 1996, http://www.adam.com.au/fredadin/
worldjew.html accessed 2 Nov. 1998.
25 Ibid.
26 Australian Jewish News, 16 Oct. 1998.
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before the Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission, Scully claimed 
the “ truth” of the Protocols as her defense.²⁷
Equally, the Australian far Right have long maintained opposition to Commu-
nism as a central focus of their ideology. As an anti-imperialist movement, Com-
munism was opposed to the British Empire with which the far Right was closely 
identified. Moreover, Communism’s anti-racist agenda meant additional rights 
for Aborigines and Asians and a broad cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, until the 
collapse of the former Soviet Union, the Communist threat to Australia from Asia 
was regarded with genuine concern. For the extremist Right, Communism was 
seen as a Jewish movement, which deniers argued was advanced through the 
“Holocaust myth.”
As an organization dedicated to the British Empire and the Crown, the myths 
of antisemitic anti-Communism were a key ideological component of the League’s 
rationale. For example, in 1943 Father Patrick Gearson, a Melbourne-based pro-
fessor of theology who became a prominent League supporter, authored Com-
munism Unmasked under the pseudonym Jean Patrice. Describing Communism 
as being “a Jewish movement inspired by Satan and hence diabolically clever,” 
early editions of the book focused on Jewish communist “atrocities.” Since 1970, 
this work has been published and distributed by the League, and is unequivocal 
in its denial of the Holocaust. In The War Behind The War (1940), Butler argued 
that the avenue through which Jews achieved power since the French Revolution 
was through socialism. Antisemitism and anti-Communism thus became a com-
plemen tary focus of League activity.
The Adelaide Institute and the ACLU also adhere to the belief in a direct link 
between Judaism and Communism. In the words of Brockschmidt, “there is a 
philosophical and religious link between Talmudic Judaism and Marxism-Lenin-
ism.”²⁸ Equally, for former ACLU secretary and Adelaide Institute Associate, Geoff 
Muriden, Bolshevism “was a Jewish creation maintained by Jews, which would 
make them liable for the murders, tortures and slavery committed in its name.”²⁹ 
Thus the deniers turn the Jews from victims into aggressors. For example, 
Brockschmidt and Muriden brazenly refer to the “Bolshevik-Jewish holocausts.”³⁰
Family experience explains why some individuals subscribe to denial. 
Explaining how her family fled to Germany from Russia where they were well 
looked after, Scully says
27 http://www.adam.com.au/fredadin/media _release_olga_scully_01.html
28 Adelaide Institute, Aug. 1995.
29 Ibid.
30 Adelaide Advertiser, 26 Oct. 1995; New Times, Apr. 1995.
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If I can do a little bit to repay that, then I will because we would have all died if it had not 
been for them, yet whenever you read about them they are all Nazis who gas 6 million Jews 
and it’s a whole lot of lies.³¹
Little is known about Toben’s family background, although being of German 
origin he appears to reflect the motivations of deniers, minimizers, and relativists 
in Germany that want to dissociate the name of Germany from the events of the 
Second World War. Bennett is not known to be of German origin but he has a 
strong affiliation to the country, claiming in 1999 to have visited there for ten of 
the previous twelve years.³²
Operating Methods
The Holocaust deniers disseminate their views in a multitude of ways, but irre-
spective of the methods employed their arguments are repackaged versions of 
those devised by European and North American deniers. As such, Australian 
deniers add little to the ideas of their overseas peers and they are highly depen-
dent on them. Their main claims are:
 – The six million figure is a myth perpetuated to achieve Zionist goals in 
Palestine, with Bennett arguing that in 1938 “there were only 6.5 million 
Jews in Europe,” and the actual number of Jews to die in the War was about 
500,000.³³
 – There is no “proof,” according to Toben, that even those 500,000 were 
murdered, for there was no policy of extermination. Bennett explains that 
the 1942 Wannsee Conference, at which the Final Solution was agreed upon, 
“refers to the evacuation to the East not to extermination.”³⁴
 – The victims, according to Bennett, actually died from disease, most notably 
typhus.³⁵ Toben asserts that this explains the presence of Zyklon B, for 
rather than kill Jews by gassing it was, as Bennett concurs, used to kill the 
disease that threatened them.³⁶ The League claims 100,000 died of dis-
ease.³⁷
31 Ibid.
32 Wimmera Mail Times, 7 June 1999.
33 Melbourne Times, 10 Feb. 1982.
34 Your Rights (1993).
35 Toorak Times, 16 Mar. 1988.
36 Ibid.
37 New Times, May 1995.
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 – The Adelaide Institute asserts that there were no gas chambers,³⁸ and the 
ACLU states they were “reconstructed or fabricated” after the war.³⁹
 – The Holocaust was created, according to the League, to justify the formation 
of the State of Israel.⁴⁰
 – The Germans were victims, not persecutors, in what Toben describes as the 
“Dresden Holocaust.”⁴¹ In a July 1982 letter by Bennett to the University of 
Melbourne student newspaper Farrago stating that the only Holocaust was 
of a million Germans and Japanese who died as a result of Allied saturation 
bombings.⁴²
The ways in which these arguments are advanced by the three denial groups 
reflects their differing operating methods. Thus the League’s Holocaust denial 
is advanced in their publications, the monthly New Times Survey and the weekly 
On Target; it features regular meetings of front organizations, such as the Con-
servative Speakers Club, which are often addressed by Holocaust deniers such 
Toben; by selling tapes of lectures given at their forums, in addition to sending 
these for free to public libraries; not to mention publishing Holocaust denial 
books through their publishing arm Veritas, whose authors include David Irving; 
by running Letters to the Editor campaigns; and organizing Australian speaking 
tours for overseas deniers.
The ACLU
The ACLU’s main activity is the annual publication of Your Rights which is also 
available online, as well as from most local news agencies. The attraction of 
this booklet is the succinct summation of legal advice on a range of issues from 
tenancy laws to police questioning, but it also exposes purchasers to Holocaust 
denial, and to opposition to non-white immigration and Aboriginal reconcilia-
tion. In choosing the name for his organization and publication Bennett hoped 
its legitimate sounding title would give it access that would otherwise be denied. 
This deceptive suggestion of being a bona fide civil liberties publication, has 
secured for Your Rights the promotional quotes which appear on its back cover 
from popular magazines like New Idea, Women’s’ Weekly, Vogue, Simply Living, 
38 Adelaide Institute, 27 Jan. 1995.
39 Your Rights (1993).
40 On Target, 3 Nov. 2000.
41 Adelaide Institute, 28 Feb. 1995.
42 Farrago, 14 July 1982.
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and Cosmopolitan. It was even positively reviewed in the journal of the Victorian 
Law Institute.⁴³
Despite Your Rights being the subject of Federal Court injunction hearings, an 
anti-Discrimination hearing in New South Wales, and having the national book-
seller Angus and Robertson removing it from their shelves, it is likely to remain in 
circulation for the foreseeable future.⁴⁴ Thus, a segment of the community which 
would not otherwise come across denial material is thereby exposed to it. Pur-
porting to be a civil liberties organization, the ACLU lobbies on legal issues with 
a racial dimension. 
Like the League, the ACLU succeeds in getting Letters to the Editor pub-
lished and its spokesmen appear as commentators on current affairs programs 
on related issues, such as the debate about regulation of the Internet, a subject of 
great importance to the far Right as a whole.
The main activity of the Adelaide Institute is the publication of their epony-
mously titled newsletter and its electronic version Adelaide Institute Online. The 
hard copy publication is a cheap stapled photocopy, usually consisting of articles 
that have appeared in the press in relation to the Holocaust—articles from Holo-
caust-denying websites; and pieces about the Adelaide Institute, especially from 
Jewish sources. By comparison, the Institute website, which has always been 
more comprehensive and impressive, offers an array of articles, many by Toben, 
and photos of him at Auschwitz standing in a gas chamber pointing to holes 
where he contends the gas would exit the chamber. After a 2003 legal finding 
forced Toben to remove denial material from his website, it has been has been 
replaced with general far Right material and anti-Zionist commentary.
Toben, like the IHR, digs into archives to find the “truth” about the Holocaust, 
and consistent with international denial efforts since the Leuchter Report, the 
Institute also undertakes “scientific” research to prove their case. For example, 
with funding from undisclosed sources, Richard Krege, an electronics engineer 
in his thirties, went to Treblinka in 1999 where he used ground penetrating radar 
to find that soil under which Jews had been buried was undisturbed. This led 
him to conclude there were no mass graves there and thus Treblinka was not a 
death camp. Indicative of how such “reports” generate media interest, the Can-
berra Times in Australia’s capital city and the Examiner in Tasmania reported his 
findings without challenge. Krege’s findings were disseminated on the Internet 
43 Law Institute Journal, August 1999.
44 Australian Jewish News, 28 May 1993.
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by the Holocaust Review Press, the Committee for Open Debate on the Holocaust, 
David Irving’s Focal Point, and the IHR.⁴⁵
Toben appears to regard himself as an ambassador-at-large for Holocaust 
denial, attending Jewish community meetings, often with other Adelaide Insti-
tute officials. Whenever an opportunity arises, he stands to ask questions and 
introduces himself in the process. In April 1998, for example, he joined a tour 
at Melbourne’s Holocaust Museum. According to witnesses, he repeatedly chal-
lenged the guide, disputing the assertion that smoke came from the crematoria. 
He also claimed that the railway lines into the Birkenau concentration camp were 
built after the war. An Auschwitz survivor interjected that he personally saw the 
smoke billowing from the crematoria, that he personally traveled on those trains, 
and that he had lost his entire family in the Holocaust. Toben remained calm 
throughout the exchange, left his Adelaide Institute business card and depart-
ed.⁴⁶
Toben is the main orator on Holocaust denial on the speaker circuit, and has 
played a key role in ensuring that denial has become a central belief of the far 
Right as whole. He has been very active in writing “Letters to the Editor” and 
calling talk-back radio, a very popular form of Australian media. As a result of 
his German trial, Toben acquired the highest profile of any Australian denier, and 
is often quoted in the media when denial news stories are generated by his legal 
cases. His prominence among the Holocaust deniers invited to Tehran by Iranian 
President Ahmadinejad in early December 2006 was therefore no surprise.
While the deniers clearly desire academic respectability, they are, in fact, 
hostile toward universities. Toben describes how “history departments at our uni-
versities resemble ideological faculties reminiscent of Marxist-Leninist state-run 
institutions,”⁴⁷ blasting as “cowards” the many academics who “will be shamed 
for having remained silent on the Jewish Holocaust issue” when they know 
the truth.⁴⁸ Although there have been no dedicated university campaigns such 
as those undertaken by denier Bradley Smith in America, there are four main 
aspects to the Australian deniers academic campaign.
First, university libraries are contacted to purchase denial books for their 
holdings. Second, historians are engaged in debate about denial. Accordingly, 
45 Canberra Times, 24 Jan. 2002; The Examiner, 24 Jan. 2002, http://www.codoh.org/
bbs/messages/2407.html  and http://www.fpp.co.uk/Auschwitz/Treblinka/groundscan.
html  and http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v19/v19n3p20radar.html  all web sites accessed 7 Aug. 2002.
46 ADC Briefing, Sept. 1998.
47 http://www.adam.com.au/fredadin/50-brock.html  accessed 2 Nov. 1998.
48 Truth Missions, 14 Mar. 1994.
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Bennett has written to academics asking for their views on the Holocaust, raising 
denial issues and suggesting the availability of Holocaust denial material. 
In September 1996, Toben and Brockschmidt repeatedly disrupted an Ade-
laide University continuing education class called Hitler’s Germany: Will History 
Repeat?⁴⁹ Third, they expose students to denial literature. Bennett personally dis-
tributed literature in the University of Melbourne Student Union building during 
the Jewish student’s Holocaust Awareness Week in April 1998, and he has written 
letters to student union papers.⁵⁰ Fourth, they organize Holocaust denial speak-
ers on campus, for example Bennett accompanied David Irving on a talk at Mel-
bourne.⁵¹
Most academics do not engage with deniers, on the basis that debating the 
issue with them confers legitimacy on their ideas. Only one academic has openly 
identified with them—Dr. William DeMaria, a lecturer at the School of Social 
Work and Social Policy at the University of Queensland. However, still hoping 
to influence students who have no personal memory of the Second World War 
but who will one day become influential members of the Australian community, 
deniers have continued their efforts in the universities.
The League, the Adelaide Institute, and the ACLU maintain a close and 
complementary relationship. The League has portrayed Bennett as “Australia’s 
leading and most influential libertarian,”⁵² while Bennett has praised the League 
“for its fight against media censorship on issues such as immigration, multicul-
turalism and finance.”⁵³ Bennett personally attended the testimonial dinner to 
mark Butler’s semi-retirement, where he praised his “courage and tenacity.”⁵⁴ 
Toben, while denying being a League activist, said he held those who were “in 
the highest regard” for having “shown a deep concern for the well being of Aus-
tralia.”⁵⁵
The three groups rely on each other for audiences. For example, Bennett 
has addressed several League meetings and written for League publications,⁵⁶ 
while Toben conducted a national speaking tour for the League on his return 
49 Australian Jewish News, 29 July 1994.
50 Farrago, 14 July 1982.
51 The Age, 15 Apr. 1986.
52 New Times, July 1992.
53 New Times, Nov. 1989.
54 New Times, July 1992.
55 Letter to Adelaide News which Toben sent to the B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation Commission, 
23 Dec. 1991.
56 New Times, 1989.
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from Germany in 2000.⁵⁷ The three organizations similarly rely on each other for 
mutual promotion. Tapes of Adelaide Institute and ACLU talks to League meet-
ings are distributed by the League, who also promote Your Rights.⁵⁸ The Adelaide 
Institute publishes material by Butler, and ACLU vice president Graham Pember 
refers readers of his Strategy column to the League’s On Target⁵⁹ The three orga-
nizations provide other assistance to each other. For example, when the League 
arranged screenings of a David Irving video after he was denied entry into Aus-
tralia in 1993, it was Bennett who organized the Melbourne showing,⁶⁰ and when 
the League arranged for Canadian lawyer Doug Collins to visit Adelaide as part 
of a national speaking tour, the Adelaide Institute was the local contact address.
The three organizations also turn to each other when legal and political 
difficulties arise. When Toben was incarcerated in Germany, his deputy David 
Brockschmidt addressed the League’s Adelaide Conservative Speakers Club on 
the events surrounding Toben’s trial.⁶¹ The ACLU set up a defence fund for Toben’s 
German trial which raised $6,000,⁶² and Bennett planned to travel to Germany 
to advise Toben during his incarceration.⁶³ The three organizations provide each 
other with practical and moral support, a core constituency, and a rationale that 
they would otherwise be denied.
International links
The importation into the country of overseas denial and deniers has been fun-
damental to the development of Holocaust “revisionism” in Australia. Given the 
limited resources in Australia, deniers from abroad add a dimension that makes 
the work of the Australian Holocaust negators more viable as they regularly 
publish and refer to the work of their overseas peers. The League has gotten main-
stream media coverage by inviting speakers who attract media attention to Aus-
tralia. This included the 1988 speaking tour of Dr. Robert Countess of Alabama, 
an editorial advisory board member of the IHR⁶⁴; and the 1991 visit of the Cana-
57 On Target, 14 Jan. 2000.
58 On Target, 2 Apr. 1984.
59 The Strategy, Mar. 1999.
60 The Age, 20 May 1993.
61 On Target, 28 May 1999.
62 Wimmera Mail-Times, 14 May 1999.
63 Wimmera Mail Times, 7 June 1999.
64 Australia Israel Review, 1–14 Sept. 1988.
170   Danny Ben-Moshe
dian lawyer Douglas Christie who had represented Holocaust deniers such as 
Ernst Zündel.
The clearest illustration of the local use of overseas deniers was during the 
first Australian Revisionists Conference that took place in August 1998 in Ade-
laide. There were four speakers from overseas, including Butz from America and 
Jürgen Graf from Switzerland who delivered the keynote address. Sixteen deniers 
participated by video or phone, including Robert Faurisson, Mark Weber, Ahmed 
Rami, Ernst Zündel, and Charles Weber.⁶⁵
The relationship between Australian and overseas deniers is mutually bene-
ficial. The overseas negationists increase their sense of relevance, purpose, and 
effect. Organizations such as the IHR based in California cite their participation 
in Australian activities in order to present themselves as an international orga-
nization. Similarly, the relationship Australian deniers have with their overseas 
peers makes them feel that however marginal they are locally, they are relevant 
internationally. As an IHR report about the 1998 Adelaide conference stated, “For 
some time now, Australia has been one of the most dynamic battlefields in the 
worldwide struggle against the historical blackout. And at the forefront of the 
battle there is the Adelaide Institute.”⁶⁶
Both Toben and Bennett regularly attend IHR conferences, but the more 
active of the two is Toben, who has extensive contacts with deniers across the 
globe. His European contacts are well documented in his travel diary of a 1998 trip 
to Europe which was devoted to meeting deniers, visiting concentration camps, 
including Auschwitz, and delving into archives where his findings merely reaf-
firmed his beliefs. In London he met Germar Rudolf to discuss the involvement 
of Adelaide Institute Online in an English language publication Rudolf had been 
planning, and he stayed with Rudolf on the farm of British National Party leader 
Nick Griffin. In Poland he met with Tomasz Gabis, editor of the magazine Stancyk 
which features denial; in Vienna he spent time with Emil Lachout, an engineer 
who supposedly “proved” there were no gas chambers; and in France he visited 
Robert Faurisson at his home.⁶⁷
In addition to reinforcing Toben’s worldview and providing him with infor-
mation to disseminate in Australia there was a practical dimension to these con-
tacts. Ludwig Bock, who had personally been convicted for Holocaust denial,⁶⁸ 
65 www.adelaideinstitute.org/newsletters/news80.html and www.adelaideinstitute.org/
newsletters/news81.html   accessed 13 July 2000.
66 ihr.org/ihr/v17/v17n6p-6.html accessed 26 June 2000.
67 www.adam.com.au/fredadin/travel_diary.html accessed 4 Dec. 1999.
68 Sydney Morning Herald, 13 Nov. 1999.
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represented Toben during his German trial, and German supporter Eric Rossler 
paid the fine imposed on Toben by the German court.⁶⁹
Israel, the Middle East, and the Left
A central thesis of the deniers is that the Holocaust “hoax” was created to justify 
ongoing support for the State of Israel. This rationale has led the denial move-
ment to win many adherents in the Middle East. Indeed, there are increasing 
links between Australian deniers and Middle Eastern regimes and groups which 
support denial. For example, the Libyan regime of Colonel Gaddafi was active in 
Australia, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Bennett wrote an article for 
the first edition of the pro-Libyan magazine The Green March in 1986,⁷⁰ and in 
1988 he reportedly traveled to Libya as part of a delegation to sit on a “tribunal” 
to “judge” the U.S. bombing of Libya.⁷¹ The ACLU’s Graham Pember liked to refer 
readers of his Strategy column to Radio Islam, providing an extremist Islamic 
source of denial for Australians to access.
When Toben held his 1998 international denial conference in Adelaide, 
the United Arab Emirates Ambassador to Australia attended.⁷² In December 
1999, Toben spent three weeks in Iran⁷³ where he lectured on denial to univer-
sity students⁷⁴ and was interviewed by the Tehran Times, which described him 
as a “German researcher residing in Australia.”⁷⁵ Since then he was interviewed 
from Australia by Iranian television about the Pope’s 2000 visit to Jerusalem, 
claiming that “the Jewish politicians are using the Holocaust and the six million 
dead figure as a justification for suppressing the Palestinians and for claiming 
that Jerusalem is their undivided capital.”⁷⁶ During his attendance at the 2006 
Holocaust denial festival in Iran, Toben was again, a prominent figure. Toben 
clearly enjoys the sense of importance this provides, and the Iranians benefited 
from using a Western figure to reinforce their views. Middle Eastern issues, more 
specifically anti-Zionism, have indeed taken an increasingly prominent place in 
69 Adelaide Advertiser, 16 Nov. 1999.
70 The Green March, Feb.–Mar. 1986.
71 Bulletin, 25 Apr. 1989.
72 Weekend Australian, 24 Oct. 1998.
73 Australian Jewish News, 10 Dec. 1999.
74 Australian Jewish News, 4 May 2001.
75 Tehran Times, 8 Dec. 1999.
76 Adelaide Institute, No. 106, Apr.2000 and No. 107, April 2000.
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Toben’s activities. After the Australian High Court ordered him to remove denial 
material from his Internet site, it has been largely dedicated to the Palestinian 
cause, which provides a basis for indirect denial.
In August 2003 Toben and his Adelaide Institute colleague Mohammed 
Hegazi attended a conference in Iran on the Palestinian Intifada at which Toben 
was one of the speakers. The Adelaide Institute website included photos of Toben 
wearing a black and white keffiyah, next to women in traditional Islamic dress 
as he described how they questioned the Holocaust. In other photos Toben and 
Hegazi appeared next to two Palestinians who had witnessed the “Zionist ‘Holo-
caust’” of the people of Palestine. At Tehran University they stood in front of a 
recreated Palestinian home demolished by the Israeli army. The caption read: “A 
demolished home symbolizes the actual ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from 
their own homes: millions of Germans suffered this fate at the end of World War 
Two, carried out by the same Axis of Evil that supports aggression against and 
oppresses the Palestinians.”
Australian collaboration with Middle Eastern regimes and organizations over 
Holocaust denial is consistent with trends internationally. Ties to those involved 
in Middle Eastern denial have the potential to introduce more extreme forms of 
antisemitism into Australia. It is no accident that several deniers, such as Jürgen 
Graf, have made Iran their home and Toben has suggested that he may follow 
their lead.⁷⁷ He said in relation to Federal Court action arising from the Human 
Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission finding against him, that he “would 
apply for political refugee status in Iran if and when his condition of stay in Aus-
tralia becomes insecure.”⁷⁸ In the interim, Toben remains active in the broad 
Middle Eastern anti-Zionist crusade, boasting that he traveled to Jordan during 
the 2003 war in Iraq in an attempt to offer himself as a human shield. In August 
2003, he declared: “The tragedy in Iraq deflects from the Palestinian tragedy, and 
peace will only come to the Middle East with the dismantling of the Zionist, apart-
heid, racist state of Israel.”⁷⁹
The increasing prevalence of Holocaust denial in the Muslim world has the 
potential to increase support for Holocaust denial in Australia from within the 
Islamic and Arabic communities, as has already occurred in Europe and North 
77 Abraham Cooper and Harold Brackman, “The Fight Against Holocaust Denial,” Midstream 
(April 2001).
78 Australian Jewish News, 18 May 2001.
79 ADC Online 5, no. 2 (Aug. 2003).
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America. Incidents of this nature have happened in Australia in the past.⁸⁰ This 
could lead to alliances between Islamic extremists and the traditional far Right, a 
practice which is evident in Europe and North America. In addition, with denial 
often related to extreme forms of antisemitism in the Middle East, these ties may 
increase the radical character of denial amongst groups such as the League, 
ACLU, and the Adelaide Institute in Australia. Moreover, as Islam in South East 
Asia is influenced by the extremist Islamic groups from the Middle East there 
may be a growth of denial in Asia in which Australian deniers could play a role. 
Indeed on his way to Iran for the conference on the Intifada in August 2003, Toben 
stopped in Malaysia where he gave a lecture to the history class of Professor A. B. 
Kopanski at the International Islamic University in Malaysia.⁸¹
Holocaust denial is also likely to appear in the Australian Islamic/Arabic 
community in relation to attacks against Israel. For example, in October 2000 as 
the Al-Aqsa “Intifada” erupted, the Australian Muslim News published on its front 
page a statement from the president of the Supreme Islamic Council of New South 
Wales, Gabr Elgafi, which stated that the Council
deplores the Israeli Government and its army for the atrocity and the barbaric behaviour in 
the State of Palestine. We the Muslims of New South Wales urge the Australian Government 
and the Prime Minister to demonstrate their disgust and disapproval of the events in Pal-
estine and the Israeli territories. We find ironical that the victims of the so called holocaust 
have had a lapse of memory.⁸²
The Middle Eastern dimension adds another potential source of support for 
deniers from the hard Left where anti-Zionism plays a central role. Anti-Zionism, 
particularly amongst elites, has been identified as a new form of antisemitism 
with implications for Holocaust denial.⁸³ Evidence of the Israeli-Nazi equivalence 
in left-wing circles has been widely seen since the outbreak of Israel-Palestinian 
fighting in September 2000. In 2003, as controversy raged about Israel’s security 
fence, the Sydney Morning Herald broadsheet published a cartoon which equated 
the West Bank with the Warsaw Ghetto, through two walls.⁸⁴ Hatred for Israel on 
80 Jeremy Jones, “Holocaust Revisionism in Australia,” Without Prejudice vol. 4, (Dec. 1991): 
53.
81 www.adelaideinstitute.org accessed 17 Aug. 2003.
82 Australian Muslim News (Oct. 2000): 1.
83 Paul Iganski and Barry Kosmin, eds., A New AntiSemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 
21st-Century Britain (London: Institute for Jewish Policy Research, 2003); see also Robert S. 
Wistrich, “Cruel Britannia: Anti-Semitism among the Ruling Elites,” Azure, no. 21 (Summer 
2005), 100–24.
84 See editorial, Australian Jewish News, 22 Aug. 2003.
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the Left, which involves breaking down the taboo of the Holocaust, could thus 
fuel Holocaust relativism and lead to direct collaboration between anti-Zionists 
and Holocaust deniers as has occurred in Europe. Indeed, in 2003 the left-wing 
Melbourne Underground Film Festival in Australia offered screenings on the 
Israeli occupation from “a Palestinian perspective” together with the screening of 
films by Irving and Faurisson. This was a clear sign of the developing relationship 
between Holocaust relativism, denial, and left-wing anti-Zionism.
David Irving
Any discussion about Holocaust denial in Australia would be incomplete without 
considering the British historian David Irving. While obviously not an Australian 
denier, he has done more than anyone else to make Holocaust denial an issue 
of public debate in Australia. Australian denial organizations were centrally 
involved in this process, with Irving acting as a vehicle to promote their agenda. 
Irving first visited Australia in March 1986 on a national tour organized by the 
League publishing arm, Veritas, to promote his book Uprising. League leader 
Butler and Irving appeared to have a close relationship, with Butler hosting him 
in his home during this visit.⁸⁵ Overseas, Butler also chaired meetings for Irving, 
such as that held in Winnipeg in 1987.⁸⁶ Because of his relatively high profile, 
Irving attracted extensive and mostly uncritical media interest during his visit, 
far more than the local deniers could generate for themselves.
After Irving failed to find a British publisher for Churchill’s War, Veritas pub-
lished the book and organized a 1987 tour of Australia for Irving to promote it. 
The Australian Jewish community became increasingly concerned at the higher 
profile Irving was giving to Holocaust denial and as reports emerged in 1992 that 
he would be visiting again, the Jewish community began to lobby for him to 
be denied an entry visa.⁸⁷ In 1993 Irving received a letter from the Government 
informing him that he was being denied a visa based on concern that “the effect 
your presence in Australia will have within the community” and “that your pro-
posed visit…would have been disruptive to the Australian community.”⁸⁸ Thus 
85 The Bulletin, 13 May 86.
86 On Target, 30 Nov. 1990.
87 The Age, 2 Dec. 1992.
88 The Australian, 19 Feb. 1993.
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began a cycle of repeated visa applications which enveloped the sick cause of 
Holocaust denial in the false halo of free speech.
While denied personal entry, in 1993 Irving produced a video especially 
designed for an Australian audience, “The Search for Truth in History,” with the 
local deniers responsible for its promotion. Newspaper advertisements promot-
ing the video listed Muriden and the ACLU’s contact details, and in a program 
organized by Veritas and Bennett, the video was scheduled to be shown nation-
ally but most talks were cancelled because of protests.⁸⁹ However, this whole 
process made denial an almost daily news item, fed by interviews with Irving 
from the UK and America.
Irving received some practical benefit from this Australian support during 
his 2001 libel trial in London.⁹⁰ 288 donations were received from Australia 
alone, ranging from $10–$2000, in the period leading up to his trial.⁹¹ Irving was 
assisted in preparing information for his cross-examination by Australian public 
servant Michael Mills. This demonstrates that an Australian such as Mills who 
has no impact on the debate about the Holocaust in Australia, can play a more 
significant role when connected to prominent overseas deniers.⁹² Following the 
court’s decision against Irving, the ACLU sought to provide financial assistance 
for his appeal.⁹³
The Internet has undoubtedly broadened the reach of all deniers and is the 
primary means through which non-Australian deniers can reach an Australian 
audience. Irving’s Internet site, for example, provides a section for purchases 
with Australian credit cards.⁹⁴ While the Internet does not offer the range of 
coverage of mainstream media, it has been the means by which Irving interacts 
with Australians in a mutually beneficial and close relationship.⁹⁵ The ACLU and 
League promote his books, which are available at their meetings,⁹⁶ while Toben 
lauds Irving as “one of the few historians to have their moral and intellectual 
integrity intact.” Irving returned the favor by issuing a statement in support of 
Toben during his own legal difficulties in Australia.⁹⁷
89 The Age, 19 June 1993.
90 The Age, 20 May 1993.
91 The Weekend Australian, 15–16 Apr. 2000.
92 Generation, May 2000.
93 According to columnist Jill Singer, Herald Sun, 14 Apr. 2000.
94 http://www.fpp.co.uk/orderforms/orderformAustral.html   accessed 17 July 2002.
95 See, for example http://www.fpp.co.uk/Letters/Rightwing/Knight241101.html accessed 3 
July 2002.
96 ACLU newsletter, no. 110 (April 1996).
97 Sydney Morning Herald, 10 Apr. 1999.
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By lending his name to the Australian deniers, Irving has been able to assist 
their campaign and they have remained committed to him despite the London 
court’s decision unequivocally branding him as a racist, antisemite, and Holo-
caust denier.
The Far Right
Holocaust deniers are sufficiently connected to the broader far Right that they 
can use these links effectively to advance their cause. It is far Right tolerance of 
Holocaust denial that provides the deniers with a base to increase their support. 
For example, the militia magazine Lock Stock and Barrel does not directly espouse 
negationist theses, but it does carry advertisements from Olga Scully.⁹⁸ More-
over, Holocaust denial is a crucial part of the white supremacist agenda, openly 
espoused by Australian neo-Nazi skinheads and New Age racists obsessed with 
UFOs, lost civilizations, and alternative health. It has long been embraced by mil-
itant Christian Identity ministries who have distributed the Leuchter Report and 
Ernst Zündel’s tapes. It also creeps into the agitation of the racist Right opposed 
to Asian immigration and multiculturalism.
Denial clearly generates antisemitism, so protecting freedom of speech 
must be balanced with protecting the Holocaust denier’s Jewish targets. Despite 
the centrality of freedom of speech, there are legal limitations on hate speech 
to which the Jewish community has recourse, primarily the 1995 Racial Hatred 
Act. This prohibits racially offensive or abusive behavior, covering public acts 
“reasonably likely in all the circumstances to offend, insult, humiliate or intim-
idate that person or group.” The Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) 
took action against both Toben and Scully under the act with the Human Rights 
and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC). In 2001, HREOC ordered Toben 
to remove material from his Internet site which breached the act by denigrating 
Jews, and to apologize to ECAJ,⁹⁹ while Scully was similarly ordered to apologize 
for her literature.
However, for Toben and Scully the process reinforced their world view, with 
both stating they would ignore the findings. Toben responded to the pending case 
by switching to an overseas Internet Service Provider, but in a 2002 landmark 
ruling, the Federal Court found the 1995 Racial Hatred Act applied to the Internet 
98 The Age, 3 Nov. 1998.
99 The Age, 8 July 2003.
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and ordered Toben to remove material from his Internet site. The Federal Court 
ruled that he would be in contempt of court if he refused to do so, making him 
accountable under Australian law even if the material is hosted in another juris-
diction. This was an important precedent in relation to online racism in Austra-
lia and may also influence similar deliberations by courts overseas. The Federal 
Court decision against Toben, which was upheld following an appeal, was also 
of particular importance because it found that Holocaust denial breached the 
Racial Hatred Act objectively, rather than being subjective to the feelings of the 
complainant. Scully was also found to breach the act with the risk that if she 
continued to distribute her material she would be in contempt of court. Toben 
removed offending material and the threat remains of being held in contempt 
of court should he add denial material to his Internet site. Ultimately, if Toben 
moved overseas it would be hard to enforce any decision handed down by an Aus-
tralian court but his legal liability would probably prevent his return to Australia.
Despite the important precedent of the High Court decision against Toben, 
the ability of the judiciary to identify the antisemitic nature of denial remains a 
moot point. When, for example, the Jewish Community Council of Victoria sought 
an interim injunction to prevent the screening of Irving’s film at the Melbourne 
Underground Film Festival, the judge said it may be offensive to some members 
of the Jewish community but it did not constitute racial vilification under the Vic-
torian Racial and Religious Tolerance Act. He found the film to be “quite bland” 
despite references such “traditional enemies” and “dining out on the Holocaust.” 
Reflecting the importance of freedom of speech in Australia, the judge said he 
made the ruling to uphold the right of the Victorian population to engage in 
robust discussion. Legal responses to Internet regulation may well prove pivotal 
in the future of Holocaust denial in Australia and indeed internationally.
In terms of Holocaust denial on the Internet, the work of Australian deniers 
will also be affected by the situation overseas. In his German trial, for instance, 
Toben was acquitted of charges of defaming the memory of the dead on the Inter-
net because the offending information was installed outside the German jurisdic-
tion. However, an appeal to the German Supreme Court found he might be tried 
as the material could be downloaded in Germany. This has global implications 
for Internet regulation, but its practical effect means that Toben is unlikely to 
return to Germany. This indicates that the future prospects of Holocaust denial in 
Australia will be directly affected by global responses to it.
Denial in Australia will also be effected by developments in the negationist 
movement overseas. For example, the reduced funding that the California-based 
IHR enjoys, as compared to the past will asffect its activities in Australia and the 
support it can offer figures such as Toben. In terms of responding to Holocaust 
denial, the Jewish community runs extensive Holocaust educational programs 
178   Danny Ben-Moshe
while in both government and private high schools, Holocaust literature such as 
the Diary of Anne Frank is widely read. However, educational authorities, both 
Jewish and general, will need to consider as part of these efforts the develop-
ment of specific educational programs aimed at addressing the issue of Holocaust 
denial. This will be increasingly important as survivors of the Holocaust, who 
speak to thousands of schoolchildren each year, pass away.
An indication of the potential for Holocaust denial was provided well 
over a decade ago by the best-selling and award- winning 1994 book by Helen 
Demidenko, The Hand That Signed the Paper. This case demonstrated that some 
of Australia’s leading literary figures and intellectuals were willing to embrace 
a book whose central thesis, while not denying the Holocaust, found a defence 
for it. The book presented “Jewish-Bolshevik” persecution of Ukranians in the 
1930s as a parallel to the Holocaust and a kind of “justification” for it. All three 
Holocaust denying organizations enthusiastically embraced the novel. Although 
The Hand That Signed the Paper is a work of fiction and as such is distinct from 
overt denial, this experience suggests that a time may arise when literary figures 
will similarly defend a work of Holocaust denial. Indeed, in February 2000, the 
Victorian Minister for the Arts, Mary Delahunty, in a hypothetical discussion said 
she would hope to “have the courage” to put public money into a play based on 
the work of David Irving.¹⁰⁰
It is easy to dismiss Holocaust deniers as extremists. But with the passage 
of time, the advantages of the Internet and international support, the potential 
exists for them to establish an “alternative history.” Acceptance of denial’s core 
thesis is by no means limited to the racist fringe. The Chief Historical Examiners 
for the High School certificate in one state and a school history teacher in another 
have reportedly said, when referring to revisionism, that there is an alternative 
point of view. A danger lies in the appeal of relativism to some Western liberals 
as was seen in responses to Norman Finkelstein’s book, The Holocaust Industry. 
While hard core deniers remain small in number, scores are known to attend their 
meetings, hundreds are sympathizers, and they reach thousands through their 
mailing lists.
Denial of the Shoah can and does lead to overt antisemitism. It can also put 
Holocaust survivors, of which Australia has the highest per capita number any-
where outside of Israel, on the defensive. This is what Nadine Fresco, a French 
100 Arts Today, ABC Radio National, 16 Feb. 2000. When criticized for this, she said Holocaust 
revisionism was outside the boundaries of what is acceptable and therefore would not be 
publicly supported. Mary Delahunty to B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation Commission, Inc., 21 Feb. 
2000.
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authority on Holocaust denial, describes as the “double liquidation,” denying not 
only the dead but also the living.¹⁰¹
101 Nadine Fresco, in Holocaust Remembrance: The Shapes of Memory, edited by Geoffrey 
Hartman (Oxford, 1994), 191.

Rotem Kowner
The Strange Case of Japanese “Revisionism”
Japan occupies a special place in the research concerning attitudes toward the 
Jews in modern times. Japanese antisemitism has not evolved from an encoun-
ter with Jews, and it lacks deep historical roots or religious origins. It has never 
gained wholehearted governmental support or become a national ideology; 
neither has it developed because of any significant conflict between modern-day 
Israel and Japan. Moreover, antisemitism has never penetrated the lower classes 
or attracted popular support. Manifesting itself almost exclusively in written 
form, it has never been exacerbated to the point of material or physical assaults 
upon Jews living in Japan.
Nevertheless, after 1918, the encounter of the Japanese with the Protocols 
of the Elders of Zion heralded the emergence of antisemitic views in the country 
along with a growing public interest in the role of Jews in world politics and the 
economy. The Protocols were not only a catalyst, but also a mirror of negative 
Japanese attitudes to Jews in general. When anti-Jewish views were rife, interest 
in the Protocols grew, and when Japanese antisemitism languished, so did inter-
est in the book. This fluctuation was often a reflection of Japanese xenophobic 
nationalism in general, and its bizarre antisemitic attitudes in particular, and 
should be treated as such.¹
At the end of World War I, Japan was burdened by social discontent, and 
its elite was apprehensive of the spread of Communist ideas into the working 
masses. The encounter with a foreign book that offered not only a partial account 
for the world turmoil, but also a colorful warning seemed effective and the book 
was soon embraced. Some of the Japanese who welcomed the book, however, 
were also admirers of Jews, partly because they exaggerated Jewish power. From 
their local perspective, they had a good reason to view the Protocols as confirm-
ing their positive preconceptions, and this duality has remained an unmistable 
characteristic of Japanese attitudes to this very day.
Two decades earlier, during the Russo-Japanese War, these future philosem-
ites and antisemites received an unequivocal demonstration of Jewish “power,” 
when a single banker, Jacob H. Schiff of the New York bank, Loeb, Kuhn and 
1 On the Protocols, see “Symposium: The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, Aum, and 
Antisemitism in Japan (David Goodman); The Protocols in a Land without Jews: A 
Reconsideration (Rotem Kowner); Comments (Ben-Ami Shillony),” Antisemitism International, 
nos. 3–4 (2006): 55–79. This journal, published by the Vidal Sassoon International Center for 
the Study of Antisemitism at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem is edited by Robert Wistrich.
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Company, obtained for Japan about half of its desperately needed foreign loans. 
Half a year after the conclusion of the war, when Schiff arrived to Japan to receive 
the Order of the Rising Sun from Emperor Meiji, virtually all the political, mili-
tary, and business elite took part in the banquets given in his honor. Thereafter, 
Schiff’s meddling in world politics, at least in Japanese eyes, did not cease. Even 
as late as during World War I, he refused to allow his firm to participate in any 
Russian war financing.
It is important to note that the Protocols were not unanimously accepted 
in Japan at face value. While some were quick to translate it, others were even 
quicker to refute it. However, the interest in the Protocols generated in Japan fol-
lowing their publication in Western languages led to their full translation in 1924 
by an army officer named Yasue Norihiro [Senkô] (1888–1950) under the pseud-
onym Hô Kôshi. This prompted the Army General Staff three years later to dis-
patch Yasue, who was on a study tour in Germany, to Palestine to further examine 
the Jewish situation there.²
Although antisemitic ideas began to take root in Japan during the 1920s, 
only during the following decade was there a substantial increase in antisemitic 
publications in Japan. They represented a conservative reaction to liberalism 
and socialism by ultranationalist scholars and military figures, and served as 
an explanation for the growing conflict with the United States and Great Britain. 
While reflecting much of the Japanese approach to the external world at that time, 
these publications were merely a feeble echo of the identity crisis Japan expe-
rienced during its cataclysmic turn against the West. It was the rise of fascism 
which contributed to the greater interest in antisemitic writings in the 1930s. Like 
Yasue before him, the writings of Navy Captain Inuzuka Koreshige, who was in 
charge of the Jewish refugees in Shanghai from 1939 to 1942, are a vivid example 
of the duality of Japanese attitudes.³
While heavily relying on the Protocols, Inuzuka held Jews in awe and offered 
to create for them an Asian homeland, and expected to benefit from their influ-
ence and power. Believing that Jews controlled the finance, politics, and media in 
the United States and Great Britain, Inuzuka and Yasue, by then colonel and the 
liaison with the Jewish Far East Council from 1938 to 1940, formulated the Japa-
2 On Yasue’s visit to Palestine, see David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis, and Jews: The Jewish 
Refugee Community in Shanghai, 1938-1945 (New York, 1976), 207.
3 On Yasue’s ambivalence to Judaism and his appreciation of the Zionist effort, alongside 
fears of Jewish power, see Yasue Norihiro, Kakumei Undô o Abaku—Yudaya no Chi o Fumite 
(Unmasking a revolutionary movement: Setting foot on Jewish land) (Tokyo, 1931), 1.
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nese policy permitting the entry of Jewish refugees from Germany into Shanghai.⁴ 
While it is true that German influence on Japan was weakened by the racial fric-
tion and limited military cooperation between the two nations, one can argue 
that the Protocols had a certain positive effect on Japanese decision makers in 
China and Manchuria, since it made them believe that Jewish power might be 
instrumental for their empire. In this sense, Japanese promulgators of the Pro-
tocols markedly differed from European antisemites who never interpreted the 
book in any positive, or at least constructive, light.⁵
Ironically, by 1940 both Inuzuka and Yasue were regarded by German offi-
cials as “friends of the Jews.”⁶ More important, however, is the fact that Japan, 
despite signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany in 1936 and the Tripar-
tite Pact with Germany and Italy in 1940, never joined the two in deporting Jews, 
using them as a labor force, or facilitating their extermination. German pres-
sure notwithstanding, Japan’s overall benevolent policy toward Jews (although 
marred occasionally by harsh treatment) during World War II, demonstrates the 
limited detrimental, if not ambivalent, effect the Protocols exerted in Japan in the 
first two decades after its publication.
The decline of Japanese interest in the Protocols after 1945 is no less reveal-
ing. Except for one minor reference to it, in the twenty-six years that followed 
Japan’s surrender no author dealt with the book, nor was it republished.⁷ Japa-
nese society was occupied by fundamental needs such as rebuilding its cities and 
industrial infrastructure and restoring its economy. It was less troubled by iden-
tity issues. For this reason the interest in Jews—always a marginal topic in the Jap-
anese society—totally subsided. In 1970, however, a book by Yamamoto Shichihei 
(using the seemingly more authoritative pseudonym Isaiah Ben-Dasan), Nihonjin 
to Yudayajin (The Japanese and the Jews), heralded a new era of growing inter-
national aspirations and a return to global competition.⁸ Two years earlier, the 
4 See Pamela Rotner Sakamoto, Japanese Diplomats and Jewish Refugees: A World War II 
Dilemma (Westport, Conn., 1998), 27–28.
5 On Inuzuka’s plans, see Marvin Tokayer and Mary Swartz. The Fugu Plan: The Untold Story of 
the Japanese and the Jews During World War II (New York, 1979).
6 It is unclear whether the motive was his age or views, but within a short time, the Army 
released Yasue from active service. See Krebs, The “Jewish problem,” 117; Françoise Kreissler, 
“Japans Judenpolitik (1931–1945),” in Formierung und Fall der Achse Berlin-Tokyo, ed. by 
Gerhard Krebs and Bernd Martin (Munich, 1984): 187–210, 203–4.
7 In 1958 Matsumoto Fumi reprinted Kubota Eikichi’s translation of the Protocols from 1938; 
see Matsumoto Fumi, Fuji Kaidan’in Konryû (Building the altar at Mount Fuji) (Tokyo, 1958).
8 Isaiah Ben-Dasan [Yamamoto Shichihei], Nihonjin to Yudayajin (The Japanese and the Jews) 
(Tokyo, 1970).
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Japanese economy had surpassed that of Germany, becoming the second largest 
economy in the capitalist world. The Japanese quest for recognition following the 
success of the Tokyo Olympic games of 1964 and the World Exposition in Osaka in 
1970 was accompanied by a renewed search for self-definition.
Shichihei’s book offered just that, although it was basically about Japan 
rather than Jews. For this reason, but also for the writing style and the timing, it 
became a sensational success and sold more than three million copies. Less than 
a year passed before Nagafuchi Ichirô authored his own version of the Protocols.⁹ 
In the mid-1980s Japan witnessed a second surge of antisemitic writings, which 
included many references to the Protocols, or at least notions of a Jewish ambition 
to gain control of the world. It is not surprising that this reemergence of the Proto-
cols occurred when it was predicted that the Japanese economy would supercede 
that of the United States, and the Japanese were facing a second identity crisis. 
Like the situation half a century earlier, this time, too, there was increasing fric-
tion with the United States, reinforced by rising nationalism in Japan.
There have been various views on the actual significance of Japanese antise-
mitic writings and their impact on Japanese society. They range from alarmist 
fears to ironic deflation of the phenomenon. Some experts argue that Japanese 
antisemitism leads to anti-Jewish hatred and anti-Israel views, while others 
suggest that it is a marginal phenomenon that may even reinforce positive images 
of a successful group, thereby providing Jews and the state of Israel with some 
credit they do not necessarily deserve.
The exposure to antisemitic literature has not led to a substantial shift in 
perceptions of the Jews, but it tends to slightly underscore its positive and nega-
tive facets. In some cases and for some individuals it may lead to suspicion and 
distrust, while for others, as Prof. Ben-Ami Shillony of the Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem has pointed out, it may lead to greater respect and admiration. The 
majority of Japanese are ignorant of the Protocols and unaware of the long legacy 
of antisemitism in the world and its offshoots in Japan.¹⁰ This negative implica-
tion notwithstanding, antisemitism has not led to any cases of physical violence 
against Jews for being Jews.
The Protocols in Japan do, however, combine both a long-term demonization 
of Jews (of more than 80 years), with an occult image of a sinister group that 
clandestinely gathers and plans to rule the world. It is really not important, if the 
9 Nagafuchi Ichirô, Yudayajin to Sekai Kakumei: Shion no Giteisho (The Jews and the world 
revolution: the Protocols of the Elders of Zion (Tokyo, 1971).
10 Rotem Kowner, On Ignorance, Respect, and Suspicion: Current Japanese Attitudes Towards 
Jews, ACTA no. 11 (Jerusalem: SICSA, 1997).
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book is genuine. The belief in the power of the Jews is much stronger than any 
rational refutation and serves far more important goals than its authors could 
dream about.
Since the antisemitic surge of the late 1980s, Jewish organizations have made 
several attempts to halt the publication and distribution of the Protocols. Their 
most fruitful activities took place during the Marco Polo Affair, which ultimately 
led to the appearance of many articles about Jews and the Holocaust, mostly pos-
itive and some even self-reflective.¹¹ This certainly was a breakthrough in the Jap-
anese intellectual treatment of this issue in the last twenty years.¹²
It should be emphasized in this context that antisemitic authors in Japan ini-
tially ignored the Holocaust, in line with a longstanding lack of popular awareness 
regarding the subject. Although Anne Frank’s Diary of a Young Girl, published in 
Japanese in 1952, had been a bestseller, most readers regarded the book as an 
account of a universal war victim and remained oblivious to the Jewish identity of 
its heroine. More informed interest in the Holocaust began to be expressed only 
during the Eichmann trial a decade later, which was covered by several Japanese 
journalists.
When Holocaust denial attracted widespread attention in the West in the 
course of the 1980s, it was only a matter of time until Japanese antisemitic writers 
followed suit. Uno Masami, a Christian pastor who in 1986 had published two 
antisemitic books in Japan which together sold over a million copies, led the 
field.¹³ In 1989, he became the first Japanese to publicly deny the Holocaust, as 
well as establishing strong ties with various Holocaust-denial organizations. In 
books and lectures, he denounced the “lies” in Anne Frank’s diary and argued 
that the Holocaust was “Jewish propaganda.”¹⁴ In the wake of Uno’s publica-
tions, an increasing number of Japanese began to show interest in Holocaust 
denial. In 1992, for example, Keiichiro Kobori, a professor at the University of 
11 See Goodman and Miyazawa, Jews in the Japanese Mind: The History and Uses of a Cultural 
Stereotype 2nd ed. (Lexington Mass., 2000), 271–76; Rotem Kowner, “Tokyo Recognizes 
Auschwitz: The Rise and Fall of Holocaust Denial in Japan, 1989–1999,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 3 (2001): 257–72; Herbert Worm, “Holocaust-Leugner in Japan: Der Fall ‘Marco Polo’—
Printmedien und Vergangenheitsbewältignug,” in Japan 1994/95: Politics und Wirtschaft, ed. by 
Manfred Pohl (Hamburg, 1995): 114–61.
12 For some suggestions for practical measures, see Kowner, Tokyo Recognizes Auschwitz, 
269–70.
13 On the Japanese perception of the Holocaust and Holocaust denial, see n. 11, and Rotem 
Kowner, “The Rise and Fall of Holocaust Denial in Japan, 1989–1999” (2001).
14 See, for instance, Uno Masami, Miezaru teikoku: 1993, shionisto, yudaya ga seikai o shihai 
suru [The invisible empire: the Zionist Jews will control the world in 1993] (Tokyo, 1989).
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Tokyo, praised the work of the California-based Institute for Historical Review 
(IHR), one of the leading Holocaust-denial organizations, in an article published 
in the prestigious daily Sankei Shimbun. The IHR, for its part, has invited Japa-
nese speakers to its annual convention, and several Japanese “revisionists” have 
submitted articles to its newsletter.¹⁵
This “revisionism” cannot be divorced from the role that Jews occupy in the 
minds of the Japanese. The most common view is that Jews serve as a reflection 
of the Other, representing or displacing the preoccupation with external ele-
ments (the West, foreigners in Japan) about which the Japanese feel conflicted, 
but which are less “legitimate” targets of criticism. Jews are also used to facil-
itate internal needs: they serve as a beacon of Japan’s quest for self-definition, 
namely as reinforcement of a sense of uniqueness, as well as an explanation for 
Japan’s problems (e.g., economic distress and international criticism), and as a 
warning for future developments. In addition, the Japanese have a fascination for 
works dealing with the occult, supernatural phenomena, and conspiracies. The 
Jews are already perceived as an unfamiliar and legendary people; some authors, 
responding to market demand, also portray them as manipulators of the world’s 
political and economic system.¹⁶
Based on three surveys that I conducted among more than 600 students 
during 1995–1996, I contend that Jews, in their virtual nonexistence in Japan, 
often play the role of demonic conspirators.¹⁷ Rationally, the majority of Japa-
nese do not accept such a notion. Yet many Japanese—including businessmen, 
politicians, and members of the more educated echelon—turn to antisemitic liter-
ature for the comforting rationales to be found there. It is surely more appealing 
to blame Japan’s economic or political “misfortunes” on some outside demonic 
force rather than submitting to a sober appraisal of the country’s past and future 
path.
Given the recent wave of antisemitic literature, one may wonder whether it 
is possible to alter the Japanese mindset toward Jews. In fact, the unique char-
acteristics of Japanese antisemitism may make the problem easier to deal with. 
In the case study presented below, the “Marco Polo affair,” it will be shown how 
publication of an article promoting Holocaust denial led to a fully orchestrated 
15 On the ties of the Institute for Historical Review and Japan, see Kenneth S. Stern, Holocaust 
Denial (New York: American Jewish Committee, 1994), 49.
16 For further discussion, see Kowner, On Ignorance, Respect, and Suspicion; Jennifer Golub, 
Japanese Attitudes toward Jews (Pacific Rim Institute of the American Jewish Committee, 1992).
17 See Kowner, On Ignorance, Respect, and Suspicion.
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operation against the spread of antisemitism in a manner that may have changed 
the course of current attitudes toward Jews in Japan.
To understand the context of this affair, it is important to remember that the 
year 1995 was an annus horribilis for the Japanese. On 17 January, the city of Kobe 
was shaken by a great earthquake that left more than six thousand people dead. 
Two months later, millions of underground commuters in Tokyo were subjected 
to a series of nerve gas attacks that killed twelve and injured some five thousand. 
On the economic front, 1995 marked the end of a spectacular rise that had lasted 
several decades. After the yen-dollar rate reached an all-time high in April, with 
Japan’s GNP amounting to more than 80 percent of that of the United States, the 
economy took a sharp downturn, entering into a painful recession.
It is against this backdrop that the first widely publicized case of Holocaust 
denial in Japan took place. The affair began on 14 January 1995 with a ten-page 
article published in the monthly Marco Polo. Owned by the prestigious publish-
ing house Bungei Shunju, Marco Polo had a circulation of about 200,000 and 
was aimed at young, affluent, and educated Japanese men. The offending article, 
entitled, “The Greatest Taboo in Postwar History: There Were No Nazi Gas Cham-
bers” was a classic piece of Holocaust denial. According to its author, a neurolo-
gist named Nishioka Masanori, there was scant evidence to show that Jews were 
systematically killed in gas chambers. The Final Solution, he claimed, was merely 
a plan to resettle Jews in the East, as Hitler never desired the annihilation of the 
Jews. In all, the article concluded, the “Holocaust” was nothing more than Allied 
propaganda.¹⁸
Over a period of several years, Nishioka had submitted his article to more 
than sixty Japanese journals. “The Greatest Taboo” was finally accepted by Marco 
Polo in June 1994. However, the magazine’s editor, Hanada Kazuyoshi, decided to 
withhold publication until January 1995 in order to coincide with the 50th anni-
versary of the liberation of Auschwitz.¹⁹ It was there, he wrote in his introduction 
to the article, that “the greatest taboo of postwar history is being kept secret.... 
Why is it that Japan’s media do not write on this matter?”²⁰
18 Nishioka Masanori, “Sengo sekaishi saidai no tabu: Nachi gasu shitsu wa nakkata” [The 
greatest taboo of postwar history: there were no Nazi gas chambers], Marco Polo (February 
1995): 170–79.
19 See Iwakami Yasumi, “Mujaki na Holocaust revisionist” [An artless Holocaust revisionist], 
Takarajima 30 (April 1995): 18–27. Before coming to Marco Polo, Hanada served as editor of the 
weekly Shûkan Bunshun, which in 1993 published a large advertisement for a three-volume, 
virulently antisemitic work.
20 Introduction by Hanada to Nishioka, “Nachi gasu shitsu wa nakkata,” 171.
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Echoes and Responses
Responses to the article published in Marco Polo can be divided into three stages. 
In the first stage, the Japanese media ignored the article, in part because most 
of the public attention was focused on the horrendous aftermath of the earth-
quake in Kobe. Thus it came about that the article was “discovered” by foreigners, 
namely, members of the Committee Against Antisemitism in Japan, a watchdog 
group established in August 1994 by Jewish residents of the country.²¹ The com-
mittee first decided to inform several Jewish organizations and embassies about 
the content of the article. Then, once coverage of the earthquake had subsided, it 
issued its own public statement.
Three entities responded quickly to the committee’s alert. Abraham Foxman, 
national director of the Anti-Defamation League in the United States, wrote to the 
editor of Marco Polo and demanded a retraction in the next issue of the magazine. 
Simultaneously, the Los Angeles-based Simon Wiesenthal Center dispatched a 
protest to the Japanese ambassador to the United States and sent Rabbi Abraham 
Cooper, an associate dean of the Center and a veteran opponent of Japanese 
antisemitism, to Japan. A day later, the Israeli embassy sent its press attaché to 
Marco Polo’s editorial office to protest the publication and demand an apology. 
The assistant editor who met with the attaché expressed no apology; he did, 
however, offer to provide space in the next issue for a rebuttal of the article’s 
accusations.²²
The second stage focused on the threat of a boycott against the journal and its 
publisher. After Bungei Shunju refused to retract or apologize for the article, Rabbi 
Cooper decided to contact eight companies whose advertisements had appeared 
in the latest issue of Marco Polo. Volkswagen was the first to respond, announc-
ing that it would cease advertising in the magazine. Two days later, Mitsubishi 
Motors and Mitsubishi Electric followed suit, while Cartier Japan took the more 
radical step of suspending its advertising in all Bungei Shunju publications.²³
The final stage involved local and foreign media pressure. Ten days after 
Marco Polo hit the stands, the Associated Press reported on the Holocaust-denial 
article, and by the next day, the Japanese media had picked up the item.²⁴ At first, 
21 For a detailed account of the Committee against Antisemitism in Japan, see Nicolas Davis, 
“The Marco Polo Affair” (unpubl. seminar paper).
22 See “Publisher Closes Marco Polo for Anti-Jewish Article,” Daily Yomiuri, 31 January 1995, 1; 
“Japanese Criticized for Holocaust Denial,” Chicago Tribune, 25 January 1995.
23 See “Volkswagen Pulls Advert from Japanese Magazine,” Jewish Chronicle, 27 January 1995.
24 See, for example, “Jews Blast Article Denying Holocaust,” Asahi Evening News, 25 January 
1995; “Nachi no gasu shitsu no hitei ni kōgi” [Protests about the denial of Nazi gas chambers], 
 The Strange Case of Japanese “Revisionism”   189
Hanada continued to defend his decision to publish Nishioka’s article, arguing 
that freedom of expression extended as well to the publication of nonconformist 
views. Criticism of Hanada, however, mounted as more and more newspapers, 
both domestic and foreign, reported on the affair. On January 27, Bungei Shunju 
evinced its first signs of capitulation, instructing its agents in the United States to 
notify Abraham Cooper that it was weighing the possibility of closing down the 
magazine.
At this point, the course of events accelerated. On 30 January, Bungei Shunju 
dismissed Hanada and announced that publication of Marco Polo had been per-
manently suspended. The dismissal announcement was accompanied by a letter 
of apology written to Cooper by Tanaka Kengo, the president of Bungei Shunju, in 
which the latter admitted to an overall lack of understanding regarding the Holo-
caust. Both the announcement and the apology received wide media coverage 
both at home and abroad.²⁵
Even the Japanese government—which in general is reluctant to involve itself 
in media affairs—felt obliged to denounce the article. But an even more dramatic 
and arguably more successful outcome of the Jewish campaign against Marco 
Polo was the sensation it sparked in the Japanese media. On February 2, three 
days after his written apology, Tanaka met with Cooper at a joint press confer-
ence. In front of hundreds of representatives of the print and broadcast media, 
Tanaka reiterated his apology and announced that closure of Marco Polo was the 
best way to show Bungei Shunju’s deep regret over the incident.²⁶
Less than two weeks later, Tanaka was forced to step down as head of the 
publishing company, citing the Marco Polo affair as one of the factors behind 
his resignation.²⁷ Sources in the Japanese media later reported that the incident 
was only the last in a series of scandals that had rocked Bungei Shunju (more-
over, they reported, both Tanaka and Hanada had been reassigned within the 
company). They agreed, however, that publication of the Holocaust denial article 
Asahi Shimbun, 26 January 1995.
25 See, for example, “Holocaust Denial Dooms Marco Polo,” Japan Times, 31 January 1995; 
“Japanese Magazine Closes after Anti-Semitic Article,” International Herald Tribune, 1 February 
1995.
26 See “Publisher Eases Jewish Groups’ Wrath by Closing Magazine over Holocaust Story,” 
Nikkei Weekly, 6 February 1995.
27 See Kawado Kazufumi, “’Hanada ryū’ o dō sōkatsu suru no ka” [How can we summarize 
‘Hanada’s manner’?], Asahi Shimbun, 24 February 1995.
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and, more importantly, the boycott it sparked had had a definite impact on the 
decision to replace Tanaka.²⁸
In the following weeks, numerous articles and programs were devoted to 
various aspects of the Marco Polo affair. While many articles focused on the back-
stage power struggle at Bungei Shunju and the company’s fall from grace, others 
examined more fundamental aspects of the affair. A few writers challenged 
the company’s hasty capitulation to foreign pressure, arguing that the Jewish 
response to Marco Polo’s publication of “The Greatest Taboo” was indicative 
of undue Jewish power and influence, which, if unchecked, would be a barrier 
against legitimate critical discussion of the Holocaust. A majority, however, 
avoided criticism of the Jewish campaign against the magazine. Several journals 
even published sympathetic and informative articles on Jews and the Holocaust; 
some journalists began to criticize Japanese ignorance of Jewish suffering, while 
deploring the lack of professional judgment and sensationalist tendencies of their 
own media.²⁹ The American scholar, David Goodman, went still further, contend-
ing that the “solipsistic monologue about Jews and antisemitism” in Japan was 
typical of Japanese dealings with the outside world for centuries.³⁰
Holocaust denial is admittedly still a novel and limited phenomenon in Japa-
nese society. It seems to be promulgated only by a few individuals whose motives 
are not always related to antisemitism; they may instead be demonstrating a 
Japanese tendency to emulate foreign fashions or fads. Nonetheless, Holocaust 
denial in Japan has a historical context.
My belief is that this phenomenon is associated with Japan’s lingering denial 
of its own past, namely, its actions during the second Sino–Japanese War and 
the Pacific front of World War II (1937–1945). A growing body of Japanese histo-
riography presents Japan as a victim rather than as an aggressor in these wars: 
acceptance of such revisionist views becomes much easier when it is believed 
that European modern history has been falsified as well.
Since the end of the 1980s, the Japanese public has been shocked by a stream 
of testimonies regarding the disgraceful conduct of their country’s imperial army 
and navy during the eight-year period of warfare. They have also become aware 
28 See Shinoda Hiroyuki, “Bungei Shunju, Tanaka Kengo zen-shachô no yūutsu” [The 
depression of Tanaka Kengo, former president of Bungei Shunju], Tsukuru (April 1995): 134–39; 
see also David G. Goodman, “Anti-Semitism in Japan: Its History and Current Implications,” 
in The Construction of Racial Identities in China and Japan, ed. Frank Dikötter (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1997), 177–98, esp. 194.
29 See, for example, Sapio, 23 March 1995; Takarajima, 30 April 1995; Seiron (April 1995), 
Brutus, 1 July 1995.
30 Goodman, “Anti-Semitism in Japan,” 195.
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of the international attention and sharp criticism focused on Japan’s reaction to 
these revelations. In the past, the Japanese had been somewhat insulated from 
documentation of their country’s wartime role. Moreover, there was no clear con-
sensus regarding what had happened and why. Over time, however, victims of 
that era began to speak out, and with the emergence of a new generation of Japa-
nese who had been born after 1945, there was increased willingness to publicize 
wartime testimonies that were painful and sometimes appalling.
Although the most detailed accounts were published abroad, the Japanese 
public gradually became familiar with the sequence of events regarding hideous 
experiments in biological and chemical warfare that had been conducted by the 
notorious Unit 731, which had resulted in the deaths of thousands of prisoners. 
They learned of the “comfort women”—more than 100,000 non-Japanese women 
who had been forced to serve Japanese troops as sex slaves.³¹ Most shocking, 
however, were the revelations concerning the massacre carried out by Japanese 
troops in Nanjing (Nanking). According to conservative sources, some 100,000–
200,000 Chinese civilians had been murdered and thousands of women raped 
when Japanese troops occupied the Chinese capital in December 1937.³²
Unlike Germany, Japan has never publicly acknowledged full responsi bility 
for its wartime actions. Thus, whereas Germany constructs its defeat in 1945 as 
a form of liberation, Japan still views it as a juncture of victimization.³³ Three 
months before the Marco Polo affair, Ben Hills, the Tokyo correspondent of the 
Australian daily, The Age, summarized the Japanese mindset regarding the war 
as follows:
Imagine a country responsible for a war in which upwards of 20 million people were killed, 
whose armies committed atrocities of the nature of Hitler’s “final solution”—and yet which 
31 See Peter Williams and David Wallace, Unit 731: The Japanese Army’s Secret of 
Secrets (London, 1989); George Hicks, The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of 
Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War (New York, 1995); David Boling, Mass Rape, 
Enforced Prostitution, and the Japa nese Imperial Army: Japan Eschews International Legal 
Responsibility? (Baltimore: Occasional Papers in Contemporary Asian Studies, 1995), 3 (128).
32 See Iguchi Kazuki, Kisaka Jun’ichiro, and Shimozato Masaki, Nanking jiken: Nanking shidan 
kanei shiryoshu [Nanking incident: data collection of the Kyoto division] (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 
1989); Hora Tomio, Fujihara Akira, and Honda Katsuichi, eds., Nanking daigyakusatsu no 
Kenkyū [Research of the Nanking massacre] (Tokyo, 1992); Nanking daigyakusatsu no Shinsō 
wo akiraka ni suru Zenkoku Renrakukai [The National Association for Revealing the Truth about 
the Nanking Massacre], ed., Nanking daigyakusatsu: nihonjin heno hokuhatsu [The Nanking 
massacre: accusation to the Japanese people] (Tokyo, 1992).
33 See Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York, 
1994).
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50 years on is still living in a fantasy world of denial and disbelief. Imagine a country where 
Adolf Hitler never died, but lived on to a ripe old age, stripped of his absolute powers but 
still worshipped by his people....³⁴
At the same time, since the 1990s, pleas for introspection and reconciliation with 
the past have been heard more frequently in Japan.³⁵ For instance, in 1993, when 
the 39-year rule of the Liberal Democratic party finally ended, the newly-elected 
government of Hosokawa Morihiro indicated its willingness to reexamine some of 
the long-concealed issues of the past. In his inaugural speech, Hosokawa spoke 
of his “deep regret” concerning the “unbearable sufferings caused to so many 
by Japan’s aggressive behavior and colonial control.” Soon thereafter, Hosokawa 
chose South Korea as the site of his first overseas visit and issued there a “pro-
found apology” for Japanese acts of war.³⁶
Hosokawa’s approach, although it fell short of a full acknowledgement of 
Japanese atrocities, made many uncomfortable. In 1994, Nagano Shigeto, the 
minister of justice in a new government headed by Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu, 
declared in a newspaper interview that the war waged by Japan should not be 
viewed as a war of aggression, since it was essentially designed to free Asian 
colonies of Western control. Tellingly, Nagano also contended that the Nanjing 
massacre was a “fabrication” and that the comfort women were simply “military 
prostitutes.”³⁷ Although a public outcry across Asia led to Nagano’s resigna-
tion two days later, his statement expressed sentiments that were still held by a 
large number of Japanese and were an indication of the way in which the Japan’s 
leaders had largely refused to come to terms with their country’s recent past.³⁸
Japan—again, unlike Germany—has never passed legislation either to 
remove immunity for war crimes or to ban the denial of its own or other coun-
34 Ben Hills, “Why Japan Must Face Its Past,” The Age, 4 October 1994, cited in Gavan 
McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence (Armonk, 1996), 230.
35 In this context, mention should be made of Japanese historian Ienaga Saburo, who waged 
a long struggle against the Japanese Ministry of Education. See Irie Yoshimasa, “The History of 
the Textbook Controversy,” Japan Echo 24, no. 3 (1997): 34–38.
36 McCormack, The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence, 226–27.
37 See “Nagano Retracts Remark about Nanjing ‘Hoax,’” Daily Yomiuri, 7 May 1994, 1; 
Takahama Tatou, “Time to drop Tatemae and Speak the Truth,” Daily Yomiuri, 23 August 1994, 
6.
38 A second minister to resign in similar circumstances was Sakurai Shin, the director-general 
of the Environmental Agency, who declared that Japan had freed most of Asia from European 
colonialism. See “Sakurai Resigns over War Remark,” Daily Yomiuri, 16 August 1994, 1; 
“Cabinet Members’ Statements,” Aera, 12 September 1994, 36–38.
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tries’ war crimes. In addition, it resisted offering across-the-board compensation 
to the comfort women, ex-POWs, or others victimized by Japanese war crimes. 
In this moral, political, and intellectual climate, it is not difficult to understand 
the interest in Holocaust denial. For if the Holocaust can be relativized or even 
denied, why not do the same for the Nanjing massacre—or, for that matter, any 
other Japanese imperialistic activities from the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894 
until its surrender to Allied forces in 1945?
Conclusions
The Marco Polo affair can be seen as a link in a long chain of anti-Jewish publi-
cations that appeared in Japan in the 1990s. Earlier, as noted, Uno Masami had 
explicitly denied the Holocaust in books published by the magazine’s publisher, 
Bungei Shunju. The article appearing in Marco Polo, however, was the most 
salient case of Japanese antisemitism in the postwar era. Moreover, its publi-
cation marked the first occasion on which Jews not only effectively retaliated 
against a specific piece of propaganda but succeeded as well in drawing attention 
to the broader issue of Holocaust denial and Japanese antisemitism. Indeed, the 
Marco Polo affair was a turning point in the long struggle over the Jews’ image in 
Japan. In its wake, the Jews merited massive positive exposure, while a warning 
was issued to producers of antisemitic material that their activities were being 
monitored and would no longer be tolerated.
Massive exposure, it is true, had negative effects as well. A few months later, 
another Holocaust denial scandal surfaced, which demonstrated that Japanese 
insensitivity (perhaps motivated as well by a desire for free publicity) had by no 
means vanished from the scene. Kimura Aiji, the almost unknown author of a 
Holocaust denial book, sued for libel two critics who had written an article attack-
ing the book in the weekly Shukan Kinyôbi. In typical Japanese fashion, the judge 
assigned to the case appeared to be slow and indecisive. Yet the final verdict, 
delivered on February 16, 1999, was unequivocal: in dismissing the charges, the 
judge ruled that, contrary to Kimura’s claim, Nazi Germany, “as acknowledged 
by the international Nuremberg trial, murdered in its concentration camps great 
numbers of Jews by poison gas.”³⁹
Both the Jewish reaction to the Marco Polo affair and the subsequent Jap-
anese response provide some insights concerning future campaigns against 
39 For further details, see Kowner, “Rise and Fall of Holocaust Denial in Japan.”
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Holocaust denial and the broader phenomenon of “intellectual” antisemitism in 
countries, such as Japan, that have limited acquaintance with Jews. Obviously, 
any engagement against antisemitism requires an organization that surveys the 
media and warns of any expression of antisemitism. In this regard, the strategy 
of “riding out the storm,” of not responding to antisemitic provocation, seems to 
be counterproductive. Similarly, appealing to editors’ or publishers’ goodwill in 
combating antisemitism or Holocaust denial appears to be ineffective, since the 
initial motive for publication is often the desire to spark a well-publicized scandal 
that will lead to increased sales.
Japanese antisemitism appears to this author to be less connected with Jews 
or Israel than it is a function of internal factors within Japanese society—includ-
ing the desire of various segments of the Japanese leadership, to deny or sani-
tize elements of Japan’s own wartime past. Nevertheless, among various options, 
perhaps the most efficient way to combat antisemitism in Japan is to launch a 
coordinated counterattack that combines the awakening of the  Japanese and 
foreign media, criticism voiced by well-known foreign personalities, politi-
cal intervention, and even economic sanctions. When all of these energies are 
brought to bear, as happened in the Marco Polo affair, we may witness the con-
tinuation of a gradual change of Japanese attitudes toward Jews. Jewish concerns 
may come to be treated with greater awareness and sensitivity instead of being 
demonized.
Mark Weitzman
Globalization, Conspiracy Theory,  
and the Shoah¹
Ever since the beginnings of right-wing extremism, antisemitism has been one 
of the dominant ideological foundations that has permeated every aspect of 
the movement and its thought. George L. Mosse once pointed out: “Just as the 
right and its nationalism transformed its own myths into concrete symbols, so 
the enemy was not left abstract; he was embodied in Jews and parliamentari-
ans.”² While for most educated strata, antisemitism became unacceptable after 
the Second World War and the revelations of the Holocaust, recent events have 
shown that antisemitism, often disguised as anti-Zionism or criticism of Israel 
has now begun to appear at all levels of society. It is the Jewish State which now 
embodies “the enemy” of humanity. For current right-wing extremists, antisem-
itism has taken on even greater importance since the birth of the State of Israel 
brought Jews into the public sphere of the Western World as equal actors. This 
gave antisemites a new focus. Now Jews are not only pulling strings behind the 
scenes, but they are playing starring roles on the world stage. A further layer of 
hate based on this switch has been added to ancient stereotypes. After centuries 
of secret manipulation, the Jew has come out of the closet, as it were, and has 
begun to influence, or even control, the world. Thus, the hatred of the antisemite 
for the Jew has perhaps even more of a force than before. This was anticipated in 
the last political testament of Adolf Hitler, when he wrote:
Centuries will pass away but…the hatred against those finally responsible…international 
Jewry and its helpers will grow.... I have also made it quite plain that, if the nations of 
Europe are again to be regarded as mere shares to be bought and sold by these international 
conspirators in money and finance, then that race, Jewry, which is the real criminal of this 
murderous struggle, will be saddled with the responsibility.³
1 This is a much revised and expanded version of the article “Antisemitismus und Holocaust-
Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechts-extremismus,” that originally appeared 
in Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremische Rechte in der Ara der Globaisierung, 
edited by Thomas Greven and Thomas Grumke (Wiesbaden, 2006). I am grateful for their 
permission to use it here and to Robert S. Wistrich for his editorial work on the text.
2 George L. Mosse, “Community in Nationalism, Fascism and the Radical Right,” in idem, 
Confronting the Nation (Hanover, 1993), 44–45.
3 http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/documents/poltest.htm
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Antisemitism, always a constant on the radical Right, was commanded by one 
of its most iconic figures to avenge itself against the perceived “Jewish victory” 
at the end of the Second World War. In this effort, the far Right continued to 
embrace the older, traditional forms of antisemitism, while looking for new paths 
and methods to reach a wider audience and overcome the stigma associated with 
mass murder. This is a pattern Robert Chazan described a few years ago when he 
wrote: “every new stage in the evolution of anti-Jewish thinking is marked by a 
dialectical interplay between a prior legacy of negative stereotypes and the reali-
ties of a new social context.”⁴
This is the case with right-wing extremism, which appears in a variety of 
forms, but invariably relies on traditional antisemitism as both the common 
thread and underlying explanation of all world problems. These varieties can 
include traditional neo-Nazi groups, skinheads, Holocaust denial groups, or reli-
gious extremists.
Neo-Nazism, a term which encompasses a variety of meanings, continues 
to be an international presence. In the United States, there is currently a period 
of flux within the movement, as long-time leaders like Dr. William Pierce of the 
National Alliance and Richard Butler of the Aryan Nation have died, and some 
of their possible successors like Matt Hale of the World Church of the Creator 
have been sentenced to long prison terms. This has left a vacuum that figures like 
David Duke are attempting to fill. Duke, whose group EURO (European-American 
Unity and Rights Organization) is one of the many that claim an international 
presence, has devoted much energy to positioning himself to fill the movement’s 
leadership gap. This included spending time in Russia and the Ukraine, where he 
established himself sufficiently to be listed as a faculty member at a Ukrainian 
university.⁵
Duke also managed to bring together a number of prominent U.S. neo-Nazis, 
who met under his auspices in New Orleans in May, 2004. There they signed a 
document called the New Orleans Protocol, promising cooperation amongst the 
leadership and various factions of the movement. Along with the pledges came 
an aggressive and extensive assertion of antisemitism, which led one observer to 
write that
During the meeting, Duke singled out Jews as the source of the world’s problems.... Most 
of conference participants’ ire was directed at what they consider to be a worldwide Jewish 
conspiracy to destroy the white race through immigration and miscegenation.⁶
4 Robert Chazan, Medieval Stereotypes and Modern Antisemitism (Berkeley, 1997), 135.
5 http://www.whitecivilrights.com/flyers/Dr55.pdf
6 http://www.splcenter.org/center/splcreport/article.jsp?aid=83
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The fear of miscegenation, or “race mixing,” has long been part of European 
Nazi and American racist groups. However, the New Orleans Protocol particu-
larly emphasized the Jewish role in deliberately encouraging miscegenation to 
weaken the white race. In other words, miscegenation was viewed not only as 
bad in itself, but as a weapon of the international Jewish conspiracy. According to 
Duke, this conspiracy is based on the underlying premise of Judaism, evidenced 
by the fact that, in Duke’s opinion “organized Jewry has pursued a successful 
agenda that has amassed incredible power in modern times.”⁷ This explanation 
serves to explain Duke’s world-view and his motivation. In his own words, he is 
compelled to “address what Henry Ford called the ‘world’s foremost problem, 
a problem now critical to our people’s survival and freedom.’”⁸ Duke explains 
that his “awakening” refers to the discovery he made as a young man, of “the 
shared roots of both Communism and Zionism.”⁹ Having made this discovery, he 
went on to investigate Judaism more thoroughly, and came to the discovery that 
what he calls “Jewish Supremacism” is at the root of all the major problems that 
we now face.¹⁰ Thus, for example, 9/11 was caused by Israeli actions (“Israel and 
its control over American foreign policy was the primary reason for this terror-
ism against America”).¹¹ Globalization is also a Jewish scheme that needs to be 
opposed:
For the last few decades of my life I have earnestly tried to inform people that those who 
are the true forces behind globalism are in actuality, racial supremacists. But, they are not 
the so-called racial supremacists the media talks about. They are not European, African or 
Asian supremacists, they are Jewish supremacists.¹²
And, of course, no mention of the Jewish conspiracy to control the world would 
be complete without a reference to the classic text of antisemitic propaganda, the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion. While the Protocols remain a staple of antisemitic 
conspiracy theorists, it is certainly no surprise to find that Duke has given them a 
new, updated look.¹³ His book, My Awakening, which alleges a Jewish plot to take 
7 David Duke, “Preface,” Jewish Supremacism at http://www.davidduke.com/ index.
php?p=129
8 David Duke, My Awakening, Chapter 15, at http://www.davidduke.com
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 David Duke, One Year Later: The Real Causes of the 911 Attack, at http://www.davidduke.com
12 David Duke, The Lies of Globalism, at http://www.davidduke.com
13 On the history and present uses of the Protocols, along with a critical analysis and 
refutation of its text, see Steven L. Jacobs and Mark Weitzman, Dismantling the Big Lie: The 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion (New York, 2003); Andrian Kreye, “Die Falschung,” Suddeutsche 
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over the world, is described by one sympathetic critic as “eclipsing” the Protocols 
themselves.¹⁴
Duke has also embraced other themes that can help him to popularize the move-
ment, and shore up his leadership claims. For example, he has joined those who 
use ecological concerns to broaden the reach of the movement. For these theo-
rists, there is no contradiction between ecology and neo-Nazism. In fact, ecolog-
ical concerns are a direct outgrowth of their National Socialist philosophies. In 
Duke’s writings we find this spelled out directly:
I do, though, have an abiding love for our White race and the civilization and values that it 
created. I want my children and all my descendants to live in a free and healthy society, not 
a Third World hovel. I want to preserve the unique character and beauty of my people the 
same way that, as an ecology-minded individual, I desire the preservation of the Blue Whale 
or the great African Elephant.”¹⁵
For Duke, it is the Jews who are the enemies of ecology. Motivated by greed, they 
will do anything, including exploiting nature, to turn a profit. Duke asks “do we 
really want the Third world to be made into economic colonies for the New World 
Order and the new globalism? What will this do to them, to their own cultures, 
to the well being of the world’s ecology?” And all this to benefit “the true forces 
behind globalism (who) are in actuality, racial supremacists.”¹⁶
I have used Duke’s writings to sketch out some of the newer themes that 
have become part of the current far-right discourse. These motifs, such as the 
emergence of anti-globalization or ecology were often seen as part of the left 
or liberal agenda. They have been reworked to fit into right wing extremist dis-
course, retooled by giving them an antisemitic cast. But these adaptations are 
by no means limited to ideologues like David Duke.¹⁷ The basic idea was already 
Zeitung, 25-26 May 2005, presents a recent German perspective on the current status of the 
Protocols at the 100th anniversary of their appearance.
14 The citation is taken from a review entitled “Jewish Supremacism: A Powerful Expose of 
International Zionism” attributed to Edgar Johnston, Ph.D., found online at various sites, 
including http://www.adelaideinstitute.org/USA/019.htm  This is the website of the Adelaide 
Institute, Australia’s most notorious Holocaust denial group. Johnston attributed this statement 
to “prominent Jewish leaders in Russia,” whom he did not identify.
15 David Duke, “America is at the  crossroads,” 23 Oct. 2004, http:// www.davidduke.com/
index.php?p=22
16 David Duke, “The Lies of Globalism,” 23 Oct. 2004, http:// www.davidduke.com/index.
php?p=11
17 See now the recent Southern Poverty Law Center article, “Syria/Iran: Duke, Other Anti-
Semites, Propagandize in Middle East,” Intelligence Report (Spring 2006), http://www.
splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=620
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expressed earlier by deeper and more original neo-Nazi thinkers, such as the late 
William Pierce in the United States, or Horst Mahler in Germany. Pierce had actu-
ally articulated such a view as far back as 1976, when he said that
There are, in fact, several issues on which we are closer to what would ordinarily be consid-
ered the left-wing or liberal position than we are to the conservative or right-wing position. 
One of these issues is the ecology issue: the protection of our natural environment, the 
elimination of pollution, and the protection of wildlife. And there are also other issues in 
which we are closer to the liberals than to the conservatives, although I doubt that we agree 
with them completely on any issue; just as we seldom, if ever, agree completely with the 
right-wing on any issue.¹⁸
Thus, nearly three decades before Duke proposed a similar perspective, we can 
find a clear statement of this theme. And, of course, we find the same diabolical 
causality which invokes “the Jewish assault on all our values and institutions.”¹⁹ 
Later in life Pierce was also using anti-globalization as a theme. In a broadcast 
of 5 September 1998, Pierce began by saying that “Every few months for the past 
several years I have used this program to warn against the policy of economic glo-
balization.” Only a few months later Pierce explicitly charged Jews with being the 
prime movers of globalization, when he wrote that “the process of globalization 
(is) being promoted by the Jews and their allies, whether international capital-
ists or deranged liberals.”²⁰ The neo-Nazi extremist, Horst Mahler, also began his 
career on the far left as a lawyer connected with the Red Army Faction, more pop-
ularly known as the Baader-Meinhof Group in West Germany. Trained as a lawyer, 
Mahler defended Andreas Baader in the early 1970s, and then was jailed for par-
ticipating in a violent shootout that freed him for a while. While in prison, Mahler 
had an epiphany and turned to the right, eventually ending up in the 1990s with 
the neo-Nazi NPD. Mahler left that party to join Deutsches Kolleg, which consid-
ers itself as the theoretical arm of those who hope to reconstitute a Fourth Reich. 
Mahler’s thought contains a typically fascistic mix of left and right. For example, 
like both Pierce and Duke he is virulently against globalization. Mahler viewed 
the September 11 attacks as the first shot in a war against globalization.²¹
Writing ten days after the events of 9/11, Mahler said that
18 William Pierce, “Our Cause,” http://www.nationalvanguard.org/ story.php?id=3482
19 Ibid.
20 William Pierce, “Nationalism vs. the New World Order,” in Free Speech (May 1998); http://
www.natvan.com/free-speech/fs985c.html
21 Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2003).
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Globalism, already powerfully damaged by the runaway world economic crisis, will sink 
down upon itself, like the towers of Manhattan, under a thousand dagger strikes from 
Islamic fundamentalists. This collapse will finally also be the signal to the [various] peoples 
in the metropolises to revolt.²²
According to Mahler, 9/11 meant that “Now—for the first time—a military beating 
has been inflicted on American ground, upon the war of extermination of the 
Globalists against national cultures.”²³ Even before 9/11, Mahler made it clear that 
he saw Jews as being inextricably linked to globalization. In an article dated from 
March 2001, he wrote
We have to find this prospect unpleasant, especially since this power hides itself behind the 
smoke-screen of fine-sounding words like “enlightenment,” “tolerance,” “emancipation,” 
“Modernism,” “human rights,” “free trade,” and “Globalism,” and attacks and destroys 
nations and peoples from its place of concealment.
Mahler later made it clear that the power referred to was “the Jews” by writing 
that in “the present World situation, Globalism, [should be linked to] the objec-
tive existence of the Jewish Question.”²⁴
In an interview posted on the Internet, Mahler further claimed that “there is 
no American war against terrorism, (but instead) we are witnessing a worldwide 
campaign of terror, a proxy war conducted by the USA on behalf of the Jews.” He 
explained that:
What is generally meant by “Democracy” is actually Jewish rule, which Jewish plutocrats 
exercise through their control of global finance, the monetary system and the media.... I do 
know that the nations are going to liberate themselves from the Jewish yoke.”
He even resorted to traditional Christian antisemitism by quoting John 8:44—“For 
ye have the devil as father, and ye wish to carry out your father’s desire.”²⁵
A recent analysis of Mahler’s ideology concluded:
22 http://www.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/mahler/partfour.html
23 Mahler, “Independence day—2001,” 12 Sept. 2001, http:// www.alphalink.com.
au/~radnat/mahler/partthree.html
24 Mahler, “Final Solution of the Jewish Question: Discovery of God instead of Jewish 
Hatred,” http://www.alphalink.com.au/~radnat/mahler/parttwo.html   A valuable summary of 
antisemitism in the anti-globalization movement is in Mark Strauss, “Antiglobalism’s Jewish 
Problem,” in Foreign Policy (Nov./Dec. 2003); reprinted in Ron Rosenbaum, Those Who Forget 
the Past: The Question of Anti-Semitism (New York, 2004), 271–85. See also Robert S. Wistrich, 
A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihadi (New York, 2010).
25 http://www.stormfront.org/forum/showthread.php?p=1781479#post1781479
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Mahler condemned the U.S. as being responsible for this world order because of its “limit-
less craving for enrichment and power,” which showed no consideration for the fundamen-
tals of life of nations and destroyed economies and cultures. His anti-Americanism became 
intertwined with antisemitism when he targeted the American East Coast as “that web of 
power, money and the military.” Mahler equated “imperialists” with “globalists,” claiming 
that they governed the US which then bled other nations dry. The financial power of the 
American East Coast was connected, Mahler said, to the so-called cult of Jahwe, which he 
defined as “the cult of world power of the chosen people.” Thus, the linkage was complete: 
solidarity with the Islamist attacks on the US, the struggle against imperialistic US power, 
or more precisely against Jewish financial control of the East Coast, and the fight against 
“globalization” and the Jews.²⁶
These new forms of antisemitism, particularly as expressed in anti-American 
feeling, have taken a significant turn in the attempt by right-wing extremists to 
reach out to the Islamic world. Radical Islam is viewed as the only force capable 
of challenging the United States and the Western concepts of liberal democracy, 
racial or religious equality. The principle of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” 
applies, as does the vicious antisemitism espoused by Horst Mahler ever since 
his espousal of a völkisch-racist worldview. As with the German National Social-
ists before the Holocaust, Mahler equates democracy with the rule of Jews who 
control the international financial system from which the “peoples” are seeking 
their national liberation.
Indeed this “liberation” has currently taken the shape of the Islamist war on 
the West. Again, in Mahler’s words:
[T]he “September Lie,” the gruesome fairy tale about Osama bin Laden’s unprovoked attack 
on the USA, is now being challenged worldwide.... From the unmistakable victory of Wash-
ington’s opponent has emerged the worldwide realization that the Jewish media monopoly 
represents a mortal danger for all mankind.”²⁷
Mahler makes clear that the common enemy of Islamists and right-wing extrem-
ists is Israel and also the United States (along with the West), which is its tool. 
This new alliance may still be utopian for most right-wing extremists, but nev-
ertheless such attempts have been initiated, based to a large extent on mutually 
shared antisemitism. For example, David Duke, in a recent commentary posted 




the Jewish supremacist globalists seek to destroy the identity and heritage of all peoples 
while erecting a supra-national state of Jewish supremacy not only over the people of Pal-
estine but over the entire planet.²⁸
Duke has in recent years carried his message to places like Iran and Bahrain, 
where in 2002 he delivered lectures claiming that Israel was behind the 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks in New York, and that the attacks were planned as a pretext to push 
the U.S. government into war with the Arab world. Duke’s message was picked up 
by various Arab media sources, which helped it reach a wider audience includ-
ing the Saudi Arabian Arab News, which featured a report about Duke’s talks in 
May 2002. The website Tanzeem e-islami eagerly reproduced Duke’s analysis of 
9/11, entitled “The Real Evil Spirit,” which blamed “the Jewish Lobby and media 
power…for alienat[ing] the entire Arab world” and provoking the 9/11 attacks.²⁹
Another right-wing extremist who developed similar links is the Swiss-born 
financier Achmed Huber (originally Albert Friedrich Armand Huber). Huber 
differs from Duke in that he formally converted to Islam in 1962 in Egypt, after 
studying Islam in Europe with the extremist Muslim Brotherhood. Huber’s neo-
Nazi links began very early. In a 1965 interview he spoke of the influence of the 
Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini on his outlook. Husseini collab-
orated with the Nazis, met with Hitler, recruited and even organized a SS divi-
sion of Bosnian Muslim volunteers. Huber at this time also spoke positively of 
another Nazi, Johann von Leers, who had converted to Islam, taking the name of 
Omar Amin. Von Leers was a fanatical antisemite in the Third Reich who became 
a leading figure in Gamel Abdel Nasser’s propaganda machine.³⁰ Huber was also 
associated with another shadowy figure, the Swiss lawyer François Genoud who 
consistently tried to bridge the Nazi-Islamist spectrum. Before his suicide in 1996, 
Genoud worked with the terrorist Palestinian Radical Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine. At the same time, he held the legal rights to the writings of Hitler, Martin 
Bormann, and Goebbels. He was also behind the legal defense of the notorious 
Nazi war criminal, Klaus Barbie.³¹ More recently, Huber allied with Horst Mahler 
and spoke at NPD conventions in 2000 and 2001. At the same time, his active par-
28 David Duke, “Syria’s Assad speaks of Jewish media attack on identity of people,” 8 June 
2005 at http://www.davidduke.com/index.php?p=302
29 http://www.tanzeem.org/resources/articles/articles/david duke-the real evil spirit.htm
30 On von Leers see Robert Wistrich, Who’s Who in Nazi Germany (London, 1982); Gregory Paul 
Wegner, Anti-Semitism and Schooling Under the Third Reich (New York, 2002) examines the 
impact of von Leers’ propaganda on the German educational system during the Nazi era.
31 On Genoud, see David Lee Preston, “Hitler’s Swiss Connection,” Philadelphia Inquirer, 5 
Jan. 1997.
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ticipation in Islamist activity included being one of the five members of the man-
aging committee of Al Taqwa (Fear of God) Management, a Swiss-based financial 
institution believed by the United States and European governments to be sup-
porting bin Laden by laundering money and providing other forms of assistance. 
In November 2001, Huber was listed by the U.S. government as number 56 among 
62 organizations and individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities, 
and is not permitted to enter the United States.³² More recently, the NPD journal 
Deutsche Stimme published an interview with the head of the local Muslim com-
munity in its May 2006 edition. The interview presented an explanation of Islam, 
rather than an inflammatory attack on Jews or the United States, but it showed 
that the German extreme Right was ready to give a sympathetic hearing to Islam.³³
The career of David Myatt represents yet another version of this extreme 
right-wing and Islamist axis. Myatt was a longtime member of notorious British 
neo-Nazi groups. Indeed he was even described by an English newspaper as the 
“ideological heavyweight” of Combat 18, closely identified with National Social-
ism.³⁴ His 1997 pamphlet, A Practical Guide to Aryan Revolution was said to have 
inspired David Copeland, convicted for a series of bombings in London in 1999. 
A year earlier, Myatt had converted to Islam, but still continued to write neo-Nazi 
material that can be found on websites such as the Aryan Nation and White Rev-
olution. Myatt, who took the Moslem name of Abdul-Aziz Ibn Myatt, continued to 
be a prolific writer after his conversion. As one website devoted to his work puts 
it “Many of these articles praise and defend Osama bin Laden, and praise and 
justify suicide attacks (or “martyrdom operations” as he and others call them) in 
Palestine, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Myatt—using his Muslim persona—also 
defended the September 11 attacks and the bombings in Bali. Indeed, “Abdul 
Aziz” Myatt wrote one of the most detailed defenses in the English language of 
martyrdom operations, entitled Are Martyrdom Operations Lawful According to 
Quran and Sunnah?³⁵ Myatt has also made a point of trying to amplify the connec-
tion between Islam and National Socialism. For example, a posting in his name 
to the neo-Nazi Aryan Nation website contains “The National-Socialist Guide to 
Understanding Islam” which is introduced as an attempt to find a “genuine and 
32 http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/november01/moneylist_11-7.html
33 http://www.deutsche-stimme.de/Ausgaben2006/Sites/05-06-Gespraech.html  My thanks 
to Thomas Grumke for this reference.
34 The Observer, 9 Feb. 2003, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/ review/story 
/0,6903,891761,00.html
35 J. R. Wright, “David Myatt Biographical Information: The Life and Times of David Myatt,” 
http://www.geocities.com/davidmyatt/biog.html   According to Wright, this article was even 
used by Hamas as a justification of some of its own terrorist activities.
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worthwhile co-operation between Muslims and people, such as National-Social-
ists, who accept a non-Muslim way of life and who are also fighting the dishon-
our which is Zionism.”³⁶ Elsewhere, Myatt speaks openly of the proposed alliance 
between radical Islamists and neo-Nazis. His article “Why Islam is our Ally” ends 
with the following conclusion:
But many, many Muslims, and some National-Socialists, have seen through the lies, the 
propaganda of the Zionists—for we know what is going on, in this world, and why. Muslims 
have and are gathering together to try and do something practical about it by taking up 
arms. Surely, now it is the turn of National-Socialists, who can and who should join with or 
aid those warriors of Islam who are fighting, in a practical way, the Zionists, who are fight-
ing the lackeys of the Zionists, and who are fighting those governments who are doing the 
dirty work for their Zionist masters.³⁷
While questions have been raised about the sincerity of Myatt’s conversion, or 
whether he still is a Muslim, there can be no question that the underlying link for 
Myatt, as for others, was the hatred of Jews shared by both the extreme right wing/
neo-Nazi movement and radical Islam. Myatt also uses “Nature” to justify Nazi 
ideology in Darwinian terms, writing that “In essence, Aryan National-Socialism 
is a working in harmony with Nature to produce further evolutionary change.”³⁸
Over the past few years, Myatt’s influence in the movement has steadily 
grown. Originally limited essentially to a British audience, he has received wider 
exposure in recent times through his conversion, after which he traveled and 
spoke in some Arab countries. In the West, his writings, once considered too eso-
teric and intellectual, can be found on popular neo-Nazi websites such as Storm-
front, Aryan Nation, White Revolution, and others. His views also reflect the 
movement’s growing interest in creating a link with radical Islam, based on the 
common ideology of antisemitism. For example, the Aryan Nation, a group that 
achieved a certain echo in the United States in the 1980s has since fallen on hard 
times—having lost their compound and suffered the death of their leader, Richard 
Butler. They now feature on the front page of their website greetings in Arabic, 
along with the following quotes—among others from Obergruppenführer Gottlob 
Berger in 1942: “...a link is created between Islam and National-Socialism on an 
open, honest basis. It will be directed in terms of blood and race from the North, 
and in the ideological-spiritual sphere from the East.” Another quote comes from 
36 http://www.agentofchaos.invisionzone.com/lofiversion/index.php/t696.html
37 David Myatt, Why Islam is our Ally, http://nexion3.tripod.com/islam_ally.html
38 David Myatt, “The Philosophical Foundations of Aryan Religion,” http://www.stormfront.
org/archive/t-98628The_Philosophical_Foundations_of_ Aryan_Religion.html
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Palestinian Arab leader Haj Amin al-Husseini, speaking on Berlin radio in 1944: 
“Arabs! Rise as one and fight for your sacred rights. Kill the Jews wherever you 
find them. This pleases God, history, and religion. This saves your honor.”
This recent emphasis on rebuilding a Nazi-Islamic alliance is still perceived 
as new and questionable by some of the more traditional members of the Aryan 
Nation.³⁹ On the other hand, those in favor of this link can invoke the respect 
and attention that Adolf Hitler and other Nazis expressed for Islam. Clearly, in a 
fractured movement, the current Aryan Nations sees potential benefits in being 
identified with Islamist extremists. This contrasts vividly with William Pierce’s 
insistence after 9/11 on dissociating himself from those white supremacists who 
admire the “testicular fortitude” of the Muslim hijackers.⁴⁰
There is anonther area where Arabs and the neo-Nazis have found common 
ground, namely in Holocaust denial (known as the Auschwitz Lie in Germany). 
This has encouraged the integration of Arab antisemitism and anti-Zionism 
into the white supremacist program. The annual conferences of the Institute for 
Historical Review, the center of the Holocaust denial movement in the United 
States, included over the years speakers and topics that reflect an Arab perspec-
tive. The 2002 conference program featured “Arab scholar Said Arikat (who) will 
shed new light on the background to the dramatically unfolding events in the 
Middle East.”⁴¹ David Irving’s conferences have also featured speakers on current 
Middle Eastern topics from the “Arab” standpoint.⁴² The website of Ahmed Rami, 
Radio Islam, is especially notorious for the intermixing of classical antisemitism, 
Holocaust denial, and strident anti-Zionism in a Muslim perspective. Rami, a 
veteran agitator who fled Morocco and served a prison sentence for hate speech 
in Sweden, has an Arabic section on his website and has been featured on Al-Ja-
zeera, the Arab news network.⁴³
39 http://www.aryan-nations.org/   Another dissenting voice is that of veteran Alaskan neo-
Nazi David Pringle, who has spoken out against David Duke’s Middle Eastern outreach. Pringle 
was quoted as claiming that Duke ran the risk of becoming known as another “Hanoi Jane,” 
referring to the controversial visit of Jane Fonda to Hanoi during the Vietnam War; http://www.
splcenter.org/intel/intelreport/ article.jsp?aid=620
40 See the report from the Southern Poverty Law Center, where it is reported that “leader 
William Pierce recently upbraided Roper for a private comment he made—wishing that his 
members had ‘half as much testicular fortitude’ as the Sept. 11 hijackers.... Pierce called 






The first real attempt to bring together prominent leaders of Holocaust denial, 
neo-Nazism, and Arab anti-Zionism was a non-event, although one whose pro-
posed agenda was noteworthy. A conference scheduled for the spring of 2001 
was organized by Jürgen Graf who fled Switzerland to avoid a prison sentence 
for hate speech and had ended up in Iran. There he found a welcoming atmo-
sphere and support, as the Iranians officially embraced Holocaust denial.⁴⁴ The 
proposed conference featured a roster of international neo-Nazis and Holocaust 
deniers including William Pierce, Horst Mahler, Roger Garaudy, and Robert Fau-
risson along with Arab Holocaust deniers and “representatives of Hezbollah and 
other radical Muslim groups.”⁴⁵ After a great deal of international condemnation, 
the conference was finally cancelled by the Lebanese government, although a 
watered down version was held later in Jordan without most of the major figures 
who had been scheduled to appear in Beirut.⁴⁶ However, Iran has persisted in 
strenuous efforts to become an international center for Holocaust denial. In 
December 2005, Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad touched off an inter-
national outcry when he labeled the Holocaust “a myth.”⁴⁷ Ahmadinejad was not 
finished, however, and called for an international conference on the topic to be 
held in January 2006. He even sent an individual invitation to British Prime Min-
ister Tony Blair who had severely criticized Ahmeadinejad’s earlier statement.⁴⁸ 
The conference did eventually take place, but on a much lower level, involving 
the roster of familiar names from Western Holocaust denial circles along with the 
Iranian participants.⁴⁹
44 According to the Institute of Historical Review’s own website “Iran’s official radio voice 
to the world, IRIB, has in recent years expressed support for Holocaust revisionism by 
broadcasting sympathetic interviews with leading negationist scholars and activists. Several 
interviews with IHR Director Mark Weber have been aired on the English-language service, and 
similar interviews have been broadcast with Ernst Zündel in German and with Ahmed Rami in 
Arabic. IRIB short-wave radio reaches millions in the Middle East, Europe and Asia.” http://
www.ihr.org/conference/ beirutconf/background.html
45 Peter Finn, “Unlikely Allies Bound by a Common Hatred: Neo-Nazis Find They Share Views of 




49 While veteran Holocaust deniers like Robert Faurisson and Horst Mahler were in touch 
with the Iranians before the conference (see “European Holocaust Deniers Involved in Iranian 
Holocaust Conference Plans,” 27 Feb. 2006, at http://www.tau.ac.il/Anti-Semitism/updates.
htm  ), Australians Frederick Toben and Richard Krege, both of the Adelaide Institute, were the 
Western focal points of the conference. Their report can be found at the Adelaide Institute’s 
website http://www.adelaideinstitute.org/Iran/conference1.htm
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A few years ago, Meir Litwak analyzed the Iranian case and its special atti-
tudes toward the Holocaust, and drew some valuable conclusions.⁵⁰ He points out 
that Iranian Holocaust denial “adopts the discourse and arguments of Western 
neo-Nazis and anti-Semites in order to grant it pseudo-scientific value.”⁵¹ He goes 
on to add that the validity of using these Western sources, despite Iran’s general 
estrangement from Western intellectual discourse, is justified by the “objectiv-
ity” of these sources on Israel and the Middle East. In other words, the fact that 
these Western sources are “anti-Zionist” or antisemitic is all that is needed to 
justify their use in Iranian Holocaust denial discourse, while dismissing all other 
evidence as merely propaganda. The fact that Western negationist sources are 
exploited is covered up and wrapped in a pseudo-scholarly veneer, in order to 
give it greater reach and authority. This also demonstrates the intensive effort 
made to appeal to an international audience. Iran’s goal of exporting Holocaust 
denial can be seen not only from the conferences that it has supported, but is 
also evident from the fact that a great deal of its Holocaust denial propaganda 
has been found in the state-owned English media. But Iran has even gone further 
in becoming a center of Holocaust denial. As witnessed by the words of Presi-
dent Ahmadinejad,  the campaign has moved Holocaust denial from the murky 
fringes of extremism where it generally exists in the West to the center of state 
policy. Over the last decade and a half, through various state political and media 
venues, the regime in Tehran has hosted or encouraged a whole roster of Western 
Holocaust deniers, including some who have found refuge in Iran after being con-
victed of hate speech violations in the West.⁵² Moreover, not only is Holocaust 
denial at the heart of Iranian power, it is unchallenged—even if on one occasion 
a leader of Iran’s tiny Jewish community did react to President Ahmadinejad’s 
notorious statements.⁵³ Where Holocaust denial in the West can be met with every 
form of opposition, from academic to political and legal, in Iran it is the only 
50 Meir Litwak, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust: Anti-Semitism and Anti-
Zionism,” Journal of Israeli History 25, no. 1 (Mar. 2006): 267–84.
51 Ibid., 280.
52 The list of visitors, according to Litwak, “Islamic Republic,” 277–80, includes Roger 
Garaudy who, after his 1998 conviction in France met with President Khatami, Supreme Leader 
Khamene’i, and Ahmed Rami, who had a special session of the Parliament held in his honor in 
1990; Jürgen Graf and Wolfgang Frohlich were two European deniers who found asylum in Iran; 
and, as noted above, Iranian state radio interviewed Mark Weber (in English), Ernst Zündel (in 
German), and Ahmed Rami (in Arabic).




perspective offered by the State and its subservient media. The Iranian deniers 
seek to demolish the Holocaust as a means of undermining Western support for 
Israel—claiming that both the West and the Islamic world are victims of a massive 
Jewish plot reminiscent of the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion.⁵⁴ Litwak 
wonders whether as younger Iranians grow restless about the government’s offi-
cial message, they might not grow out of Holocaust denial as one of the themes 
discredited by bankrupt conspiracy theories.⁵⁵
The Holocaust denial movement is another example of how globalization has 
affected extremism. While the movement has always attempted to see itself as 
international in scope, both technology and politics have recently taken it further 
in that direction. Not by chance, Holocaust denial has been centered in California 
for almost three decades, in particular at the Institute for Historical Review, cur-
rently located in Newport Beach, California.⁵⁶ The Institute, originally founded 
under the influence of Willlis Carto, a major force in American far Right extrem-
ism for decades, has in recent years been operating on its own, after Carto was 
ousted in a power struggle in 1994. The struggle for control of the IHR centered on 
a number of issues, but prominent amongst them was that Carto wanted to take 
the Institute’s agenda into a more “racialist” direction, in other words, to expand 
into a wider range of topics. On the other hand, the IHR’s staff, including Direc-
tor Mark Weber, wanted to keep the focus on Holocaust denial.⁵⁷ Without Carto’s 
financial support, the IHR was dependent on direct mail approaches for sales and 
54 For recent Iranian use of the Protocols, see Litwak, “Islamic Republic ,” 272.
55 Ibid., 280–81.
56 See Deborah Lipstadt, Denying the Holocaust (New York, 1993), 50–51; also Pierre Vidal-
Naquet’s Assassins of Memory (New York, 1993)—an intriguing look at some of the discourse 
and cultural assertions, along with the implications of Holocaust denial, particularly in France. 
More recently, see Michael Shermer and Alex Grobman, Denying History: Who Says The 
Holocaust Never Happened and Why Do They Say It (Berkeley, 2000). There is also a substantial 
literature that has grown out of the David Irving trial, such as D. D. Guttenplan, The Holocaust 
on Trial (New York, 2001). Expert witnesses have published works reflecting their testimony, 
including Richard Evans, Lying About Hitler (New York, 2001) and Robert Jan van Pelt, The Case 
for Auschwitz: Evidence from the Irving Trial (Bloomington, Ind., 2002). Deborah Lipstadt’s 
account is found in History on Trial (New York, 2005), while David Irving’s version is found at his 
website, http://www.fpp.co.uk/
57 See, for example, the statement by Arthur Butz, a longtime Holocaust denier “During 
1992–1993 Willis Carto sought to transform the Journal of Historical Review into a journal with 
a racialist political mission and editorial content.” http://www.ihr.org/other/endorsements.
html   The page is a list of Holocaust denial luminaries who supported the ousting of Carto.
 Globalization, Conspiracy Theory, and the Shoah    209
fundraising.⁵⁸ Therefore, they had to tailor their approach to a perspective that 
would attract the support needed for survival; and according to the IHR leader-
ship, that theme was Holocaust denial, rather than race or politics.
Outside of being the source for a great deal of the denial writings that appear 
online, the California IHR website claimed 2½ million hits in September 2005 
alone.⁵⁹ The first comparison I made was in November 2005, which I compared to 
the IHR’s November 2004, page. In 2004, there were 18 stories featured and out of 
those 18, 16 dealt with the Holocaust, Jews, Nazis, or Israel. This was thoroughly 
consistent with their program, which in their own words was described as being 
centered on “the Holocaust issue.” They also assert that “their work calls into 
question aspects of the orthodox Holocaust extermination story, and highlights 
specific Holocaust exaggerations and falsehoods....”⁶⁰
However, by November 2005 the picture was different. Of the 23 stories then 
posted, only 14 had the themes of Holocaust and Jews. A recent look at the IHR 
website confirms this shift. Of the 14 stories featured, none referred to the Holo-
caust, almost all were concerned with current events, including the war on Hez-
bollah and the war in Iraq.⁶¹
The current negationist theme is clearly an attempt to build on anti-war 
feeling, both in the United States and abroad, and to use it to subtly attract and 
convince users of the argument of the site. For, if we look closely, what exactly 
is the message? As stated above, Jews distort reality and manipulate history 
for their own purposes. Thus, the distortions that are seen as connected to the 
way the conflicts in the Middle East are presented turn out to ultimately be just 
another example of Jewish conspiracy and manipulation. The title of one of the 
IHR articles, “The White House Cabal,” confirms this—with its echoes of a secret 
plot to seize control of the world. In a talk in New York entitled “The Challenge 
of Jewish-Zionist Power in an Era of Global Struggle” (16 July 2005), IHR director 
Mark Weber spelled out the new focus: “no task is more urgent than breaking the 
stranglehold of the Jewish-Zionist grip on American political, social and cultural 
life.”⁶² The Holocaust was mentioned several times, but was far less central than 
the propaganda concerning Israel and the United States in 2006. Similarly, in 




61 http://www.ihr.org/ visited on 3 Aug. 2006.
62 http://www.ihr.org/other/thechallenge.html
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Australia the focus among deniers like Frederick Toben was at least temporarily 
on the Iraq war.
This tactical shift underlined the need to get support (especially financial), as 
well as to widen the base and eventually penetrate as far as possible into main-
stream society. To do that it appears that significant elements of the movement 
have decided to embrace popular “hot-button” themes, such as anti-globaliza-
tion or anger over the war in Iraq, and to use them as their points of entry, in the 
hope that they will help move them away from the margins of Western society. 
However, in adopting these themes, they have not surrendered their beliefs. 
Instead, they have taken the topics and undergirded them with the tropes of 
antisemitism that have always been at the core of their belief structure. Thus, 
every issue eventually comes back to the Jews, their manipulations of history 
and society, and their malignant influence on the world. In essence, the theme 
of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion remains active, only the methodology has 
been upgraded to reflect the new age.⁶³ Along with controlling stock markets, 
Jews supposedly control multinational corporations and the banks that service 
them; instead of war aimed at controlling European powers, they now are behind 
Western (U.S.) invasions of the Middle East.
This type of material has been made much more accessible by the increased 
use of the Internet. Reaching about one billion people, the Internet has become 
the greatest propaganda tool in history, and extremists of all varieties have been 
quick to adapt to its use. There are currently about 5,500 extremist websites 
online, a jump from merely 1 in 1995.⁶⁴ This has led David Duke to write about 
the “White Revolution and the Internet.”⁶⁵ Online one can find Holocaust denial, 
Nazi, neo-Nazi, Ku Klux Klan, skinhead, Christian Identity, neo-pagan, and other 
types of antisemitism (and any other form of bigotry as well).⁶⁶ The effect of the 
Internet cannot therefore be underestimated. It has kept these ideas current by 
preserving every piece of antisemitism that has ever been posted, including arti-
cles that were long forgotten; by breaking down personal inhibitions and national 
boundaries; by creating the opportunity to target specific groups; by providing 
63 For a more detailed look at the Protocols and its themes, see Jacobs and Weitzman, 
Dismantling the Big Lie.
64 Digital Terrorism and Hate (Simon Wiesenthal Center, 2006).
65 For a more extensive look at antisemitism on the Internet, see Mark Weitzman, “The 
Internet is Our Sword: Aspects of Online Antisemitism,” in Remembering for the Future: The 
Holocaust in an Age of Genocide (London, 2001), 1; 911–25.
66 For a short overview of many of these different groups and ideologies, see Rick Eaton and 
Mark Weitzman, The New Lexicon of Hate: The Changing Tactics, Language and Symbols of 
America’s Extremists (Los Angeles, 2004).
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a source for revenue and communications; and by increasing the technological 
sophistication of their approach. Antisemitism and other forms of extremism 
have now moved into the communications mainstream.⁶⁷ This main streaming, 
along with the other trends outlined above, shows how, sixty-five years after the 
Holocaust, antisemitism in its most radical form has come out of the closet and 
become an international reality that challenges us every day. Whether it be linked 
to globalization, ecology, or the war in Iraq, or the use of the latest technology, 
the contemporary discourse of antisemitism proves once more that within every 
new stage in the evolution of anti-Jewish thinking there is interplay between the 
“legacy of negative stereotypes and the realities of a new social context.”⁶⁸ Any 
response to the new manifestations of antisemitism must take into account both 
traditional forms of Judeophobia as well as the contemporary realities of global-
ization which have created a new highway for antisemitism. While antisemitism 
still exists in localized versions, its global impact is spread dramatically quicker 
and more intensively then ever before. Thus responses have to be geared toward 
having the same impact. Otherwise, we will be left with the sad reality that we are 
fighting a twenty-first century battle with twentieth century weapons, which does 
not bode well for the future.
67 See for example Arnold Leese’s “Jewish Ritual Murder,” originally published in 1938, and 





Broadcasting Antisemitism to the Middle 
East: Nazi Propaganda during the Holocaust
With the emergence of radical Islam in recent decades, the question of the rela-
tionship between antisemitism in Europe, and hatred of the Jews in Muslim, Arab, 
and Persian societies has remained the subject of intense political discussion. 
To what extent can the Jew-hatred expressed by the radical Islamists of varying 
ideological hues in Al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah and the government of Iran be 
explained by factors indigenous to these societies and cultures experiencing the 
pressures of attempted modernization? Or do they also have roots in antisemitic 
currents that came to the Middle East from twentieth-century Europe, especially 
during the era of fascism and Nazism.¹ Historians of modern Europe have exhaus-
tively documented and analyzed the European impact on Latin America, Africa, 
the Middle East, and Asia in the era of colonialism. Until recently, however, 
the impact of Nazism and fascism outside Europe was less examined. In recent 
years, in part under the impact of contemporary events, this relative disinterest 
has given way to a flurry of scholarly interest in Nazi Germany’s efforts to spread 
its ideology and policies in the Arab, Persian, and Muslim countries. As a result 
of recent research, we have a better understanding of a meeting of hearts and 
minds, not a clash of civilizations, that took place in wartime Berlin between pro-
Nazi Arab exiles, on the one hand, and Nazi leaders, on the other. The result of 
that conjuncture was the production of thousands of hours of Arabic radio broad-
casts and hundreds of thousands of Arabic leaflets and pamphlets that trans-
lated and diffused Nazism’s radical antisemitism into an easily understandable 
political discourse adapted to the political realities of local circumstances in the 
Middle East.
Due in part to the fact that Germany’s armed forces were defeated in North 
Africa in the fall of 1942, the several million pieces of printed materials in Arabic 
dropped from airplanes and distributed by propaganda units working with the 
General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika-Korps comprised only a small portion of Nazi 
Germany’s propaganda efforts. By far, the most important means used to spread 
the Nazi message was shortwave radio beamed to the region by powerful trans-
mitters near Berlin. The archives of the German Foreign Ministry, which directed 
the program, hold important materials on the direction and organization of the 
1 For a recent essay collection on this issue, see Jeffrey Herf, ed., Antisemitism and Anti-
Zionism in Historical Perspective: Convergence and Divergence (London, 2006).
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program. Some texts of broadcasts survive in the files of the Propaganda Ministry. 
Yet a combination of Allied bombing raids on government buildings in Berlin, the 
chaos of war, and perhaps significant amounts of document destruction meant 
that much of the evidence of the Arabic language broadcasts no longer exists in 
the German archives.
What did not survive in Berlin was recorded for posterity in wartime Cairo by 
officials working in the American Embassy there. Beginning in the fall of 1941, 
under the direction of Ambassador Alexander Kirk, a staff equipped with tape 
recorders and working with native Arab speakers taped, transcribed, translated, 
and sent to Washington a (mostly) weekly set of verbatim English translations of 
Nazi Germany’s Arabic language radio broadcasts to the Middle East. Between the 
fall of 1941 to the spring of 1945, “Axis Broadcasts in Arabic” resulted in several 
thousand pages of texts. Kirk’s despatches were sent to the Office of the Secre-
tary of State and were circulated to the key American (and British) intelligence 
agencies as well as to the U.S. Office of War Information that conducted Amer-
ican political warfare. In summer 2007, I found them in the State Department 
files of the United States National Archives. Although what I will call “the Kirk 
transcripts” were declassified in the 1970s, they have not figured in subsequent 
scholarship.² With the recent findings in the American and German archives, we 
now have much more evidence regarding Nazi Germany’s efforts to find common 
cause with radical Arabs and Muslims and to adapt its central propaganda themes 
to circumstances of the Arab and Muslim societies of the Middle East.
Needless to say, a fully adequate history of the reception and impact of this 
propaganda and its aftereffects in both Arab nationalist and radical Islamist 
ideology will require the efforts of historians who read Arabic and Persian. My 
current work will, I hope, be of use to them in that important endeavor.
In The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holo-
caust,³ I asked what had changed between 1939 and 1941 in Nazi Germany in the 
nature of antisemitism, which Robert Wistrich aptly called “the longest hatred,” 
so that for the first time in its history it became an ideology that incited and legit-
imated genocide.⁴ While George Mosse and many others have documented the 
ideological path “towards the Final Solution,” the search for origins and long 
2 On some examples of the distribution of the Kirk despatches to other agencies of the United 
States government, see “Dimensions of Allied Response to Hitler’s ‘Jewish Politics’ and the 
Deepening of the Trap,” in Hitler, the Allies and the Jews, ed. Shlomo Aronson (New York, 2004), 
54–64.
3 Jeffrey Herf,  The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Holocaust 
(Cambridge, Mass, 2006).
4 See Robert Wistrich, Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (New York, 1991).
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continuities did not bring us to the event itself.⁵ In The Jewish Enemy, I exam-
ined both very famous and very public speeches and essays by Hitler and other 
leaders of the Nazi regime as well as lesser-known government directives sent to 
the German press to depict the translation of antisemitic ideology into a narra-
tive of ongoing events present as well in the daily and weekly news. My resulting 
interpretation of Nazism’s radical antisemitism focused on the following points.
First, the Nazi’s radical antisemitism was an interpretive framework through 
which the Nazi leadership misunderstood ongoing events. It was not only a 
bundle of prejudices. From the beginning to the end of the war Hitler and his 
associates concluded that their paranoid fantasy of an international Jewish con-
spiracy was the key to contemporary history. As E.  H. Gombrich, who worked 
at the BBC during the war listening to German radio broadcasts, understood, 
the Nazis’ interpretation of the actual events of the Second World War through 
the distorted and paranoid prism of radical antisemitism comprised the core 
element of Nazi propaganda.⁶ The “logical” endpoint of this paranoia was to 
push German antisemitism beyond its past eras of persecution to one of geno-
cide. Theirs was an explanatory narrative that seemed to solve key riddles of con-
temporary history. Radical antisemitism offered an explanation of this central 
paradox of the Second World War in Europe, namely the emergence, deepening, 
and persistence of what Churchill called “the unnatural alliance” between the 
Soviet Union and the Western democracies. In the eyes of common sense, Frank-
lin Roosevelt and Churchill had decided to make a pact with a lesser evil Stalin, 
in order to defeat a greater evil, Hitler.⁷ From the perspective of Nazi antisemitic 
propaganda, the anti-Hitler coalition, along with the entry into the war by the 
United States, were the two most powerful pieces of evidence that international 
Jewry had created and sustained “the unnatural alliance.”
Second, the key to the radicalization of Nazi antisemitism lay in its over-
whelmingly political accusation, that “international Jewry,” had started and esca-
lated the Second World War in order to exterminate Germany and the Germans. 
The regime’s frequently-discussed biological racism was important primar-
ily because it pointed to a bond said to exist among all Jews. Yet though racial 
5 George Mosse, Toward the Final Solution: A History of European Racism (Madison, Wisc., 
1985); and idem, The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New 
York, 1964, 1998).
6 E. H. Gombrich, Myth and Reality in German Wartime Broadcasts (London, 1970), 18.
7 Jeffrey Herf, “If Hitler Invaded Hell: Distinguishing between Nazism and Communism during 
World War II, the Cold War and since the Fall of European Communism,” in The Lesser Evil: Moral 
Approaches to Genocide Practices, eds. Helmut Dubiel and Gabriel Motzkin (London, 2004), 
182–95.
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biology did justify horrible crimes against tens of thousands of persons judged 
to be “unworthy of life,” it was not central to the justification for mass murder.⁸ 
While caricatures of the Jewish body filled the pages of Der Stürmer, the distinc-
tively genocidal components of radical antisemitism derived from beliefs about 
what “international Jewry” was alleged to have done, not how Jews looked. It was 
the actions of what the Nazis believed was a truly active political actor, “interna-
tional Jewry”—not the Jews’ supposed stereotyped physical features—that have 
preoccupied so much scholarship, that stood at the center of the Nazi commit-
ment to mass murder. When the Nazi leaders spoke of what Lucy Dawidowicz 
called “the war against the Jews” they were not only referring to the Final Solu-
tion.⁹ Rather it referred as well to the conventional war Nazi Germany was waging 
against the anti-Hitler coalition composed of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and other Allies. On many occasions, Nazi propagandists described 
the war that the Allies were waging against the Third Reich as “the Jewish war.” 
Hitler and his associates pointed to an allegedly real political subject, “interna-
tional Jewry” which was the power behind the scenes, the driving force and the 
glue of the Allied coalition. The history of World War II and that of the Holocaust 
did not only demonstrate a contingent coincidence of timing, geography and 
opportunity. Rather, in the minds of the Nazi leadership, there was an inherent 
connection between the two.¹⁰
Third, the projection and paranoia that connected radical antisemitism 
led to repeated and publicly expressed threats to murder the Jews of Europe. In 
speeches and writings reported in the national and world press, Hitler and his 
associates were clear and blunt, not secretive and euphemistic, about their inten-
tion to “exterminate” and “annihilate” the “Jewish race in Europe.” To be sure, 
euphemisms such as the “Final Solution,” and bureaucratic abstractions played 
8 On the importance of biological racism for the Nazi euthanasia program, see Henry 
Friedländer, The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill, 
N.C., 1995). Friedlander demonstrates the importance of the personnel used in the euthanasia 
program for subsequent mass murder by gas in the death camps. However horrifying, the 
ideological justification for these murders was distinct from the one that was central to the 
Final Solution.
9 Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933–1945 (New York, 1975).
10 For the full argument, see Herf, The Jewish Enemy; Richard Breitman, The Architect of 
Genocide: Himmler and the Final Solution (New York, 1991); Christopher Browning, The Path to 
Genocide (New York, 2000); idem, The Origins of the Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish 
Policy, September 1939–March 1942 (Lincoln, Neb. and Jerusalem, 2004); Saul Friedländer, The 
Years of Extermination: Nazi Germany and the Jews, 1939–1945 (New York, 2007); and Gerhard 
Weinberg, Germany, Hitler and World War II (New York, 1995).
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a role. Yet the public language of the Nazi regime was often quite frank. When 
Hitler, Goebbels, and other officials threatened to, and then boasted of extermi-
nating the Jews, they meant exactly what they said. At the time, too many of their 
adversaries assumed that such statements were “mere propaganda” and bombast 
but not a guide to policy. On numerous occasions, Hitler and other leading offi-
cials publicly threatened to murder the Jews and then subsequently announced 
that they were in the process of carrying out those threats. They presented this 
ongoing policy of “extermination” and “annihilation” as an act of retaliation 
against a war of extermination which, they claimed, “the Jewish enemy” had 
launched against Germany and the Germans. The Final Solution was, in their 
view, an act of fully justified retaliation. Throughout World War II and the Holo-
caust, the paranoia and projection inherent in this view remained handmaidens 
of Nazi aggression and mass murder. As the Second World War continued and 
the toll of death and destruction on Germany’s armed forces and civilians on the 
home front grew, the Nazi antisemitic narrative focused rage and hatred among 
the Germans that were partly the byproducts of the war the Allies were waging 
against the Third Reich and the supposed actual decision maker—international 
Jewry. Hitler implemented and continued the Final Solution in a spirit of self-righ-
teous indignation which placed this most extraordinary of events into an ordi-
nary sequence of attack and retaliation in war. Denial of the uniqueness of the 
Holocaust was one of its constitutive elements. As a result of this narrative, it was 
to be expected that as the fortunes of war turned against Germany, hatred of Jews 
persisted in Germany up to the end the war.
Hitler established the core narrative of the war in his infamous “prophecy” 
first uttered on 30 January 1939. In that speech to the Reichstag, he publicly 
threatened to “exterminate” all the Jews of Europe in the event that “international 
finance Jewry inside and outside Europe,” provoked the world war, in fact, the 
very same war which he at that moment was planning to unleash.¹¹ He publicly 
repeated the genocidal prophecy on at least seven different occasions between 30 
January 1939 and 24 February 1943.¹² As if to underscore the link in his own mind 
between the war and his policies toward the Jews, he erroneously dated the first 
11 Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Reden und Proklamation, 1932–1945, 2 vols. (Wiesbaden, 1972), 
1058.
12 For the text of the 30 January 1939 speech and the repetitions and variations of the 
prophecy on 30 January 1941, 30 January 1942, 15 February 1942, 30 September 1942, 8 
November 1942, and 24 February 1943, see Domarus, Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen, 2: 
1058, 1663–1664, 1843, 1920, 1937, 1992.
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utterance of the prophecy as 1 September 1939, the day he ordered the invasion of 
Poland. On 30 January 1941, he said
not to be forgotten is the comment I already made on September 1, 1939 in the Reichstag 
that if the world were to be pushed by Jewry into a general war, the role of the whole of 
Jewry in Europe would be finished.... Today, they [the Jews] may still be laughing about [that 
statement] just as they laughed earlier about my prophecies. Now our racial knowledge is 
spreading from people to people. I hope that those who still are our antagonists will one day 
recognize the greater domestic enemy and will then make common front with us: against 
the international Jewish exploitation and corruption of nations!¹³
The speech was published in the German and the world press.
The following day, the editors of the New York Times wrote that
inside Germany or outside, no one in the world expects truth from Adolf Hitler...there is not 
a single precedent to prove he will either keep a promise or fulfill a threat. If there is any 
guarantee in his record, in fact, it is that the one thing he will not do is the thing he says he 
will do.... Nobody expects consistency from Hitler....¹⁴
Hitler was consistent in ways that The Times editors and many other observers 
did not expect. The history of the connection between Nazi propaganda and its 
policy and what the German historian Karl Bracher called the underestimation of 
Hitler by his contemporaries calls for a still uncompleted transformation of the 
meaning of political sophistication and insight in the face of totalitarian ideology.
In his “Political Testament” written in the Berlin bunker on 29 April 1945, 
Hitler blamed the Jews for World War II.¹⁵ He had
left no one in doubt that this time millions of adult men would not die and hundreds of 
thousands of women and children burn in the cities and die under bombardment without 
the really guilty party having to pay for his guilt, albeit with more humane means.¹⁶
13 Ibid., 30 January 1941, pp. 1663–1664; also see “30.1.1941 Adolf Hitler: Kundgebung im 
Berliner Sportpalast zum 8. Jahrestag der nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung,” in Roller 
and Höschel, eds. Judenverfolgung und jüdisches Leben... 165–66. These paragraphs were 
featured on the front page of Die Judenfrage, then published by the office of Antisemitischen 
Aktion. See “Der Führer sprach; Aus den Rede im Sportpalast vom 30 Januar 1941,” Die 
Judenfrage 5, no. 2 (10 Feb. 1941): 1.
14 “When Hitler Threatens,” New York Times, 31 Jan. 1941, 18.
15 See the classic account in H. R. Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler (New York, 1962), 225–
65; and Ian Kershaw, Hitler: 1936–1945, Nemesis (New York, 2000), 820–28.
16 Domarus, Hitler; Reden und Proklamation, 2: 2236–2237.
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To the end, he persisted in the paranoid logic of innocence, irresponsibility and 
projection. The logical conclusion of Hitler’s illogic was that while he was able to 
murder millions of Jews in Europe, international Jewry, in the form of the anti-Hit-
ler coalition, had won the Second World War. Hitler’s last will has sometimes been 
interpreted as evidence of his descent into madness under the impact of impend-
ing total defeat. Yet what is most striking about it against the background of Nazi 
propaganda is that it simply restated what he had been saying publicly since the 
beginning of the war. The paranoid vision of an international Jewish conspiracy 
waging aggressive and genocidal war against an innocent Nazi Germany that 
flowed from Hitler’s pen on 29 April 1945 had been the core element of the text 
and imagery of the Nazi regime’s antisemitic propaganda from the beginning to 
the end of the Second World War and the Holocaust. When the Allied powers 
defeated the Third Reich—and then when the state of Israel was founded—unre-
constructed Nazis found further evidence of the victory of powerful international 
Jewry. In Arabic and Persian, in the themes of Islam, Arab nationalism, and 
anti-colonialism, Nazi propaganda adapted this conspiracy theory to the local 
circumstances of the Middle East. Its ideological assault on Zionism was central 
to this effort, which entailed both trying to win the war against Britain and the 
United States in North Africa as well as seeking to extend the Final Solution of 
the Jewish Question in Europe to encompass the Jews living in the Middle East as 
well.
Before the Nazis could appeal to Arabs, Persians, and Muslims in general, 
they needed to clarify if their “antisemitism” extended to the non-Jewish 
“Semites” of the Arab, Persian, and Muslim world. In Mein Kampf, Hitler thought 
it did. He spoke with disdain about hopes for “any mythical uprising in Egypt” 
or the idea that “that now perhaps others are ready to shed their blood for us.” 
English machine guns and fragmentation bombs would bring such a Holy War “to 
an infernal end.” It was, he continued,
impossible to overwhelm with a coalition of cripples a powerful state that is determined to 
stake, if necessary, its last drop of blood for its existence. As a völkisch man, who appraises 
the value of men on a racial basis, I am prevented by mere knowledge of the racial inferior-
ity of these so-called “oppressed nations” from linking the destiny of my own people with 
theirs.¹⁷
Hitler’s famous book gave antisemitism a broad meaning, one that applied first 
and foremost to the Jews, but that also encompassed non-Jewish “Semites” such 
as Arabs and Muslims.
17 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Mannheim (Boston, 1943, 1971), 658–59.
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Disputes surrounding the Berlin Olympics of 1936 alerted German diplomats 
that Hitler’s broad view of antisemitism posed a problem for effective propaganda 
aimed at Arabs, Persians, and Muslims. A narrower conception was called for—
one that made clear how focused Nazi racial policy was on the Jews. The belief 
that the Nuremberg race laws in 1935 discriminated against “non-Aryans” caused 
consternation in Egypt. The coach of Egypt’s Olympic team threatened to boycott 
the Berlin Olympics in 1936. As they were non-Aryans, he asked, why should 
Egyptian athletes travel to a country that regarded them as racially inferior? In a 
series of meetings in 1936 and 1937, high ranking officials in the German Foreign 
Ministry, the Propaganda Ministry, the Nazi Party’s Office of Racial Politics (Ras-
senpolitisches Amt) and Himmler’s Reich Security Main Office (SS) devoted many 
hours to reach the conclusion that Nazi racial legislation distinguished between 
Germans and Jews, not Aryans and non-Aryans.¹⁸ Arabs, Persians, and Muslims 
were simply different, not inferior. The Foreign Ministry devoted considerable 
effort before and during World War II to convince Arabs, Persians (Iranians) and 
Muslims in general that its anti-Jewish policies were not based on a biological 
racism directed at “non-Aryans” as a whole. It was only the Jews who were the 
common “enemy” of Nazi Germany and the Arab and Islamic Middle East. In the 
diffusion of Nazi antisemitism to the Arab and Muslim Middle East, a political 
accusation wrapped in a conspiracy theory superseded an antisemitism based on 
racial biology. Nazi propagandists appealed to them as allies in a common cause, 
the fight against the Jews.
Short wave radio became the regime’s most important means spreading its 
views, both in occupied Europe and around the world. In October 1939, Nazi 
Germany was broadcasting fifteen hours of air time in 113 daily broadcasts. The 
number of hours on air increased to twenty-two by January 1940, thirty-one by 
the summer of 1940, and fifty-three by 1943 in 147 different broadcasts.¹⁹ Broad-
casts were in Arabic, Afrikkans, Portuguese, Bulgarian, Dutch, English, French, 
Hungarian, Italian, Romanian, Serbo-Croatian, Spanish, and Turkish. During 
the first year of the World War II, the Germans made 89,500 foreign language 
broadcasts that took up 30,500 hours of radio time. By the end of 1940, about 
500 people were working in the offices of German radio aimed abroad.²⁰ By 1943, 
18 On these discussions see “Zugehöigkeit der Ägypter, Iraker, Iraner, Perser und Türken zur 
arischen Rasse, Bd. 1, 1935–1936,” Politisches Archive des Auswärtiges Amt (Berlin) R99173.
19 Werner Schwipps, “Vorwart,” in Wortschlacht im Äther: Die deutsche Auslandsrundfunk im 
Zweiten Weltkrieg, ed. Werner Schipps (Berlin, 1971), 9; and Gerhart Goebel, “Fernkampfwaffen 
im Rundfunkkrieg,” in ibid.
20 Werner Schipps, “Die deutsche Auslandsrundfunk im Zweiten Weltkrieg” in Wortschlacht 
im Äther, 16.
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the Nazi regime had sixteen stations with programing in thirteen different lan-
guages every day.²¹ Prominent exile politicians, such as Subhas Chandra Bose 
from India, Rashid Ali al Khilani from Iraq, and Haj Amin al-Husseini, the Grand 
Mufti of Jerusalem, spoke frequently on these stations.²²
Within the Foreign Office Political Division, the Orient Office, Division VII, 
oversaw propaganda and political strategy towards Egypt, Afghanistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, India, Iran, Sudan, and Ceylon.²³ An Office for 
Political Radio (Rundfunkpolitischen Abteilung) existed within the Foreign Office 
Political Division.²⁴ By 1 September 1943, its staff included 226 employees.²⁵ Kurt 
Kiesinger (subsequently Chancellor of the Federal Republic between 1966 and 
1969), worked in the office and was its director from 1943 to 1945.²⁶ The staff 
of Division VII wrote and discussed German texts for broadcasts primarily in 
Arabic, but also in Persian or Hindi intended for audiences in North Africa, the 
Arab world (from Egypt to Iraq), Turkey, Iran, and India. It met regularly with 
the Foreign Office Arab Committee, which included experts on the region and 
officials responsible for contact with prominent Arab exiles such as Husseini and 
Khilani.²⁷ Among the various divisions of the Foreign Office working on foreign 
language broadcasts, only the Russia division with a staff of fifty-one broadcast-
ing to the enormous Eastern Front was larger. By 1942, the Orient Division was 
larger than the offices broadcasting to Western Europe, England, Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, Italy, Southeastern Europe, Eastern Europe, Northern Europe, the Far 
East, the United States, and Africa).²⁸ The director of Division VII throughout the 
21 Ibid., 25.
22 Ibid., 58.
23 “Auswärtiges Amt, Politische Abteilung,” PAdAA R67478 Referat RüPers, RüHS,Bd. 3: 
Haushalt, Personal (Handakte Bartsch), 1939–1943, Bd. 3–4.
24 “Haushaltsvoranschlag der Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung des Auswärtigen Amtes vom 
1.4.1942 bis 31.3.1943, PAdAA Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, R67477 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, 
Bd. 1: Verwaltung Organisation 1941–1943, Bde 2–3.
25 “Anlage 1: Zahlenmäßige Übersicht über den Inlandspersonalbestand der Abteilung Ru., 
Stand vom 1.9.1942,” PAdAA Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, R67477 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, 
Bd. 1: Verwaltung Organisation 1941–1943, Bde 2–3.
26 “Personalbestand der Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung (Berlin, August 14, 1943), PAdAA 
Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, R67476 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, Bd. 1: Verwaltung Organisation 
1939–1945, Bde 1–2.
27 “Übersicht über die Arbeitsgebiete der Rundfunkpolitischen Abteilung und ihrer Referate, 
Anlage 6,” PAdAA Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, R67477 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, Bd. 1: 
Verwaltung Organisation 1941–1943, Bde 2–3.
28 “Abteilung Ru, Anlage 1a,”  R67477 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, Bd. 1: Verwaltung Organisation 
1941–1943, Bde 2–3; “Anlage 1a, Abteilung Ru, Zahlenmäßige Übersicht über den 
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war was Kurt Munzel, a diplomat and Orientalist who had worked in the Dresd-
ner Bank in Cairo in the decade before the war.²⁹ By 1942, he led a staff of nine-
teen including (judging from the names) seven native Arabic speakers, and four 
“scholarly assistants,” that is, Germans with knowledge of Arabic and Islam. 
Broadcasts were beamed to Egypt, Afghanistan, Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Cyprus, Pal-
estine, Turkey, India, Iran, Sudan, and Ceylon. The office also published Barid 
as-Sarq (Orient Post) an Arabic language magazine, and worked closely with the 
Arab Committee in the Foreign Office.³⁰
From September 1939 to the the fall of 1941, the Arabic broadcasts drew on 
the expertise of German Orientalists with a knowledge of Arabic and Islamic 
literature and poetry, together with former diplomats of the prewar years with 
local knowledge, and an uncertain contribution by pro-Axis Arabs living in Berlin 
when the war began. Most of these broadcasts had the tone of a sympathetic, 
well-informed, politically engaged scholar, one eager to please yet not quite 
able to pick up the ins and outs of local politics. Yet the early broadcasts did 
send a clear message that the Nazi regime, rather than celebrate the superior-
ity of Aryans over inferior Middle Eastern “Semites,” was a friend to both Arab 
nationalists and Muslims. Of the approximately 2,000 days of radio broadcasting 
from Nazi Germany, those of December 1940 to February 1941 are the only ones 
for which there is extensive documentation in the German archives. As the texts 
indicate that Munzel wrote or co-wrote them, I will refer to the following as the 
“Munzel broadcasts.”
Inlandspersonalbestand der Abteilung Ru., Stand vom 1.9.1942,” PAdAA Rundfunkpolitische 
Abteilung, R67477 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, Bd. 1: Verwaltung Organisation 1941–1943, Bde 
2–3.
29 Ibid. In 1948, Munzel completed a doctoral dissertation at the University of Erlangen. He 
returned to service in the West German Foreign Office in the 1950s. See Ludmila Hanisch, Die 
Nachfolger der Exegeten: Deutschsprachige Erforschung des Vorderen Orients in der ersten 
Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts (Wiesbaden, 2003), 199.
30 Übersicht über die Arbeitsgebiete der rundfunkpolitischen Abteilung und ihrer Referate, 
Ref. VII Orient,” p. 4; “Rundfunkabteilung Inland, Personalstand 1.9.1942, Referat VII Orient,” 
p. 16, PAdAA Rundfunkpolitische Abteilung, R67477 Referate Ru Pers. Ru Hs, Bd. 1: Verwaltung 
Organisation 1941–1943, Bde 2–3. Personnel of the Orient office in the Foreign Ministry’s 
Rundfunkpolitischen Abteilung. Kissling became a Dozent for history and culture of the Orient 
and of Turkey at the University of Munich. See, among others, his The Muslim World (1969), 
Handbuch der Orientalistik (1959), Islamistische Abhandlungen (1974). Also see Kurt Munzel, 
Ägyptischer-arabischer Sprachführer (Wiesbaden, 1958 and 1983).
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On 3 December 1940, Munzel’s Orient Office VII broadcast “a paper about the 
English occupation of Egypt.”³¹ With the incantation “Oh Mohammedaner!” (Oh 
Muslims!), the broadcast made a direct appeal to Muslims and not only to Arab 
nationalists opposed to British rule in Egypt. It did so in the repetitive incanta-
tions of a religious sermon that evoked the authority of the Holy Qur’an and past 
days of piety.
Oh, God’s servants! Above all of the other commandments, none is more important to the 
Muslims (Mohammedaner) than piety for piety is the core of all virtues and the bond of all 
honorable human characteristics. Muslims you are now backward because you have not 
shown God the proper piety and do not fear him. You do things that are not commanded 
and you leave to the side things that are. God’s word has proven to be true and you are 
now the humiliated ones in your own country. This has come about because you don’t have 
the piety and fear of God as your pious forefathers did. Of them, one can say that they 
“are strong against the unbelievers and merciful amongst themselves.” Oh Muslims! (Oh 
Mohammedaner!) Direct your gaze to the holy Koran and the tradition of the prophets. Then 
you will see that Islamic law is driven by piety toward God and fear of his punishment. The 
Koran inscribed piety as above all other commandments. Read, for example, the words: 
“Oh, believers, be pious and do not die without being a Muslim. Stand by God and don’t 
be divided.”
Oh Muslims! I call you to piety towards God because it is an inexhaustible source and 
a sharp weapon. It offers the good and prevents evil. In short, it is Islam, that is, surrender 
to God! Oh Muslims, you’ve seen how God placed piety at the top of all the commandments 
and how God has rewarded the pious with victory and success, how he helps him in every 
situation....
There was some debate in the German Foreign Ministry about the extent to which 
the Nazi regime should make explicit Islamist appeals. Some officials preferred 
to direct appeals to secular nationalists. Yet the broadcasts and inner-office 
memos indicated that during the course of the war, the Nazi hardliners around 
Himmler in the SS, the Foreign Office, and the Propaganda Ministry, as well as 
Hitler himself perceived an elective affinity between Nazi ideology and policy 
and that of a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. Nazi broadcasts repeated 
that the values of Islam, such as piety, obedience, community, unity rather than 
skepticism, individualism and division were similar to those of Nazi Germany. 
That such a melange of assault on modern political values was conveyed via the 
most modern means of electronic communication in 1940 was another example 
31 Kult.R.Ref. VIII (VII) (Orient) Mn/P/B Kultureller Talk vom 3. Dezember 1940, “Ein Blatt über 
die Besetzung der Englander in Ägypten,” Berlin (3 December 1940), BAB R901 Auswärtiges 
Amt, R73039 Rundfunkabteilung, Ref. VIII Arabische und Iranische Sendungen, vorl. 39, Dez. 
1940–Jan. 1941, 2.
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of what I have previously called the “reactionary modernist” character of aspects 
of Nazi ideology and policy.³² This and other broadcasts conveyed the message 
that a revival of fundamentalist Islam was a parallel project to National Social-
ism’s political and ideological revolt against Western political modernity. The 
message of this broadcast was that a return to a literal reading of the Qur’an and 
its application to contemporary events was not only or primarily a relic of a back-
ward culture but part of the great movement now in power in Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy.
This and the host of broadcasts that followed offered evidence that National 
Socialism was appealing to Muslims as Muslims, not only to Arabs in their strug-
gle against the British. While Nazi propaganda in Germany was claiming that a 
regrettable elective affinity existed between English Puritanism and the Jews, it 
also postulated a welcome affinity between National Socialist ideology and what 
it selected from the traditions of Islam.³³ On 12 December 1940, for example, 
German radio announced that Islam “is a religion of the community, not a religion 
of the individual. It is thus a religion of the common welfare (Gemeinnutzes) and 
not of self-interest (Eigennutzes). Islam therefore is a just and true nationalism for 
it calls on the Muslim to place the general interest ahead of private interests, to 
live not for himself but for his religion and his fatherland. This is the most import-
ant goal that Islam follows. It is at the basis of its prayers and commandments.”³⁴ 
The priority of “the common welfare” over self-interest was a continuing and key 
theme of the Nazi Party before 1933 and the Nazi regime afterwards.
It was hoped that the appeals to Islamic themes in these broadcasts would 
establish a willingness among Muslims to listen to Nazism’s secular political mes-
sages as well. On the same day that Radio Berlin broadcast the above message, 
it also sent out “A Government Statement for the Arabs”³⁵ From the same station 
in the same hour, perhaps with the same announcer, Nazi radio moved from the 
32 Jeffrey Herf, Reactionary Modernism: Technology, Culture and Politics in Weimar and the 
Third Reich (New York, 1984).
33 On the elective affinity asserted by Nazi propagandists between English Puritanism and the 
Jews, see Jeffrey Herf, The Jewish Enemy: Nazi Propaganda During World War II and the Jews 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2006), 71–74.
34 Bundesarchiv Berlin, [Lichterfelde] (BAB) R901 Auswärtiges Amt, R73039 
Rundfunkabteilung, Ref. VIII Arabische und Iranische Sendungen, vorl. 39, Dez. 1940–Jan. 1941, 
Kult.R, Ref. VIII (Orient), Mu/Scha “Religiöser Wochentalk vom 12. Dez.1940 (arabisch) Die 
Friegebigkeit,” broadcast on 12 Dec. 1940, 14–16.
35 “Zur Regierungserklärung für die Araber,” Talk vom 12. Dezember 1940 (arabisch), 
BAB) R901 Auswärtiges Amt, R73039 Rundfunkabteilung, Ref. VIII Arabische und Iranische 
Sendungen, vorl. 39, Dez. 1940–Jan. 1941, Kult.R, Ref. VIII (Orient), Mu/Scha, pp. 11–13.
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specifically religious to the clearly secular and political. Listeners heard that 
Germany expressed full sympathy for the Arab’s “struggle for freedom and inde-
pendence” so that they could “take their proper place under the sun and recover 
glory and honor in the service of humanity and civilization.” The German gov-
ernment’s expression of “love and sympathy” for the Arabs had “found a strong 
echo among the German people” while strengthening “the bonds of friendship 
with the Arabs which the Germans have cherished for many years.” This connec-
tion was not surprising, the talk continued, because Germans and Arabs shared 
“many qualities and virtues,” such as “courage in war...heroism and manly char-
acter.” They
both shared in the suffering and injustices after the end of the [First] World War. Both of 
these great peoples had their honor insulted, their rights were denied and trampled under-
foot. Both bled from the same wounds and both also had the same enemy: namely the Allies 
who divided them and allowed them no claim to honor. Now Germany has succeeded to get 
out from under this disgrace and to regain all of its old rights so that Germany’s voice is now 
heard everywhere and has again taken its old place.³⁶
The idea that Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany were “the powerful, young nations” 
was a continuing theme of these broadcasts.³⁷ They broadcast combined appeals 
to Islamic traditionalism combined with evocations of the values of the Nazi 
Volksgemeinschaft and a promise of future Arabic and Islamic revival if Germa-
ny’s example was followed. Yet these early broadcasts lacked a certain political 
punch and grasp of local idioms and politics. This changed in November 1941 
when pro-Nazi Arab exiles, Haj Amin al-Husseini and Rashid al-Khilani, arrived 
in Berlin.³⁸ They both met with Hitler and Ribbentrop and they and their asso-
ciates worked closely with officials in the Nazi Foreign Ministry in its Arab and 
Orient committees in the Office of Political Radio to fashion radio and print pro-
36 Ibid.
37 “Die Selbstsuch: Talk vom 16. Januar 1941 (arabisch) broadcast 16 Jan. 1941, BAB, R901 
Auswärtiges Amt, R73039 Rundfunkabteilung, Ref. VIII Arabische und Iranische Sendungen, 
vorl. 39, Dez. 1940–Jan. 1941, Kult.R, Ref. VIII (Orient), Mu/B., pp. 62–64.
38 On Haj Amin al-Husseini and Rashid Ali el Khilani in Berlin see Zvi Elpeleg, The Grand Mufti: 
Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement, trans. David Harvey 
(London, 1993); Klaus Gensicke, Der Mufti von Jerusalem und die Nationalsozialisten: Eine 
politische Biographie Amin el-Husseinis (Darmstadt, 2007); Michael Mallmann and Martin 
Cuppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina (Darmstadt, 
2006), 105–20; and Lukasz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the Arab East (London, 1966), 
211–28.
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paganda for Arabs and Muslims.³⁹ In his subsequently famous meeting with Hus-
seini in Berlin on 28 November 1941, Hitler heard Husseini lavish praise on him, 
express his support for Nazi Germany in the war, and request that Germany and 
Italy issue a strong declaration in support of Arab independence from Britain. 
Though Hitler replied that the time had not yet arrived for issuing such a declara-
tion, he told Husseini that when the German armies on the Eastern Front reached 
“the southern exit” from the Caucasus, Hitler would
give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived. Germany’s objec-
tive would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere 
under the protection of British power.⁴⁰
In other words, in the same period in which Hitler had taken the decision to 
launch the Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe, he also made clear to 
Husseini that he intended to extend it as well outside Europe, that is, at least to 
the Jews living in Egypt, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. Husseini and Khilani 
and the Arabic-language radio writers and speakers accompanying them gave 
the Nazi regime an asset it had not had before, namely, native Arab speakers 
who could communicate Nazism’s messages in colloquial, fluent, and passion-
ate Arabic. This was an important for carrying out the war against the Jews that 
Germany was waging in both senses of that term because it was intended both 
to stimulate Arab and Muslim support for the German armed forces fighting in 
North Africa as well as incite support for an extension of the Final Solution to the 
Jews of the Middle East should the Germans defeat the British and Americans in 
North Africa.⁴¹ According to the language of the Genocide Convention adopted by 
the United Nations after World War II, many of the resulting broadcasts amounted 
to “incitement” and could thus be described as part of the crime of genocide.⁴²
39 On this see Peter Longerich, Propagandisten im Krieg : die Presseabteilung des 
Auswärtigen Amtes unter Ribbentrop, (Munich, 1987).
40 “No. 515, Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister’s Secretariat, Record of the 
Conversation between the Führer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in 
the Presence of Reich Foreign Minister and Minster Grobba in Berlin,” Berlin (30 Nov. 1941), 
DGFP Series D (1937–1945) Vol. 13: The War Years, June 23–December 11, 1941, pp. 881–82, 
884.
41 As Tuvia Friling has pointed out, David Ben Gurion and the political leaders of the Jews in 
pre-state Palestine, thought a great deal about the threat of Nazi expansion in the Middle East. 
See Tuvia Friling, Arrows in the dark : David Ben-Gurion, the Yishuv Leadership, and Rescue 
Attempts during the Holocaust, trans. by Ora Cummings (Madison: University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2005).
42 Clause 3 in Article 3 of the “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide,” includes “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” as acts that should be 
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Alexander Kirk arrived to take up his post as head of the American Legation 
in Cairo on 29 March 1941, following his posting as Chargé d’Affaires of the United 
States Embassy in Berlin from 1939 to 1940. He came to Cairo with a deep knowl-
edge of and opposition to the Nazi regime, and remained as ambassador until 29 
March 1944. Kirk set up one of the more remarkable intelligence operations of 
the war devoted to what the Nazis were publicly saying, both to understand them 
as well as to learn how to counter their propaganda offensive. He hired a techni-
cal staff and native Arabic speakers. Kirk sent one of the first of his dispatches 
about Nazi radio broadcasts in Arabic to the office of Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull Washington on 13 September 1941, summarizing the themes of broadcasts 
from 18 August through 7 September 1941.⁴³ The regular summaries continued, 
expanding in length and detail until April 1942, when Kirk’s staff began to produce 
verbatim transcripts in English translation of Nazi Germany’s Arabic-language 
radio broadcasts to the Middle East. Kirk sent the texts to Washington every 
week until March 1944, and this was continued by his successor, Pickney Tuck, 
until spring 1945. In Washington, the Kirk transcripts were circulated in the State 
Department, the Office of War Information (which was responsible for American 
“political warfare”), the Office of Strategic Services and the Pentagon’s various 
military intelligence agencies. As far as I have been able to determine, the result-
ing several thousand pages comprise the most complete record anywhere of Nazi 
Germany’s efforts to influence the Arab and Islamic world via its most important 
propaganda program of shortwave radio broadcasts.
Kirk’s memos in the spring of 1942 to Secretary of State Cordell Hull under-
scored both the strategic importance of Allied victory in the Middle East for the 
outcome of the war as a whole, as well as the need for a greater American mili-
tary commitment in the region in order to prevent a German victory over Britain’s 
armed forces in North Africa.⁴⁴ In a despatch of 18 April 1942, Kirk summarized 
punishable. See http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html
43 Alexander Kirk, “Telegram Sent, September 13, 8 p.m., 1941 to Department of State form 
Cairo Legation, Number 1361,” pp. 1–3, NARA RG84, Cairo Legation and Embassy, Secret and 
Confidential General Records, 1939, 1941–1947, 1941, 820.02-830, Entry 2412, 350/55/6/5, Box 
4, Folder 820.02 1941.
44 The Minister in Egypt (Kirk) to the Secretary of State, Cairo (16 Feb. 1942), “Concern of 
the United States regarding effect of Axis military advance into Egypt; plans for evacuation 
of American diplomatic and consular personnel from Egypt,” Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers 1942, vol. 4: The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C.: United 
States Government Printing Office, 1962), 71–73.
228   Jeffrey Herf
the broadcasts of the preceding six months.⁴⁵ German propaganda sought to con-
vince the Arabs that the Axis countries had “a natural sympathy with the Arabs 
and their great civilization, the only one comparable with the civilization intro-
duced by the New Order into Europe, which is now being suppressed by ‘British 
Imperialism,’ ‘Bolshevik barbarity,’ and ‘Jewish greed’ and more recently ‘Amer-
ican materialism.’”
The Arabs could “never be the friends of Britain” because her promises are 
false. German Arabic radio denounced the Jews “ad nauseum.” It asserted that 
the Jews, “backed by Britain and the U.S.A.” were “the arch-enemies of Islam.” 
They controlled American finance and had “forced Roosevelt to purse a policy of 
aggression.” Roosevelt and Churchill were “playthings in the hands of the Jewish 
fiends who are destroying civilization.”⁴⁶ Throughout World War II, Nazi radio 
propaganda linked Britain and the United States in particular to support for the 
establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Every statement by any public figure 
in Britain or the United States expressing anger over the persecution of Jews in 
Europe or support for a Jewish state in Palestine was taken as further proof of the 
truth that the Jews were in control of the governments of Britain, the United States 
but also of “Jewish Bolshevism” in Moscow. As was the case in Nazi propaganda 
in Europe, Roosevelt and Churchill were the main culprits and stooges.
In the spring, summer, and fall of  1942, as General Erwin Rommel’s North 
Africa Corps advanced to within sixty miles of Alexandria, the broadcasts envis-
aged imminent victory. On 3 July 1942 “Berlin in Arabic” announced that Germany 
and Italy resolved that “the troops of the Axis powers are victoriously advancing 
into Egyptian territory...to guarantee Egypt’s independence and sovereignty.” 
The Axis forces were entering Egypt
to dismiss the British from Egyptian territory...and to liberate the whole of the Near East 
from the British yoke. The policy of the Axis powers is inspired by the principle “Egypt for 
the Egyptians.” The emancipation of Egypt from the chains which have linked her with 
Britain, and her security from the risks of war, will enable her to assume her position among 
the independent sovereign states.⁴⁷
45 Alexander Kirk to Secretary of State, “Telegram 340, General Summary of Tendencies in Axis 
Broadcasts in Arabic,” Cairo (18 Apr. 1942), NARA, RG659, United States Department of State, 
Central Decimal File, 1940–1944, 740.0011/European War 1939, Microfilm Records M982, Roll 
114, p. 21414.
46 Ibid., 1–2.
47 “Despatch No. 502 from the American Legation at Cairo, Egypt, Axis Broadcasts in Arabic 
for the Period July 3 to 9, 1942, Cairo, July 21, 1942,” NARA, RG 84 Foreign Service Posts of the 
Department of State, General Records, Cairo Embassy, 1942, 815.4-820.02, Box 77, p. 1.
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The radio then broadcast the following statement by the Grand Mufti of Palestine, 
Haj Amin al-Husseini:
The Glorious victory secured by the Axis troops in North Africa, has encouraged the Arabs 
and the whole East, and filled their hearts with admiration for Marshall Rommel’s genius, 
and the bravery of the Axis soldiers. This is because the Arabs believe that the Axis Powers 
are fighting against the common enemy, namely the British and the Jews, and in order to 
remove the danger of communism spreading, following the [Allied, JH] aggression on Iran. 
These victories, generally speaking, will have far reaching repercussions on Egypt, because 
the loss of the Nile Valley and of the Suez Canal, and the collapse of the British mastery over 
the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, will bring nearer the defeat of Britain and the end of 
the British Empire.”⁴⁸
The German and Italian declaration was one that Husseini and Khilani had been 
seeking ever since they arrived in Rome and Berlin and expressed their support 
for the Axis powers. Given that neither Vichy France nor Fascist Italy had gone to 
war in order to guarantee independence and sovereignty to the Arabs, Hitler and 
Mussolini had postponed making any such statement. Now that an uprising in 
Egypt might undermine British armed forces, the dictators agreed to do so.
The Kirk transcripts recorded a steady diet of antisemitic arguments that 
echoed the political accusations at the core of Nazi propaganda in Europe. The 
Nazis claimed that Britain and the United States had become stooges of the Jews, 
that World War II was a Jewish war ,and that Allied victory would mean Jewish 
domination of the Middle East. The Americans recorded one of the most remark-
able Nazi broadcasts of the war—“The Voice of Free Arabism”—at 8:15 p.m. Cairo 
time on 7 July 1942. It illustrated the links between the general propaganda line in 
Europe and its adaptation to the Middle East context. The text is entitled, “KILL 
THE JEWS BEFORE THEY KILL YOU”—a statement that equaled that of Hitler and 
Goebbels in its antisemitic radicalism. The broadcast began with a lie:
a large number of Jews residing in Egypt and a number of Poles, Greeks, Armenians and 
Free French, have been issued with revolvers and ammunition” in order to “help them 
against the Egyptians at the last moment, when Britain is forced to evacuate Egypt.⁴⁹
The statement continued:
In the face of this barbaric procedure by the British we think it best, if the life of the Egyptian 
nation is to be saved, that the Egyptians rise as one man to kill the Jews before they have a 
chance of betraying the Egyptian people. It is the duty of the Egyptians to annihilate the 
48 Ibid., 1–2.
49 “KILL THE JEWS BEFORE THEY KILL YOU,” ibid., 13.
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Jews and to destroy their property. Egypt can never forget that it is the Jews who are carrying 
out Britain’s imperialist policy in the Arab countries and that they are the source of all the 
disasters, which have befallen the countries of the East. The Jews aim at extending their 
domination throughout the Arab countries, but their future depends on a British victory. 
That is why they are trying to save Britain from her fate and why Britain is arming them to 
kill the Arabs and save the British Empire.
You must kill the Jews, before they open fire on you. Kill the Jews, who have appro-
priated your wealth and who are plotting against your security. Arabs of Syria, Iraq and 
Palestine, what are you waiting for? The Jews are planning to violate your women, to kill 
your children and to destroy you. According to the Moslem religion, the defense of your 
life is a duty which can only be fulfilled by annihilating the Jews. This is your best oppor-
tunity to get rid of this dirty race, which has usurped your rights and brought misfortune 
and destruction on your countries. Kill the Jews, burn their property, destroy their stores, 
annihilate these base supporters of British imperialism. Your sole hope of salvation lies in 
annihilating the Jews before they annihilate you.⁵⁰
Here, applied to the Arab and Moslem context, was the same logic of projection 
and paranoia that was the defining feature of Nazism’s radical antisemitism. It 
is impossible to be more blunt. It combined the political accusations of Nazism 
with evocation of the religious demands of Islam. A statement such as this was 
unusual only in the extent to which it voiced the genocidal threats that were more 
implicit in many other assertions about the venality and power of the Jews that 
were broadcast on Nazi Arabic-language radio.
In their important recent work, Halbmond und Hakenkruez: Das Dritte Reich, 
die Araber und Palästina [Crescent and Swastika: The Third Reich, the Arabs and 
the Palestinians], German historians Michael Mallmann and Martin Cuppers 
have revealed that German intelligence agents were reporting back to Berlin that 
if Rommel’s North Africa Corps was victorious and was able to enter Cairo and 
Palestine, it could count on support from some elements of the Egyptian officer 
corps as well as from the Moslem Brotherhood. They also discovered that an Ein-
satzgruppe of SS troops in Rome was prepared to depart to Palestine to murder 
the Jewish population if Rommel won the battle of Al-Alamein. German officials 
expected as much support for that endeavor from the local Arab population as 
Ukranians had given to SS units on the Eastern Front.⁵¹ As Hitler indicated to 
Husseini at their meeting of 28 November 1941, the fate of both the Allied armies 
as well as the Jewish population in the Middle East hung in the balance. The 
purpose of the propaganda was both to draw Arabs and Muslims to the side of the 
50 Ibid., 13–14.
51 Michael Mallmann and Martin Cuppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die 
Araber und Palästina (Darmstadt, 2007), especially chs. 7–9.
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Axis as well as to incite them to support Nazi plans to extend the Final Solution 
beyond Europe’s geographical limits.
Much work remains to be done on the reception of Nazism in wartime 
Cairo and the Middle East. Tantalizing hints of “fifth column” activity in the 
Muslim Brotherhood, by students at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, Young Egypt, 
and some parts of the officer corp are to be found in reports by American and 
British diplomats and intelligence agencies. The immediate postwar months and 
years produced evidence regarding the very enthusiastic reception of the Grand 
Mufti’s message in the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo. In summer 1945, Husseini 
fled Germany but was arrested in France. Under suspicious circumstances he 
“escaped” French custody and arrived in Cairo. Marshall Tito’s government in 
Yugoslavia wanted to put him on trial for war crimes for his role in inspiring and 
organizing an SS division of Bosnian Muslims. The Allies were fully aware of his 
antisemitic incitement on wartime radio. However, an Office of Strategic Services 
report of 23 June 1945 on “The Near East and the War Crimes Problem” revealed 
a quite different reaction to these events in the Middle East.⁵² The authors wrote 
that “in the Near East the popular attitude toward the trial of [Nazi, JH] war crimi-
nals is one of apathy. As a result of the general Near Eastern feeling of hostility to 
the imperialism of certain of the Allied powers, there is a tendency to sympathize 
with rather than condemn those who have aided the Axis.”⁵³
The Mufti arrived in Cairo in June 1946. On 11 June, Hassan al-Banna, the 
leader of the Muslim Brotherhood sent a statement to officials of the Arab League:
Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimin [the Moslem Brotherhood] and all Arabs request the Arab League 
on which Arab hopes are pinned, to declare that the Mufti is welcome to stay in any Arab 
country he may choose and that great welcome should be extended to him wherever he 
goes, as a sign of appreciation for his great services for the glory of Islam and the Arabs.... 
The hearts of the Arabs palpitated with joy at hearing that the Mufti has succeeded in reach-
ing an Arab country. The news sounded like thunder to the ears of some American, British 
and Jewish tyrants. The lion is at least free and he will roam the Arabian jungle to clear it of 
the wolves.... What a hero, what a miracle of a man. We wish to know what the Arab youth, 
Cabinet Ministers, rich men, and princess of Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Tunis, Morocco,, and 
Tripoli are going to do to be worthy of this hero. Yes, this hero who challenged an empire 
and fought Zionism, with the help of Hitler and Germany. Germany and Hitler are gone, but 
52 “‘The Near East and the War Crimes Problem’: Office of Strategic Services, Research and 
Analysis Branch, R and A, No. 1090.116, 23 June 1945, Situation Report: Near East, Analysis of 
Current Intelligence for the Use of OSS,” pp. 1–28, in NARA, RG84, Foreign Service Posts of the 
Department of State, Syria: Damascus Legation, Confidential File, 1945: vols. 1–2, 030-800B, 
Classified General Records, Entry 3248A, 350/69/5/6-7, Box 4, vol. 2, 711-800B.
53 Ibid., “Summary.”
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Amin Al-Husseini will continue the struggle.... God entrusted him with a mission and he must 
succeed.... The Lord Almighty did not preserve Amin for nothing. There must be a divine 
purpose behind the preservation of the life of this man, namely the defeat of Zionism. Amin! 
March on! God is with you! We are behind you! We are willing to sacrifice our necks for the 
cause. To death! Forward March.⁵⁴
Writing the history of radical Islam must entail the history of the interaction of 
fascist Italy, Vichy France, and above all, Nazi Germany, with the Moslem funda-
mentalists and radical Arab nationalists of the wartime years. There is much work 
to be done on the intellectual, political, and cultural atmosphere of wartime and 
postwar Cairo for I think it is plausible that it was then and there and in wartime 
Berlin that an important chapter in the history of radical Islam was written. In 
1950, Sayid Qutb, the preeminent intellectual of radical Islam of the 1950s and 
1960s and a key inspiration to the founders of al-Qaeda, published an essay enti-
tled “Our Struggle with the Jews.” It combined a close reading of the Qu’ran with 
reflections on recent history. Ronald Nettler translates a section of that text as 
follows:
And the Jews did indeed return to evil-doing, so Allah gave to the Muslims power over them. 
The Muslims then expelled them from the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.... Then the Jews 
again returned to evil-doing and consequently Allah sent against them others of his ser-
vants, until the modern period. Then Allah brought Hitler to rule over them. And once again 
today the Jews have returned to evil-doing, in the form of “Israel” which made the Arabs, 
the owners of the Land, taste of sorrows and woe. So let Allah bring down upon the Jews 
people who will mete out the worst kind of punishment.⁵⁵
As a historian of Europe and Germany, it is not my place to engage in Qu’ranic 
exegesis. However we all know that Qutb introduced an idea that could not possi-
bly be derived from reading that holy book, namely that Hitler was sent by Allah 
to rule the Jews. Yet a parallel between Mohammed’s “struggle with the Jews” 
and that of Hitler was a theme broached in Nazi broadcasts. We do not know if 
Qutb was listening but we do know that he knew al-Banna and was in the Muslim 
Brotherhood. There is much work to be done to connect European cultural diffu-
sion to its reception in Cairo and elsewhere in the Middle East. Yet there is much 
54 “Hassan Al-Banna and the Mufti of Palestine” in “Contents of Secret Bulletin of Al Ikhwan 
al-Muslimin dated 11 June 1946,” Cairo (July 23, 1946). NARA RG 226 (Office of Strategic 
Services) Washington Registry SI Intelligence, Field Files, Entry 108A, 190/16/28/3-7, Box 15, 
Folder 2.
55 Sayid Qutb, “Our Struggle with the Jews,” translated by Ronald Nettler in Ronald L. Nettler, 
Past Trials and Present Tribulations: A Muslim Fundamentalist’s View of the Jews (Oxford, 1987), 
86–87.
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evidence now to suggest that the diffusion of Nazi ideology to the Middle East 
during World War II was one important chapter in the history of the radical Islam 
that reached full bloom only many decades later.
Conclusion
Though Nazi Germany failed in its military and propaganda offensives in the 
Middle East, the conspiracy theories stemming from European radical antisem-
itism, including the Arabic translations of the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, 
persisted after the war, in particular in the ideologies of radical Islam. In both 
Europe and in the Middle East, radical antisemitic ideology interpreted World 
War II as a war fought between international Jewry and the Axis powers. Notwith-
standing the Holocaust, in the view of adherents of this ideology, “international 
Jewry” in the form of the Allied coalition won that war. The defeat of Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany, and the subsequent full revelation of the extent of the crimes 
of the Third Reich, discredited Nazism, fascism, and antisemitism in post-1945 
Europe. Yet the evidence at our disposal points to the persistence and deepen-
ing of antisemitism in the Middle East before the founding of the State of Israel 
in 1948. As I noted at the outset, the Nazi leaders viewed the existence of the 
anti-Hitler coalition between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies as 
powerful evidence that an international Jewish conspiracy was, as Joseph Goeb-
bels put it, the “glue” of Allied coalition. In the Middle East, the foundation of 
Israel, its recognition by the Soviet Union and the United States, followed by the 
surprising success of the Jews in the war of 1948 all contributed to a distinct Arab 
and Muslim variant of the conspiracy theories of European antisemitism: Israel 
was founded and the Jews won the war of 1948 because of the vast international 
power of the Jews. The success of the Zionist project was attributed to the same 
vast power that had brought about Allied victory in the war and then Arab defeat 
in 1948.
The conjuncture between radical Islam and National Socialism in wartime 
Berlin and its impact on the Arab, Persian,and Muslim societies of the Middle 
East should be the subject of future research and debate among historians. In 
wartime Berlin, a meeting of the minds, not a clash of civilizations, took place 
between radical Islamists and National Socialists as a result of which a connec-
tion emerged between two quite different traditions of antipathy to the Jews. Just 
as Nazism was not strictly a eurocentric story, so the history of radical Islam turns 
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out to have an important European component.⁵⁶ In post-1945 Europe, radical 
antisemitism, on the whole, ceased to be a major factor in mainstream politics. 
The conjuncture of National Socialism and militant Islam in wartime Berlin and 
its diffusion via radio to the Middle East in World War II contributed to the per-
sistence of the longest hatred with new vigor and with a blend of old and new, 
European, Arab and Muslim tones.
56 On this point see Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (New York, 2003); Mathias Kuentzel, 
Jihad and Jew Hatred: Nazism, Islamism and the Roots of 9/11 (New York, 2007); and Bernard 
Lewis, Semites and Anti-Semites: An Inquiry into Conflict and Prejudice (New York, 1986, 1999); 
Robert S. Wistrich, Muslim Antisemitism: A Clear and Present Danger (New York: American 
Jewish Committee, 2002).
Matthias Küntzel
Judeophobia and the Denial of the Holocaust 
in Iran¹
Never before has a head of state called into question the reality of the Holocaust so 
vociferously as the President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A provisional high 
point in his campaign was reached with the conference “Review of the Holocaust: 
Global Vision,” hosted by the Iranian regime on 11–12 December 2006 in Teheran. 
More than sixty participants from thirty different countries included the former 
Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke, the nutty followers of the Jewish Neturei Karta 
sect, officials of Germany’s neo-Nazi German National Party (NPD), as well as 
the usual crowd of Holocaust deniers. Fredrick Toben delivered a lecture entitled 
“The Holocaust—A Murder Weapon,” Robert Faurisson referred to the Shoah as a 
“fairy tale,” while his colleague Veronika Clarke from the United States explained 
that “the Jews made money in Auschwitz.” A certain Professor McNalley declared 
that regarding the Holocaust as a fact is as ludicrous as believing in “magicians 
and witches,” while the Belgian Leonardo Clerici offered the following explana-
tion in his capacity as a Muslim: “I believe that the value of metaphysics is greater 
than the value of history.”²
Had such a gathering taken place in a pub somewhere in Melbourne, hardly 
anyone would have paid any attention. The gathering took on historical signifi-
cance only because it happened by invitation and on the premises of the Iranian 
foreign ministry: hosted by the government of a country that disposes of the 
world’s largest oil reserves after Saudi Arabia and the largest natural gas reserves 
after Russia. In this setting, even the most delusional phantasms did not provoke 
laughter, but attentive nodding and applause. On the walls, there hung photos 
of corpses with the caption “myth,” as well as photos of laughing concentration 
camp survivors with the caption “truth.”
1 This article was translated from German by John Rosenthal.
2 These quotes are taken from the most comprehensive documentation of the conference 
to date, translated (into German) and published by the Iran research section of Honestly-
Concerned.org, 14 Dec. 2006 under the title “Die staatlich organisierte Teheraner 
Hasspropagandakonferenz…” http://www.honestlyconcerned.info/bin/articles.
cgi?ID=IR4306&Category=ir&Subcategory=19 . Interview with the conservative Iranian website 
“Baztab,” 27 Dec. 2006 (www.baztab/ir/news/56550.php). Cited from the (German) translation 
of the Iran Research Section of Honestly Concerned: “Interview mit Mohammad Ali Ramin,” 7 
Jan. 2007.
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The Teheran deniers conference marked a turning point because for the 
first time the leadership of a large and important state put Holocaust denial at 
the center of its foreign policy agenda. The founding conception of the United 
Nations, created in the 1940s as a response to the massacres of the Second World 
War, has never been challenged in a more provocative fashion. It is clear that 
this was precisely the point of the exercise for the Iranian elites. Mohammed Ali 
Ramin, one of Ahmadinejad’s closest advisors who was charged with the prepa-
ration of the Holocaust conference, compared this “second historical conference, 
that took place in Tehran” with the famous Tehran Conference of the World War 
II Allied Powers in 1943. Just like the first Tehran Conference, so too the second 
would “change the face of the world,” he enthused.
But the Tehran deniers conference marks a turning point not only because 
of its state sponsorship, but also because of its purpose. Up until now, Holo-
caust deniers wanted to revise the past. Today, Iran wants to shape the future: 
to prepare the next Holocaust. In his opening speech to the conference, Iranian 
Foreign Minister Manucher Mottaki left no doubt that the aim was the destruction 
of Israel: if “the official version of the Holocaust is called into question,” Mottaki 
said, then “the nature and identity of Israel” must also be called into question.³ 
By denying the particularity of the Nazi persecution of the Jews, a central motive 
for the establishment of the State of Israel gets debased. Consideration of Aus-
chwitz is de-legitimized in order to legitimize a second anti-Jewish genocide. If, 
however, the Holocaust did occur after all, then—per Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric—
Israel has even less of a reason to be in Palestine, but should be transplanted 
instead to Europe. One way or another, the result is the same: Israel must vanish.
This was the sole reason for Iran attaching so much importance to the partic-
ipation of the delegation from the Jewish Neturei Karta sect: i.e., because while 
Neturei Karta does not deny the Holocaust, it welcomes the destruction of Israel. 
This objective was the common denominator uniting all the participants in the 
conference. In his closing speech, Ahmadinejad formulated his aim with unmis-
takable clarity:
The life-curve of the Zionist regime has begun its descent, and it is now on a downward 
slope towards its fall.… The Zionist regime will be wiped out, and humanity will be liber-
ated.⁴
3 Boris Kalnoky, “Iran versammelt die Holocaust-Leugner,” Die Welt, 12 Dec. 2006.
4 Yigal Carmon, “The Role of Holocaust Denial in the Ideology and Strategy of the Iranian 
Regime,” Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Inquiry and Analysis Series, no. 307, 15 
Dec. 2006.
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Holocaust Denial and the Nuclear Program
Just as Hitler sought to “liberate” humanity by murdering the Jews, so Ahmadine-
jad believes that he can “liberate” humanity through the violent eradication of 
Israel. The deniers conference as an instrument for propagating this project was 
intimately linked to the nuclear program as an instrument for realizing it.
The nuclear program is already being celebrated in Iran as otherwise only 
the 12th Imam has been celebrated before: as a sort of divine apparition that will 
drive all injustice from the earth. Thus, in April 2006, in a cult-like ceremony, 
Ahmadinejad unveiled two metal containers in which were to be found Iran’s first 
independently enriched uranium. Choirs thundered “Allahu Akbar” as exotically 
clad dancers whirled ecstatically around the containers and lifted them hero-
ically toward the sky in the style of Maoist opera.
Five years before, in December 2001, the former Iranian President Hashemi 
Rafsanjani first boasted that “the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel 
will destroy everything,” whereas the damage to the Islamic world of a potential 
nuclear retaliatory attack could be limited. “It is not irrational to contemplate 
such an eventuality,” he said.⁵ While the Islamic world could sacrifice hundreds 
of thousands of “martyrs” in an Israeli riposte without disappearing — thus the 
logic of Rafsanjani’s calculation — Israel would be relegated to history after the 
first bomb. It is precisely this suicidal mentality that distinguishes the Iranian 
nuclear weapons program from the programs of all other countries and that 
makes it particularly dangerous.
The ideology of martyrdom is the most important heritage that the Ayatol-
lah Khomeini bequeathed to his successors. Life was always regarded by him as 
valueless and death as the beginning of true life. “The natural world,” Khomeini 
explained in October 1980, “is the lowest element, the scum of creation.” What 
is decisive is the beyond: the “divine world that is eternal.”⁶ This latter world 
is accessible to martyrs. Their death is no death, but merely the transition from 
this world to the world beyond, where they will live on eternally and in splendor. 
Whether the warrior wins the battle or loses it and dies a martyr, in both cases, his 
victory is assured: either a mundane victory or a spiritual one.
It is only against the background of these theological convictions that we can 
comprehend the readiness of Khomeini and some of his followers even to sacri-
5 Quoted in MEMRI Special Dispatch Series, no. 324, 3 Jan. 2002.
6 Cited in Daniel Brumberg, “Khomeini’s Legacy: Islamic Rule and Islamic Social Justice,” in 
Spokesmen for the Despised: Fundamental Leaders of the Middle East, ed. R. Scott Appleby 
(Chicago, 1997), 56.
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fice Iran itself, if necessary, in order to wipe out Israel. In 1980, Khomeini himself 
summed up this mentality as follows: “We do not worship Iran, we worship Allah. 
For patriotism is another name for paganism. I say let this land [Iran] burn. I say 
let this land go up in smoke, provided Islam emerges triumphant in the rest of the 
world.”⁷
Whereas the majority of Iranians and even a large part of the clerical elite 
would presumably reject such a scenario, the radical Islamist camp appears pre-
cisely to be preparing for it. A recent statement by Mohammad Hassan Rahimian, 
representative of the Iranian revolutionary guide Ali Khamenei, made this unmis-
takably clear. On 16 November 2006, Rahimian explained:
The Jew”—not the Zionist, but the Jew!—“is the most obstinate enemy of the devout. And 
the main war will determine the destiny of mankind…. The reappearance of the twelfth 
Imam will lead to a war between Israel and the Shia.⁸
Iran, the first country to make Holocaust denial a matter of foreign policy, is like-
wise the first openly to threaten another UN member state with annihilation. In 
light of this objective, however, why would those in power in Tehran call into 
doubt Hitler’s Holocaust, rather than praising it? After all, in the Arab world, 
where Ahmadinejad’s campaign has enjoyed the most enthusiastic reception, 
Hitler is admired and he is admired not for building highways or conquering 
Paris, but precisely for murdering Jews. Why should Holocaust denial be most 
widespread in a region where admiration for Hitler remains to this day common-
place? How do Holocaust denial and admiration for Hitler go together? The key to 
the resolution of this paradox is to be found in the peculiarities of the antisemitic 
mind-set.
“Brother Hitler,” “Eichmann, the Martyr”
Holocaust denial is an extreme form of antisemitism. Whoever declares Aus-
chwitz to be a “myth” implicitly portrays the Jews as the enemy of humankind, 
who for filthy lucre has been duping the rest of humanity for the past sixty years. 
Whoever talks of the “so-called” Holocaust suggests that over ninety percent 
7 From A Selection of the Imam’s Speeches, vol. 3 (Tehran 1981), 109; quoted in Amir Taheri, 
Nest of Spies: America’s Journey to Disaster in Iran (London, 1988), 269.
8 ISNA, 16 Nov. 2006, http://isna.ir/Main/NewsViews.aspx?ID=News-825902, translated and 
quoted by the Iran research section of Honestly-Concerned.org, 17 Nov. 2006.
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of the world’s media and university professorships are controlled by Jews and 
thereby cut off from the “real” truth. In this way, precisely that sort of genocidal 
hatred gets incited that helped prepare the way for the Shoah. Every denial of the 
Holocaust thus tacitly contains an appeal to repeat it.
In April 2002, an Egyptian columnist for the state-controlled newspaper Al 
Akhbar, Egypt’s second-largest daily, wrote:
The entire matter [the Holocaust], as many French and British scientists and researchers 
have proven, is nothing more than a huge Israeli plot aimed at extorting the German gov-
ernment in particular and the European countries in general. But I, personally and in light 
of this imaginary tale, complain to Hitler, even saying to him from the bottom of my heart, 
“If only you had done it, brother, if only it had really happened, so that the world could sigh 
in relief [without] their evil and sin.”⁹
The citation illustrates how the Holocaust can be denied and celebrated at the 
same time.
Often, however, the enthusiasm for the Shoah is expressed without reserva-
tions. In 1961, at a time when the trial of Adolf Eichmann dominated the head-
lines, this became evident for the first time. The Jordanian Jerusalem Times pub-
lished an “Open Letter to Eichmann,” which stated:
By liquidating six millions you have…conferred a real blessing on humanity.… But the brave 
Eichmann finds solace in the fact that this trial will one day culminate in the liquidation of 
the remaining six million to avenge your blood.¹⁰
Arab writers such as Abdallah al-Tall eulogized “the martyr Eichmann,” “who fell 
in the Holy War.”¹¹ In her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, Hannah Arendt summa-
rized the mood in the Arab world as follows:
The newspapers in Damascus and Beirut, in Cairo and Jordan did not conceal either their 
sympathy for Eichmann nor their regret that he “did not finish the job”; a radio broadcast 
from Cairo on the opening day of the trial even included a little sideswipe at the Germans, 
reproaching them for the fact that “in the last war, no German plane had ever flown over 
and bombed a Jewish settlement.”¹²
This heartfelt desire to see all Jews exterminated was reiterated in the Egyptian 
daily Al-Akhbar in April 2001 by the columnist Achmad Ragab: “[Give] thanks to 
9 Quoted in MEMRI, Report no. 375, 3 May 2002.
10 Jerusalem Times, 24 Apr. 1961, quoted in Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Attitudes to Israel 
(Jerusalem, 1972), 279.
11 Ibid.
12 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem (Munich, 1986), 81.
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Hitler. He took revenge on the Israelis in advance, on behalf of the Palestinians. 
Our one complaint against him was that his revenge was not complete enough.”¹³
It is obvious that from a logical point of view, such enthusiasm for the 
Holocaust is incompatible with its denial. Logic, however, is beside the point. 
Antisemitism builds upon an emotional infrastructure that substitutes for logic 
and reason an ephemeral combination of mutually exclusive attributions, whose 
only common denominator is the exterminatory hatred of everything Jewish. Thus 
all the different and contradictory versions of an anti-Jewish interpretation of the 
Holocaust can be deployed simultaneously: first, the enthusiastic “Hurrah!” for 
the millionfold extermination; second, the indignant “proof” that this millionfold 
extermination is an invention of the Zionists; third, the allegation of a Jewish con-
spiracy against Germany that Hitler effectively thwarted and punished; fourth, 
the certainty that the Holocaust was the product of a joint enterprise between the 
Zionists and Nazis; fifth, the accusation that the very same Zionists exaggerated 
the murder of the Jews with their “Holocaust industry” for obvious reasons; sixth, 
the accusation that Israeli actions against the Palestinians represent the “true” 
Holocaust—and so on and so forth.
We are dealing here with a phantasmagoric parallel universe in which the 
reality principle is constantly ignored and blatantly contradictory phantasms 
about Jews all have their place so long as they serve to confirm antisemitic para-
noia and hatred: a universe from which the laws of reason have been excluded 
and all mental energy is harnessed for the cause of antisemitism.
For all its confusion, this universe is characterized by two constants: firstly, 
by the refusal to come to terms with the facts of the Holocaust as it actually took 
place; secondly, by the willingness to see in the Holocaust—in however refracted 
a manner—a source of encouragement and inspiration: a kind of precedent that 
proves that it is possible to murder Jews by the millions. This is why the exact 
wording of Ahmadinejad’s Holocaust tirades is not the issue. He is obsessed with 
the subject because he is fascinated by the possibility of a second Holocaust.
Why, then, did Ahmadinejad demonstratively embrace the ultra-Orthodox 
Jews at the deniers conference? Why did he personally greet every Jew present 
and say that “Zionism should be strictly separated from the Jewish faith”? Is it 
perhaps true, as Baham Nirumand, the best-known and influential Iranian exile 
in Germany, has written, that Ahmadinejad’s call to eliminate Israel and his 
13 Ragab in Al-Akhbar, 20 Apr. 2001. He repeated the remark in Al-Akhbar, 25 Apr. 2001 and 27 
May 2001. See also Anti-Defamation League, “Holocaust Denial in the Middle East: The Latest 
Anti-Israel Propaganda Theme” (New York 2001), http://www.adl.org/holocaust/denial_ME/ 
hdme_ genocide_denial.asp
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Holocaust denial have “little to do” with antisemitism? “In Iran,” Nirumand has 
written,
there would no basis for this, since Iranian Jews lived here for 2,000 years with persons 
of other faiths. Even in the Islamic state they are fully accepted as a community of faith 
and represented in the parliament by elected representatives. Up to now, Ahmadinejad has 
never criticized Jews as such, but above all the “Zionist occupation power,” Israel.¹⁴
The following review of the history of the relationship between Iranian Jews and 
Iranian Shiites will answer this question.
Najas: The Shiite Dogma of the “Impurity”  
of the Jews
It is indeed true the Jews and Muslims share a history going back some 2,700 years 
in Iran. This does not mean, however, that Jews have enjoyed equality under the 
Shiite rule that began in 1501. On the contrary, in no other Islamic land were Jews 
so poorly treated and so brutally persecuted as in Persia. Thus Bernard Lewis, the 
dean of historians of Islam, writes, “Expulsion, forced conversion, and massa-
cre—all three of rare occurrence in the Sunni lands—were features of life in Iran 
up to the ninetheenth century.”¹⁵ In 1830, 400 Jews in Tabriz had their throats 
slashed. In 1839, all the Jews in Mashad were forced to convert to Islam. In 1910, 
following rumors of a ritual murder, 6,000 Jews in Shiraz were robbed of all their 
possessions: twelve were killed and another fifty wounded.¹⁶ “I do not know any 
more miserable, helpless, and pitiful individual on God’s earth than the Jahudi 
in those countries,” the Orientalist and voyager Arminius Vambery wrote in 1905 
following his return from Persia: “The poor Jew is despised, belabored and tor-
tured.... [H]e is the poorest of the poor.”¹⁷
This inhuman treatment has to do with a particularity of the Shiite image of 
the Jew that has no counterpart in Sunni Islam. Only the Shiites established a 
system of “ritual purity,” which bears similarities to the attitude of Hindus toward 
14 Baham Nirumand, “Der Verrückte aus Teheran,” Die Tageszeitung (taz), 23 June 2006.
15 Bernard Lewis, The Jews of Islam (Princeton, N.J., 1984), 40.
16 David Littmann, “Jews Under Muslim Rule: The Case of Persia,” Wiener Library Bulletin 32, 
n.s. nos. 49/50, ed. Robert S. Wistrich (1979): 4 and 12.
17 Cited from David Menashri, “The Jews of Iran,” in Antisemitism in Times of Crisis, eds. 
Sander L. Gilman and Steven T. Katz (New York, 1991), 354.
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the Pariahs or “untouchables.” This system draws on the Zoroastrianism that was 
the state religion in Persia before Islam.¹⁸ According to it, whoever is not Muslim 
is najas or “impure.” All contact with a Najas is considered a sort of poisoning. 
The paranoid fear of “infection” provoked periodic excesses and led to the devel-
opment of a particular Shiite code of conduct, which especially affected Jews, 
since unlike the Armenian Christians and the small Zoroastrian community, the 
Jewish minority was present throughout the country. Its members had to live in 
ghettoes and were not permitted to go out when it rained or snowed, in order to 
prevent their “impurity” from spreading and coming into contact with Muslims. 
For the same reason, they were prohibited from visiting public baths or having 
any contact with the food and drink of Muslims.¹⁹
Officially, these rules were abolished when the Pahlavis came to power. But 
the orthodox clergy continued to insist on them. Thus, in 1962, the Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini, the later Supreme Leader of the Revolution, explicitly propa-
gated the najas doctrine in a widely disseminated handbook titled “Clarification 
of the Problems: a Guide to Muslims in their Daily Life.” He noted:
There are eleven things which make unclean: 1. urine; 2. faeces; 3. sperm; 4. carrion; 5. 
blood; 6. dog; 7. pig; 8. unbeliever; 9. wine; 10. beer; 11.the sweat of a camel which eats 
unclean things.
In a gloss on number 8, he adds: “The entire body of the unbeliever is unclean; 
even his hair and nails and body moistures are unclean.” There is, however, some 
hope: “When a non-Muslim man or woman is converted to Islam, their body, 
saliva, nasal secretions, and sweat are ritually clean. If, however, their clothes 
were in contact with their sweaty body before their conversion, these remain 
unclean.”²⁰
These prescripts demonstrate the exaggerated Manichaeism of Shiite Islam: 
the complement of the elitist view of the self is an unmitigated image of the abso-
lute enemy. The consciousness of one’s own chosenness is tied to the conviction 
that the Shiites are the true successors of Mohammed and to the messianic belief 
in the return of the “Twelfth Imam.” The image of the enemy, on the other hand, 
has biological connotations and is distinguished by a distinctly physical disgust. 
18 Founded by the ancient Iranian priest and prophet Zoroaster (630–553 BC), Zoroastrianism 
interprets world history as a struggle between the “spirit of good” (Ako Mainyu) and the 
“principle of evil” (Ahriman). In this dualistic system, Ahriman is regarded as “the source of 
everything that is bad and impure, a murderer and destroyer, and the cause of 9,999 diseases.” 
See Gerhard J. Bellinger, Knaurs Grosser Religionsführer (Munich, 1986), 420.
19 Lewis, Jews of Islam, 33ff, Menashri, “Jews of Iran,” 356.
20 Risala-i Tawzih al-Masa’il (Tehran, 1962), cited in Lewis, Jews of Islam, 34.
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Nonetheless, there is an enormous difference between this Shiite conception and 
the Nazi conception, since the option of conversion did not exist in the delirious, 
racially-structured universe of the National Socialists.
After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Khomeini did not officially require the 
application of the najas doctrine. Nonetheless, it was discreetly practiced. Thus, 
for example, Eliz Sanasarian writes of a beverage factory in which the employment 
of Armenian Christians was prohibited, such that “impure” non-Muslims would 
not come into contact with the liquids that Muslims would consume or the bottles 
that contained them.²¹ Roya Hakakian recalls that in the mid-1980s, the water 
fountains and restrooms in her school in Tehran bore signs reading “For Muslims 
Only.”²² Asked about non-Muslims in the late 1980s, a Sheik named Murtesa from 
the religious center of Qum gave the following symptomatic response: “[They] 
are impure in two important areas. 1) They are physically impure as they don’t 
keep taharat (clealiness).... 2) Since they do not believe in Islam, their breath is 
haram (unclean).... If I had to shake hands with (such) a man...I would then take 
a shower and wash my entire body as soon as I could get to my hotel room.”²³
Up till today, Jews living in Iran continue to feel the consequences of the 
najas tradition. Still more massive, however, are the effects of the antisemitic 
campaigns unleashed by Khomeini in the 1960s that would bring him to power 
in 1979.
Khomeini’s Antisemitism
During the reigns of Reza Shah (1925–1941) and of his son Mohammed Reza Shah 
(1941–1979), Iranian Jews enjoyed political equality, cultural autonomy, and also 
an increasing level of economic security. Nonetheless, even if unofficial, Judeo-
phobia continued to exist. David Menashri, himself an Iranian Jew who lived 
through this period, writes: “On many occasions (mainly in small towns, or in 
the bazaars), they were even threatened, and sometimes insulted and beaten up. 
21 Eliz Sanasarian, cited in Andrew G. Bostom, “The Ayatollahs’ Final Solution?,” 
FrontPageMagazine.com, 5 July 2004 www.frontpagemag.com/ articles/Printable.
asp?ID=14071
22 Roya Hakakian, “Reading the Holocaust Cartoons in Tehren,” New York Times, 2 Sept. 2006.
23 Tahmoores Sarraf, Cry of a Nation: The Saga of the Iranian Revolution (New York, 1990), 
111ff.
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There were numerous anti-Jewish articles and even more so anti-Jewish remarks 
and expressions (in speeches, media reports, cartoons, etc.).”²⁴
From 1963 onward, Khomeini, the most important opponent of the Shah, rec-
ognized the mobilizing power of antisemitism and openly exploited it himself. 
“I know that you do not want Iran to be under the boot of the Jews,” he cried 
out to his supporters on 13 April 1963.²⁵ In the same year, he called the Shah a 
Jew in disguise and accused him of taking orders from Israel.²⁶ The response was 
enormous: Khomeini had found his theme. Khomeini’s biographer Amir Taheri 
writes:
The Ayatollah was by now convinced that the central political theme of contemporary 
life was an elaborate and highly complex conspiracy by the Jews—“who controlled every-
thing”—to “emasculate Islam” and dominate the world thanks to the natural wealth of the 
Muslim nations.²⁷
From this point on, hatred of Jews—both in its atavistic Shiite form and in the 
form of modern antisemitism—would remain a central component of the Islamist 
ideology of Iran.
When in June 1963 thousands of Khomeini-influenced theology students set 
off to Tehran for a demonstration and were brutally stopped by the Shah’s secu-
rity forces, Khomeini channeled all the anger toward foreign Jews:
Israel does not want the Koran to survive in this country.… It is destroying us. It is destroying 
you and the nation. It wants to take possession of the economy. It wants to demolish our 
trade and agriculture. It wants to grab the wealth of the country.²⁸
After the Six-Day War of 1967, the antisemitic agitation, which did not differentiate 
between Jews and Israelis, intensified. “[I]t was [the Jews] who first established 
anti-Islamic propaganda and engaged in various stratagems, and as you can see, 
this activity continues down to the present,” Khomeini wrote in 1970 in his main 
24 Menashri, “Jews of Iran,” 359.
25 Cheryl Benard and Zalmay Khalilzad, Gott in Teheran: Irans Islamische Republik (Frankfurt 
a.M., 1988), 260, n. 26.
26 Amir Taheri, The Spirit of Allah: Khomeini & the Islamic Revolution (New York, 1986), 131ff.
27 Ibid., 159.
28 Henner Fürtig, “Die Bedeutung der iranischen Revolution von 1979 als Ausgangspunkt 
für eine antijüdisch orientierte Islamisierung,” Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, vol. 12 
(Berlin, 2003), 77.
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work Islamic Government.²⁹ “[T]he Jews…wish to establish Jewish domination 
throughout the world,” he continued, “Since they are a cunning and resourceful 
group of people, I fear that…they may one day achieve their goal.”³⁰ In September 
1977, he declared finally: “The Jews have grasped the world with both hands and 
are devouring it with an insatiable appetite, they are devouring America and have 
now turned their attention to Iran and still they are not satisfied.”³¹
Two years later, Khomeini was the unchallenged leader of the Iranian revo-
lution. His antisemitic tirades found favor with the opponents of the Shah, both 
Leftists and Islamists. Khomeini’s antisemitism ran along the same lines as the 
Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which were republished in Persian in the summer 
of 1978 and widely disseminated in order to serve as a weapon against the Shah, 
Israel, and the Jews.³²
During the revolutionary period, between September 1977 and February 1979, 
the situation of Jews in Iran was highly precarious. David Menashri cites the 
threats circulated by the National Front of Young Iranian Muslims in 1978:
O bloodthirsty people, who suck the blood of each one of us Muslims.... Now your golden 
dreams have come to an end. You are hereby warned that you must leave the country as 
soon as possible, otherwise we shall massacre all the Jews from the youngest to the oldest. 
Every age needs its Hitler to take care of the people of deceit and eradicate the offspring of 
the Jews from the earth, so that our brothers in religion in the Arab countries will live in 
peace.³³
Khomeini did not mince words either, as Meir Litvak shows: “Pointing to the ‘most 
noble messenger’ as his model, he reminds his readers that when the Jewish tribe 
of Banu Qurayza, who were a troublesome group, ‘caused corruption among the 
Muslims,’ the Prophet eliminated them.”³⁴
29 Ayatollah Rouhollah Mousavi Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist 
(Tehran: Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, International 
Affairs Division), 7. Page references are to the PDF version made available by the Iran Chamber 
Society at http://www.iranchamber.com/history/rkhomeini/ayatollah _khomeini.php.
30 Ibid., 79.
31 Kauthar—An Anthology of the Speeches of Imam Khomeini (s.a.) 1962–1978 (Tehran: 
Institute for the Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini, International 
Affairs Division, vol. 1, 1995), 370.
32 Orly Rahimiyan-Tsadik of Ben-Gurion University, is doing extensive research on the Persian 
copies of the Protocols published from the 1940s to the present time.
33 Cited in Menashri, “Jews of Iran,” 360.
34 Meir Litvak, “The Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust: Anti-Semitism and Anti-
Zionism,” Journal of Israeli History 25, no. 1 (Mar. 2006): 271.
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After the victory of the revolution in 1979, such rhetoric was toned down. 
Khomeini could ignore neither the signs of submission given by the Jewish com-
munity nor the precept of tolerance laid down in the Koran. In May 1979, he 
declared: “We distinguish between Jews and Zionists. Zionism has nothing to do 
with religion.”³⁵ From then on, Jews (like the Armenian Christians and Zoroastri-
ans) were treated as wards of a traditional Islamic state—Dhimmis—according to 
the “principles of Islamic justice.” According to Article 14 of the Iranian constitu-
tion, “this principle is applied to everyone who does not participate in activities 
or conspiracies directed against Islam or the Islamic Republic of Iran.” In order 
to discourage such “conspiracies,” several Jewish leaders, including the former 
chair of the Jewish community, Habib Alqanayan, were sentenced to death and 
executed. The sole reason given was that they had ties to Israel and Zionism.
The Jews in Iran
From among the approximately 100,000 Jews who lived in Iran under the Shah, 
some 25,000 remained in Iran after Khomeini took power. The majority (around 
15,000) live in Tehran; the rest, in Isfahan, Schiraz,and Hamedan. They thereby 
represent the largest Jewish community in any Muslim country. Jews were permit-
ted to move out of their residential quarters and to some degree enter the Iranian 
mainstream. They are free to observe their religious traditions, relatively undis-
turbed, in over 100 synagogues across the country. At the same time, Jews in Iran 
are made clearly to feel their subordinate Dhimmi status. Thus, for example, they 
are excluded from “sensitive” senior posts in the military and judiciary. Jewish 
schools are required to have Muslim principals. They are forced to remain open 
on the Sabbath and Hebrew lessons are not permitted outside prayer time. Prayer 
books are printed in Farsi instead of Hebrew, as a means of controlling what is 
studied.³⁶
Again and again, the Iranian media and leadership attack Jews in general. 
They cite the anti-Jewish passages from the Sunna and the Koran, and they equate 
the alleged behavior of Israel with that of the Jewish tribes of Medina in the time 
35 Menashri, “Jews of Iran,” 363.
36 Rachel Silverman, “It’s not the best place for Jews, but Iran’s home to a sizeable 
community,” Jewish Telegraph Agency (JTA), 4 June 2006; Ewen MacAskill, Simon Tisdall, and 
Robert Tait, “Iran’s Jews learn to live with Ahmadinejad,” The Guardian, 27 June 2006.
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of the Prophet.³⁷ It is suggested that there is a contemporary “Jewish threat” to 
Iran as well. The example of the Grand Ayatollah Noori Hamadani, for whom 
the redemption of Muslims is tied to victory over “the Jews,” is instructive. “One 
should explain in the clearest terms the danger the Jews pose to the [Iranian] 
people and to the Muslims,” Noori Hamadani insisted in April 2005: “One should 
fight the Jews and vanquish them so that the conditions for the advent of the 
Hidden Imam [the Shiite Messiah] be met.” At the same, he praised Mohammed’s 
anti-Jewish massacre in 627 as a “step towards strengthening Islam, in order 
to crush the bastion of the global arrogance, and...to eradicate this cancerous 
tumor.”³⁸
Tolerance of the Jewish community in Iran is combined with the massive dis-
semination of antisemitic literature. Thus, in 1984, the newspaper Imam, pub-
lished by the Iranian embassy in London, reprinted excerpts from the Protocols.³⁹ 
Somewhat later, the periodical Eslami serialized the Protocols under the title “The 
Smell of Blood: Jewish Conspiracies.”
Just two years ago, in 2005, at the Iranian stand at the Frankfurt Book Fair, I 
was readily able to purchase an English edition of the Protocols published by the 
Islamic Propagation Organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Other antise-
mitic literature was also available, such as Henry Ford’s The International Jew, and 
Mohammad Taqi Taqipour’s screed, Tale of the “Chosen People” and the Legend 
of “Historical Right.” The cover illustration on the latter volume had caught my 
eye: a red Star of David superimposed over a grey skull and a yellow map of the 
world.⁴⁰ Obviously, even after the death of Khomeini in 1989, the worldwide dis-
semination of antisemitism by Iran did not come to an end.
David Menashri is undoubtedly justified when he takes such propaganda as 
an indication of the regime’s real attitude toward Jews and points to the provi-
sional nature and fragility of the tolerance that is, for the moment, still accorded 
to the Iranian Jewish community.⁴¹ By virtue of the mixture of incitement and 
restraint practiced by the Iranian regime, the Jewish community has been kept in a 
permanent state of uncertainty since 1979 and this uncertainty has only increased 
37 Menashri, “Jews of Iran,” 365f.
38 Litvak, “Islamic Republic of Iran and the Holocaust,” 272; and MEMRI, Special Dispatch 
Series, no. 897, 22 Apr. 2005. In 627, all the men (comprising some 600–900 individuals) in 
the last remaining Jewish tribe in Medina were killed by decapitation and all the women and 
children were sold into slavery.
39 Robert Wistrich, Der antisemitische Wahn (Munich, 1987), 320f.
40 See http://www.trans-int.com/news/archives/60-The-Protocols-of-the-Elders-of-Zion-at-
the.html
41 Menashri, “Jews of Iran,” 364.
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since the election of Ahmadinejad. Whereas, on the one hand, the Iranian Pres-
ident cites the presence of a Jewish community for the media as proof of his lack 
of prejudice, at the same time he lets one of his closest advisors, Mohammed Ali 
Ramin, threaten Iranian Jews by invoking the najas doctrine. Thus, in June 2006, 
Ramin said: “Jews are a dirty people. That is why one has accused them through-
out history of being responsible for the spread of deadly diseases and plagues.”⁴²
It is hardly any wonder, then, that the leaders of the Iranian Jewish community 
outdo themselves in offering gestures of subservience toward the regime. When, 
in June 1999, thirteen Iranian Jews were arrested for allegedly spying on behalf 
of Israel, the Jewish community found itself constrained to praise the Iranian 
government. “The Islamic Republic of Iran has demonstrated to the world,” it 
declared in a statement, “that it has treated the Jewish community…well; …the 
arrest and charges against a number of Iranian Jews has nothing to do with their 
religion.”⁴³ The community’s statements from 2006 were similarly abject. Thus it 
congratulated the regime on the progress made in the Iranian nuclear program; 
it celebrated the martyrs of the war against Iraq; it expressed solidarity with the 
“Lebanese resistance” in its fight against Israel and it called on Jews the world 
over to condemn the “Israeli attacks” and an Israeli policy that “tramples upon 
the humane tenets of the Jewish tradition.”⁴⁴
Today, the Jewish community serves Ahmadinejad not only as an alibi in his 
power game, but also increasingly as a deterrent: in the event of an Israeli attack 
on Iranian nuclear facilities, the community would find itself held hostage and 
vulnerable to acts of reprisal. Irrespective of the latitude that Ahmadinejad has 
for the time being left the Iranian Jews, his rhetoric is steeped in an antisemitism 
that is unprecedented for a head of state after the Second World War.
Ahmadinejad’s Antisemitism
What thoughts crossed the mind of the Iranian President as he embraced the 
Jews of the Neturei Karta sect at the deniers conference in Tehran? Was his first 
thought “so nice of you to help me!”? Or did he think rather “You idiots! You’ll 
soon be next!”? We do not know. And we do not know either whether he had a 
thorough shower after the meeting.
42 Ynet, 8 June 2006, cited from Newsletter der israelischen Botschaft in Berlin, 8 June 2006.
43 Andrew G. Bostom, “The Ayatollahs’ Final Solution?,” FrontPageMagazine.com, 5 July 2004.
44 See the homepage of the “Tehran Jewish Committee,” www.iranjewish.com
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Ahmadinejad is not a racist Social Darwinist, who, like Hitler, wants to elim-
inate every last trace of “Jewish blood.” He does not attack “the Jews,” but rather 
“the Zionists.” He says, “Two thousand Zionists want to rule the world.”⁴⁵ He 
says, “The Zionists” have for sixty years now blackmailed “all western govern-
ments.”⁴⁶ “The Zionists have imposed themselves on a substantial portion of the 
banking, financial, cultural and media sectors.”⁴⁷ “The Zionists” fabricated the 
Danish Muhammad cartoons. “The Zionists” are responsible for the destruction 
of the dome of the Golden Mosque in Iraq.⁴⁸ But he invests the word “Zionist” with 
exactly the same sense as that with which Hitler once invested the word “Jew”: 
namely, that of being the incarnation of all evil. Even if the regime tolerates the 
Jewish community of Tehran, whoever makes Jews responsible for all the ills of 
the world—whether as “Judases” or “Zionists”—is clearly driven by antisemitism 
of a genocidal nature. Demonization of Jews, Holocaust denial, and the will to 
eliminate Israel—these are the three elements of an ideological constellation that 
collapses as soon as one of the elements is removed.
The morbid phantasms of Ahmadinejad and his supporters are impervious 
to reality. Consider, for example, the case of the Iranian historian who on Iranian 
television touted his “discovery” that in 1883 French Jews murdered 150 Christian 
children in the suburbs of Paris, to use their blood in the baking of matzah bread. 
The actual revelation, however, was not supposed to be the alleged murder, but 
rather the fact that while the memory of the murder had lived on in the souls of 
Europeans, “the incident is, regrettably, never mentioned—due to the growing 
influence of the Zionist lobby in Europe—or, more precisely, the influence of the 
Jews.”⁴⁹ Could there be any clearer proof of how helpless Europe is in the face of 
the Zionists and their media empires?
Circular reasoning such as the foregoing is not susceptible of refutation. 
The louder the liberal West protests against Iran’s Holocaust denial or threats 
to destroy Israel, the clearer for Ahmadinejad is the proof of Zionist domina-
tion. In a conversation with the editors of the German news weekly Spiegel, the 
Iranian President reacted as follows to the remark that Israel’s right to exist is not 
questioned by the magazine: “I am glad that you are honest people and say that 
45 Hooman Majd, “Mahmoud and Me,” New York Observer, 2 Oct. 2006.
46 MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, no. 1091, 14 Feb. 2006.
47 From “Letter to the Noble Americans,” available at http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/
meast/11/29/ahmadinejad.letter/
48 WorldNetDaily, 11 Feb. 2006.
49 “Iranian TV Blood Libel: Jewish Rabbis killed Hundreds of European Children to use Their 
Blood for Passover Holiday,” MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, no. 1053, 22 Dec. 2005.
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you are required to support the Zionists.”⁵⁰ Only when we too finally realize that 
the Holocaust is a Jewish lie, only when we too want to annihilate Israel, only 
then would Ahmadinejad be convinced that we are academically credible and 
politically free. It is this maddening circularity that characterizes contemporary 
Iranian Holocaust denial and that makes the revolutionary mission of the Iranian 
leadership so dangerous.
Holocaust Denial as Liberation Struggle
Whoever denies the Holocaust kills the victims a second time. To destroy the 
memory of the victims completes the work of their extermination. This has 
nothing to do with freedom of opinion in the sense of human rights protections: 
Article 17 of the European Humans Rights Convention lays down that there is no 
right to undermine the rights and freedoms that the convention is meant to pro-
tect.⁵¹ And Holocaust denial has absolutely nothing to do with science: there is 
no other crime in history that has been so precisely described by perpetrators, 
victims, and external observers. Whereas serious research on the Holocaust tests 
and, if necessary, modifies previous findings on the basis of established facts, 
Holocaust deniers only acknowledge those facts that fit their antisemitic world-
view.
The novelty of Ahmadinejad consists in his fusing Holocaust denial with the 
historical claim of Shiite Islam to be the religion of the politically dispossessed. 
Ahmadinejad is the first to celebrate the intellectual and moral crime of Holo-
caust denial in adopting the stance of a freedom fighter. Until now, Holocaust 
denial has been a marginal addition to the traditional antisemitic arsenal, serving 
the struggle to reduce alleged Jewish influence. Integrating antisemitism into his 
discourse of global populism, Ahmadinejad has inserted it within the context of 
freedom versus enslavement. “They are allowed to study anything except for the 
Holocaust myth,” Ahmadinejad said of Europeans in February 2006: “Are these 
50 “Wir sind entschlossen,” Interview with Mahmud Ahmadinejad, Spiegel 22/2006, 29 May 
2006.
51 Article 17 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads: “Nothing in this Convention 
may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity 
or perform any act aimed at the destruction on any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.”
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not medieval methods?… On the face of it, the technology has changed, but the 
culture and the way of thinking remain medieval.”⁵²
In this way, Ahmadinejad has managed to make Holocaust denial a mark of 
progressiveness and to place the Tehran conference under the sign of “freedom of 
thought.” “It would be good for Mr. Blair to participate in the Holocaust seminar 
in Tehran,” the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Hamid Reza Asefi, 
explained, since at the conference Blair would be able to “say the kind of things 
he cannot say in London.”⁵³ But who was it that suppressed the free speech of the 
British premier? In this connection as well, Ahmadinejad had a ready answer: 
“The pillaging Zionist regime has managed, for 60 years, to extort all Western 
governments on the basis of this myth [of the Holocaust].… They are hostages in 
the hands of the Zionists.”⁵⁴
Since December 2005, the Iranian President has placed the denial of the 
Holocaust at the center of his agitation. During this time, the Iranian regime has 
spared no effort to establish the “exposure” of the “Holocaust Myth” as a new 
historiographical paradigm. Thus the “lie about the Holocaust” has become a 
regular topic of televised Friday sermons.⁵⁵ Talk shows on public television 
feature a parade of historians who mock the “fairy tale about the gas cham-
bers.” The Iranian state press agency has developed into a platform for Holocaust 
deniers from all over the world.
The “Holocaust International Cartoon Contest” announced by the Iranian 
newspaper Hamshahri in February 2006 revealed the new style of Iranian Holo-
caust denial: creative, modern, unrestrained, and self-assertive. Hamshahri has 
the largest circulation of any paper in Iran and it is publicly owned by the city 
of Tehran. “Whether or not there was a Holocaust, that is up to the cartoon-
ists to decide,” Achmed Kasemi, one of the organizers of the contest, said.⁵⁶ 
The newspaper received over 1000 submissions from 62 countries. In fall 2006, 
a selection of 200 cartoons was exhibited in the Palestine Museum in Tehran. 
This will undoubtedly have been the first internationally publicized exhibition of 
antisemitic art since 1945. The exhibit was opened by Saffar Harandi, the Iranian 
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance. The ambassador of Lebanon and the 
52 MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, no. 1091, 14 Feb. 2006 http://memri.org/bin/articles.
cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP109106
53 “Iran Sends Blair Invitation to Holocaust Conference,” Deutsche Welle, 18 Jan. 2006.
54 MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, no. 1091, 14 Feb. 2006 http://memri.org/bin/articles.
cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP109106
55 MEMRI, Special Report, no. 39, 5 Jan. 2006 http://memri.org/ bin/articles.
cgi?Page=archives&Area=sr&ID=SR3906
56 Matthias Küntzel, “Die zweite Spaltung der Welt,” Internationale Politik (Apr. 2006): 75.
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representative of the Palestinian territories figured among the foreign dignitaries 
present.⁵⁷ The first prize of $12,000 went to a cartoon by a Moroccan that drew par-
allels between Israel’s controversial security barrier and Auschwitz. The second 
and third prizes went to cartoons that present the Holocaust as a crude fabrica-
tion. The former depicts a stage backdrop that has been knocked over and that is 
meant to represent a gas chamber and crematorium: “Who knocked that down?” 
one Jew asks; “Faurisson,” replies another. The latter shows two grinning soldiers 
above a freshly dug mass grave in which they are placing not real corpses, but 
merely paper cut-outs. There appear, then, not to have been real victims.⁵⁸
Up to 2006, we associated Holocaust denial with the self-styled “expert” opin-
ions of individual cranks in various countries or with the small disparate band of 
neo-Nazis. Ostracized by society as obscurantists, the Holocaust deniers had to 
struggle for every millimeter of respectability they could muster. Now, Ahmadine-
jad has reversed the customary roles: it is not the Holocaust denier who has to 
justify himself—but the non-denier. It is not the denier who must struggle for his 
freedom; it is rather the non-deniers—like Tony Blair, for example—who are not 
free. Such inversions suggest that Iranian Holocaust deniers are after more than 
just disseminating anti-Israeli propaganda. For them, the rewriting of history is 
an inherent part of a global Islamist mission.
“Historical War”
In his first speech on the guiding principles of his politics, Ahmadinejad made 
this clear. “We are in the process of an historical war,... and this war has been 
going on for hundreds of years,” he declared in October 2005. This is a war, 
then, that has nothing to do originally with the Middle East conflict and that 
will be far from over even when Israel has been eliminated. He continued: “We 
have to understand the depth of the disgrace of the enemy, until our holy hatred 
expands continuously and strikes like a wave.”⁵⁹ This “holy hatred” is boundless 
and unconditional. It will not be mitigated by any form of Jewish or non-Jewish 
conduct—other than subordination under the Sharia or Koran.
In his letter to George W. Bush, the Iranian President described the objective 
of his mission: “Those with insights can already hear the sounds of the shattering 
57 Baham Nirumand, “Holocaust-Ausstellung in Teheran,” Tageszeitung (taz), 16 Aug. 2006.
58 See http://www.irancartoon.com/120/holocaust
59 Quoted in MEMRI, Special Dispatch Series, no. 1013, 28 Oct. 2005.
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and fall of the ideology and thoughts of the liberal democratic systems.” We are 
also told in this letter just how he thinks the liberal democracies will be shattered. 
Even here, if albeit in slightly diluted form, the ideology of martyrdom—you love 
life, we love death—is propagated: “A bad ending belongs only to those who have 
chosen the life of this world.… A good land and eternal paradise belong to those 
servants who fear His majesty and do not follow their lascivious selves.”
In the Shiite version of Islamism, we are confronted with an opponent who 
combats the achievements of modernity as Satan’s deed, who denounces the 
system of international relations that was created after 1945 as a “Jewish-Chris-
tian conspiracy,” and who therefore wishes to overturn the accepted historiogra-
phy of this system. At the start of the deniers conference, Foreign Minister Mottaki 
explained that the problem is that the “wording of historical occurrences and 
their analysis [are written from] the perspective of the West.”⁶⁰ As against this 
“Western” historiography, Islamism seeks to create a new historical “truth,” in 
which the Holocaust is declared a myth, while the Twelfth Imam is deemed to be 
real. Whereas the delusional system of Holocaust denial is elevated to the norm, 
any divergence from the latter is denounced as a symptom of “Jewish domina-
tion.”
Even as he is conducting his religious war, Ahmadinejad also plays the role 
of a global populist. His speeches are addressed to all the world’s “oppressed.” 
He cultivates good relations with Fidel Castro and Hugo Chávez and ingratiates 
himself to the Western Left by employing anti-American rhetoric. His use of the 
word “Zionist” is particularly relevant in this connection as well. It is the Trojan 
horse under cover of which he makes his antisemitism respectable: allowing him 
to be all at once antisemite and Holocaust denier, on the one hand, and spokes-
man of the so-called “oppressed nations,” on the other.
This is why the Iranian leadership vehemently denies the charges of antisem-
itism, as well as all sympathy for Nazism. Islam, Mottaki explained in his opening 
address, “stands in clear contradiction to racist and Nazi ideology.” “I say to you 
unequivocally,” he continued, “that Judeophobia is a western phenomenon that 
only concerns western States. There has never been such a thing in the Islamic 
states.”⁶¹ Ahmadinejad’s highly publicized embrace of the Jews present at the 
deniers conference—who were later even accorded a special audience with the 
President—was meant to support this claim and to demonstrate to the world that 
60 Iran Research of Honestly-Concerned.org, “Die staatlich organisierte Teheraner 
Hasspropagandakonferenz...,” http://www.honestlyconcerned.info/ bin/articles.cgi?ID=IR430
6&Category=ir&Subcategory=19
61 Honestly Concerned, Iran Research section.
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while Iran fights Zionism as a political movement, it respects Jews as representa-
tives of a religion. The pictures of anti-Israel Jews with their broad-brimmed hats 
amicably exchanging business cards with the equally anti-Israel Muslim clergy 
were beamed around the world: pictures of brotherhood and harmony that create 
the impression that it is indeed first in a “world without Zionism” that perpetual 
peace will break out. In keeping with this image, four weeks after the deniers 
conference, Ahmadinejad was greeted by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, 
who praised him as a “fighter for just causes, a revolutionary and a brother,” 
and then warmly received by yet another icon of the Left, Nicaragua’s president 
Daniel Ortega.⁶²
Although Holocaust denial is not a popular theme for the Iranian popula-
tion and has drawn criticism even from within the ranks of the Mullah’s regime,⁶³ 
Ahmadinejad and his allies persist in their campaign. There were plans to make 
the cartoon contest and exhibition yearly events. “We will continue until the 
destruction of Israel,” the curator of the 2006 version of the exhibit insisted.⁶⁴ 
This appears also to be the motto of the organizer of the deniers conference, 
Mohammad Ali Ramin. Thus in January 2007, he explained:
The participants in the Holocaust conference have created the “World Foundation for Holo-
caust Research” and I will be the director of this foundation. The headquarters of the foun-
dation is for the moment in Tehran. If, however, at some point the European governments—
Germany, for example—are prepared to guarantee the freedom of opinion of independent 
researchers, we will move the headquarters from Tehran to Berlin.⁶⁵
Iranian historians have already made queries in Poland as to whether they might 
undertake certain “calculations” in Auschwitz. In this case, however, their request 
fell on deaf ears. It “goes beyond every imaginable norm to call into question this 
matter, to discuss it, or to negotiate about it,” then Polish Foreign Minister Stefan 
Meller remarked.⁶⁶
It should go without saying that a country that makes such madness—which 
goes beyond every imaginable norm—into government policy has placed itself 
outside of the community known as the “United Nations.” It is regrettable that 
for the moment no other state has joined Israel in demanding the temporary 
62 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 Jan. 2007.
63 Criticism of Tehran Holocaust Denial Conference in Arab and Iranian Media, in MEMRI 
Special Dispatch Series, no. 1425, 16 Jan. 2007.
64 “Iran: Moroccan Wins Holocaust Cartoon Contest,” New York Times, 2 Nov. 2006.
65 Honestly Concerned, Iran Research section, Interview with Mohammad Ali Ramin, 7 Jan. 
2007.
66 Spiegel-Online, 17 Feb. 2006.
 Judeophobia and the Denial of the Holocaust in Iran   255
suspension of Iran’s UN membership. It is particularly noteworthy that Germany 
in particular continues to maintain perfectly normal relations with Ahmadine-
jad’s Iran. So long as the international community fails to react in an appropriate 
manner, Tehran will continue to turn the tables on it. Thus on 8 January 2007, the 
Iranian government filed a complaint with the UN Human Rights Council against 
those who do not deny the Holocaust. “History cannot be rewritten as it pleases 
the Israeli regime,” Alireza Moayera, Iran’s representative to the Council, wrote 
in his letter to its president, Luis Alfonso de Alba: “It cannot be manipulated 
and hand-picked selectively and it cannot be reformatted based on the political 
agenda or historical ambitions of this regime.”

Robert Solomon Wistrich
Negationism, Antisemitism,  
and Anti-Zionism
Already in 1971, the French philosopher, Vladimir Jankélévitch, had predicted the 
increasingly ominous connection between Israel, antisemitism, and the Shoah, 
which has come to haunt the contemporary European mind. He remarked on the 
extraordinary shadow which the Holocaust had cast over the events of the Second 
World War and modernity as a whole—a kind of invisible cloud of remorse. This 
was the “shameful secret” (“ce secret honteux”) behind the apparent “bonne 
conscience contemporaine”—the hidden anxiety which seized so many Europe-
ans at their belated realization of the enormity of the crime in which they were so 
deeply implicated.
How then could one be freed from such a terrible incubus? Jankélévitch sug-
gested that “anti-Zionism” was likely to provide the providential and unexpected 
opportunity for much-needed relief: for it offered the freedom, the right, and 
perhaps even the duty to be “antisemitic” in the name of democracy!¹ Anti-Zion-
ism would become the new “justifiable” and democratized antisemitism of the 
future, finally placed within the reach of Mr. and Mrs. Everyman. And what if 
the Jews themselves were no better than Nazis? Why, that would be just wonder-
ful. One would no longer have to feel sorry for them—after all, “they would have 
deserved their fate.” What better alibi could there be for forgetting the unspeak-
able crime or diluting European responsibilities and thinking about happier 
things?
Today, of course, such observations come more naturally and may even 
seem self-evident, though they were much less clear at the time. At least some 
of the new European Judeophobia functions psychologically as a kind of over-
compensation mechanism for discharging latent and often unavowed guilt feel-
ings about the Jews. In fact, by branding Israel as a Nazi State, one is killing two 
birds with one stone. One may point the finger at the erstwhile victims who are 
no better than “we, Europeans” (in fact they are worse, since they did not try 
to learn from their history); and one is free to express in a “politically correct” 
anti-Zionist language those sentiments which are no longer respectable among 
educated people—namely dislike of Jews. The Star of David is thereby visually 
metamorphosed into the swastika, the victims mutate into perpetrators and 
1 Vladimir Jankélévitch, L’Imprescriptible: pardonner dans l’honneur et la dignité (Paris, 1996; 
1st ed. 1971), 188.
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Jews (or others) who defend the “Nazi” State of Israel can expect to be vilified 
as “racists,” “fascists,” and “ethnic cleansers.” Indeed, in many European coun-
tries, it is becoming increasingly difficult to even discuss the Shoah without bal-
ancing it by appropriate references to Palestine, intended to offset the horrors of 
Nazi Germany with those of the Palestinian naqba (catastrophe) since 1948.²
For several decades now, the Shoah has ceased to be a taboo subject. On the 
contrary, it is at the heart of contemporary Western consciousness—a subject of 
constant interdisciplinary research and media interest—integral to the culture, 
pedagogy, and politics of the new Europe.³ Yet this preoccupation (which has at 
times assumed an obsessive quality) also has its perverse side effects. The most 
obvious perversion is of course, straightforward Holocaust denial. I mean the sur-
realist claim that there was no “extermination” of the Jews, that there were no 
gas chambers, that the Jews and/or Zionists (with some help from the Western 
Allies or the Communists) simply invented the “hoax of the century.” As Alain 
Finkielkraut once put it, the classical antisemites screamed: “À mort les Juifs” 
(Death to the Jews) but the Holocaust deniers added something new—“Les Juifs 
ne sont pas morts” (the Jews did not die).⁴ This was and is a double assassination. 
It begins with the genocidal antisemitism that produced the mass murder of Euro-
pean Jewry and is followed by the denial that the six million were even here, on 
our planet, that they ever existed. To quote Per Ahlmark: “First the antisemites 
take Jewish lives; a few decades later they take their deaths from them too.”⁵
Holocaust denial in its purest sense is precisely this sickening effort of the 
Jew-haters to destroy memory. Beyond that, by accusing Jews and/or Zionists 
of “inventing” the Shoah to extract billions of dollars and blackmail postwar 
Germany or the West, it has added a peculiarly vile conspiracy theory to the 
arsenal of millennial antisemitism and transformed the victims into superla-
tively cunning and fraudulent perpetrators. The main purpose of this monstrous 
perversion has been “to clear Nazism from its criminal stigma and rehabilitate 
antisemitism.”⁶ Hence this type of denial is primarily an expression of neo-Nazi, 
2 A good illustration of this syndrome is Belgium; see Joël Kotek, La Belgique et ses Juifs: De 
l’antijudaïsme comme code culturel, à l’antisionisme comme religion civique (Les Études du 
Crif, no. 4, June 2004).
3 See Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust (Proceedings of the Conference on 
Education, Remembrance and Research in Stockholm, 26–28 Jan. 2000).
4 Alain Finkielkraut, L’avenir d’une negation: Reflexions sur la question du genocide (Paris, 
1982).
5 Per Ahlmark, quoted in the workshop on “Facing Denial in Society and Education,” 
Stockholm International Forum, 235.
6 Ibid.
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far-right and so-called “revisionist” politics in Europe, North America, and other 
parts of the world. Let me quote Irwin Cotler on this classic Orwellian cover-up of 
a true international conspiracy:
[T]the Holocaust denial movement whitewashes the crimes of the Nazis, as it excoriates the 
crimes of the Jews. It not only holds that the Holocaust was a hoax, but maligns the Jew for 
fabricating the hoax.⁷
Nowhere has this imposture been more transparent and widespread than among 
militant Muslims. For example, the present leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Ali Kha-
meini, brazenly condemns the “exaggerated statistics on Jewish killings” and 
emphasizes the close relations between the Zionists and the German Nazis.⁸ The 
Lebanese Hezbollah, like its Iranian paymasters, sees the “Auschwitz lie” as an 
integral part of its general delegitimization of Israel and use of antisemitic dis-
course. Its spiritual leader, the late Sheikh Fadlallah, never tired of referring to 
the six million victims as a “pure fiction,” a mark of Zionist cunning and rapacity; 
and a testament to the ability of Jews to squeeze the West and manipulate its guilt 
feelings, as a result of their stranglehold over the capitalist economy and mass 
media.⁹ This media control allegedly permits Israel to persecute all those—like 
the French Holocaust denier Roger Garaudy—who dare to challenge its founding 
myths.¹⁰ Islam and the Palestinians are naturally regarded as the prime victims 
of the “Zionist” hoax.
The former Mufti of Jerusalem, Sheikh Ikrima Sabri, like not a few Palestin-
ian clerics and intellectuals, eagerly seized on Holocaust denial to assert that 
the Zionists used this issue “to blackmail the Germans financially” and protect 
Israel.¹¹ The dark shadow of Shylock is never far from such “revisionist” dis-
course. As one Palestinian professor at the Islamic University in Gaza City put it 
a decade ago,
7 See the comments of Irwin Cotler on this phenomenon, in ibid., 242.
8 Quoted in Jerusalem Post, 25 Apr. 2001.
9 Esther Webman, “Die Rhetorik der Hisbollah: die Weiterführung eines antisemitischen 
Diskurses,” Jahrbuch für Antisemitismusforschung, no. 12 (Berlin, 2003): 47–49.
10 Goetz Nordbruch, The Socio-Historical Background of Holocaust Denial in Arab Countries. 
Reactions to Roger Garaudy’s The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics, ACTA series, no. 17 
(Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Center for the Study of Antisemitism, Hebrew 
University of Jerusalem, 2001).
11 Interview, New York Times, 26 Mar. 2000.
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[T]he Jews view it [the Holocaust] as a profitable activity so they inflate the number of 
victims all the time.... As you know, when it comes to economics and investments, the Jews 
have been very experienced even since the days of The Merchant of Venice.¹²
At the same time, while slandering Jews and denying the reality of the Holo-
caust, some Arab and Muslim commentators have come to stress that Israel—the 
so-called “heir of Holocaust victims”—has committed far worse crimes than those 
of the Nazis. At the UN-sponsored Durban Conference of 2001, the decision was 
even implemented publicly to trivialize the Holocaust by denying its uniqueness 
and turning it into one of “many holocausts”—ultimately far less important than 
the Palestinian tragedy.
The growing centrality of Holocaust denial in contemporary Arab discourse 
was already revealed ten years ago by the Arab forum on historical revisionism 
that took place in Amman on May 13, 2001—replacing the aborted conference 
scheduled for Beirut two months earlier.¹³ At this gathering of Arab journalists 
and members of professional associations opposed to “normalization” with 
Israel, speakers enthusiastically praised the French “revisionists” Roger Garaudy 
and Robert Faurisson.¹⁴ They also argued that Zionism was much worse than 
Nazism, denounced the handful of Arab intellectuals who were critical of Holo-
caust denial and insisted that “revisionism” was not a reactionary ideology at all 
but a well-documented research project.¹⁵
The case of Roger Garaudy was particularly significant. As a prominent left-
wing French intellectual (originally Catholic, then Stalinist) converted to Islam, 
he became a culture hero in the Arab world after his trial and conviction in a Paris 
12 Holocaust Denial in the Middle East. The Latest Anti-Israel Propaganda Themes (New York: 
Anti-Defamation League, 2001), 12.
13 The driving force behind that aborted conference was Swiss Holocaust denier, Jürgen Graf, 
founder of The Truth and Justice Association; it was co-sponsored by the California-based 
Institute of Historical Review—the leading “revisionist” organization in the world. Among 
those originally scheduled to speak were French deniers Garaudy and Robert Faurisson, and 
the German neo-Nazi ideologue, Horst Mahler. Lebanese President Rafiq Hariri (murdered by 
Hezbollah operatives in 2005) cancelled the Conference under intense prodding from the U.S. 
State Department and an open letter of protest by 14 Arab intellectuals. However, after severe 
criticism for having conceded too much to the “Zionist” narrative of the Shoah, several of these 
intellectuals retracted, including Edward Said and Mahmud Darwish.
14 Free Arab Voice Online (FAV) 15, 28 Apr., 22 May 2001; Jordan Times Online, 15 May 2001.
15 Ibrahim Alloush, “Why is the ‘Holocaust’ Important to Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims?” 
FAV, 28 Apr. 2001; and the interview in the California-based Journal of Historical Review (May/
June 2001).
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court in 1998 for antisemitic incitement and négationisme.¹⁶ Garaudy’s completely 
unoriginal thesis that there was no Nazi extermination policy or gas chambers, 
his charge that Zionists had collaborated with the Nazis, and that Israel fabri-
cated the Holocaust to justify its occupation of Arab lands, has proven to be a 
source of deep satisfaction for many Arab intellectuals.¹⁷
If such “revisionist” charlatans as Henri Rocques, Wilhelm Stäglich, and 
Gerd Honsik can be regarded as respectable historians in the Arab world, it is 
small wonder, that The Founding Myths of Israeli Politics struck such a respon-
sive chord among Muslims. Among Garaudy’s most fervent advocates was former 
Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the same cleric who proclaimed 
on “Jerusalem Day” 2001 in Teheran that “one atomic bomb would wipe out Israel 
without a trace.”¹⁸ It is, of all-too-revealing of this radical Islamist mind-set that 
the real Nazi Holocaust should be so vehemently denied by those determined to 
repeat it.
A discussion eleven years ago on Al-Jazeera TV (15 May 2001) revealed just 
how widespread such genocidal passions had become.¹⁹ During the debate, Hayat 
Atiya, the female translator of Garaudy into Arabic, shouted before the cameras 
(while brandishing the photograph of an Arab child accidentally killed during 
the intifada):
Here is the Holocaust.... There is no Jewish Holocaust! There is only one Holocaust, that of 
the Palestinians!²⁰
16 Nordbruch, Socio-Historical Background, 3–5, 9–13, 27; for details of the affair in France, 
see Valérie Igounet, Histoire du Négationisme en France (Paris, 2000), 472–83.
17 The Arab reaction to Garaudy was overwhelmingly favorable. None of those who protested 
on his behalf questioned his claim that the Holocaust was a Zionist invention. His supporters 
included Sheikh Muhammad Al-Tantawi of Al-Azhar University, Rafiq Hariri, former prime 
minister of Lebanon, Egyptian Nobel Laureate Nadjīb Mahfouz, and the famous Arab political 
commentator Muhammad Hassanin Haikal. The Arab Lawyers Federation and Palestinian 
Writers Association also wrote protest letters in his favor. For the contrast between the French 
and Arab reaction, see Mouna Naim, “Critiqué, jugé, sanctionnné pour ses theses en France, 
l’ancien théoricien du PC, Roger Garaudy, est décoré et louangé dans les pays arabes,” Le 
Monde, 1 Mar. 1998.
18 Holocaust Denial in the Middle East, 8–9.
19 See Memri, no. 225, 6 June 2001, for the details; Raphaël Israeli, “L’antisémitisme travesti 
en antisionisme,” Revue d’histoire de la Shoah, Le monde juif, no. 180, special issue on 
“Antisémitisme et Négationnisme dans le monde Arabo-Musulman: La Dérive.” (Jan.–June 
2004): 109–71.
20 Israeli, ibid., 151.
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Among the statements appearing on the Al-Jazeera website and announced 
before the end of the debate was one to the effect that
nothing will dissuade the sons of Zion, whom our God described as descendants of apes 
and pigs, except a real Holocaust which would exterminate them in a single blow....²¹
At the end of this so-called “debate,” it emerged from an internet survey 
conducted by the channel that 85% of Arab spectators watching this program 
believed that Zionism was indeed worse than Nazism.
Arab Holocaust denial, unlike its Western counterparts, is undoubtedly main-
stream. In Egyptian government-subsidized newspapers like Al-Akhbar, deniers 
regularly treat the Holocaust as a “swindle,” already proven by French and British 
“revisionists” (such as David Irving), while regretting that Hitler did not succeed 
in carrying it through to completion.²² The deniers endlessly manipulate figures 
to pretend that there were less than a million Jewish victims all told; that the Jews 
were a fifth column in Germany, that they were traitors and spies who had in any 
case to be eliminated; that the Zionists originally inspired Hitler’s racism while 
deliberately stoking up antisemitism (as stated in the doctoral dissertation of Pal-
estinian leader Abu Mazen).²³ Such a bewildering tissue of contradictions reveals 
a seemingly boundless abyss of hatred.²⁴
This culture of hatred has carried over into European countries with large 
Muslim populations, such as France (and to a growing extent Belgium, Holland, 
Sweden, and Great Britain) where Holocaust denial or relativization fuses all too 
easily with pro-Palestinism, anti-Zionism, and anti-Americanism.²⁵ The situation 
in French public schools emerged as especially alarming after 2000, with pupils 
from the Maghreb often rejecting any attempt to teach them about the Shoah. The 
subject was negatively identified by the young Maghrébins with the established 
order, with the “Zionist enemy” and the political self-interest of the Jewish com-
munity. In this immigrant milieu, far from having a beneficial pedagogical effect, 
21 Ibid.
22 Al-Akhbar (Egypt), 29 Apr. 2002; Memri, special report no. 375, 2 May 2002; no. 231, 20 
June 2001.
23 Abu Mazen’s doctoral thesis was defended in Moscow in 1982 and published in Arabic two 
years later in Amman under the title The Secret Ties between the Nazis and the Leadership of 
the Zionist Movement; on Abu Mazen’s “moderation,” see Israeli, “L’antisémitisme travesti en 
anti sionisme,” 165–68.
24 See the column by Rifaat Sayed Ahmed in Al-Lewaa al-Islami (Islamic banner) branding the 
Holocaust as a Zionist lie to justify the founding of Israel; Jerusalem Post, 5 Aug. 2004, 6.
25 Pierre-André Taguieff, Rising from the Muck: The New Anti-Semitism in Europe (Chicago, 
2004), 97–100.
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the very mention of the Holocaust has seemed to elicit violence and threats to 
exterminate or burn the Jews. The importance given to the subject, if anything, 
“confirmed” the widespread Muslim belief in a Jewish conspiracy or Jewish 
control of the Western media. European and French sensitivity to the Shoah is 
frequently linked by young Muslims to “Jewish money” and the power of the 
Zionist lobby. Hence the paradox that antisemitism has risen to unprecedented 
levels in France, Britain, and Europe as a whole (particularly among Muslims but 
not exclusively by any means) at a time when the Shoah has never been so widely 
recognized and integrated into cultural consciousness. Surely this fact should 
inspire greater prudence and soul-searching among those who believe that Holo-
caust education, in and of itself, can dam up the rising antisemitic wave. On the 
contrary, I would argue, there is ample evidence that it is currently serving as a 
potentially dangerous boomerang against Israel and Diaspora Jewry.
If this is increasingly true in the school classroom, it is even more painfully 
evident at the level of public discourse that invokes the Holocaust for political 
ends. No doubt some of this malaise has its roots in the earlier postwar years, and 
in the case of Eastern Europe, it reflects transparent communist manipulations 
of the national memory.²⁶ All serious debate on the truth of the war years was 
delayed in the former Soviet bloc until the 1990s. But in the West, Holocaust edu-
cation and growing interest in the Shoah have been a reality for a considerable 
period of time. There is no convincing evidence, however, that educating young 
people about the Shoah will prevent attacks on Jews; or lead to a better world, let 
alone reduce racism and antisemitism.²⁷
Most dangerous for the future is not only the outright denial of the Holocaust 
but its relativization and banalization through false analogies, especially with 
the policies of the Jewish State. Increasingly, we see the bitter fruit of this syn-
drome across Europe, as well as on other continents. Examples of the “Nazi-Zion-
ist” amalgam abound on the internet, television, radio, in the press and the arts. 
The instances I will mention are only the tip of a huge iceberg. In April 2002, the 
pro-Government Center Left Greek publication, Eleftherotypia, featured a carica-
ture of a Nazi soldier, labeled with a Star of David, threatening an Arab, dressed 
up like a Jewish concentration camp prisoner. The headline read “Holocaust II” 
and the caption said:
The War machine of Sharon is attempting to carry out a new Holocaust, a new genocide.²⁸
26 See Manfred Gerstenfeld, Europe’s Crumbling Myths. The Post-Holocaust Origins of Today’s 
Anti-Semitism (Jerusalem, 2003), 10–92.
27 Ibid., 45.
28 Eleftherotypia, 1 Apr. 2002.
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Such caricatures are frequent in Greece. In Italy, the well-known journalist of the 
liberal daily La Stampa, Barbara Spinelli, wrote in October 2001, that
there are those, in Israel itself, who suspect that the people of Israel, in order to regenerate 
itself, wish to attract new pain from future days, while dreaming of a sort of second holo-
caust.²⁹
In Spain, the leader of the left-wing Izquierda Unida, Caspar Llamazares, a con-
firmed Israel-baiter, declared that his party was fed up with the six million Jews 
killed during the Holocaust. He ostentatiously announced that his comrades 
would no longer participate in any homage to their memory.³⁰
The deceased Portuguese Nobel Prize winner, José Saramago, for his part 
compared Ramallah to Auschwitz while on a visit to Israel several years ago. 
Writing in the Spanish daily El País he subsequently described Israelis as
educated and trained in the idea that any suffering that has been inflicted, or is being 
inflicted, or will be inflicted on everyone else, especially the Palestinians, will always be 
inferior to that which they themselves suffered in the Holocaust. The Jews endlessly scratch 
their own wound to keep it bleeding, to make it incurable, and they show it to the world as 
if it were a banner.³¹
In Belgium, a Catholic writer from a prominent family, Simon-Pierre Nothomb, 
also visited the West Bank and was instantly reminded of Poland during the 
darkest years of the war; he advised his readers that, when crossing the Gaza 
Strip, they should think above all of the Warsaw Ghetto. Typically, he asked, how 
such a talented people like the Jews which had suffered so many atrocities in its 
history, could accept
that its government and army inflict today on others, who are not responsible for it, that 
which they themselves suffered.³²
In France, even the august Le Monde could not resist the temptation in May 2002 
to publish a caricature showing the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto uprising as 
identical to Jenin after the Israeli military operation. For many French intellec-
29 Barbara Spinelli, “Ebraismo senza mea culpa,” La Stampa, 31 Oct. 2001.
30 He was sharply criticized in Libertad Digital (30 Apr. 2003) for insulting the Jewish people 
by spitting on the Holocaust; see Gustavo D. Perednik, “Naïve Spanish Judeophobia,” Jewish 
Political Studies Review, 15, nos. 3–4 (Fall 2003): 87–110.
31 Quoted in Phyllis Chesler, The New Antisemitism (San Francisco, 2003), 119.
32 Simon-Pierre Nothomb, “L’ordre va-t-il règner à Gaza,” Le Soir, 18 Dec. 2001; for the original 
French text, see Joël Kotek, La Belgique et ses Juifs, 27–28.
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tuals, especially of the “progressive” persuasion, it goes without saying that the 
Shoah has to be ritually invoked when denouncing Israel’s allegedly “racist” pol-
icies. Hidden behind this obsessive analogy is a barely concealed need to under-
mine the singularity of the Holocaust and call the Jews to account.³³
In Germany, this preoccupation has been present for several decades, fea-
turing in a long series of debates about antisemitism and the burden of Holo-
caust memory on postwar German society.³⁴ After the Moelleman and Walser 
Affairs (post-2000), there was the notorious effort to invert the roles of Jews and 
Germans made by the Christian Democrat MP, Martin Hohmann. In October 2003 
he announced that the Jews, too, were a Tätervolk (a nation of perpetrators) no 
better than the Nazis themselves.³⁵ In this context, it is worth remembering the 
cynical observation, made over sixty years ago: “The Germans will never forgive 
the Jews for Auschwitz.”³⁶
Even in Sweden, a country in the forefront of Holocaust education, there have 
also been deep ambivalences when it comes to Israel. Swedish Foreign Minister 
Laila Freivalds saw fit to castigate Israelis, accusing them of behaving like Nazis 
towards the Palestinians before and after an unofficial visit to Yad Vashem in 
June 2004. If Israeli Jews are assumed to resemble “Nazis,” even at the higher 
levels of European diplomacy, then one can only conclude that Holocaust educa-
tion has failed miserably, even among a part of Europe’s educated elites.³⁷
Much the same could be said about Great Britain, where Holocaust education 
in the past ten years made considerable progress, almost in tandem with Isra-
el-bashing and the emergence of a new form of Judeophobia. Thus the Irish poet 
and Oxford University professor, Tom Paulin, angrily linked the Israel Defence 
Forces with the SS, the most brutal of Hitler’s executioners—and continued to 
be host of a BBC arts program.³⁸ Prominent journalists like A. N. Wilson, Brian 
Sewell, and Richard Ingrams have also made similarly despicable comparisons 
with very little opposition. As elsewhere in Western Europe, it is no longer possi-
33 Guy Konopnicki, La Faute des Juifs (Paris, 2002), 137–38.
34 Alvin H. Rosenfeld, “Feeling Alone, Again.” The Growing Unease among Germany’s Jews 
(New York: American Jewish Committee, International Perspectives, 49, 2002).
35 Richard Herzinger, “Der Fall Hohmann. Raunen, Angst und Hass,” Die Zeit, 47/2003, 13 Nov. 
2003.
36 Henryk Broder, Der ewige Antisemit (Frankfurt a.M., 1987). The remark was originally made 
by an Israeli psychologist, Zvi Rex, many years earlier.
37 Ilya Mayer, “Whither the White Buses?” Jerusalem Post, 18 June 2004.
38 Quoted in Winston Pickett, “Nasty or Nazi? The Use of Antisemitic Topoi by the Left-Liberal 
Media,” in A New Antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-Century Britain, edited by Paul 
Iganski and Barry Kosmin (London 2003), 155–57.
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ble to discuss the Arab-Israeli conflict without invoking the spectre and vocabu-
lary of Auschwitz—only this time it is Jews who are depicted as the perpetrators 
of genocidal crimes.³⁹ Thus, the notion that the “Zionist State” is a mirror image 
of Nazism or else a racist “apartheid” state is unabashedly mainstream at many 
British universities.⁴⁰ So, too, illustrations that could have been lifted from Der 
Stürmer have surfaced at times in respectable British newspapers and periodi-
cals, like The Independent or the New Statesman.
This is not, of course, the crassly antisemitic Holocaust denial of the Arab 
world, of the neo-Nazis, or radical right-wing extremists in Europe and America. 
Such Holocaust “inversion” which has reopened so many unhealed wounds, orig-
inates in a “post-national” Europe that outwardly, at least, repudiates the Nazi 
legacy, deploring all forms of racist antisemitism, warmongering, empire, and 
power politics.⁴¹ For this new Europe which has become so fervently anti-Israel, 
the Holocaust is the direct antithesis of its pluralist, democratic credo currently 
rooted in the civic religion of human rights. The contemporary European “con-
sensus” attacks Zionism in the name of universal humanity and the rights of the 
“Other,” which by some strange twist of history, appears to have become exclu-
sively Muslim and Palestinian. If, however, the Palestinian “other” is assumed to 
be the absolute victim of injustice, then Israel, too, must logically be the absolute 
perpetrator, the ultimate configuration of evil—literally a “Nazified” State.
This is a much more subtle form of lying about the Holocaust. It has no resem-
blance to the visions of blackshirted skinheads in jackboots yelling “Sieg Heil!” 
The future of antisemitism does not belong to them but to militant Muslim immi-
grants and their “progressive” allies who have constructed a Manichean universe 
where Jews who defend Israel find themselves beyond the pale. Indeed, “Zionists” 
have been demonized and turned into “enemies of humanity,” the embodiment 
of racism, the lackeys of a criminal State. The painful truth is that antisemitism 
is back despite decades of Holocaust education, interfaith dialogue, memorials, 
films, and university courses; despite the Stockholm Conference of 27 January 
2000, and the creation of national Holocaust Memorial Days across the civilized 
world.⁴² The antisemitic sickness has returned to haunt us and we have as yet no 
39 Alvin H. Rosenfeld, Anti-Zionism in Great Britain and Beyond. A “Respectable” Anti-Semitism? 
(New York: American Jewish Committee, 2004).
40 Ibid., 17.
41 Alain Finkielkraut, “In the Name of the Other: Reflections on the Coming Antisemitism,” 
Azure, no. 18 (Autumn 2004): 21–33.
42 See Robert S. Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession. Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad 
(New York, 2010).
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obvious antidote, except the stubborn if problematic hope that eventually truth, 
honesty and rationality will prevail over the would-be falsifiers of history.
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